Right of Supply — South Africa

01 · Correspondence

From the Chair · to Enoch Godongwana, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · South Africa · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Godongwana,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for South Africa — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why South Africa is in this room

South Africa's strongest endowment is refined platinum-group metals and PGM-based autocatalysts. It holds the world's largest PGM reserves at 63,000,000 kg of contained metal out of a world total above 81,000,000 kg, is the number one global producer, and, unusually among its minerals, beneficiates them fully at home through integrated mine-to-refined value chains, with installed catalytic-converter capacity of roughly 27.1 million units per year and 54% of Africa's vehicle assembly on the same territory. The honest constraint is that delivery is hostage to power and rail: load-shedding has fallen from 335 days in 2023 to 12 in the first eight months of 2025 but the system remains fragile with 8.4 GW of coal retiring in 2029 to 2030, while Transnet rail and port failures cost an estimated R98 to R100 billion in lost bulk export revenue between 2021 and 2023.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to South Africa, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

02 · Executive summary

The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for South Africa

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports

620USD bn sourced off-continent

136.75USD bn measured procurement

18draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

South Africa’s draft bundle. 18 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Motor vehicles, Maize & maize meal, Thermal coal. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 6 continental anchor · 10 strong contender · 2 emerging.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for South Africa is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance

What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 18 candidate lines proposed for South Africa below.

Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
No claim value is stated for South Africa. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what South Africa will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That South Africa will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize

709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn

Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources

The market

USD 620 bn

From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize

The prize

USD 136.75 bn

Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included

Band A

≈USD 207 bn total

Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated

Band B

18 lines

South Africa’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2

Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for South Africa at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead

Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor

USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT

Band B · estimated tender layer

≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65

Strategic agriculture & food27.03

Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02

Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53

Infrastructure & transport6.60

Currency, governance & elections5.54

Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic

Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness

Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline

Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and South Africa’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin

Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana

Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline

What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from South Africa’s own capability audit.

Ferrochrome

Once world-leading, ferrochrome is now collapsing on power costs and the audit states plainly that it is no longer defensible. Output is forecast to fall from 3.0 to 3.3 million tonnes in 2024 toward about 2 million tonnes in 2025 and possibly around 1 million tonnes in 2026, with China having overtaken South Africa as leading producer.

Incumbency

Steel, flat and long products

ArcelorMittal South Africa has announced closure of its Longs steel division with the loss of around 3,500 jobs, held off only by R3.063 billion of IDC support between June 2024 and March 2025. The audit classes steel as emerging and declining, with continental demand high but capacity shrinking.

Incumbency

Manganese ore and alloys

South Africa holds the largest share of world manganese resources and is the leading global ore producer, yet the beneficiation status is raw ore with only some alloy, and continental demand is assessed as low. The endowment is world-class; the finished-goods capability is not.

Capability inversion

Iron ore

Production of about 61 million tonnes in 2023 is down from an 81 million tonne peak in 2017, the beneficiation stage is raw, and intra-African demand is assessed as low. The audit warns that South Africa risks reverting to a raw-ore exporter in exactly the categories the AU framework wants beneficiated.

Raw base, industrial screen

Citrus

South Africa is the world's second-largest citrus exporter after Spain, with a record 203.4 million cartons packed in 2025 and 2.23 million tonnes in 2024 representing two-thirds of Southern Hemisphere exports. However, Africa takes only about 2% of South African citrus and the EU is the main market, so the anchor is global rather than continental.

Scale-matching

Motor vehicles and components as an African-facing claim

This is the strongest manufacturing revealed comparative advantage, but two-thirds of output goes to the EU and US rather than Africa, and the EU's 2035 ban on internal combustion engines is an existential exposure. Africa is already the second-largest export region at R42.8 billion in 2023, but the audit describes the AfCFTA upside as real and unrealised.

Scale-matching

08 · Endowment

What South Africa actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for South Africa. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

South Africa's endowment is, on the audit's own measure, the deepest mineral base on the continent. It holds the world's largest reserves of platinum-group metals — 63,000,000 kg of contained PGM out of a world total above 81,000,000 kg (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025) — overwhelmingly in the Bushveld Complex, and it is the number one global producer at roughly 120,000 kg of platinum and 72,000 kg of palladium (2024 estimate). It produced 71.5% of global platinum in 2024. Alongside this it holds the largest share of world manganese resources and is the leading global ore producer, is the world's leading chromite producer, is the world's second-largest producer of titanium minerals and zircon, holds Africa's largest coal reserves as the world's seventh-largest producer, and retains major vanadium reserves and production. The decisive distinction the audit draws is beneficiation stage: deep and fully integrated for PGMs and vanadium, declining for ferrochrome, and still raw or ore-stage for manganese, iron ore and coal.

The industrial base is the continent's most developed. Manufacturing value added stands at US$51.2 billion, or 12.8% of GDP (2024, World Bank). South Africa is ranked first in Africa on UNIDO's Competitive Industrial Performance Index, a position held for around a decade, and 51st of 153 globally on 2022 data. It hosts seven vehicle assemblers — Toyota, Volkswagen, Isuzu, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Ford and Nissan — producing 633,332 units in 2023 and 54.1% of all African vehicle output, with catalytic converters the single largest component export at R25.9 billion in 2023. Sasol's Secunda complex is the world's only commercial coal-to-liquids plant at about 150,000 barrels per day, supplying roughly 28% of national fuel needs and 52% of domestic liquid-fuel production, and is the sole domestic producer of ethylene and many basic petrochemicals. Agriculture is a credible continental food-security supplier: leading regional maize source with 3.24 million MT exported in marketing year 2023/24, one of only two significant white-maize sources in the region alongside Tanzania, and the world's second-largest citrus exporter with 2.23 million tonnes in 2024.

The complexity picture is more sober. South Africa ranks 58th globally on Harvard's Atlas of Economic Complexity 10.0 using 2022 trade data, but has worsened nine positions over the decade, driven by a lack of export diversification, while remaining slightly more complex than expected for its income level. Growth to 2034 is projected at 1.8% per year, in the bottom half globally. Revealed comparative advantage above one covers platinum and PGMs, chromium and manganese ore, ferro-alloys, coal, iron ore, gold, motor vehicles and parts, catalytic products, citrus, grapes, wine, basic chemicals and paper and pulp. Feasible diversification options identified by relatedness — crude petroleum, uranium and thorium ore, raw cotton, other ores, petroleum gas — are mostly resource-adjacent with limited complexity uplift. Even so, the product-space position shows South Africa more competitive in machinery, vehicles and chemicals than any other African economy.

The endowment in depth

South Africa's mineral endowment is the deepest on the continent. It holds the world's largest reserves of platinum-group metals — 63,000,000 kg of contained PGM of a world total exceeding 81,000,000 kg (USGS MCS 2025) — overwhelmingly hosted in the Bushveld Complex, and is the #1 global producer at roughly 120,000 kg of platinum and 72,000 kg of palladium (2024 estimate). It produced 71.5% of global platinum in 2024, and the Critical Minerals & Metals Strategy 2025 cites an 88% PGM reserve share. It also holds the largest share of world manganese resources (the Strategy cites ~80%) and is the leading global ore producer; it is the world's leading chromite producer (~72% reserve share), with chromium resources 95% concentrated in Kazakhstan and southern Africa. Gold output has fallen to ~100–110 t (2023) from the ~1,000 t peak of 1970 (~13% reserve share); vanadium reserves are major, supplying 36% of US vanadium-pentoxide imports (2019–22), ~32% reserve share. Iron-ore production was ~61 Mt (2023), down from an 81 Mt peak (2017), against reserves of ~696 Mt (30 June 2023); coal production was ~235 Mt (2024), the world's 7th-largest producer and Africa's largest reserves. It is the world #2 producer of titanium minerals (ilmenite, rutile) and zircon and the leading vermiculite producer. Beneficiation is deep only for PGMs (integrated mine-to-refined) and vanadium; declining for ferrochrome; and raw or ore-stage for manganese, iron ore and coal.

Installed electricity capacity is ~65 GW (2024, Eskom MTSAO), of which the Eskom coal fleet is ~38.7 GW of ~52.5 GW Eskom capacity across 15 plants averaging ~41 years old. Load-shedding fell sharply from 335 days in 2023 (16.6 million MWh shed) to 83 days in 2024 and just 12 days in the first eight months of 2025 (last event 15 May 2025); the SARB estimated that electricity shortages cut 1.5 percentage points off GDP in 2023, moderating to 0.6pp in 2024 and 0.2pp in 2025. Rooftop solar PV reached ~6,165 MW by December 2024, and publicly procured renewables expanded from 0.47 GW (2013) to 7.32 GW (2025). But Eskom direct-customer tariffs rose 12.74% from 1 April 2025 (municipal tariffs +11.32% from 1 July), crippling for energy-intensive smelting, and 8.4 GW of Eskom coal is scheduled to retire 2029–2030, coinciding with the expiry of the 1.15 GW Cahora Bassa import from Mozambique. SA is a net importer at the margin but exports to some SADC neighbours via Eskom contracts.

Agriculture is a credible continental food-security supplier. Record agricultural exports reached US$13.7 billion in 2024, of which Africa took 44% of total value (maize, maize meal, wheat, sugar, apples and pears, fruit juices, wine); grapes (US$818.8 million) and maize (US$814.7 million) were the top single products. SA is the world's 2nd-largest citrus exporter after Spain — a record 203.4 million cartons packed for export in 2025, and 2.23 million tonnes in 2024, two-thirds of Southern Hemisphere exports — though Africa takes only ~2% of SA citrus, the EU being the main market. It is the leading regional maize supplier (3.24 million MT exported in MY2023/24) and, with Tanzania, one of the region's only two significant white-maize sources, with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Mozambique the principal SADC markets. Wine, deciduous fruit, sugar, wool, fisheries (hake, anchovy) and timber and pulp (Sappi, Mondi) are all significant export categories.

The industrial base is Africa's largest and most diversified: manufacturing value added of US$51.2 billion, 12.8% of GDP (2024), ranked #1 in Africa on UNIDO's CIP Index (held for ~a decade) and 51st of 153 globally. Automotive is the flagship — 7 OEMs (Toyota, VW, Isuzu, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Ford, Nissan), 633,332 units produced (2023), 22nd globally, 54.1% of African production; vehicle and component exports of R270.8 billion (2023) rose to R291.0 billion in 2025 (15.6% of exports), with catalytic converters the top single component export (R25.9 billion). Sasol's Secunda plant is the world's only commercial coal-to-liquids plant, ~150,000 bbl/day, supplying ~28% of SA fuel needs and 52% of domestic liquid-fuel production, and the sole domestic producer of ethylene and many basic petrochemicals — though it is the world's largest single-point CO2 emitter (~56.5 Mt/yr). Human capital combines world-class mining-engineering and metallurgical expertise (research at Mintek, CSIR and leading universities; ~27.1 million-unit/yr catalytic-converter capacity built since 1990) with structural weakness: official unemployment of 31.4% (Q4 2025), rising to 32.7% in Q1 2026, alongside skills gaps and emigration. Infrastructure runs through Durban (the busiest port in sub-Saharan Africa, berth productivity up from ~52% in 2024 to ~76% in 2025), Cape Town and the Richards Bay Coal Terminal (one of the world's largest single coal export terminals); a 25-year concession for Durban Pier 2 was awarded to ICTSI in December 2025. RBCT coal exports recovered to 52.08 Mt (2024) from a record low of 47.2 Mt (2023) but remain far below the 2017 peak of 76.47 Mt, with the single North Corridor line a structural vulnerability.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

On economic complexity, South Africa ranks 58th globally on Harvard's Atlas of Economic Complexity 10.0 (2022 trade data), with a numeric ECI value of approximately −0.15 (Harvard's 2021 release; the exact Atlas 10.0/2022 decimal could not be confirmed from the primary dataset, though the rank of 58 is confirmed). It has worsened 9 positions over the decade — driven by a lack of export diversification — yet remains slightly more complex than expected for its income level, with 2034 growth projected at just 1.8%/yr, in the bottom half globally.

Its RCA-greater-than-one products (OEC/Atlas) span platinum and PGMs, chromium ore, manganese ore, ferrochrome and ferro-alloys, coal, iron ore, gold, motor vehicles and parts, catalytic and reaction products, citrus, grapes, wine, basic chemicals and paper and pulp. Feasible diversification along relatedness — crude petroleum, uranium and thorium ore, raw cotton, other ores, petroleum gas — is mostly resource-adjacent with limited complexity uplift. Nonetheless, the product-space position shows SA more competitive in machinery, vehicles and chemicals than any other African economy, giving it the continent's deepest manufacturing diversification base.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

South Africa's single defensible continental trump card is refined platinum-group metals and PGM-based autocatalysts (HS 7110/8421), the only product family that survives all five tests. Input advantage: SA holds the world's largest PGM reserves — 63,000,000 kg of contained PGM of a world total exceeding 81,000,000 kg (USGS MCS 2025) — overwhelmingly in the Bushveld Complex, and is the #1 global producer (~120,000 kg platinum, ~72,000 kg palladium, 2024 estimate); no other African, or for platinum global, supplier comes close. Processing: unlike most SA minerals exported raw, PGMs are fully beneficiated domestically through integrated mine-to-refined value chains (Anglo American/Valterra, Impala, Sibanye-Stillwater, Northam), with world-class smelting and base-metals refining at Rustenburg. Competitiveness: SA's PGM processing technology is globally benchmarked (IDC, Anglo). Deliverability and continental demand: SA already has installed catalytic-converter capacity of ~27.1 million units/yr (IDC), and as African vehicle assembly and emissions standards rise — with SA itself producing 54% of the continent's vehicles — a regional autocatalyst and refined-PGM supply chain is the natural value-add. It is the one product where endowment, processing depth and a captive continental industrialisation pathway align.

The position has honest limits. A faster-than-expected global shift to battery-electric vehicles, which use no autocatalysts, erodes the PGM auto-demand thesis; electricity costs and load-shedding raise refining costs; the autocatalyst IP is held by roughly five foreign fabricators, carrying a thrifting risk; and continental auto demand may be met by cheaper imported (Chinese) vehicles and parts rather than SA-made ones. Its durability therefore depends on autocatalyst demand persisting long enough — through hybrid and ICE longevity in Africa — to monetise refining and build a continental autocatalyst chain, or on a pivot of PGM use into hydrogen and fuel-cell catalysis; if BEV penetration in SA's export markets accelerates faster than hybrid adoption in Africa, the anchor weakens and refined-PGM-for-hydrogen should be re-weighted upward.

Current reality

South Africa is sub-Saharan Africa's most industrialised economy: GDP of US$400.3 billion in 2024 (World Bank, current US$), population 63.02 million (Stats SA Mid-Year Population Estimates 2024), GDP per capita of about US$6,267, and manufacturing value added of US$51.2 billion, or 12.8% of GDP. Total exports were around US$110.5 billion in 2024, led by mineral fuels, machinery, precious metals and stones, vehicles, iron and steel, ores and edible fruit. It led intra-regional African trade at US$15.1 billion in 2022, with intra-Africa exports at roughly 25 to 26% of the total, about 90% destined for SADC and predominantly value-added or manufactured goods. Its defining continental supply position rests on refined PGMs and autocatalysts, assembled vehicles and components, and coal-derived fuels and basic chemicals.

That position is constrained by two crises. The electricity system has improved dramatically — 335 load-shedding days in 2023, moderating to 83 in 2024 and just 12 in the first eight months of 2025, the last on 15 May 2025 — but remains fragile, with 8.4 GW of Eskom coal scheduled to retire in 2029 to 2030 alongside expiry of the 1.15 GW Cahora Bassa import. Eskom direct-customer tariffs rose 12.74% from 1 April 2025, with municipal tariffs up 11.32% from 1 July 2025, which the audit describes as crippling for energy-intensive smelting. Transnet rail and port failures cost an estimated R98 to R100 billion in lost coal and iron-ore export revenue between 2021 and 2023, with logistics inefficiencies costing the citrus sector alone about R5.2 billion. Official unemployment stands at 31.4% in Q4 2025, rising to 32.7% in Q1 2026, coexisting with technical skills gaps and emigration of expertise. Energy-intensive metals — ferrochrome, steel and ferromanganese — are actively de-industrialising.

09 · The draft bundle

Draft 1 · 18 candidate lines · will change

South Africa’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from South Africa’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what South Africa will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How South Africa’s 18 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 6Strong Contender 10Emerging 2

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Coal-to-liquids fuels

Sasol world's only commercial CTL · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)

271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....

271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c

271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara

271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

South Africa imported USD 15.19 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa your own imports USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TIPS · 2024

Motor vehicles

7 OEMs, APDP, 54% of African production · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 31.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

870310Vehicles; specially designed for travelling on snow, golf cars and similar vehicles

870321Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, cylinder capacity not over 1000cc

870322Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, cylinder capacity over 1000 but not over 1500cc

870323Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 1500 but not

870324Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine, cylinder capacity over 3000cc

870331Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), cylinder capacity no

870332Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), cylinder capacity ov

870333Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), cylinder capacity ov

870340Vehicles; with both spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine and electric motor for propulsion, incapable of bei

870350Vehicles; with both compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel) and electric motor fo

870360Vehicles; with both spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine and electric motor for propulsion, capable of being

870370Vehicles; with both compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel) and electric motor fo

870380Vehicles; with only electric motor for propulsion

870390Vehicles; for transport of persons (other than those of heading no. 8702) n.e.c. in heading no. 8703

870410Vehicles; dumpers, designed for off-highway use, for transport of goods

870421Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), for transport of goods, (of a gvw not exceeding 5 tonnes), n.e.c. in item no 8704.1

870422Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), for transport of goods, (of a g.v.w. exceeding 5 tonnes but not exceeding 20 tonnes), n.e.c. in item no 8704.1

870423Vehicles; with only compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel or semi-diesel), for transport of goods, (of a g.v.w. exceeding 20 tonnes), n.e.c. in item no 8704.1

870431Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, for transport of goods, (of a g.v.w. not exceeding 5 tonnes), n.e.c. in item no 8704.1

870432Vehicles; with only spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine, for transport of goods, (of a g.v.w. exceeding 5 tonnes), n.e.c. in item no 8704.1

870441Vehicles; with both compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel/semi-diesel) and electric motor as motor for propulsion, unassembled as in section 14, (gvw not exceeding 5000kg), for the transport of goods, vans

870442Vehicles; with both compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel/semi-diesel) and electric motors for propulsion, of a g.v.w. exceeding 5,000kg but not exceeding 20,000kg

870443Vehicles; with both compression-ignition internal combustion piston engine (diesel/semi-diesel) and electric motors for propulsion, of a g.v.w. exceeding 20,000kg

870451Vehicles; with both spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine and electric motors for propulsion, of a g.v.w. not exceeding 5,000kg

870452Vehicles; with both spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine and electric motors for propulsion, of a g.v.w. exceeding 5,000kg

870460Vehicles; with only electric motor for propulsion

870490Vehicles; for transport of goods, n.e.c. in heading no. 8704

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

South Africa imported USD 5.27 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 5.27 bnMorocco USD 2.86 bnNigeria USD 2.86 bnEgypt USD 2.55 bnAlgeria USD 2.45 bnTunisia USD 1.05 bnLibya USD 1.05 bnEthiopia USD 963.4 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: NAAMSA · 2024

Sugar

Masterplan sector · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)

170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter

170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri

170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add

170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter

170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Africa imported USD 273.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria USD 931.8 mSudan USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Source: Agbiz · 2024

Automotive components

Established supplier base · Maturity: Finished/intermediate · Competitiveness: High

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 7.66 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

870810Vehicles; bumpers and parts thereof, for the vehicles of heading no. 8701 to 8705

870821Vehicles; parts of bodies, safety seat belts

870822Vehicles; parts and accessories, front windscreens (windshields), rear windows and other windows specified in subheading

870829Vehicles; parts and accessories, of bodies, other than safety seat belts

870830Vehicle parts; brakes, servo-brakes and parts thereof

870831Mounted brake linings for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of ten or more persons,...

870839Brakes and servo-brakes and parts thereof for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of...

870840Vehicle parts; gear boxes and parts thereof

870850Vehicle parts; drive-axles with differential, whether or not provided with other transmission components, and non-drivin

870860Non-driving axles and parts thereof for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of ten or...

870870Vehicle parts; road wheels and parts and accessories thereof

870880Vehicle parts; suspension systems and parts thereof (including shock-absorbers)

870891Vehicle parts; radiators and parts thereof

870892Vehicle parts; silencers (mufflers) and exhaust pipes; parts thereof

870893Vehicle parts; clutches and parts thereof

870894Vehicle parts; steering wheels, steering columns and steering boxes; parts thereof

870895Vehicle parts; safety airbags with inflater system; parts thereof

870899Vehicle parts and accessories; n.e.c. in heading no. 8708

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Africa imported USD 1.85 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Morocco USD 2.4 bnSouth Africa your own imports USD 1.85 bnAlgeria USD 583.7 mEgypt USD 510.1 mLibya USD 270.2 mNigeria USD 260.2 mTunisia USD 214.6 mGhana USD 148 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: NAAMSA · 2024

Maize & maize meal

Leading regional supplier, white maize · Maturity: Finished/raw · Competitiveness: High

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 6.03 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

100510Cereals; maize (corn), seed

100590Cereals; maize (corn), other than seed

110210Rye flour

110220Cereal flour; of maize (corn)

110230Rice flour

110290Cereal flours; other than wheat, meslin, and maize (corn)

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): NCPB (Kenya), GMB (Zimbabwe), FRA (Zambia) · Strategic Grain Reserve · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

South Africa imported USD 24.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 2.47 bnAlgeria USD 1.08 bnMorocco USD 739.6 mTunisia USD 274.5 mKenya USD 166.9 mZimbabwe USD 152.4 mSenegal USD 137.4 mMozambique USD 100.7 m

Source: FEWS NET · 2024

Thermal coal

7th-largest producer, RBCT · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 3.41 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

270111Coal; anthracite, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated

270112Coal; bituminous, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated

270119Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous), whether or not pulverised but not agglomerated

270120Briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels; manufactured from coal

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Africa imported USD 521.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Morocco USD 1.38 bnEgypt USD 587 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 521.1 mSenegal USD 227 mKenya USD 128.9 mEthiopia USD 114.1 mDR Congo USD 100.9 mMauritius USD 94.8 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: CEIC/BP · 2024

Catalytic converters/autocatalysts

PGM feedstock + 27.1M units/yr capacity · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Growing

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 3.16 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

842111Centrifuges; cream separators

842112Centrifuges; clothes-dryers

842119Centrifuges; n.e.c. in heading no. 8421, including centrifugal dryers (but not clothes-dryers)

842121Machinery; for filtering or purifying water

842122Machinery; for filtering or purifying beverages other than water

842123Machinery; filtering or purifying machinery, oil or petrol filters for internal combustion engines

842129Machinery; for filtering or purifying liquids, n.e.c. in item no. 8421.2

842131Machinery; intake air filters for internal combustion engines

842132Machinery; catalytic converters or particulate filters, whether or not combined, for purifying or filtering exhaust gase

842139Machinery; for filtering or purifying gases, other than intake air filters, catalytic converters or particulate filters

842191Centrifuges; parts thereof, including parts for centrifugal dryers

842199Machinery; parts for filtering or purifying liquids or gases

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

South Africa imported USD 511.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 511.4 mEgypt USD 373.8 mAlgeria USD 303.1 mMorocco USD 272.3 mNigeria USD 179.6 mTunisia USD 161.8 mAngola USD 161.8 mDR Congo USD 126.5 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: IDC; NAAMSA · 2018/2024

Gold

Established producer/refiner · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Low

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder

710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)

710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured

710820Gold, monetary

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Africa imported USD 668.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa your own imports USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: WGC · 2024

Iron ore

~61 Mt production · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Low

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated

260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)

260120Iron pyrites; roasted

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 0.1 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS/Transnet · 2023

Deciduous fruit

Major global exporter · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Moderate

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 629.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

080610Fruit, edible; grapes, fresh

080620Fruit, edible; grapes, dried

080810Fruit, edible; apples, fresh

080820Fresh pears and quinces

080830Fruit, edible; pears, fresh

080840Fruit, edible; quinces, fresh

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 18.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 230.4 mMorocco USD 52.5 mNigeria USD 49.5 mLibya USD 48.8 mAlgeria USD 25.9 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 18.9 mKenya USD 16.7 mSenegal USD 15.3 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: NAMC · 2024

Manganese ore & alloys

Largest reserves, #1 ore producer · Maturity: Raw/some alloy · Competitiveness: Low

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 595.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

260200Manganese ores and concentrates, including ferruginous manganese ores and concentrates with a manganese content of 20% o

720211Ferro-alloys; ferro-manganese, containing by weight more than 2% of carbon

720219Ferro-alloys; ferro-manganese, containing by weight 2% or less of carbon

720221Ferro-alloys; ferro-silicon, containing by weight more than 55% of silicon

720229Ferro-alloys; ferro-silicon, containing by weight 55% or less of silicon

720230Ferro-alloys; ferro-silico-manganese

720241Ferro-alloys; ferro-chromium, containing by weight more than 4% of carbon

720249Ferro-alloys; ferro-chromium, containing by weight 4% or less of carbon

720250Ferro-alloys; ferro-silico-chromium

720260Ferro-alloys; ferro-nickel

720270Ferro-alloys; ferro-molybdenum

720280Ferro-alloys; ferro-tungsten and ferro-silico-tungsten

720291Ferro-alloys; ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium

720292Ferro-alloys; ferro-vanadium

720293Ferro-alloys; ferro-niobium

720299Ferro-alloys; n.e.c. in heading no. 7202

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 133.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 222.4 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 133.7 mAlgeria USD 62.8 mNigeria USD 25.3 mMorocco USD 25.1 mLibya USD 17.1 mEthiopia USD 12.5 mAngola USD 9.7 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Ferrochrome

Chrome ore + smelting (declining) · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Moderate

EMERGING

USD 583.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

720211Ferro-alloys; ferro-manganese, containing by weight more than 2% of carbon

720219Ferro-alloys; ferro-manganese, containing by weight 2% or less of carbon

720221Ferro-alloys; ferro-silicon, containing by weight more than 55% of silicon

720229Ferro-alloys; ferro-silicon, containing by weight 55% or less of silicon

720230Ferro-alloys; ferro-silico-manganese

720241Ferro-alloys; ferro-chromium, containing by weight more than 4% of carbon

720249Ferro-alloys; ferro-chromium, containing by weight 4% or less of carbon

720250Ferro-alloys; ferro-silico-chromium

720260Ferro-alloys; ferro-nickel

720270Ferro-alloys; ferro-molybdenum

720280Ferro-alloys; ferro-tungsten and ferro-silico-tungsten

720291Ferro-alloys; ferro-titanium and ferro-silico-titanium

720292Ferro-alloys; ferro-vanadium

720293Ferro-alloys; ferro-niobium

720299Ferro-alloys; n.e.c. in heading no. 7202

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Africa imported USD 131.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 213.6 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 131.4 mAlgeria USD 62.8 mNigeria USD 25.3 mMorocco USD 25.1 mLibya USD 17.1 mEthiopia USD 12.5 mAngola USD 9.4 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Fastmarkets · 2025

Wine

Established global exporter · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Moderate

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 530.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

220410Wine; sparkling

220421Wine; still, in containers holding 2 litres or less

220422Wine; still, in containers holding more than 2 litres but not more than 10 litres

220429Wine; still, in containers holding more than 10 litres

220430Grape must; n.e.c. in heading no. 2009, n.e.c. in item no. 2204.2

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 54.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Cote dIvoire USD 64.1 mAngola USD 59.5 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 54.4 mNamibia USD 47.9 mMorocco USD 46.9 mKenya USD 24.1 mGhana USD 23.3 mMauritius USD 20.3 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Agbiz/NAMC · 2024

Citrus

World #2 exporter · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Low

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 103.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

080510Fruit, edible; oranges, fresh or dried

080520Fresh or dried mandarins incl. tangerines and satsumas, clementines, wilkings and similar citrus...

080521Fruit, edible; mandarins (including tangerines and satsumas), fresh or dried

080522Fruit, edible; clementines, fresh or dried

080529Fruit, edible; tangelos, wilkings and similar citrus hybrid, fresh or dried

080540Fruit, edible; grapefruit and pomelos, fresh or dried

080550Fruit, edible; lemons (Citrus limon, Citrus limonum), limes (Citrus aurantifolia, Citrus latifolia), fresh or dried

080590Fruit, edible; citrus fruit n.e.c. in heading no. 0805, fresh or dried

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

South Africa imported USD 5.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Mauritius USD 10.6 mSenegal USD 8.2 mCote dIvoire USD 8.2 mKenya USD 6.6 mDjibouti USD 6.5 mSouth Africa your own imports USD 5.1 mCabo Verde USD 4.4 mRwanda USD 4.4 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: CGA · 2025

Refined platinum-group metals

Largest world reserves (63M kg), #1 producer, integrated refining · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Moderate

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 89.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

711011Metals; platinum, unwrought or in powder form

711019Metals; platinum, semi-manufactured

711021Metals; palladium, unwrought or in powder form

711029Metals; palladium, semi-manufactured

711031Metals; rhodium, unwrought or in powder form

711039Metals; rhodium, semi-manufactured

711041Metals; iridium, osmium, ruthenium, unwrought or in powder form

711049Metals; iridium, osmium, ruthenium, semi-manufactured

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

South Africa imported USD 88.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 88.1 mMorocco USD 0.3 mEgypt USD 0.3 mMauritius USD 0.2 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Vanadium pentoxide

Major reserves/producer · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Low

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 50.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

282510Hydrazine and hydroxylamine and their inorganic salts

282520Lithium oxide and hydroxide

282530Vanadium oxides and hydroxides

282540Nickel oxides and hydroxides

282550Copper oxides and hydroxides

282560Germanium oxides and zirconium dioxide

282570Molybdenum oxides and hydroxides

282580Antimony oxides

282590Inorganic bases, metal oxides, hydroxides and peroxides; n.e.c. in heading no. 2825

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 32.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 32.4 mEgypt USD 5.7 mGhana USD 2.9 mTunisia USD 2.1 mNigeria USD 1.3 mMorocco USD 1.1 mTanzania USD 0.7 mAlgeria USD 0.7 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MCS · 2024

Wool

Significant exporter · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Low

EMERGING

USD 46.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

510111Wool; (not carded or combed), greasy (including fleece-washed wool), shorn

510119Wool; (other than shorn), greasy (including fleece-washed wool), not carded or combed

510121Wool; (not carded or combed), degreased, (not carbonised), shorn

510129Wool; (not carded or combed), degreased, (not carbonised), (other than shorn)

510130Wool; (not carded or combed), carbonised

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

South Africa imported USD 40.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 40.2 mMauritius USD 4.3 mMorocco USD 1.3 mTunisia USD 0.4 mLibya USD 0.1 mEthiopia USD 0.1 mLesotho USD 0.1 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: NAMC · 2024

Titanium minerals/zircon

World #2 producer · Maturity: Raw/intermediate · Competitiveness: Low

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 22.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

261400Titanium ores and concentrates

261510Zirconium ores and concentrates

261590Niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

South Africa imported USD 8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa your own imports USD 8 mEgypt USD 3.2 mGhana USD 2.3 mAlgeria USD 2.1 mZambia USD 1.8 mTunisia USD 1.7 mMorocco USD 1.2 mTanzania USD 1 m

South Africa is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MYB · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for South Africa is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance

What South Africa buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: South Africa is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 107.26 bn

South Africa’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product line	Strength tier	South Africa imports, 2023	Continental demand, 2023
Coal-to-liquids fuels	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 15.19 bn	USD 110.54 bn
Motor vehicles	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 5.27 bn	USD 31.13 bn
Automotive components	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 1.85 bn	USD 7.66 bn
Gold	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 668.4 m	USD 2.99 bn
Thermal coal	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 521.1 m	USD 3.41 bn
Catalytic converters/autocatalysts	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 511.4 m	USD 3.16 bn
Sugar	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 273.6 m	USD 8.84 bn
Manganese ore & alloys	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 133.7 m	USD 595.1 m
Ferrochrome	EMERGING	USD 131.4 m	USD 583.1 m
Refined platinum-group metals	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 88.1 m	USD 89.1 m
Wine	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 54.4 m	USD 530.4 m
Wool	EMERGING	USD 40.2 m	USD 46.8 m
Vanadium pentoxide	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 32.4 m	USD 50.3 m
Maize & maize meal	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 24.9 m	USD 6.03 bn

Left-hand column: what South Africa itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion

The number this document refuses to print

What South Africa’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 18 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times South Africa’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to South Africa. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

South Africa’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map

Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind South Africa’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023

01South AfricaUSD 24.52 bn

02NigeriaUSD 24.32 bn

03MoroccoUSD 16.47 bn

04EgyptUSD 16.19 bn

05DR CongoUSD 8.02 bn

06LibyaUSD 6.39 bn

07AlgeriaUSD 6.36 bn

08KenyaUSD 5.14 bn

09GhanaUSD 4.63 bn

10UgandaUSD 1.9 bn

11TunisiaUSD 1.75 bn

12EthiopiaUSD 1.1 bn

13SudanUSD 796.2 m

14DjiboutiUSD 431.4 m

15SomaliaUSD 393.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to South Africa. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence

What would have to be true

The conditions South Africa would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for South Africa to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

Stable, affordable power

A sustained Energy Availability Factor above 60%, no return to Stage 4-plus load-shedding, and a credible replacement for the 2029–2030 coal and Cahora Bassa cliff via gas-to-power, renewables plus storage, or Koeberg life extension.

Functional logistics

Transnet rail and port throughput restored toward 2017 levels — for example RBCT back above 60 Mt — with private concessions such as ICTSI delivering.

PGM demand durability

Autocatalyst demand sustained long enough, through hybrid and ICE persistence in Africa, to monetise refining and build a continental autocatalyst chain, or a pivot of PGM use into hydrogen and fuel-cell catalysis.

Continental offtake

AfCFTA tariff and non-tariff barrier removal so that SA vehicles, fuels, chemicals, processed food and PGMs displace extra-continental imports rather than ceding share to China.

Beneficiation follow-through

The Critical Minerals Strategy translated into actual downstream investment in autocatalyst, battery and alloy plants rather than continued raw-ore export.

The binding constraints

Energy fragility and the 2029–2030 cliff Despite dramatic easing — 12 load-shedding days in 2025 versus 335 in 2023 — the system remains fragile; 8.4 GW of Eskom coal plus the 1.15 GW Cahora Bassa import are scheduled to retire 2029–2030, and Eskom direct tariffs rose 12.74% (April 2025, NERSA), crippling energy-intensive smelting and already driving ferrochrome and ferromanganese closures.

Logistics failure Transnet rail and port failures cost ~R98–100 billion in lost bulk export revenue (2021–2023, Minerals Council); single rail corridors such as the North Corridor to RBCT are structurally vulnerable to recurrent derailments, and ports are recovering but from a low base. Logistics inefficiencies cost the citrus sector alone ~R5.2 billion (~US$295 million, BFAP).

Capital and governance Eskom and Transnet governance failures exposed by the Zondo Commission, investor retreat from the resource sector, and heavy SOE debt all weigh on delivery.

Skills Official unemployment of 31.4% (Q4 2025) coexists with technical skills gaps and the emigration of expertise.

Feedstock and IP dependency Sasol's Mozambique gas feedstock is depleting, with sales to industrial customers to stop in 2027; autocatalyst IP is held offshore by roughly five foreign fabricators; and vehicle exports are exposed to the EU 2035 ICE ban.

Metals de-industrialisation Steel (ArcelorMittal's Longs division, ~3,500 jobs) and ferro-alloys are actively shrinking; ferrochrome output is forecast to fall from 3.0–3.3 Mt (2024) toward ~1 Mt (2026), with China having overtaken SA as leading producer and the Cato Ridge ferromanganese smelter permanently closed in August 2025.

13 · Devil’s advocate

Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in South Africa’s favour.

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

The power system has improved but has not been made durable. Load-shedding fell from 335 days in 2023 to 12 in the first eight months of 2025, yet the audit calls the system fragile, with 8.4 GW of Eskom coal retiring in 2029 to 2030 alongside expiry of the 1.15 GW Cahora Bassa import. The Eskom coal fleet is about 38.7 GW across 15 plants averaging roughly 41 years old.

Electricity tariffs are already forcing smelter closures. Eskom direct-customer tariffs rose 12.74% from 1 April 2025 and municipal tariffs 11.32% from 1 July 2025. The audit describes this as crippling for energy-intensive smelting and links it directly to the ferrochrome crisis and the permanent closure of the Cato Ridge ferromanganese smelter in August 2025.

Logistics remain the binding constraint on bulk delivery. Transnet rail and port failures cost an estimated R98 to R100 billion in lost coal and iron-ore export revenue between 2021 and 2023. RBCT coal exports were 52.08 million tonnes in 2024 against a 2017 peak of 76.47 million tonnes, and the single North Corridor line to RBCT is a structural vulnerability with recurrent derailments.

The autocatalyst thesis depends on vehicle technology South Africa does not control. A faster-than-expected global shift to battery-electric vehicles, which use no autocatalysts, would erode the PGM auto-demand thesis. The autocatalyst intellectual property is held by around five foreign fabricators, creating thrifting risk, and continental auto demand may be met by cheaper imported vehicles and parts.

Sasol's unique position is feedstock-limited and carbon-constrained. Secunda is the world's only commercial coal-to-liquids plant and the sole domestic source of many basic chemicals and polymers, but it is the world's largest single-point CO2 emitter at roughly 56.5 million tonnes per year, is in financial distress, and its Mozambique gas feedstock is depleting with sales to industrial customers stopping in 2027.

Complexity is declining, not rising. South Africa has worsened nine positions on the Economic Complexity Index over the decade, driven by a lack of export diversification, with 2034 growth projected at 1.8% per year, in the bottom half globally. Feasible diversification options are mostly resource-adjacent with limited complexity uplift.

Beneficiation policy must convert into plant. The audit requires that the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy 2025 translate into actual downstream investment in autocatalyst, battery and alloy plants rather than continued raw-ore export, and that AfCFTA tariff and non-tariff barriers fall so South African vehicles, fuels, chemicals, processed food and PGMs displace extra-continental imports rather than ceding share.

14 · Synthesis

The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

South Africa's Draft 1 bundle rests on the one product family that survives every test the audit applies — refined PGMs and autocatalysts, where world-leading endowment, full domestic beneficiation, globally benchmarked processing technology and a captive continental industrialisation pathway align — supported by vehicles and components, coal-to-liquids fuels and basic chemicals, and maize as a SADC food-security anchor. What must be proven is deliverability rather than capability: sustained Energy Availability Factor above 60% with no return to Stage 4 or worse load-shedding and a credible replacement for the 2029 to 2030 coal and Cahora Bassa cliff; Transnet rail and port throughput restored toward 2017 levels, with RBCT back above 60 million tonnes and private concessions delivering; PGM demand durable long enough to monetise refining and build a continental autocatalyst chain, or a pivot into hydrogen and fuel-cell catalysis; continental offtake secured through AfCFTA barrier removal; and the Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy converted into actual downstream plant rather than continued raw-ore export.

What is not fixed is the bundle. South Africa is shown 18 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask South Africa to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response

The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2

Minister — this document is unfinished on purpose.

Draft 1 exists to be marked up. Two of these take a single tap. The whole response takes a minute, and it tells the Chair exactly where South Africa stands and what would move you. A single correction is worth more than agreement.

Where do you stand on this direction for South Africa?

How strongly do you back the Right of Supply framework?

7/ 10

Not at allCompletely

How well does this draft bundle reflect South Africa’s real strengths?

Tap to rate

In one word — are you happy with what you see?

Which single line matters most to your government?

What are we missing for South Africa?

Your one instruction for Draft 2.

Collated live by the Office of the Chair of the AU STC-FMAEPI. Draft 2 will show, for each change, which member state asked for it.