Right of Supply — Tanzania

01 · Correspondence

From the Chair · to Khamis Mussa Omar, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Tanzania · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Omar,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Tanzania — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Tanzania is in this room

Tanzania's strongest present endowment is not its largest deposit but its cement and construction materials industry, which already functions as a net continental supplier: 10.9 million tonnes produced in 2024 against domestic demand of 8.5 million tonnes, yielding a 2.43 million tonne surplus exported to Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Zambia, drawn from roughly 13 plants and an input base that includes some 500 million tonnes of limestone at Mtwara alone, and now supported by the 2,115 MW Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project commissioned in 2025. The honest constraint is that cement is low-value and high-weight, so its reach is bounded by freight distance to East and Central African and Indian Ocean markets, and that beyond this sector Tanzania remains overwhelmingly a raw-commodity and transit economy, with its nickel, graphite, tanzanite, gas, helium and rare earth endowments still pre-processing or pre-production.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Tanzania, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

02 · Executive summary

The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Tanzania

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports

620USD bn sourced off-continent

136.75USD bn measured procurement

16draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Tanzania’s draft bundle. 16 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Refined gold, Cement & clinker. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 strong contender · 8 emerging · 5 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Tanzania is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance

What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 16 candidate lines proposed for Tanzania below.

Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
No claim value is stated for Tanzania. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Tanzania will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Tanzania will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize

709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn

Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources

The market

USD 620 bn

From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize

The prize

USD 136.75 bn

Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included

Band A

≈USD 207 bn total

Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated

Band B

16 lines

Tanzania’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2

Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Tanzania at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead

Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor

USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT

Band B · estimated tender layer

≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65

Strategic agriculture & food27.03

Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02

Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53

Infrastructure & transport6.60

Currency, governance & elections5.54

Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic

Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness

Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline

Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Tanzania’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin

Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana

Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline

What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Tanzania’s own capability audit.

Battery-grade nickel, copper and cobalt from Kabanga

The July 2025 Feasibility Study declared maiden reserves and a mine-to-metal plan with a Hydromet refinery at Kahama, but the project is pre-construction with no production and a Final Investment Decision only targeted for 2026. The audit further notes exposure to an Indonesia-driven nickel price collapse.

Pre-production · no realised output

Processed or spherical graphite and anode material

Tanzania holds the world's approximately fifth-largest graphite reserves at some 18 million tonnes, but there is no domestic spherical or processed graphite capacity and all output is raw flake concentrate. Production was roughly 25,000 tonnes in 2024, and the approximately 530,000 tonnes a year pipeline is announced or feasibility-stage, not installed.

Raw base · industrial screen

Cut and polished tanzanite and coloured gemstones

Tanzania is the sole world source of tanzanite, yet the material is largely exported raw with only one value-addition centre in Arusha/Manyara. Exports were valued at USD 19.2 million in 2024 while India re-exported roughly four times that value at some USD 80 million.

Capability inversion

Processed cashew kernels

Tanzania is the world's approximately eighth and Africa's fourth cashew producer at 189,114 tonnes in 2023, but the Agriculture Minister states that only 5 per cent of raw cashew nuts are processed locally, with the other 95 per cent exported to Vietnam or India. The Cashew Board of Tanzania puts local processing at less than 20 per cent.

Capability inversion

LNG and natural gas exports

Confirmed reserves of about 57.54 trillion cubic feet are used domestically for power. The proposed LNG project of roughly USD 42 billion with Shell and Equinor remains in Host Government Agreement negotiation with no Final Investment Decision, placing any export capability on a multi-year horizon.

Pre-production · no FID

Cement supply beyond East, Central and Indian Ocean markets

Cement is low-value and high-weight, so competitiveness is bounded by freight distance; Tanzania can credibly supply East and Central Africa and Indian Ocean markets but not West or North Africa. Regional rivals compete on the same logic, Dangote operating in more than ten countries and Egypt being a large exporter, and the surplus, while real, is modest relative to several neighbours' combined demand.

Scale-matching · incumbency

08 · Endowment

What Tanzania actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Tanzania. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Tanzania's mineral endowment is among the most varied on the continent. Gold output in 2024 is reported at 51.8 tonnes by the World Gold Council and at 60 tonnes by a USGS-derived series, against reserves of approximately 45 million ounces, worked at Geita (AngloGold Ashanti) and at North Mara and Bulyanhulu (Barrick/Twiga joint venture). The country is the sole world source of tanzanite, drawn from roughly 14 square kilometres in the Mererani Hills, with rough and bead production of 83,014 kilogrammes in 2024. Beyond precious materials it holds the world's approximately fifth-largest graphite reserves at some 18 million tonnes; the Kabanga deposit, one of the world's largest and highest-grade undeveloped nickel sulphide resources, measured and indicated at about 46.8 million tonnes at 2.09 per cent nickel; rare earth reserves of roughly 890,000 tonnes at Ngualla; and exceptionally high-grade helium in the Rukwa Basin, with surface seeps of 10.4 to 10.6 per cent against a 0.3 per cent commercial cut-off and certified prospective resources of 138 to 176 billion cubic feet or more.

The energy and logistics base has changed materially. Confirmed natural gas reserves stand at about 57.54 trillion cubic feet, and installed power capacity roughly doubled with the full commissioning in 2025 of the 2,115 MW Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project, designed for 5,920 GWh a year, against a pre-project base of roughly 1,900 MW. Dar es Salaam port recorded throughput of 27.7 million tonnes in FY2024/25, up from 23.69 million tonnes the previous year and described by the Tanzania Ports Authority as a level not achieved since the port's inception; it handles some 93 to 95 per cent of national trade and serves Zambia, Malawi, the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The electrified Standard Gauge Railway is operational from Dar es Salaam through Morogoro to Dodoma, and TAZARA to Zambia's Copperbelt is under a modernisation of roughly USD 1.4 billion. In agriculture, cashew production reached 189,114 tonnes in 2023, making Tanzania the world's approximately eighth and Africa's fourth producer at around 20 per cent of continental output, alongside tobacco at roughly 107,000 tonnes, coffee at about 55,000 tonnes, tea at about 36,000 tonnes and sisal at about 33,000 tonnes.

The one manufacturing sector that already operates as a net continental supplier is cement. Production reached 10.9 million tonnes in 2024 against domestic demand of 8.5 million tonnes, generating a 2.43 million tonne exportable surplus shipped to Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda, the DRC and Zambia. Installed capacity is roughly 11 million tonnes a year across some 13 plants. Against this, Tanzania ranks 116th in the Atlas of Economic Complexity and has worsened 21 positions over the prior decade, with revealed comparative advantage concentrated in low-complexity primary or lightly processed goods.

The endowment in depth

Tanzania's mineral base is anchored by gold, where Tier-1 sources diverge and must be reconciled: the World Gold Council reports 51.8 t of output in 2024, while a USGS-derived series (CEIC) reports 60 t, up from 54.76 t in 2023, against reserves near 45 million ounces (TanzaniaInvest, 2026). Production is concentrated at Geita (AngloGold Ashanti) and at North Mara and Bulyanhulu (the Barrick/Twiga JV). Refining is now partially domestic: the Mwanza Precious Metals Refinery (opened 2021, a STAMICO JV) is rated at 480 kg/day to 99.99% purity, with Geita and Dodoma refineries added, though none is yet LBMA-accredited — Geita is reported on an RMI path toward accreditation "within 3–5 years". In gemstones Tanzania is the sole world source of tanzanite (Mererani Hills, ~14 km²), with rough and bead production of 83,014 kg in 2024 and reported exports of USD 19.2 m (Bank of Tanzania), yet the stone is largely exported raw — India re-exported roughly four times Tanzania's value (~USD 80 m, 2024) and only one value-addition centre operates in the Arusha/Manyara area; reserves are widely cited at ~50 million carats but are finite, with a depletion horizon commonly placed at 2040–2050. Diamond output was about 373,000 carats in 2024 from the Williamson mine (Shinyanga), against reserves of ~51 million carats.

Beneath the producing precious segment sits a deep but pre-processing critical-minerals pipeline. Graphite reserves of ~18 million t make Tanzania the world's ~5th-largest holder (USGS MCS 2025); production was ~25,000 t in 2024 (roughly doubled year-on-year), Lindi Jumbo (Walkabout, 40,000 t/yr capacity) began shipping concentrate to Europe in 2024, and a pipeline of Bunyu, Chilalo, Epanko, Mahenge and Nachu could reach ~530,000 t/yr by ~2026 (USGS FS2024-3029) — but there is no domestic spherical or processed graphite, only raw flake concentrate. Kabanga is one of the world's largest, highest-grade undeveloped nickel sulphide deposits, with Measured+Indicated ~46.8 Mt at 2.09% Ni plus copper and cobalt (Lifezone, Dec 2024); the July 2025 Feasibility Study declared maiden reserves at a first-quartile AISC of US$3.36/lb Ni net of by-products, with FID targeted for 2026 and a planned mine-to-metal chain feeding a Hydromet refinery at Kahama (Buzwagi SEZ) — pre-construction, with no production. Rare-earth reserves are ~890,000 t with the Ngualla project targeting ~37,000 t/yr but not yet producing; the Mkuju River uranium pilot plant ran in 2025 with full operations targeted 2026–29; Liganga iron ore and Mchuchuma coal remain long-stalled; and the Rukwa Basin holds exceptionally high-grade helium (surface seeps up to 10.4–10.6% He against a 0.3% commercial cutoff, certified prospective resources of 138–176+ Bcf), with the first helium mining licence issued in 2025 (Helium One, 480 km²) but pre-production. On energy, confirmed natural-gas reserves stand at ~57.54 TCF (TPDC), from Songo Songo (1974) and Mnazi Bay (~290 Bcf proved), with a proposed ~USD 42 bn LNG project (Shell, Equinor) still in Host Government Agreement negotiation and no FID; power capacity roughly doubled with the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project (JNHPP) — 2,115 MW across nine turbines fully commissioned in 2025 (5,920 GWh/yr design) — from a pre-JNHPP base of ~1,900 MW (mix ~48% gas, ~31% hydro), materially relieving the historic energy constraint on heavy manufacturing while deepening hydro-dependence and drought-related reliability risk.

Agriculture supplies about a quarter of GDP and more than half of employment (World Bank, 2025) but is overwhelmingly raw at the point of export. Cashew output was 189,114 t in 2023 — world's ~8th and Africa's ~4th producer, ~20% of Africa's output — yet Agriculture Minister Hussein Bashe states that "only 5 percent of the raw cashew nuts are being processed locally with the other 95 percent being exported to Vietnam or India" (the Cashew Board of Tanzania puts local processing at "less than 20 percent"). Tobacco runs ~107,000 t (~8th-largest world producer), exported largely as raw leaf (~USD 500 m, OEC 2024); coffee (~55,000 t), tea (~36,000 t), sisal (~33,000 t; world's largest producer at independence), cloves (Zanzibar's signature spice) and cotton (Lake Victoria zone) are all largely exported raw or semi-processed, alongside one of Africa's largest cattle herds and Lake Victoria/Tanganyika fisheries. The one genuinely export-capable manufacturing sector is cement: production reached 10.9 Mt in 2024 against domestic demand of 8.5 Mt, generating a 2.43 Mt exportable surplus shipped to Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda, DRC and Zambia (Minister Jafo, May 2025), from installed capacity of ~11 Mt/yr across ~13 plants — Tanzania Portland (Twiga, ~2.0 Mt/yr, Wazo Hill), Tanga Cement (Simba, ~1.3 Mt/yr), Dangote Mtwara (3.0 Mt/yr, ~500 Mt limestone reserves), Mbeya (Holcim) and Huaxin — with recorded exports climbing from 441,828 t (2021) to 632,726 t (2022) and then to the 2.43 Mt surplus in 2024. Industry accounts for about a third of GDP value-added but MVA per capita is low; other manufacturing (fertiliser, textiles, agro-processing, steel re-rolling) is limited, supported by SEZs/EPZs including the Benjamin Mkapa SEZ (Kigamboni) and the Buzwagi SEZ designated for the Kahama refinery.

Human capital is defined by a large, young labour force (median age ~18) with more than half employed in agriculture, a low tertiary and TVET base, dominant informal employment and underemployment, and thin advanced-manufacturing skill clusters; the mining sector employed ~310,000 in 2020. Infrastructure is the country's most distinctive enabler: Dar es Salaam port set a record throughput of 27.7 Mt in FY2024/25 (up from 23.69 Mt, ~15% growth, "a level not achieved since the port's inception"), handling ~93–95% of national trade and serving Zambia, Malawi, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, with transit cargo to landlocked neighbours of ~10.9 Mt (Jul 2025–Mar 2026, +32.6%) and container throughput rising from ~61,000 to ~102,000 TEU/month after the 2023 DP World private-operator reform; TPA targets 54.59 Mt by 2030/31. The electrified Standard Gauge Railway runs Dar–Morogoro–Dodoma for passengers (2024) and freight from 2025, designed for 160 km/h passenger service and up to 35 Mt/yr freight along the Central Corridor to Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, while TAZARA to Zambia's Copperbelt is under a ~USD 1.4 bn China-Zambia-Tanzania modernisation (30-year concession, 2025). This positions Tanzania as the Central Corridor logistics hub; on trade structure, total exports reached ~USD 11.9 bn in 2024 (up from USD 6.4 bn in 2019), led by gold ~USD 4.44 bn, with gold exports then jumping 37.4% to a historic USD 4.7 bn in 2025 — 45.7% of all goods exports.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Tanzania ranks 116th in the Atlas of Economic Complexity ECI ranking and has worsened 21 positions over the prior decade, a deterioration the Atlas attributes to a lack of export diversification even as it judges the country "as complex as expected for its income level" (Harvard Growth Lab, 2022 data, with the exact ECI numeric value and the newest 2024-data vintage unconfirmed). The Growth Lab's 2033 projection foresaw ~4.9% annual growth — top-decile globally — but driven more by population than by complexity gains, and OEC corroborates the low position (ECI −0.50, ~119th of 130, 2024 methodology). Revealed comparative advantage (RCA > 1) is concentrated in low-complexity primary and lightly-processed goods: gold, raw cashews, tobacco, coffee, cloves, sisal, cotton, tea and pulses (Estmann et al., The World Economy, 2022, RCA 2018; OEC 2024).

Within the product space, the Atlas flags diversification opportunities in agro-processing and processed foods (the highest-value near-term move), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (a long jump), plastics and rubber, construction-metal products, and textiles and apparel (for labour absorption). The trajectory is the concern a minister should register: complexity is stalling rather than accelerating, and projected growth leans on demographics more than on structural transformation.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Cement and construction materials (HS25) is the category where Tanzania best combines all five audit criteria — and, notably, it is not its biggest raw endowment. The decisive evidence is that the industry already operates as a net continental supplier: in 2024 Tanzania produced 10.9 Mt of cement against domestic demand of 8.5 Mt, generating a 2.43 Mt surplus that was exported to Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Burundi, Uganda, DRC and Zambia (Minister of Industry and Trade, tabled May 2025). It holds the full input base — abundant limestone, with Dangote's Mtwara plant alone sitting on ~500 Mt (~149 years) — finished-product capability across roughly 13 plants (Tanzania Portland/Twiga ~2.0 Mt/yr at Wazo Hill, Tanga/Simba ~1.3 Mt/yr, Dangote Mtwara 3.0 Mt/yr, Mbeya/Holcim, Huaxin), and coastal logistics, with Dangote explicitly producing for sale "to surrounding overseas markets by sea". Recorded exports rose from 441,828 t in 2021 to 632,726 t in 2022 and then to the 2.43 Mt surplus in 2024, against installed capacity of ~11 Mt/yr. Newly abundant power — JNHPP's 2,115 MW commissioned in 2025 — removes the historic energy constraint on this energy-intensive industry, and AfCFTA models flag cement among the prime import-substitution and regional-value-chain categories.

The honest limits are equally clear. Cement is low-value and high-weight, so competitiveness is bounded by freight distance: Tanzania can credibly supply East and Central Africa and Indian Ocean markets, but not West or North Africa. Regional rivals compete on the same logic — Dangote operates in 10-plus countries and Egypt is a large exporter — and the surplus, while real, is modest relative to several neighbours' combined demand. The two runners-up carry their own caveats: refined gold rests on real and growing domestic refining (three refineries at 480 kg/day each) atop a leading African output and a 2025 export surge to USD 4.7 bn, but the refineries are not yet LBMA-accredited, capping premium-market access; and transit and logistics services — Dar es Salaam at 27.7 Mt in FY2024/25, plus SGR and TAZARA — make Tanzania the Central Corridor gateway for six-plus landlocked states, a large and defensible regional supply of a service rather than a good.

Current reality

Tanzania is an economy of roughly USD 79 billion and about 68.6 million people, classified lower-middle-income with GDP per capita near USD 1,200 and consistent real growth of some 5.5 to 6 per cent, with the African Development Bank recording 5.6 per cent in 2024. On the audit's own reading, the country today is overwhelmingly a raw-commodity and transit economy. Its strongest near-term continental supply positions are cement and construction materials, which constitute a genuine and already-exporting surplus industry, refined gold, and transit and logistics services. Its largest mineral and energy endowments — nickel, graphite, tanzanite, gas, helium and rare earths — remain pre-processing or pre-production and will not translate into finished-product continental supply for several years.

The defining structural constraint is the beneficiation gap. Gold is only partly refined domestically; tanzanite, graphite, cashews, tobacco, coffee, cloves and sisal are exported raw or barely processed. Gold dominates the trade account, with exports rising 37.4 per cent to USD 4.7 billion in 2025, accounting for 45.7 per cent of all goods exports. Three refineries operate at Mwanza, Geita and Dodoma, each rated 480 kilogrammes a day at 99.99 per cent purity, but none is yet LBMA-accredited. Skills are thin in advanced manufacturing, tertiary and technical training bases are narrow, and the complexity trajectory indicates that structural transformation is stalling rather than accelerating.

09 · The draft bundle

Draft 1 · 16 candidate lines · will change

Tanzania’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Tanzania’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Tanzania will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Tanzania’s 16 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 2Emerging 8Aspirational 5Grey 1

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

LNG / natural gas

~57.5 TCF reserves · Maturity: Domestic only; no FID · Competitiveness: Large

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas

271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane

271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes

271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene

271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711

271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas

271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Tanzania imported USD 205.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania your own imports USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Tanzania is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TPDC · 2016/2025

Sugar

Domestic deficit; Mkulazi · Maturity: Developing · Competitiveness: Large

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)

170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter

170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri

170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add

170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter

170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Tanzania imported USD 177.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria USD 931.8 mSudan USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Source: national · 2024

Refined gold

Major African producer 51.8t WGC/~60t USGS 2024; 3 refineries 480kg/day · Maturity: Raw→partial refining · Competitiveness: Large

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder

710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)

710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured

710820Gold, monetary

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: WGC; CEIC/USGS; BoT · 2024/2025

Cement & clinker

10.9Mt produced vs 8.5Mt demand 2024, 2.43Mt surplus exported to 7 neighbours; 500Mt limestone · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Large

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)

252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured

252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured

252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers

252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 45.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Min Industry&Trade; NBS; Dangote · 2024/2022

Diamonds cut

Williamson mine · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Niche

GREY

USD 1.75 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710210Diamonds; whether or not worked, but not mounted or set, unsorted

710221Diamonds; industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set

710229Diamonds; industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set

710231Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set

710239Diamonds; non-industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Botswana USD 970.9 mSouth Africa USD 578.4 mNamibia USD 111.7 mMauritius USD 76 mMorocco USD 5.8 mTunisia USD 3 mLiberia USD 1.2 mEgypt USD 0.9 m

Source: TanzaniaInvest · 2026

Coffee & tea

Established cash crops RCA>1 · Maturity: Green/raw · Competitiveness: Moderate

EMERGING

USD 1.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

090111Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated

090112Coffee; decaffeinated, not roasted

090121Coffee; roasted, not decaffeinated

090122Coffee; roasted, decaffeinated

090190Coffee; husks and skins, coffee substitutes containing coffee in any proportion

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 1.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Algeria USD 322.4 mEgypt USD 217.4 mSudan USD 151.5 mMorocco USD 148 mSouth Africa USD 99.8 mLibya USD 77.7 mTunisia USD 34.5 mNamibia USD 9.7 m

Source: FAOSTAT; Estmann · 2022

Tobacco processed

~8th world producer ~107kt · Maturity: Raw leaf · Competitiveness: Moderate

EMERGING

USD 630 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

240110Tobacco, (not stemmed or stripped)

240120Tobacco; partly or wholly stemmed or stripped

240130Tobacco refuse

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 24.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 101.4 mCote dIvoire USD 99.5 mSouth Africa USD 81 mEgypt USD 61.3 mTunisia USD 41.9 mZimbabwe USD 40.7 mMalawi USD 40.5 mMorocco USD 39.3 m

Source: FAOSTAT; OEC · 2024

Cotton & textiles

Cotton base; labour-intensive target · Maturity: Raw lint · Competitiveness: Large

EMERGING

USD 392 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

520100Cotton; not carded or combed

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 281.8 mMauritius USD 41.3 mAlgeria USD 23.8 mLesotho USD 21.2 mMorocco USD 14.4 mTunisia USD 2.6 mMozambique USD 2.4 mSouth Africa USD 2.1 m

Source: Estmann; trade.gov · 2022

Cashew kernels

World #8/Africa #4 producer 189114t; ~5% processed locally · Maturity: Raw ~95% · Competitiveness: Moderate

EMERGING

USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated

080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)

080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)

080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell

080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled

080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell

080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Source: FAO/WPR; Min Agriculture · 2023

Helium

Rukwa high-grade; 1st licence 2025 · Maturity: Pre-production · Competitiveness: Niche-strategic

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 94.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

280410Hydrogen

280421Gases, rare; argon

280429Gases, rare; other than argon

280430Nitrogen

280440Oxygen

280450Boron; tellurium

280461Silicon; containing by weight not less than 99.99% of silicon

280469Silicon; containing by weight less than 99.99% of silicon

280470Phosphorus

280480Arsenic

280490Selenium

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 1.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 28.8 mNigeria USD 11.1 mMorocco USD 6.4 mEgypt USD 5.6 mAngola USD 5.3 mMozambique USD 3.8 mTunisia USD 3 mKenya USD 3 m

Source: NSAI/Helium One · 2025

Rare earth elements

~890kt reserves; Ngualla · Maturity: Pre-production · Competitiveness: Strategic

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 22.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

280511Alkali or alkali-earth metals; sodium

280512Alkali or alkali-earth metals; calcium

280519Alkali or alkali-earth metals; other than sodium and calcium

280521Calcium

280522Strontium and barium

280530Earth-metals, rare; scandium and yttrium, whether or not intermixed or interalloyed

280540Mercury

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 8.5 mTogo USD 4.8 mSouth Africa USD 3.6 mGhana USD 1.1 mNigeria USD 1 mNiger USD 0.8 mMali USD 0.7 mKenya USD 0.5 m

Source: USGS; TanzaniaInvest · 2024/2026

Cloves & spices

Zanzibar signature RCA>1 · Maturity: Raw/dried · Competitiveness: Niche

EMERGING

USD 18.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

090700Cloves, whole fruit, cloves and stems

090710Spices; cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems), neither crushed nor ground

090720Spices; cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems), crushed or ground

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 3.6 mSudan USD 2.8 mSouth Africa USD 2.5 mMorocco USD 1.5 mGhana USD 1.5 mSomalia USD 1.3 mAlgeria USD 1.3 mLibya USD 1.1 m

Source: BoT; OEC · 2024

Battery nickel/copper/cobalt

Kabanga world-class; FID 2026 · Maturity: Pre-production · Competitiveness: Large

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 17.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

750210Nickel; unwrought, not alloyed

750220Nickel; unwrought, alloys

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Tunisia USD 9 mEgypt USD 6 mMorocco USD 1.1 mZambia USD 0.6 mAlgeria USD 0.5 mSouth Africa USD 0.3 mNigeria USD 0.1 m

Source: Lifezone FS · 2025

Tanzanite & coloured gemstones

Sole world source tanzanite · Maturity: Mostly raw · Competitiveness: Niche

EMERGING

USD 11.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710310Stones; precious (other than diamonds) and semi-precious stones, unworked or simply sawn or roughly shaped, not strung,

710391Stones; rubies, sapphires and emeralds, worked (other than simply sawn or roughly shaped), not strung, mounted or set

710399Stones; precious (other than diamonds) and semi-precious stones, (other than rubies, sapphires and emeralds), worked oth

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 9.5 mMauritius USD 0.9 mMorocco USD 0.4 mEgypt USD 0.3 mTunisia USD 0.3 mZambia USD 0.2 mNamibia USD 0.1 m

Source: BoT; The Citizen · 2024

Natural graphite & anode

5th-largest reserves; 530kt/yr pipeline · Maturity: Raw flake · Competitiveness: Large

EMERGING

USD 5.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

250410Graphite; natural, in powder or in flakes

250490Graphite; natural, in other forms, excluding powder or flakes

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tanzania imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Congo USD 2.6 mSouth Africa USD 0.9 mEgypt USD 0.3 mNiger USD 0.2 mTanzania your own imports USD 0.2 mGabon USD 0.2 mAlgeria USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Tanzania is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MCS; USGS FS2024-3029 · 2025/2024

Sisal & hard fibre

Historic world leader ~33kt · Maturity: Raw fibre · Competitiveness: Niche

EMERGING

USD 0 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

530410Sisal and other textile fibres of the genus Agave, raw

530490Sisal and other textile fibres of the genus Agave, processed but not spun; tow and waste of...

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tanzania imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Source: FAOSTAT · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Tanzania is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance

What Tanzania buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Tanzania is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 15.12 bn

Tanzania’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product line	Strength tier	Tanzania imports, 2023	Continental demand, 2023
LNG / natural gas	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 205.1 m	USD 10.27 bn
Sugar	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 177.6 m	USD 8.84 bn
Cement & clinker	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 45.6 m	USD 2.9 bn
Tobacco processed	EMERGING	USD 24.2 m	USD 630 m
Coffee & tea	EMERGING	USD 1.4 m	USD 1.13 bn
Helium	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 1.1 m	USD 94.5 m
Cotton & textiles	EMERGING	USD 0.3 m	USD 392 m
Natural graphite & anode	EMERGING	USD 0.2 m	USD 5.4 m
Refined gold	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0 m	USD 2.99 bn
Diamonds cut	GREY	USD 0 m	USD 1.75 bn
Cashew kernels	EMERGING	USD 0 m	USD 155.7 m
Rare earth elements	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 0 m	USD 22.8 m
Cloves & spices	EMERGING	USD 0 m	USD 18.7 m
Battery nickel/copper/cobalt	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 0 m	USD 17.7 m

Left-hand column: what Tanzania itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion

The number this document refuses to print

What Tanzania’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 16 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Tanzania’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Tanzania. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Tanzania’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map

Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Tanzania’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023

01EgyptUSD 4.87 bn

02MoroccoUSD 3.67 bn

03South AfricaUSD 2.28 bn

04UgandaUSD 2.04 bn

05TunisiaUSD 1.8 bn

06AlgeriaUSD 1.36 bn

07NigeriaUSD 1.1 bn

08BotswanaUSD 970.9 m

09SudanUSD 950.5 m

10Cote dIvoireUSD 786.3 m

11KenyaUSD 635.5 m

12GhanaUSD 504.7 m

13DjiboutiUSD 424.9 m

14SomaliaUSD 398.1 m

15LibyaUSD 309.9 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Tanzania. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence

What would have to be true

The conditions Tanzania would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Tanzania to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

LBMA accreditation for the gold refineries

Geita and Mwanza must gain LBMA accreditation to unlock premium continental and global supply, underpinned by reliable feedstock from artisanal and neighbouring sources.

Kabanga FID taken and financed

The 2026 nickel FID must be taken and financed and the Kahama Hydromet refinery built, with the nickel price recovering against Indonesian oversupply.

Graphite processing beyond raw flake

Tanzania would have to move from raw flake concentrate — currently ~0 domestic processing — to spherical and coated anode material to capture battery-chain value.

Domestic cutting and certification for tanzanite

Cutting, polishing and certification capacity must expand to retain the value currently lost to India, which re-exports roughly four times Tanzania's value.

Cashew and agro-processing at scale

Domestic shelling and kernel capacity must scale from ~5%, with CNSL by-product use developed and reliable power and working capital secured.

Sustained cement demand and cheap freight

Regional demand must absorb the expanded surplus, clinker must be cost-competitive, and SGR and port freight tariffs must be low enough to undercut imports in target markets.

The binding constraints

The beneficiation gap is the defining structural fact Gold (only partly), tanzanite, graphite, cashews (~95% raw), tobacco, coffee, cloves and sisal are exported raw or barely processed; endowment does not equal supply capability.

Capital and single-investor dependency The flagships — Kabanga nickel, LNG, rare earths and helium — hinge on single anchor investors and FIDs not yet taken, and nickel is exposed to an Indonesia-driven price collapse.

Power reliability despite new capacity JNHPP doubles installed capacity but deepens hydro-dependence; drought years historically caused load-shedding estimated to cost 5–7% of GDP in 2014–15.

Governance and policy volatility Resource-nationalist swings — gold export bans and raw-cashew price floors — have historically distorted trade and deterred processors, and tanzanite smuggling persists.

Logistics economics for bulk goods Low-value bulk goods are limited by freight range, and residual port congestion persists despite the DP World and SGR reforms.

Thin skills base The TVET and tertiary base is thin and advanced-manufacturing skill clusters are scarce, constraining any move up the value chain.

13 · Devil’s advocate

Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Tanzania’s favour.

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

Endowment is not supply capability. Gold is only partly refined domestically, and tanzanite, graphite, cashews at roughly 95 per cent raw, tobacco, coffee, cloves and sisal are exported raw or barely processed. The audit names this beneficiation gap as the defining structural fact.

Refined gold cannot reach premium markets without accreditation. The Mwanza, Geita and Dodoma refineries are not yet LBMA-accredited, which caps premium-market access; Geita is reported to be on a Responsible Minerals Initiative path toward LBMA within three to five years. Reliable feedstock from artisanal and neighbouring sources would also have to be secured.

New power deepens hydro-dependence. The Julius Nyerere project doubles capacity but raises drought-related reliability risk. Drought years have historically caused load-shedding estimated to have cost 5 to 7 per cent of GDP in 2014-15.

The flagship projects rest on single anchor investors. Kabanga, LNG, rare earths and helium each hinge on a single anchor investor and on Final Investment Decisions not yet taken. Several of the headline figures derive from company disclosures and are pre-production estimates rather than realised output.

Logistics economics bound the tradeable range. Low-value bulk goods are limited by freight range, and residual port congestion persists despite the 2023 private-operator reform. Cement competitiveness in particular depends on SGR and port freight tariffs being low enough to undercut imports in target markets.

Policy volatility has deterred processors. Resource-nationalist swings, including gold export bans and raw-cashew price floors, have historically distorted trade and deterred processors, and tanzanite smuggling persists. Stabilising beneficiation policy is named as a cross-cutting requirement.

The complexity trajectory is moving the wrong way. Tanzania ranks 116th in the Atlas of Economic Complexity and has worsened 21 positions over the prior decade, indicating that structural transformation is stalling rather than accelerating. The thin technical and tertiary skills base compounds this.

14 · Synthesis

The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Tanzania's Draft 1 bundle rests on three positions that exist today rather than on the endowments that dominate its geology: cement and construction materials, where a 2.43 million tonne surplus is already moving to seven neighbours; refined gold, where three domestic refineries rated 480 kilogrammes a day sit atop exports of USD 4.7 billion in 2025; and transit and logistics services, where Dar es Salaam's 27.7 million tonnes in FY2024/25, the Standard Gauge Railway and TAZARA make the country the Central Corridor gateway for six or more landlocked states. What must be proven is the conversion of endowment into finished supply: LBMA accreditation for the gold refineries, a taken and financed Kabanga Final Investment Decision with the Kahama Hydromet refinery built, movement beyond raw flake into spherical or coated graphite anode processing from a base of effectively zero, expanded domestic gemstone cutting and certification, and the scaling of cashew shelling capacity from roughly 5 per cent. Until those steps are taken, the audit's own judgement holds — endowment is not supply capability, and the larger positions are several years from delivery.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Tanzania is shown 16 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Tanzania to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response

The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2

Minister — this document is unfinished on purpose.

Draft 1 exists to be marked up. Two of these take a single tap. The whole response takes a minute, and it tells the Chair exactly where Tanzania stands and what would move you. A single correction is worth more than agreement.

Where do you stand on this direction for Tanzania?

How strongly do you back the Right of Supply framework?

7/ 10

Not at allCompletely

How well does this draft bundle reflect Tanzania’s real strengths?

Tap to rate

In one word — are you happy with what you see?

Which single line matters most to your government?

What are we missing for Tanzania?

Your one instruction for Draft 2.

Collated live by the Office of the Chair of the AU STC-FMAEPI. Draft 2 will show, for each change, which member state asked for it.