Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
South SudanBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for South Sudan — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
7
Draft 1 candidate lines for South Sudan
The Minister’s brief · for Kuol Daniel Ayulo · South Sudan
Minister Ayulo, South Sudan holds what a continent short of meat will need: a herd of roughly 11.7 million cattle and some 24 million sheep and goats, one of the largest in Africa and arguably its highest per-capita livestock holding — renewable, broadly distributed across your pastoral states, and owned by your people rather than pledged to a foreign lender through 2043. Sub-Saharan Africa's food-import bill reached 62.8 billion dollars in 2024, and the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook expects the continent to account for 73 per cent of the world's added meat-import demand to 2033. That demand is your claim. The Right of Supply grants South Sudan a twenty-five-year first right to supply that market, disciplined by Match-or-Release so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — demand certainty against which your disease-free zones, abattoirs and cold chain are built, not capacity claimed today. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, South Sudan
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Kuol Daniel Ayulo, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · South Sudan · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Ayulo,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for South Sudan — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why South Sudan is in this room

South Sudan's strongest endowment is its herd. Roughly 11.7 million cattle alongside some 12.4 million goats and 12.1 million sheep place it among the top six or seven cattle holders in Africa and give it arguably the highest per-capita livestock holding on the continent, with over 80 per cent of households dependent on livestock — a renewable, broadly distributed asset rather than a depleting one, and one that faces a continental market in which the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024-2033 expects Africa to account for 73 per cent of additional global meat-import demand to 2033. The honest constraint is that this herd is today a socio-cultural wealth store rather than a commercial off-take system: there are no export abattoirs, no traceability or functioning disease-control regime, no disease-free zone, no cold chain, and an electricity access rate of about 8 per cent with roughly 109 to 130 MW installed, half of it operational. South Sudan's allocation is therefore held at aspirational tier — demand certainty against which capability is to be built, not capacity claimed.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to South Sudan, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for South Sudan

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
7draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

South Sudan’s draft bundle. 7 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Crude petroleum, Gold, Teak / hardwood timber. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 3 emerging · 3 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for South Sudan is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 7 candidate lines proposed for South Sudan below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for South Sudan. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what South Sudan will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That South Sudan will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
7 lines
South Sudan’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for South Sudan at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and South Sudan’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from South Sudan’s own capability audit.

Crude petroleum (HS 2709)

The audit is explicit that oil is not the trump card: crude is raw, domestically refined at only about 3,000 barrels per day, exported solely via a war-exposed pipeline through Sudan, overwhelmingly China-bound, and already pledged as loan collateral through 2027 and to a UAE lender to at least 2043 at a discount of about USD 10 per barrel. It fails the procurement-led product-supply test.

Raw base · industrial screen

Crude oil as a continental supply position

Africa imports refined products, not crude, so the continental demand pull runs against South Sudan's only export of scale. The audit marks crude as a raw endowment with a weak supply position while listing refined petroleum products as merely aspirational on a sub-scale 3,000 barrels per day of output against 10,000 barrels per day nameplate.

Capability inversion

Gold (HS 7108)

Production of approximately 5 tonnes per year is entirely artisanal and small-scale, output is entirely smuggled, largely via Uganda to the UAE, there is no domestic gold refining, the Ministry of Mining does not publish production figures and South Sudan is not an EITI member. The audit describes it as geological-luck endowment with zero beneficiation position.

Raw base · industrial screen

Minerals beyond gold

Reported occurrences of copper, iron ore, chromium, zinc, manganese, mica, uranium and silver are not geologically mapped or quantified, and the audit marks them GREY or INSUFFICIENT for any supply claim.

Unquantified · grey

Gum arabic (HS 1301)

The acacia belt occurrence is shared with Sudan and there is no organised sector documented in South Sudan; beneficiation stage is raw or none. The audit tiers it GREY on a 2017 UNCTAD regional source.

Unquantified · grey

Inland fisheries (Chapter 03)

The Sudd wetland and Nile system support substantial potential, but activity is subsistence and unprocessed, and the audit tiers the category GREY or INSUFFICIENT.

Unquantified · grey
08 · Endowment
What South Sudan actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for South Sudan. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Three endowments define South Sudan. The first is crude oil: proven reserves of roughly 3.5 billion barrels, widely cited as the third-largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, held in three blends — Nile, Dar and Fula. The second is livestock, and it is the standout. The national herd is estimated at some 11.7 million cattle, 12.4 million goats and 12.1 million sheep on FAO estimates of 2009 and 2013 used officially, placing South Sudan among the top six or seven cattle holders in Africa and giving it one of the highest per-capita livestock holdings on the continent; over 80 per cent of households depend on livestock, and the Ministry has cited higher figures still. The third is land and water: vast under-used Nile-watered arable and rangeland, of which only about 4.5 per cent is cultivated on FAO figures. Sorghum is the staple, with sesame, groundnuts, gum arabic, cassava and sugarcane also grown, and the Sudd wetland and Nile system support substantial inland fisheries potential.

Alongside these sit two narrower positions. Teak is a genuine niche: plantations established in the 1940s to 1960s in Western and Central Equatoria, the oldest in Africa, managed by Equatoria Teak Company under the Maris Group, with about 2,500 hectares planted producing rough-sawn squares and skimmed logs exported via Mombasa. The first major harvest cycle begins around 2031. Gold is the only commercially mined mineral and is almost entirely artisanal; SWISSAID's "On the Trail of African Gold", released on 21 November 2025, judges annual production at approximately 5 tonnes per year, sourced solely from artisanal and small-scale mining concentrated in Eastern and Central Equatoria. Reported occurrences of copper, iron ore, chromium, zinc, manganese, mica, uranium and silver exist in government and secondary sources but are not geologically mapped or quantified.

The complexity picture is unusually stark. South Sudan carries no Economic Complexity Index rank at all — it is excluded from both the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas and the OEC for insufficient or low-quality trade data, a status the audit reads as itself diagnostic: the economy is too undiversified and its data too sparse to score. Revealed comparative advantage is concentrated almost entirely in crude petroleum, historically around 99 per cent of exports, with thin regional advantage in raw timber and live animals. The product-space implication is that the country sits at the extreme periphery, with very few low-complexity adjacencies — other agricultural raw materials, basic wood products, hides — and no near-term path into complex manufacturing. Diversification, where feasible, runs through agriculture and livestock value chains rather than industry.

The endowment in depth

On the mineral and energy side, South Sudan's endowment is narrow and barely beneficiated. Gold is the only commercially mined mineral, and it is almost entirely artisanal: SWISSAID's "On the Trail of African Gold" (21 Nov 2025) judges production at approximately 5 tonnes per year, "a medium-size gold producer by African standards," sourced solely from artisanal and small-scale mining concentrated in Eastern and Central Equatoria, with output entirely smuggled — largely via Uganda to the UAE. There is no domestic gold refining, the Ministry of Mining publishes no production figures, and the country is not an EITI member; reported occurrences of copper, iron ore, chromium, zinc, manganese, mica, uranium and silver remain unmapped and unquantified. Crude oil is the core endowment, with proven reserves of ~3.5 billion barrels (Ministry of Petroleum; widely cited as Sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest) across three blends — Nile, Dar and Fula. Production is volatile and declining: EIA data show 78,907 barrels per day in 2024, "46.03% less than in 2023, when production volume was 146,210 b/d… falling for 4 years in a row," following the February 2024 rupture of the Petrodar pipeline through Sudan; a 2025 restart lifted output to ~150,000 bbl/d before drone attacks on Sudanese infrastructure interrupted it again (Nov 2025). The only domestic refinery is Bentiu (Unity State), a Safinat–NILEPET joint venture with 10,000 bbl/d nameplate capacity reported to produce only ~3,000 bbl/d of heavy fuel oil and diesel in 2024.

Power is the binding gate on any heavy manufacturing. Installed generation capacity is roughly 109–130 MW, nearly all thermal and diesel-fired, of which only about half is operational and just ~34.5 MW is available to the public (World Bank, 2022); electricity access is among the world's lowest at ~8% of the population (World Bank, 2021), with tariffs around USD 0.40/kWh. Hydropower potential on the Nile is significant — five identified sites could add up to 2,600 MW (World Bank, 2023) — but installed renewable capacity is only ~1% of the mix. Without reliable, affordable power there is no basis for cold chains, export abattoirs or milling.

Agriculture, livestock, forestry and fisheries hold the country's most distinctive assets, almost all unconverted. Livestock is the standout: the national herd is estimated at ~11.7 million cattle, ~12.4 million goats and ~12.1 million sheep (FAO 2009/2013 estimates, used officially), placing South Sudan among the top six or seven cattle holders in Africa with one of the highest per-capita holdings on the continent, and over 80% of households depend on livestock; the Ministry cites higher figures still (~12 million cattle, 20 million sheep, 25 million goats). Crucially the herd is a socio-cultural wealth store — dowry and status — not a commercial off-take system, with minimal processing, no functioning disease-control or traceability system, and no export abattoirs. Sorghum is the staple crop, alongside sesame (simsim), groundnuts, gum arabic, cassava and sugarcane, yet only ~4.5% of arable land is cultivated (FAO). Teak is a genuine niche: plantations established in the 1940s–60s in Western and Central Equatoria — the oldest in Africa — are managed by Equatoria Teak Company (Maris Group) across ~2,500 ha, producing rough-sawn squares and skimmed logs exported via Mombasa, with the first major harvest cycle beginning ~2031; reported teak exports of ~100,000 tonnes/year (C4ADS) are dominated by illegal logging, and the World Bank estimated potential legal revenue of ~USD 150 million/year against only ~USD 2 million realised. The Sudd wetland and Nile system support substantial inland fisheries potential that remains largely subsistence and unprocessed.

The industrial base is near-zero and both human capital and infrastructure compound the problem. Formal manufacturing value added is negligible as a share of GDP; South Sudan does not feature in UNIDO CIP rankings and has no UNIDO industrial diagnostic. What exists is the Bentiu mini-refinery, small agro-processing, brick and clay works, beverage bottling around Juba and artisanal teak furniture-making, with no functioning SEZ or industrial park. Human capital is among the weakest globally: adult literacy is ~35% (UNESCO, 2008; later estimates ~40–44%), among the four lowest in the world; ~2.8 million children were out of school in 2021; roughly 76% of the population required humanitarian assistance in 2024; and the oil sector remains dependent on foreign technical manpower, with even petroleum graduates reporting difficulty finding work and virtually no TVET base. Infrastructure is the decisive constraint — the country is landlocked with minimal paved roads, no functioning rail and no domestic route to a port. Crude flows solely via the ~1,600 km pipeline through Sudan to the Bashayer/Port Sudan terminal, a single war-exposed chokepoint on which South Sudan gives ~10,000 of ~150,000 bbl/d to Sudan as transport fees, such that "Sudan receives ~$18 million from South Sudan's oil everyday" (OilPrice.com, Sept 2025). Surface trade depends on the dominant Northern Corridor (Juba–Nimule–Kampala to Mombasa, chosen for relative security despite cost) and the shorter but insecure, unpaved Juba–Nadapal–Eldoret–Mombasa route; the LAPSSET corridor remains largely unbuilt and stalled, river transport on the Nile is under-developed, and logistics costs are among the highest in the region.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

South Sudan is effectively unrankable on economic complexity: it carries no Economic Complexity Index value in the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas or the OEC because of insufficient trade-data quality (OEC, 2023), a status shared by only the most data-poor or undiversified economies, and the absence of a rank is itself diagnostic — the economy is too undiversified and its data too sparse to score. By way of comparison, neighbouring Sudan ranks near the very bottom (~125 of 130, OEC). Revealed comparative advantage is concentrated almost entirely in crude petroleum, which has historically represented ~99% of exports (OEC), with only thin regional RCA in raw teak or sawn wood and live animals where the data are weak.

The product-space implication is stark. South Sudan sits at the extreme periphery, with very few low-complexity adjacencies — other agricultural raw materials, basic wood products and hides — and no near-term path into complex manufacturing. Where diversification is feasible at all, it runs through agriculture and livestock value chains rather than industry.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

The single most defensible long-horizon continental product position is live cattle and red meat (HS 0102/0104; 0201/0202), classed ASPIRATIONAL. The case rests on the framework's own logic — endowment is necessary but not sufficient, and the prize is biggest where Africa imports most. South Sudan's herd of ~11.7 million cattle plus ~24 million sheep and goats (FAO estimates used officially) is one of the largest in Africa and arguably the highest per-capita holding on the continent (FAO; World Bank Resilient Livestock Sector Project, 2023). Unlike oil, this is a renewable, broadly distributed asset built by pastoralist culture and the Nile/Sudd agro-ecology, not a depleting, captive, pre-sold resource. The demand side is a matter of certainty rather than speculation: Africa is a structural and growing net meat importer, and the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024-2033 finds \"the most significant growth in import demand originates from Africa, which will account for 73% of additional imports of all meat types,\" set against a Sub-Saharan food import bill of USD 62.8 billion in 2024 (FAO Food Outlook, Nov 2024). A competitive South Sudanese red-meat supply would substitute genuine, expanding continental import demand — precisely the framework's target.

The honest limits keep this position ASPIRATIONAL rather than EMERGING, and they are severe. The herd is currently a cultural wealth store with minimal commercial off-take, no disease-free zones, no traceability and no export abattoirs, against a backdrop of endemic livestock disease (foot-and-mouth, East Coast fever), insecurity and cattle-raiding, and no cold chain or reliable power. Oil, by contrast, fails the procurement-led, product-supply test: crude is raw (HS 2709), refined domestically at only ~3,000 bbl/d, exported solely via a war-exposed pipeline through Sudan, overwhelmingly China-bound, and already pledged as loan collateral through 2027 and to a UAE lender to at least 2043 at a ~USD 10/barrel discount. The natural runners-up sit on the same herd and land base — hides, skins and leather (HS Ch. 41), an equally undeveloped beneficiation step, and teak or hardwood (HS 4403/4407), a genuine quality niche with operating plantations but small scale and a first major harvest only around 2031.

Current reality

South Sudan is a landlocked, conflict-affected petro-state whose entire formal export economy rests on one raw commodity. Nominal GDP had fallen roughly 55 per cent from about USD 12 billion at independence in 2011 to USD 5.4 billion in 2024, on figures from the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan of September 2025 citing World Bank and IMF data, with the IMF separately estimating about USD 4.6 billion for 2024. Population is roughly 11.9 to 12.2 million on World Bank 2024 data. In finished-product terms the country supplies the continent essentially nothing: it exports raw crude, pipeline-captive and China-bound, and processes almost nothing domestically. Crude petroleum accounts for around 90 per cent of government revenue and the overwhelming majority of exports. Intra-African export orientation is very low — recorded exports to Kenya in 2023 were only about USD 123,000, against Kenyan exports to South Sudan of some USD 227 million, and South Sudan is the second-largest transit user of Mombasa after Uganda, with more than 1.7 million tonnes of inbound cargo. It is a net importer, not a supplier.

The industrial base is near-zero. Formal manufacturing value added is negligible as a share of GDP; South Sudan does not feature in UNIDO CIP rankings and has no UNIDO industrial diagnostic. What exists is the Bentiu mini-refinery in Unity State, a Safinat–NILEPET joint venture with 10,000 barrels per day nameplate capacity reported producing only about 3,000 barrels per day of heavy fuel oil and diesel in 2024, alongside small agro-processing, brick and clay works, beverage bottling around Juba and artisanal furniture-making from teak. No functioning special economic zone or industrial park is operational. Installed generation capacity is roughly 109 to 130 MW, nearly all thermal, of which only about half is operational and around 34.5 MW available to the public, with electricity access among the world's lowest at about 8 per cent of population. Adult literacy stands at roughly 35 per cent on the most recent reliable UNESCO figure, with about 2.8 million children out of school in 2021 and some 76 per cent of the population requiring humanitarian assistance in 2024. Energy is the binding gate on any heavy manufacturing; infrastructure is the decisive constraint overall.

Read under the South Sudan Principle

South Sudan holds an aspirational allocation. Nothing on these pages is a near-term capacity claim. The bundle is the demand certainty against which capability is built, and it is deliberately held open while the state rebuilds.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 7 candidate lines · will change

South Sudan’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from South Sudan’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what South Sudan will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How South Sudan’s 7 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Emerging 3Aspirational 3Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum products

Crude feedstock + Bentiu refinery · Maturity: ~3,000 bbl/d HFO/diesel; sub-scale · Competitiveness: High — Africa imports refined fuels
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

South Sudan imported USD 18 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: EIA; NILEPET · 2024

Crude petroleum

~3.5bn bbl reserves, SSA top-5 · Maturity: Raw crude; ~3,000 bbl/d refined; pipeline-captive · Competitiveness: Low as supply (Africa imports refined, not crude)
EMERGING
USD 11.08 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 4.81 bnCote dIvoire USD 2.89 bnEgypt USD 1.74 bnSenegal USD 952.2 mTunisia USD 506 mGhana USD 124.9 mZambia USD 55.6 mZimbabwe USD 2.5 m

Source: EIA; Ministry of Petroleum · 2024

Gold

Artisanal production ~5 t/yr · Maturity: Raw/unrefined, smuggled · Competitiveness: Global, marginal continental
EMERGING
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: SWISSAID · 2025

Live bovine animals & red meat

One of Africa's largest herds, highest per-capita holding · Maturity: Raw live animals; no abattoir/traceability · Competitiveness: High & rising — Africa = 73% of added global meat-import demand 2024-33
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.26 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010210Pure-bred breeding bovines
010221Cattle; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010229Cattle; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010231Buffalo; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010239Buffalo; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010290Bovine animals; live, other than cattle and buffalo
010410Sheep; live
010420Goats; live
020110Meat; of bovine animals, carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled
020120Meat; of bovine animals, cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), fresh or chilled
020130Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, fresh or chilled
020210Meat; of bovine animals, carcasses and half-carcasses, frozen
020220Meat; of bovine animals, cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), frozen
020230Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

South Sudan imported USD 5.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.14 bnMorocco USD 285.8 mLibya USD 178.5 mSouth Africa USD 154.1 mAlgeria USD 141.4 mAngola USD 45.5 mMauritius USD 44.4 mGhana USD 33.6 m

Source: FAO; OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook · 2013/2024

Teak / hardwood timber

Oldest African teak plantations, premium quality · Maturity: Rough-sawn; first harvest ~2031 · Competitiveness: Niche; small continental
EMERGING
USD 1.91 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440310Wood in the rough, treated with paint, stains, creosote or other preservatives (excluding rough-cut...
440311Wood; coniferous species, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared; treated with pai
440312Wood; non-coniferous species, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared; treated with
440320Coniferous wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared...
440321Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squ
440322Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squ
440323Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or
440324Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or
440325Wood; coniferous species n.e.c. in headings 4403.21 or 4403.23, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood
440326Wood; coniferous species n.e.c in headings 4403.22 or 4403.24, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood,
440341Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440342Wood, tropical; teak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440349Wood, tropical; other than dark red meranti, light red meranti meranti bakau and teak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440391Wood; oak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440392Beech "Fagus spp." in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared...
440393Wood; of beech (Fagus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which the smallest cross-sectional dimension is 15 cm or more
440394Wood; of beech (Fagus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which any cross-sectional dimension is less than 15 cm
440395Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which the smallest cross-sectional dimension is 15 cm or more
440396Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which any cross-sectional dimension is less than 15 cm
440397Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440398Wood; of eucalyptus (Eucalyptus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440399Wood; in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, n.e.c. in heading no. 4403
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

South Sudan imported USD 3.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 758.2 mAlgeria USD 321.5 mMorocco USD 290.9 mSouth Africa USD 120.3 mLibya USD 48.2 mSomalia USD 44.9 mKenya USD 41.9 mSenegal USD 40.4 m

Source: World Bank; FAO; ETC · 2023

Oilseeds (sesame, groundnuts)

Nile-watered arable, traditional cultivation · Maturity: Raw seed; no crushing at scale · Competitiveness: Regional/global oilseed demand
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 614.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120210Groundnuts in shell, not roasted or otherwise cooked
120220Shelled groundnuts, whether or not broken (excluding roasted or otherwise cooked)
120230Ground-nuts; seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, whether or not shelled or broken
120241Ground-nuts; other than seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, in shell
120242Ground-nuts; other than seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, shelled, whether or not broken,
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

South Sudan imported USD 0.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Algeria USD 158.3 mEgypt USD 120.9 mMorocco USD 59.7 mGhana USD 46.4 mSouth Africa USD 45.9 mTunisia USD 32.8 mKenya USD 27.1 mUganda USD 26.9 m

Source: FAO; AfDB · 2025

Gum arabic

Acacia belt occurrence (shared with Sudan) · Maturity: Raw/none; sector undocumented · Competitiveness: Large global niche
GREY
USD 40.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
130110Natural lac
130120Gum Arabic
130190Natural gums, resins, gum-resins and oleoresins, n.e.c. in heading no. 1301
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

South Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 7.7 mEswatini USD 7.1 mEgypt USD 4.8 mMorocco USD 3.7 mAlgeria USD 3 mBurkina Faso USD 2.9 mEthiopia USD 2.5 mLibya USD 1.6 m

Source: UNCTAD · 2017

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for South Sudan is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What South Sudan buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: South Sudan is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 1.48 bn

South Sudan’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

7

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierSouth Sudan imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleum productsASPIRATIONALUSD 18 mUSD 110.54 bn
Live bovine animals & red meatASPIRATIONALUSD 5.5 mUSD 2.26 bn
Teak / hardwood timberEMERGINGUSD 3.8 mUSD 1.91 bn
Oilseeds (sesame, groundnuts)ASPIRATIONALUSD 0.9 mUSD 614.9 m
Crude petroleumEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 11.08 bn
GoldEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Gum arabicGREYUSD 0 mUSD 40.6 m

Left-hand column: what South Sudan itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What South Sudan’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 7 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times South Sudan’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to South Sudan. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

South Sudan’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind South Sudan’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 21 bn
02NigeriaUSD 19.94 bn
03EgyptUSD 10.44 bn
04MoroccoUSD 8.31 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.8 bn
06LibyaUSD 4.89 bn
07GhanaUSD 4.66 bn
08KenyaUSD 4.42 bn
09Cote dIvoireUSD 2.89 bn
10UgandaUSD 1.93 bn
11SenegalUSD 992.6 m
12AlgeriaUSD 667.6 m
13TunisiaUSD 582.2 m
14MauritiusUSD 80.5 m
15ZambiaUSD 55.6 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to South Sudan. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions South Sudan would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for South Sudan to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Basic security and an end to cattle-raiding

The livestock and meat position first requires basic security and an end to cattle-raiding in the pastoral states, since active and recurrent armed conflict and raiding directly degrade the herd asset.

02

Veterinary disease-control, traceability and a recognised disease-free zone

A functioning veterinary and disease-control system with traceability, and at least one internationally recognised disease-free zone, is the binding gate on any meat export.

03

Export-grade abattoirs with power and cold chain

At least one export-grade abattoir with reliable power and cold chain would be needed, implying grid or captive renewable or gas generation against today's ~8% electrification and 100% thermal base.

04

All-weather roads to the Nimule/Mombasa corridor

All-weather road links would have to connect the production clusters of Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria to the Nimule/Mombasa corridor.

05

EAC sanitary harmonisation

East African Community sanitary harmonisation would be required to access regional buyers, building on South Sudan's 2016 EAC accession.

06

Teak certification and Bentiu scale-up

For teak, completion of FSC re-certification, anti-illegal-logging enforcement and patience to the ~2031 harvest; for refined products, completion and scaling of Bentiu beyond 3,000 bbl/d with stable feedstock.

The binding constraints
·

Security and governance Active and recurrent armed conflict, elite capture and cattle-raiding undermine every value chain. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found the flagship "Oil for Roads" programme diverted ~USD 2.2 billion over 2021–2024, with USD 1.7 billion going to firms tied to Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel and more than 90% of promised roads never built; its chair stated "corruption is not incidental, it is the engine of South Sudan's decline." The country remains on the FATF grey list, and cattle-raiding directly degrades the herd asset.

·

Power Electrification is ~8%, installed capacity is ~109–130 MW (only about half operational), generation is essentially 100% thermal, and tariffs run around USD 0.40/kWh. This offers no basis for cold chains, abattoirs or milling.

·

Logistics and landlocked geography The country is landlocked; oil is pipeline-captive through Sudan; surface trade is forced through the high-cost Nimule–Mombasa corridor; the LAPSSET corridor is unbuilt; and there is no functioning rail.

·

Capital and feedstock dependency Oil has been pre-sold — regular production through ~2027 is pledged as loan collateral, and Dubai's HBK DOP agreed to lend €12bn (USD 12.9bn) for oil through at least 2043 with South Sudan receiving "$10 less per barrel of oil in comparison with the international benchmark" (Bloomberg, 26 Apr 2024). Crude is single-buyer (China) and single-corridor (Port Sudan), a risk realised repeatedly in the 2024 shutdown and 2025 drone attacks.

·

Skills and human capital Adult literacy is ~35%, there is no TVET or industrial base, and the oil sector remains reliant on expatriate technical manpower, with even petroleum graduates struggling to find employment.

·

Institutions There is no operative industrial or beneficiation strategy, no operational SEZ, a tiny banking system with no stock exchange, and currency collapse alongside high inflation. These are why paper endowment in oil, herd and timber does not yet become real continental supply.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in South Sudan’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

An aspirational allocation is not a capability claim. South Sudan holds lines against which capability must still be built. Nothing here should be read as present capacity, and the instrument’s value to South Sudan lies in the demand certainty, not in near-term supply.

05

Security and governance are the first gate, not a background condition. Active and recurrent armed conflict, elite capture and cattle-raiding that directly degrades the herd asset sit ahead of any commercial step. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found in its 101-page report of 18 September 2025 that the flagship "Oil for Roads" programme diverted some USD 2.2 billion over 2021 to 2024, with USD 1.7 billion going to firms tied to Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel and more than 90 per cent of promised roads never built.

06

Power cannot yet support a cold chain, an abattoir or a mill. Electrification stands at about 8 per cent, installed capacity at roughly 109 to 130 MW of which half is operational, generation is entirely thermal, and tariffs run at about USD 0.40 per kWh. Hydropower potential on the Nile across five identified sites could add up to 2,600 MW, but installed renewable capacity is about 1 per cent of the mix.

07

Logistics are the decisive constraint and every route is contested. The country is landlocked with minimal paved roads, no functioning rail and no domestic route to a port. Crude flows solely through a pipeline of about 1,600 km across Sudan to Port Sudan, surface trade is forced through the Nimule–Mombasa corridor at high cost, and the LAPSSET corridor remains largely unbuilt and stalled.

08

Capital and feedstock are already committed to others. Regular oil production through about 2027 is pledged as collateral for past loans, and per Bloomberg of 26 April 2024, citing a UN Security Council panel report, Dubai's Hamad Bin Khalifa Department of Projects agreed to lend EUR 12 billion for oil through at least 2043, with South Sudan receiving USD 10 less per barrel than the international benchmark. Single-buyer and single-corridor risk has been realised repeatedly, in the 2024 shutdown and the 2025 drone attacks.

09

The skills base cannot yet staff an industrial step. Adult literacy is around 35 per cent, among the four lowest in the world, there is virtually no TVET or industrial skills cluster, and the oil sector remains dependent on foreign technical manpower, with even petroleum graduates reporting difficulty gaining employment.

10

Institutions offer no industrial scaffolding. There is no operative beneficiation or industrial strategy, no operational special economic zone, a tiny banking system, no stock exchange, currency collapse and high inflation, and the country remains on the FATF grey list. FDI into manufacturing is negligible.

11

The meat position requires a long, strictly sequenced build. The audit sets out the order: basic security and an end to cattle-raiding; a functioning veterinary, disease-control and traceability system with at least one internationally recognised disease-free zone, which is the binding gate on any meat export; export-grade abattoirs with reliable power and cold chain; all-weather roads from Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria to the Nimule and Mombasa corridor; and EAC sanitary harmonisation. None of these is near-term.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

South Sudan's Draft 1 bundle rests on livestock and its direct by-products — live cattle and red meat, with hides, skins and leather as the natural beneficiation step off the same herd — supported at the margin by teak and hardwood from the oldest plantations in Africa and by Nile-watered oilseeds. It does not rest on oil, which the audit sets aside as raw, pipeline-captive, China-bound and pre-sold through 2027 and to at least 2043, nor on gold, gum arabic or fisheries, which are raw, undocumented or subsistence. What must be proven is sequential and none of it is near-term: security and an end to cattle-raiding in the pastoral states; a veterinary, disease-control and traceability system carrying at least one internationally recognised disease-free zone, which is the binding gate on any meat export; export-grade abattoirs with reliable power and cold chain; all-weather road links from Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria to the Nimule and Mombasa corridor; and EAC sanitary harmonisation to reach regional buyers. The allocation is justified under the fragile-state directive as a motivational carrot with no downside under match-or-release — a demand signal against which capability is built, not a capacity the country holds today.

What is not fixed is the bundle. South Sudan is shown 7 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask South Sudan to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2