Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
TunisiaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Tunisia — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
18
Draft 1 candidate lines for Tunisia
The Minister’s brief · for Michket Slama Khaldi · Tunisia
Minister Slama Khaldi, no other African economy makes what your factory floors make. Tunisia's automotive wiring harnesses and insulated wire reached USD 2.99 billion in 2023, 14.9% of all your exports, built to European OEM standards by Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier, ranking you the world's thirteenth-largest exporter of insulated wire. As Morocco, Egypt and South Africa scale vehicle assembly, the harness is the one high-value input they cannot yet source on-continent, and you already make it. Today the EU takes 70.3% of your exports while Africa takes barely 11.5%; this is your defensible claim on that gap. The Right of Supply gives Tunisia a twenty-five-year first right to supply African assemblers, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — you supply only when you meet the market. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move, and we are waiting for it.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Tunisia
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Michket Slama Khaldi, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Tunisia · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Slama Khaldi,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Tunisia — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Tunisia is in this room

Tunisia's strongest endowment is manufactured, not extracted: automotive wiring harnesses and insulated wire, at USD 2.99 billion in 2023 and 14.9% of all merchandise exports, made to European OEM standards by Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier, and ranking Tunisia the 13th-largest exporter of insulated wire in the world. It sits inside an electrical cluster worth USD 5.39 billion, drawn on a workforce of more than 65,000 graduates a year from 47 engineering schools, in an economy that ranks 47th globally on the Economic Complexity Index and among the highest in Africa. The honest constraint is that this capacity is EU-captured and fiscally constrained rather than absent: the EU took 70.3% of exports in 2023 against Africa's 11.5% in 2024, the offshore regime binds those plants contractually to European value chains, and public debt of around 84.9% of GDP alongside a stalled IMF programme limits the capital available to add lines. Any continental role must therefore be built on incremental capacity dedicated to African buyers, not on substitution.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Tunisia, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Tunisia

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
18draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Tunisia’s draft bundle. 18 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Automotive wiring harnesses / insulated wire, Olive oil. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 continental anchor · 6 strong contender · 5 emerging · 3 aspirational · 2 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Tunisia is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 18 candidate lines proposed for Tunisia below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Tunisia. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Tunisia will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Tunisia will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
18 lines
Tunisia’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Tunisia at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Tunisia’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Tunisia’s own capability audit.

Aerospace parts (HS8803)

The audit instructs that Tunisia should not be allocated against aerospace, where evidence is thin or capacity is EU-locked. The latest firm export figure is 2018 (about EUR 590 million), aircraft parts are dispersed across HS chapters, and continental aero demand is assessed as low. Confidence in HS8803 export values is explicitly graded low or GREY.

Evidence thinness · EU-locked

Lead, zinc and iron ore concentrates (HS2607/2608, HS2601)

Both rows are tiered GREY — insufficient evidence. Combined capacity targets of roughly 120,000 tonnes per year of lead and 70,000 tonnes per year of zinc were never fully realised, and the audit records no precise current tonnages for zinc, lead or iron ore. The audit directs that minerals not be allocated against.

Raw base · industrial screen

Crude and refined petroleum (HS2709/2710)

Tunisia is a net energy importer with declining fields: crude output was about 29,200 barrels per day at end-September 2024 against a 1980 peak of 118,000 barrels per day, and gas production has roughly halved since 2010 to 1.8 bcm in 2024. The category is tiered ASPIRATIONAL and the audit directs that petroleum not be allocated against.

Declining capacity

Raw phosphate rock as a supply line

Rock production remains less than half the 2010 peak and the national plan target of 14 million tonnes by 2030 is a projection, not an achieved figure, requiring more than a tripling of current output. The audit's Stage 3 direction is to back finished fertilisers over raw rock, and to condition any fertiliser mandate on demonstrated Gafsa stabilisation.

Raw base · industrial screen

Bulk olive oil presented as value-added supply

Between 80% and 91% of olive oil exports leave in bulk, with value-added bottling under 9% (ONAGRI, 2023). The audit treats upgrading olive oil from bulk commodity to value-added anchor as contingent on bottled-oil share rising above roughly 15% of olive-oil exports.

Capability inversion

Fertiliser and phosphoric acid volumes claimed at nameplate capacity

GCT's installed capacity is 8.5 million tonnes of rock and 1.6 million tonnes of P2O5 per year, but overall utilisation was only about 40% in 2025 and M'dhilla-2 has been stalled since 2020. The audit flags press-derived utilisation figures as the weakest evidentiary link and sets a threshold at which DAP and phosphoric acid would be tiered down from STRONG to EMERGING.

Scale-matching
08 · Endowment
What Tunisia actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Tunisia. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Tunisia's decisive endowment is not under the ground but on the factory floor. Automotive wiring harnesses and insulated wire (HS8544) are the country's single largest export line, at USD 2.99 billion in 2023, or 14.9% of all merchandise exports, up from USD 2.37 billion in 2022 (TrendEconomy/UN Comtrade); OEC records USD 3.23 billion for 2023 and ranks Tunisia the 13th-largest global exporter of insulated wire, with Germany, France and Italy the leading destinations. Production is anchored by Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo, Dräxlmaier and other harness makers serving European automakers. Around this sits a wider electrical cluster: HS85 as a whole reached USD 5.39 billion in 2023, some 26% of exports, with switching and protection apparatus (HS8536) a top line and boards (HS8537) produced for European industrial customers. Aerospace adds a second precision layer — the El Mghira aeropark near Tunis spans 200,000 square metres, hosts more than ten firms including Airbus Atlantic, Corse Composites, Figeac Aero, Mecahers, Latécoère and Safran, employs over 3,000 people and produces roughly 2.5 million parts a year (DG Trésor France, 2024). Textiles and apparel form a long-established EU nearshoring base of about 1,000 firms and some 160,000 workers, with combined knit and non-knit clothing exports of roughly USD 3.6 billion in 2024.

The mineral identity is phosphate. The Gafsa basin holds over 800 million tonnes of active reserves, the undeveloped Sra Ouertane deposit in the north is estimated at around 5 billion tonnes (Knowledge Ridge/CPG, 2022), and the USGS lists Tunisia's phosphate rock reserves at 2.5 billion tonnes — the fourth largest in the world (USGS MCS 2026). Groupe Chimique Tunisien transforms Tunisian rock into phosphoric acid, DAP, TSP, MAP and DCP across Gabès, Skhira, Sfax and M'dhilla, with installed capacity of 8.5 million tonnes of rock and 1.6 million tonnes of P2O5 a year. In agriculture, olive oil is the crown: output rebounded to 340,000 tonnes in 2024/25, a rise of 55%, and Tunisia ranked second worldwide in exports after Spain and ahead of Italy, capturing 27.9% of global olive oil exports with 226,472 tonnes, an increase of 23.3% over 2023/24 (IOC via News Tunisia). The olive sector spans approximately 1.7 million hectares, around 35% of cultivable land, supporting more than 300,000 producers. Tunisia is also the world's leading date exporter by value, led by the premium Deglet Nour variety, with roughly USD 256.7 million exported in 2023 and about 21% of world date export value.

Underpinning all of this is human capital. Per FIPA-Tunisia, the country has more than 260 university establishments and 1,000 professional training centres, produces more than 65,000 graduates annually, more than 30% of them in scientific and engineering fields, and is supported by a network of 47 engineering schools. Tunisia ranks 47th globally in the Harvard Growth Lab's Economic Complexity Index on 2024 data, having improved twelve positions over the prior decade — among the highest complexity ranks in Africa, typically first or second on the continent alongside South Africa. Harvard assesses Tunisia as more complex than expected for its income level. The strategic implication is stated plainly in the audit: Tunisia already possesses the diversified productive know-how, in electricals, light machinery, chemicals and precision assembly, that most African economies lack. Its constraint is scale, capital and market orientation, not capability.

The endowment in depth

Tunisia's mineral identity is phosphate. The Gafsa basin holds over 800 million tonnes of active reserves, while the undeveloped Sra Ouertane deposit in the north is estimated at around 5 billion tonnes; USGS lists national phosphate rock reserves at 2.5 billion tonnes, the fourth largest in the world (USGS MCS 2026). The production trajectory, not the geology, is the central story. Tunisia produced roughly 7.6 million tonnes of marketable rock in 2010 on USGS figures (8.13 Mt on official Tunisian crude/commercial figures) before the 2011 revolution triggered a collapse to about 2.28 Mt. Output has since plateaued in a 2.6-4.1 Mt band, recorded at 3.28 Mt in 2024 (MCS 2026), with CPG director-general Abdelkader Amidi confirming company output of 3.04 Mt in 2024 rising to 3.9 Mt in 2025. The national plan targets 14 Mt by 2030, a projection requiring more than a tripling of current output. Beyond phosphate, Tunisia produces lead and zinc from small deposits (Bou Jaber, Fej Lehdoum, Sidi Idris, where combined capacity targets of about 120,000 t/yr lead and 70,000 t/yr zinc were never fully realised), iron ore (production up 54% in 2021), gypsum, and Mediterranean solar-evaporation sea salt at over one million tonnes a year.

On energy, Tunisia is a modest and declining hydrocarbon producer that has been a net importer since around 2000. Crude output was about 29,200 barrels per day at end-September 2024, down from a 1980 peak of 118,000 b/d, anchored on the El Borma field (discovered 1964) alongside Ashtart, Miskar, Hasdrubal and the Nawara field, which came online in 2020 and supplied about 23% of domestic gas in 2024. Gas production has roughly halved since 2010 to 1.8 bcm in 2024. Installed power capacity is 5,944 MW across 25 plants producing 19,395 GWh in 2024, with state utility STEG controlling 92.1% of capacity; roughly 93.7% of electricity comes from fossil fuels, and Tunisia imports 62% of the gas used for power via the TransMed pipeline from Algeria. Energy self-sufficiency fell from 47% in 2023 to 45% in 2024 to 39% in 2025. Renewables stood at about 787 MW as of June 2025 (485 MW solar, 240 MW wind, 62 MW hydro) against a government target of 35% renewables and 4,850 MW by 2030.

Agriculture is smaller than industry but strategically vital, crowned by olive oil. Output swings with the alternate-bearing cycle, rebounding to 340,000 tonnes in 2024/25 (+55%) and reaching a record 500,000 tonnes in 2025/26, nearly 80% of it organic, making Tunisia the world's second-largest producer behind Spain. In 2024/25 Tunisia was the world's second exporter after Spain, capturing 27.9% of global olive oil exports with 226,472 tonnes; a structural weakness is that 80-91% of exports leave in bulk, with value-added bottling under 9%. Tunisia is also the world's leading date exporter by value, led by the premium Deglet Nour variety, shipping roughly USD 256.7 million (129,929 tonnes) in 2023 and capturing about 21% of world date export value. The olive sector spans approximately 1.7 million hectares, around 35% of cultivable land, supports more than 300,000 producers, and up to 10% of the population depends on it. The existing industrial base is the decisive endowment. Automotive wiring harnesses and insulated wire (HS8544) are the single largest export at USD 2.99-3.23 billion in 2023, making Tunisia the 13th-largest global exporter, anchored by Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier. The El Mghira aeropark near Tunis (200,000 m2, 10-plus firms, over 3,000 employees, some 2.5 million parts a year) hosts Airbus Atlantic, Corse Composites, Figeac Aero, Latécoère and four Safran sites. Electrical machinery (HS85) totalled USD 5.39 billion in 2023, textiles and apparel span roughly 1,000 firms and 160,000 workers with combined clothing exports near USD 3.6 billion in 2024, and Groupe Chimique Tunisien transforms rock across Gabès, Skhira, Sfax and M'dhilla with installed capacity of 8.5 Mt rock and 1.6 Mt P2O5 a year, though running at only about 40% utilisation in 2025. Over 40 pharmaceutical plants cover around 80% of market needs by volume and 60% by value.

The human-capital base underwrites this industrial density. Tunisia has more than 260 university establishments and 1,000 professional training centres, produces over 65,000 graduates annually with more than 30% in scientific and engineering fields, operates a network of 47 engineering schools, and ranks first in Africa for graduates in scientific and engineering fields, supported by the CEMIA centre of excellence (600 trainees a year) and 15 sectoral training centres. French companies employ roughly 70% of aerospace workers, reflecting deep francophone technical ties, and the offshore "totalement exportatrice" regime supplies a disciplined, cost-competitive engineering and assembly workforce. On logistics, Radès is the main container port with El Mghira about 10 km away, served alongside Enfidha-Hammamet and Tunis-Carthage airports; 98% of foreign trade by value moves by sea, and EU proximity underpins the nearshoring model. The binding physical weakness is the Gafsa-Sfax/Gabès phosphate rail corridor, whose ageing wagon fleet is repeatedly cited by CPG as a production constraint.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Tunisia ranks 47th globally in the Harvard Growth Lab's Economic Complexity Index (2024 data), an improvement of 12 positions over the prior decade and among the highest ECI ranks in Africa, typically first or second on the continent alongside South Africa. OEC, using an HS96 methodology, records a slightly different rank of 50th, having moved from 60th to 50th over two decades, with the discrepancy reflecting methodology rather than substance. Harvard assesses Tunisia as more complex than expected for its income level and projects around 3.3% annual growth to 2034, placing it in the top half of countries. The strategic implication is that Tunisia already possesses the diversified productive know-how, in electricals, light machinery, chemicals and precision assembly, that most African economies lack; its binding constraint is scale, capital and market orientation, not capability.

OEC records Tunisia exporting 239 products with a revealed comparative advantage above 1. The highest-specialisation lines are Pure Olive Oil (RCA index 87.8), Flax Yarn (59.2), Phosphatic Fertilizers (55.4), Phosphoric Acid (46.5) and other Olive Oil (40.9), with RCA above 1 also covering insulated wire, non-knit suits, dates, electrical switching apparatus and vehicle parts. Crucially, the highest-PCI, most knowledge-intensive exports include auxiliary machinery for textile machines, flow, level and pressure measuring instruments, and additive-manufacturing machines, evidence of latent sophistication that sits above the country's current income and scale. The picture is of an economy whose product space is unusually deep for the region but whose output remains EU-captured and fiscally constrained.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Tunisia's one category to anchor continental supply is automotive wiring harnesses and insulated wire (HS8544). It is the country's single largest export, recorded at USD 2.99 billion by TrendEconomy and USD 3.23 billion by OEC in 2023, equivalent to roughly 14.9% of all merchandise exports and making Tunisia the 13th-largest global exporter of insulated wire, with Germany, France and Italy the top destinations. Production is anchored by a mature multinational ecosystem, Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier among others, serving European automakers and drawing on a proven engineering and assembly workforce. As African vehicle assembly expands in Morocco, Egypt and South Africa, harnesses are the highest-value, most labour-embedded input that African plants cannot yet source at scale on-continent, and Tunisia already makes them to European OEM standards. No other African economy combines this depth, quality certification and cost position; the audit judges this to be capability that exists today, not aspiration.

The honest limits are structural rather than technical. The capacity is contractually embedded in EU value chains under the offshore regime, so a continental pivot must run on incremental, ring-fenced African-destined lines rather than the substitution of existing higher-margin EU volumes, or it risks cannibalising the very base that makes the cluster credible. Delivery therefore depends on operationalising AfCFTA rules of origin and PAPSS payments so goods clear duty-free, and the audit's own recommendation is to first quantify spare and incremental capacity across the Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier plants; if audited spare capacity is below about 10% of output, the anchor emphasis would shift toward fertilisers. Within those conditions, Tunisia could credibly serve as the continent's harness and cable hub, redirecting incremental capacity toward African assemblers while retaining its EU base.

Current reality

Tunisia is a lower-middle-income, capability-rich North African economy of 12,277,109 people in 2024, with nominal GDP of USD 53.4 billion and GDP per capita of USD 4,350, up from USD 3,950 in 2023 (World Bank via Trading Economics). The economy grew 1.4% in 2024 after zero growth in 2023, with public debt at around 84.9% of GDP. The audit's industrial verdict is that Tunisia is Africa's most complex manufacturing-services hybrid outside South Africa — a genuine light-industrial power whose capacity is EU-captured and fiscally constrained rather than absent. That capture is measurable: the EU took 70.3% of exports in 2023, with France, Italy and Germany dominant, while Africa took about 11.5% of exports in 2024. Roughly 80% of apparel goes to the EU. The offshore, or totalement exportatrice, regime operates as a duty- and tax-privileged export enclave largely disconnected from the domestic onshore economy.

Two structural weaknesses qualify the picture. Phosphate output has not recovered from the post-2011 collapse: from a 2010 peak of 8.13 million tonnes on the Tunisian official series, output fell to about 2.28 million tonnes in 2011 and has since plateaued between 2.6 and 4.1 million tonnes, recorded by the USGS at 3.28 million tonnes in 2024 and an estimated 3.3 million tonnes for 2025. CPG's director-general Abdelkader Amidi confirmed company output of 3.04 million tonnes in 2024 rising to 3.9 million tonnes in 2025. GCT's overall utilisation was only around 40% in 2025 per director-general Hédi Youssef, with the M'dhilla-2 TSP and acid project suspended since 2020. Energy compounds the constraint: Tunisia has been a net energy importer since around 2000, imports 62% of the gas used for power via the TransMed pipeline from Algeria, and energy self-sufficiency fell from 47% in 2023 to 45% in 2024 and 39% in 2025. Installed power capacity is 5,944 MW across 25 plants, 93.7% fossil-fuelled, with renewables at about 787 MW as of June 2025.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 18 candidate lines · will change

Tunisia’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Tunisia’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Tunisia will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Tunisia’s 18 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 2Strong Contender 6Emerging 5Aspirational 3Grey 2
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Crude/refined petroleum

Declining fields; net importer · Maturity: Crude · Competitiveness: Low
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 121.62 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Tunisia imported USD 2.61 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 20 bnNigeria USD 19.94 bnEgypt USD 8.27 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.58 bnCote dIvoire USD 4.36 bn

Source: Enerdata · 2024

Vehicle parts & accessories

USD 512m 2023; auto supply base · Maturity: Components · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 7.66 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
870810Vehicles; bumpers and parts thereof, for the vehicles of heading no. 8701 to 8705
870821Vehicles; parts of bodies, safety seat belts
870822Vehicles; parts and accessories, front windscreens (windshields), rear windows and other windows specified in subheading
870829Vehicles; parts and accessories, of bodies, other than safety seat belts
870830Vehicle parts; brakes, servo-brakes and parts thereof
870831Mounted brake linings for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of ten or more persons,...
870839Brakes and servo-brakes and parts thereof for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of...
870840Vehicle parts; gear boxes and parts thereof
870850Vehicle parts; drive-axles with differential, whether or not provided with other transmission components, and non-drivin
870860Non-driving axles and parts thereof for tractors, motor vehicles for the transport of ten or...
870870Vehicle parts; road wheels and parts and accessories thereof
870880Vehicle parts; suspension systems and parts thereof (including shock-absorbers)
870891Vehicle parts; radiators and parts thereof
870892Vehicle parts; silencers (mufflers) and exhaust pipes; parts thereof
870893Vehicle parts; clutches and parts thereof
870894Vehicle parts; steering wheels, steering columns and steering boxes; parts thereof
870895Vehicle parts; safety airbags with inflater system; parts thereof
870899Vehicle parts and accessories; n.e.c. in heading no. 8708
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 214.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 2.4 bnSouth Africa USD 1.85 bnAlgeria USD 583.7 mEgypt USD 510.1 mLibya USD 270.2 mNigeria USD 260.2 mTunisia your own imports USD 214.6 mGhana USD 148 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TrendEconomy · 2023

Automotive wiring harnesses / insulated wire

13th-largest global exporter; USD 2.99-3.23bn; OEM cluster · Maturity: Finished assemblies · Competitiveness: High
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 5.78 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
854411Insulated electric conductors; winding wire, of copper
854419Insulated electric conductors; winding wire, (of other than copper)
854420Insulated electric conductors; co-axial cable and other co-axial electric conductors
854430Insulated electric conductors; ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets of a kind used in vehicles, aircraft or ships
854441Electric conductors for a voltage <= 80 V, insulated, fitted with connectors, n.e.s.
854442Insulated electric conductors; for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts, fitted with connectors
854449Insulated electric conductors; for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts, not fitted with connectors
854451Electric conductors, for a voltage > 80 V but <= 1.000 V, insulated, fitted with connectors,...
854459Electric conductors, for a voltage > 80 V but <= 1.000 V, insulated, not fitted with connectors,...
854460Insulated electric conductors; for a voltage exceeding 1000 volts
854470Insulated electric conductors; optical fibre cables
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · High-voltage transmission lines · control: sole lawful buyer. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Tunisia imported USD 591.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 1.78 bnTunisia your own imports USD 591.1 mSouth Africa USD 566.5 mEgypt USD 349.9 mLibya USD 203.7 mGhana USD 183.7 mAlgeria USD 179.7 mDR Congo USD 146.7 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OEC / UN Comtrade · 2023

DAP / phosphatic fertilisers

Established DAP/TSP capacity; RCA 55.4 · Maturity: Finished fertiliser · Competitiveness: Very high
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 3.44 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310310Superphosphates (excluding those in tablets or similar forms, or in packages with a gross weight...
310311Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, superphosphates, containing by weight 35% or more of diphosphorus pentaoxi
310319Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, superphosphates, other than containing by weight 35% or more of diphosphor
310390Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, n.e.c. in heading no. 3103
310510Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10kg
310520Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the three fertilizing elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium
310530Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate)
310540Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium dihydrogenorthophosphate (monoammonium phosphate) and mixtures thereof with d
310551Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing nitrates and phosphates
310559Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements nitrogen and phosphorus, other than nitrates a
310560Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements phosphorus and potassium
310590Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; n.e.c. in heading no. 3105
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Ministry of Agriculture · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Tunisia imported USD 16.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 699.4 mKenya USD 275.9 mZambia USD 217.8 mTanzania USD 217.7 mCote dIvoire USD 178.2 mEgypt USD 172.9 mMalawi USD 170.1 mSouth Africa USD 169.1 m

Source: Knowledge Ridge/CPG; USGS MCS · 2022/2026

Electrical switching/protection apparatus

~USD 590m 2023 export line · Maturity: Finished components · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.98 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
853610Electrical apparatus; fuses, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts
853620Electrical apparatus; automatic circuit breakers, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts
853630Electrical apparatus; for protecting electrical circuits, n.e.c. in heading no. 8536, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 v
853641Electrical apparatus; relays, (for a voltage not exceeding 60 volts)
853649Electrical apparatus; relays, for a voltage exceeding 60 volts
853650Electrical apparatus; switches n.e.c. in heading no. 8536, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts
853661Electrical apparatus; lamp-holders, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts
853669Electrical apparatus; plugs and sockets, for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts
853670Connectors for optical fibres, optical fibre bundles or cables
853690Electrical apparatus; n.e.c. in heading no. 8536, for switching or protecting electrical circuits, for a voltage not exc
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 591 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 793.9 mTunisia your own imports USD 591 mSouth Africa USD 425.9 mEgypt USD 256.2 mAlgeria USD 116.2 mAngola USD 55.5 mNigeria USD 52.9 mEthiopia USD 46.1 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TrendEconomy · 2023

Cement & clinker

Domestic overcapacity; coastal plants · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 6.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: USGS MY · 2020-21

Iron ore

Minor production; +54% in 2021 · Maturity: Ore · Competitiveness: Low
GREY
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MY · 2020-21

Electrical boards/panels

Part of HS85 (USD 5.39bn) cluster · Maturity: Finished components · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 2.05 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
853710Boards, panels, consoles, desks and other bases; for electric control or the distribution of electricity, (other than sw
853720Boards, panels, consoles, desks and other bases; for electric control or the distribution of electricity, (other than sw
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tunisia imported USD 59 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 291.5 mEgypt USD 241.7 mMorocco USD 174.6 mAlgeria USD 171 mNigeria USD 151 mDR Congo USD 123.5 mEthiopia USD 91.8 mAngola USD 64.6 m

Source: TrendEconomy · 2023

Cables & conductors (industrial)

Same cluster as harnesses · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Moderate-high
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 986.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
854442Insulated electric conductors; for a voltage not exceeding 1000 volts, fitted with connectors
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Tunisia imported USD 114 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 443.4 mTunisia your own imports USD 114 mSouth Africa USD 113.7 mEgypt USD 70 mGhana USD 49.7 mAlgeria USD 29.5 mNigeria USD 16.7 mAngola USD 14.4 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OEC · 2023

Measuring/checking instruments

High-PCI export capability · Maturity: Components · Competitiveness: Low
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 670 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
902610Instruments and apparatus; for measuring or checking the flow or level of liquids
902620Instruments and apparatus; for measuring or checking pressure
902680Instruments and apparatus; for measuring or checking variables of liquids or gases (excluding pressure or the flow and l
902690Instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories for those measuring or checking the flow, level, pressure or other vari
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Tunisia imported USD 37 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 143.2 mAngola USD 54.1 mEgypt USD 49.3 mAlgeria USD 40 mNigeria USD 38.4 mTunisia your own imports USD 37 mMorocco USD 29 mMozambique USD 27 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OEC · 2023

Dates (Deglet Nour)

World #1 by export value; USD 256.7m · Maturity: Packed/processed · Competitiveness: Moderate
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 473.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080410Fruit, edible; dates, fresh or dried
080420Fruit, edible; figs, fresh or dried
080430Fruit, edible; pineapples, fresh or dried
080440Fruit, edible; avocados, fresh or dried
080450Fruit, edible; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 267.6 mEgypt USD 35.2 mSomalia USD 30.2 mNigeria USD 28.1 mGhana USD 19.3 mSouth Africa USD 11.9 mMauritania USD 9.5 mDjibouti USD 8 m

Source: WITS/UN Comtrade; FAO · 2023

Sea salt

Mediterranean solar evaporation; >1 Mt/yr · Maturity: Raw/refined · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 303.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
250100Salt (including table salt and denatured salt); pure sodium chloride whether or not in aqueous solution; sea water
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 1.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 38.2 mCote dIvoire USD 22.9 mUganda USD 21.9 mSouth Africa USD 19.6 mZimbabwe USD 18.5 mMalawi USD 15.1 mZambia USD 13.6 mGhana USD 12.9 m

Source: USGS MY · 2020-21

Dicalcium phosphate (feed)

USD 61m calcium phosphate exports · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 285.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
283510Phosphinates (hypophosphites) and phosphonates (phosphites), whether or not chemically defined
283522Phosphates; of mono- or disodium, whether or not chemically defined
283523Phosphate of trisodium
283524Phosphates; of potassium, whether or not chemically defined
283525Phosphates; calcium hydrogenorthophosphate (dicalcium phosphate), whether or not chemically defined
283526Phosphates; of calcium n.e.c. in item no. 2835.25, whether or not chemically defined
283529Phosphates; (other than of mono- or disodium, other than of potassium or of calcium hydrogenorthophosphate (dicalcium ph
283531Polyphosphates; sodium triphosphate (sodium tripolyphosphate), whether or not chemically defined
283539Polyphosphates; other than sodium triphosphate (sodium tripolyphosphate), whether or not chemically defined
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Tunisia imported USD 10.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 64.1 mSouth Africa USD 47.2 mAlgeria USD 35.6 mKenya USD 24.1 mMorocco USD 18.2 mNigeria USD 14.5 mZambia USD 11.1 mTunisia your own imports USD 10.2 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TrendEconomy · 2023

Olive oil

World #2 exporter 2024/25, 27.9% share, 226,472 t; RCA 87.8 · Maturity: Mostly bulk · Competitiveness: Moderate
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 138 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
150910Olive oil, virgin
150920Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, extra virgin olive oil, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
150930Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, virgin olive oil, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
150940Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, virgin olive oils n.e.c. in heading 1509, whether or not refined, but not c
150990Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, other than virgin, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 0.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 59.6 mSouth Africa USD 15.9 mSeychelles USD 8.2 mMauritius USD 5.6 mMali USD 5.3 mCabo Verde USD 5 mAngola USD 4.7 mGhana USD 4.1 m

Source: IOC / OEC · 2025

Textile machinery auxiliaries

Highest-PCI export; latent capability · Maturity: Components · Competitiveness: Low-moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 115.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
844811Machinery, auxiliary; dobbies and jacquards, card reducing, copying, punching or assembling machines for use therewith
844819Machinery, auxiliary; for machines of heading no. 8444, 8445, 8446 or 8447, n.e.c. in item no. 8448.11
844820Machines; parts and accessories of machines or auxiliary machinery of heading no. 8444
844831Machines, card clothing; parts and accessories
844832Machines; parts and accessories of machines or auxiliary machinery for preparing textile fibres, other than card clothin
844833Machines; parts and accessories of machines or auxiliary machinery, spindles, spindle flyers, spinning rings and ring tr
844839Machines; parts and accessories of machines or auxiliary machinery of heading no. 8445, n.e.c. in item no. 8448.3
844841Shuttles for looms
844842Weaving machines (looms); parts including their auxiliary machinery, and accessories thereof, reeds for looms, healds an
844849Weaving machines (looms); parts including their auxiliary machinery, and accessories thereof n.e.c. in item no. 8448.4
844851Machines; parts and accessories of machines of heading no. 8447 or auxiliary machinery, sinkers, needles and other artic
844859Machines; parts and accessories of machines or auxiliary machinery of heading no. 8447, other than sinkers, needles and
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Tunisia imported USD 10.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 23.5 mBenin USD 15.8 mSouth Africa USD 10.6 mTunisia your own imports USD 10.6 mMorocco USD 8.7 mAlgeria USD 6.9 mEthiopia USD 3.9 mNigeria USD 3.4 m

Tunisia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OEC · 2023

Phosphoric acid

RCA 46.5; GCT 1.6 Mt P2O5 capacity · Maturity: Intermediate chemical · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 81.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
280910Diphosphorus pentoxide
280920Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acids
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 0.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
DR Congo USD 15.1 mEgypt USD 13.3 mAlgeria USD 11.3 mSouth Africa USD 7.9 mEswatini USD 7.9 mMorocco USD 5.2 mCote dIvoire USD 3.8 mNigeria USD 2.5 m

Source: OEC / TrendEconomy · 2023

Aerospace parts

El Mghira cluster; Airbus/Safran; EUR 590m · Maturity: Sub-assemblies · Competitiveness: Low
EMERGING
USD 5.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
880310Propellers and rotors for aircraft
880320Undercarriages and parts for aircraft
880330Other Aircraft parts
880390Parts of balloons, dirigibles, spacecraft
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Tunisia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 5.2 m

Source: Jeune Afrique; DG Trésor · 2018/2024

Lead & zinc concentrates

Small deposits; sub-scale output · Maturity: Concentrate · Competitiveness: Moderate
GREY
USD 0.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260700Lead ores and concentrates
260800Zinc ores and concentrates

Tunisia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MY · 2016/2020-21

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Tunisia is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Tunisia buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Tunisia is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 25.27 bn

Tunisia’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

18

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierTunisia imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Crude/refined petroleumASPIRATIONALUSD 2.61 bnUSD 121.62 bn
Automotive wiring harnesses / insulated wireCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 591.1 mUSD 5.78 bn
Electrical switching/protection apparatusSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 591 mUSD 2.98 bn
Vehicle parts & accessoriesSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 214.6 mUSD 7.66 bn
Cables & conductors (industrial)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 114 mUSD 986.9 m
Electrical boards/panelsEMERGINGUSD 59 mUSD 2.05 bn
Measuring/checking instrumentsASPIRATIONALUSD 37 mUSD 670 m
DAP / phosphatic fertilisersSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 16.4 mUSD 3.44 bn
Textile machinery auxiliariesASPIRATIONALUSD 10.6 mUSD 115.2 m
Dicalcium phosphate (feed)EMERGINGUSD 10.2 mUSD 285.1 m
Cement & clinkerEMERGINGUSD 6.3 mUSD 2.9 bn
Dates (Deglet Nour)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 3 mUSD 473.4 m
Sea saltEMERGINGUSD 1.1 mUSD 303.1 m
Olive oilCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0.6 mUSD 138 m

Left-hand column: what Tunisia itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Tunisia’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 18 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Tunisia’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Tunisia. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Tunisia’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Tunisia’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 23.67 bn
02NigeriaUSD 20.55 bn
03MoroccoUSD 13.59 bn
04EgyptUSD 11.69 bn
05DR CongoUSD 8.08 bn
06LibyaUSD 5.57 bn
07GhanaUSD 5.32 bn
08Cote dIvoireUSD 4.84 bn
09AlgeriaUSD 2 bn
10TunisiaUSD 1.57 bn
11EthiopiaUSD 841.2 m
12KenyaUSD 350 m
13MaliUSD 308 m
14ZambiaUSD 242.5 m
15TanzaniaUSD 217.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Tunisia. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Tunisia would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Tunisia to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Gafsa social and logistics stabilisation

A durable local pact plus rail-fleet renewal is needed to lift GCT above roughly 40% utilisation and restore phosphate and fertiliser reliability, since the collapse from 8.13 Mt to about 3 Mt was driven by strikes, sit-ins and rail breakdowns rather than geology.

02

Incremental, not substitutive, capacity

New harness, apparel and fertiliser lines must be dedicated to African buyers so that existing higher-margin EU contracts are not cannibalised; the rational path is additive African supply rather than substitution.

03

AfCFTA rules-of-origin operationalisation

Functioning origin certification and PAPSS payments are required so that Tunisian goods clear duty-free into African markets.

04

Fiscal and FX stabilisation

An IMF or equivalent anchor is needed to unlock investment finance and reduce default risk, given public debt around 84.9% of GDP and a stalled Extended Fund Facility.

05

Energy cost containment

Renewable build-out is required to curb gas-import exposure that inflates the cost of energy-intensive phosphate chemistry.

06

Logistics to sub-Saharan markets

Direct maritime and air links, a noted gap for pharmaceuticals and dates, are needed to reach African customers beyond Libya and Algeria, alongside value-added migration from bulk olive oil and raw rock toward bottled oil and finished fertilisers.

The binding constraints
·

Phosphate labour and logistics fragility The sector's collapse from 8.13 Mt in 2010 to about 3 Mt was driven not by geology but by recurring strikes, sit-ins and rail breakdowns concentrated in the Gafsa basin (Métlaoui, Redeyef, Moularès, M'dhilla). Protest-related losses were estimated at around USD 1 billion a year in 2019, GCT ran at only about 40% utilisation in 2025, and the M'dhilla-2 line has been stalled since 2020, so any continental fertiliser allocation is hostage to this social-logistics fragility.

·

Fiscal stress Public debt of around 84.9% of GDP in 2024, a stalled IMF programme, reliance on central-bank financing and default-risk commentary together constrain the investment finance needed to expand capacity.

·

EU orientation and cannibalisation risk Harness, apparel and aerospace capacity is contractually embedded in EU value chains under the offshore regime. Reorienting output toward African buyers could cannibalise existing higher-margin EU contracts unless it draws on genuinely incremental capacity, so the rational path is additive African supply rather than substitution.

·

Energy-import dependence Energy self-sufficiency fell from 47% in 2023 to 39% in 2025, with 62% of the gas used for power imported via the TransMed pipeline from Algeria and 93.7% of electricity fossil-fuelled. This high and worsening dependence is a structural macro risk that raises the cost base of energy-intensive phosphate chemistry.

·

Water stress Tunisia is highly water-scarce. Deglet Nour date monoculture consumes around 20,000 m3 per hectare, and olive and phosphate processing are water-intensive, capping the sustainable expansion of agricultural and chemical exports.

·

Governance uncertainty President Saied's 2021 suspension of parliament and subsequent centralisation add governance uncertainty for investors, making political and rules-based predictability a precondition for the investor confidence that capacity expansion requires.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Tunisia’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Phosphate collapse was social, not geological. The fall from 8.13 million tonnes in 2010 to around 3 million tonnes was driven by recurring strikes, sit-ins and rail breakdowns concentrated in the Gafsa basin at Métlaoui, Redeyef, Moularès and M'dhilla. Protest-related losses were estimated at roughly USD 1 billion a year in 2019, and any continental fertiliser allocation is hostage to this social-logistics fragility.

05

EU orientation risks cannibalisation, not addition. Harness, apparel and aerospace capacity is contractually embedded in EU value chains under the offshore regime, and reorienting output toward African buyers could cannibalise existing, higher-margin EU contracts unless it is incremental capacity. The audit's rational path is additive African supply, not substitution.

06

Fiscal stress constrains any expansion. Public debt stands at around 84.9% of GDP in 2024, the roughly USD 1.9 billion Extended Fund Facility agreed at staff level in late 2022 has stalled amid reform disagreements, and the government has leaned on domestic and central-bank financing. Default-risk commentary constrains the investment needed to expand capacity.

07

Energy dependence inflates the phosphate cost base. Self-sufficiency fell from 47% in 2023 to 45% in 2024 and 39% in 2025, with 62% of power-sector gas imported via TransMed from Algeria and 93.7% of electricity fossil-fuelled. High and worsening energy-import dependence raises the cost base of energy-intensive phosphate chemistry.

08

Water scarcity caps agricultural and chemical expansion. Tunisia is highly water-scarce; Deglet Nour date monoculture consumes roughly 20,000 cubic metres per hectare, and olive and phosphate processing are water-intensive. This caps sustainable expansion of agri and chemical exports.

09

Rules of origin and payments must actually function. Tunisia ratified the AfCFTA in 2020 and acceded to COMESA in 2018, but the audit requires functioning origin certification and PAPSS payments before Tunisian goods clear duty-free into African markets. Direct maritime and air links to sub-Saharan markets are a noted gap for pharmaceuticals and dates.

10

Governance predictability is unresolved. President Saied's 2021 suspension of parliament and subsequent centralisation add governance uncertainty for investors. The audit lists investor confidence under a stable, rules-based regime among the conditions that would have to hold.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Tunisia's Draft 1 bundle rests on demonstrated light-industrial capability rather than resource endowment: harnesses and cable (HS8544) and olive oil (HS1509) as anchors, with phosphoric acid, phosphatic fertilisers, knit and non-knit apparel, electrical switching apparatus, vehicle parts, industrial cable and Deglet Nour dates as strong contenders. What must be proven is threefold. First, that spare and incremental harness capacity across the Leoni, Yazaki, Sumitomo and Dräxlmaier plants can be ring-fenced for African-destined lines without touching EU contract volumes — the audit notes that if audited spare capacity is below roughly 10% of output, the anchor emphasis should shift toward fertilisers. Second, that the phosphate spine can be stabilised: sustained CPG output above around 5 million tonnes for four consecutive quarters and completion of the stalled M'dhilla-2 line, failing which DAP and phosphoric acid tier down from STRONG to EMERGING. Third, that value migrates upward — bottled oil above roughly 15% of olive-oil exports, finished fertilisers over raw rock, and pharmaceutical exports into sub-Saharan Africa contingent on new maritime and air links. The audit's continental instruction is to allocate the harness, cable and light-electrical mandate now, and the fertiliser mandate conditional on Gafsa performance.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Tunisia is shown 18 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Tunisia to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2