Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
SudanBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Sudan — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
17
Draft 1 candidate lines for Sudan
The Minister’s brief · for Gibril Ibrahim · Sudan
Minister Ibrahim, no other nation on this continent holds what Sudan holds in gum arabic. The Acacia belt across some 500,000 square kilometres has furnished 70 to 80 per cent of the world's supply for decades, and the premium hashab grade your acacia yields remains the benchmark the global food, beverage and pharmaceutical industries cannot perfectly synthesise. Today that endowment is a demand certainty, not yet a delivered tonnage — the war has cut what Sudan ships, never what the world must still buy. World buyers spend roughly half a billion dollars a year on this gum, yet the value multiplies downstream: France alone imports 97 million dollars of raw gum and sells 205 million once processed. The Right of Supply gives Sudan a twenty-five-year first right to serve that demand, held honest by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; your correction, Minister, is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Sudan
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Gibril Ibrahim, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Sudan · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Ibrahim,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Sudan — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Sudan is in this room

Sudan's strongest endowment is gum arabic. The Acacia belt spanning some 500,000 square kilometres has supplied 70 to 80 per cent of world gum arabic for decades, yields the premium hashab grades that the global food, beverage and pharmaceutical industries treat as a benchmark, and faces no perfect synthetic substitute for many applications. The honest constraint is that this endowment is presently unrealisable at scale: civil war since April 2023 has cut gum exports to roughly 40 per cent of pre-war levels, collapsed the Khartoum processing and finance hub, and left Port Sudan as the sole, strategically exposed gateway. Sudan's allocation is therefore aspirational — a demand certainty against which capability is to be rebuilt, not a near-term supply commitment.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Sudan, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Sudan

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
17draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Sudan’s draft bundle. 17 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Gum arabic (raw + cleaned/kibbled). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 1 continental anchor · 3 strong contender · 8 emerging · 3 aspirational · 2 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Sudan is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 17 candidate lines proposed for Sudan below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Sudan. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Sudan will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Sudan will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
17 lines
Sudan’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Sudan at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Sudan’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Sudan’s own capability audit.

Gold and refined bullion

Sudan is a top-five African producer with an existing refinery, but the audit records that capability is captured by armed actors, that the sector is smuggling-dominated, and that it is oriented to the UAE rather than to Africa. The refinery is heavily underused and gold leaves the country largely as doré or semi-refined bullion.

Capability inversion · raw base, no finished good

Sesame oil, hulled seed and tahini

Sudan is the world's largest sesame producer and a top global exporter, but the audit states the crop is exported as raw seed with negligible hulling or oil processing. The endowment is in the seed, not in the processed product.

Raw base · industrial screen

Chilled and frozen halal meat

The herd is among Africa's largest, but the audit records that meat exports are tiny relative to live animals, with little abattoir or chilled capacity. Live sheep dominate exports at 85 to 90 per cent by value, going mostly to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Capability inversion · live vs processed

Cotton yarn and textiles

The historic long-staple base at Gezira is much diminished and the textile base has decayed; roughly 75 small factories around Gezira and Khartoum operate at a fraction of a design capacity of about 54,000 tonnes of yarn and 380 million yards of cloth. The audit tiers this as aspirational, with cotton exported mostly as raw lint.

Incumbency · decayed base

Iron and steel rebar

Rebar plants exist and iron-ore reserves are cited, but the audit records rebar output as limited and war-damaged, and notes that the Red Sea Hills and Baljrawih reserve figures of around 2 billion tonnes are large but partly unverified and low-grade.

Scale-matching · unverified base

Silver and manganese

The audit classes both as grey or insufficient. Silver is a semi-refined by-product of gold refining serving a niche, and manganese exists as occurrences in the Red Sea and Albeodh areas with minimal or raw processing.

Grey · insufficient evidence
08 · Endowment
What Sudan actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Sudan. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Three endowments define Sudan. The first is the Acacia "gum belt" — a stretch of Acacia senegal (hashab) and Acacia seyal (talha) spanning roughly 500,000 square kilometres — which has underpinned a structural 70 to 80 per cent share of world gum arabic supply for decades. UNCTAD's 2018 assessment put Sudan at 66 per cent of global supply; FAO and peer-reviewed studies cite 70 to 90 per cent. The country produces the premium hashab grades that the global food, beverage and pharmaceutical industries treat as a benchmark for the E414 emulsifier and stabiliser.

The second is minerals, and above all gold. Sudan's state Mineral Resources Company reported record output of 64.4 tonnes in 2024, up from 41.8 tonnes in 2022, with traditional and artisanal mining accounting for roughly 53 tonnes and concession companies roughly 11 tonnes. The World Gold Council ranked Sudan 16th globally and 5th in Africa for 2023. Confirmed reserves are reported by the Geological Research Authority at 533 tonnes, with more than 1,100 tonnes under evaluation. The Sudan Gold Refinery at Khartoum, opened in 2012, has a stated capacity of 900 kilogrammes of gold per day — among Africa's larger refineries. Beyond gold there is chromite from the Ingessana Hills, with resources of about 1 million tonnes grading up to 60 per cent Cr2O3, alongside manganese, gypsum, iron ore, silver, salt, feldspar, mica, marble and kaolin.

The third is agriculture. Sudan held the largest single share of global sesame production at 20.15 per cent in 2023, reaching some 1.37 million tonnes, ahead of India and Myanmar. Its livestock herd is among Africa's largest — approximately 31 million cattle, 41 million sheep, 32 million goats and 4.9 million camels — with livestock representing around 34 per cent of agricultural GDP and about 40 per cent of employment. Kenana Sugar Company is one of the world's largest integrated cane-sugar complexes. Sorghum is the staple cereal, with groundnuts, long-staple cotton from the Gezira Scheme, and hides and skins also featuring. Against this, the audit records that Sudan ranks 125th of 130 on the Economic Complexity Index for trade in 2024, and that the realistic diversification frontier is downstream agro-processing of the existing endowment rather than leaps into complex manufacturing.

The endowment in depth

Gold anchors the mineral endowment. Sudan's state Mineral Resources Company reported record output of 64.4 tonnes in 2024, generating roughly US$1.6bn in government revenue, up from 41.8 tonnes in 2022; of the 2024 total, traditional and artisanal mining produced about 53 tonnes and concession companies about 11 tonnes. The World Gold Council ranked Sudan 16th globally and 5th in Africa for 2023, and the Geological Research Authority reports confirmed reserves of 533 tonnes with more than 1,100 tonnes under evaluation. Production is dominated by more than a million artisanal and small-scale miners, and the Sudan Gold Refinery in Khartoum (opened 2012) has a stated capacity of 900 kg/day (~270–328 t/yr) plus silver — one of Africa's larger refineries, but heavily underused. Gold leaves the country largely as doré or semi-refined bullion bound for the UAE, which imported 29 tonnes directly in 2024, up from 17 tonnes in 2023; SWISSAID calculates that at least 400 tonnes were smuggled out between 2012 and 2024. Beyond gold, the endowment includes chromite from the Ingessana Hills (~100,000 t gross weight in 2015, resources of roughly 1 Mt grading up to 60% Cr₂O₃), plus manganese, gypsum, low-grade iron ore (Red Sea Hills/Baljrawih reserves cited at ~2 bn t), silver, salt, feldspar, mica, marble and kaolin — almost all exported raw or near-raw, as beneficiation beyond gold refining is essentially absent.

On energy, Sudan lost about 75% of its oil reserves to South Sudan at the 2011 secession but retained the export pipelines (GNPOC and Petrodar), the Bashayer Marine Terminal at Port Sudan and its refineries, earning transit and processing fees on South Sudanese crude (historically about US$11/bbl on GNPOC and US$9.10/bbl on Petrodar under the 2012 agreement). Its own crude reserves were around 1.25 bn barrels in 2021, with domestic production falling from roughly 130,000 bpd in 2013 to about 72,000 bpd in 2019 as fields neared depletion. The Khartoum Refinery (a CNPC/Sudapet joint venture) has about 100,000 bpd of capacity, the Port Sudan refinery is smaller and largely out of service, and El-Obeid runs at about 10,000 bpd. Total installed power capacity is around 3,676 MW with roughly 3,400 MW available, split about 48% hydro and 52% thermal, anchored by the Merowe Dam (1,250 MW, 2009) and Roseires (280 MW); electricity access was about 63% in 2022 and solar potential is among the best in Sub-Saharan Africa. War has badly damaged generation, the grid and fuel supply.

Agriculture and forestry hold the country's most distinctive endowments. The Acacia "gum belt" of Acacia senegal (hashab) and Acacia seyal (talha), spanning some 500,000 km², underpins a structural 70–80% share of world gum arabic supply. Sudan was also the world's largest sesame producer in 2023, with a 20.15% share reaching about 1.37 Mt, ahead of India and Myanmar. Its livestock herd is among Africa's largest — roughly 31 million cattle, 41 million sheep, 32 million goats and 4.9 million camels (2019) — with livestock contributing about 34% of agricultural GDP and 40% of employment, and sheep dominating live exports (85–90% by value) to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The Kenana Sugar Company is one of the world's largest integrated cane-sugar complexes, at roughly 400,000–500,000 t/yr of capacity, while sorghum is the staple cereal and groundnuts, long-staple cotton (the much-diminished Gezira Scheme) and hides and skins round out the base. Processing is thin throughout: gum, sesame and livestock are overwhelmingly exported raw or live.

The built and human base is shallow and, since April 2023, war-degraded. Manufacturing value added was just 6.7% of GDP in 2019, essentially unchanged from 6.9% in 2010, with MVA per capita of about US$148 — below the COMESA average of 9.8% MVA/GDP; actual output spans sugar refining (Kenana, plus White Nile Sugar in which Kenana holds 31.1%), cement, oil refining, food processing, textiles (~75 small factories with design capacity of ~54,000 t of yarn and 380 million yards of cloth, running at a fraction of capacity), edible oils and the gold refinery. The Khartoum/Bahri industrial corridor — the manufacturing heartland — has been heavily damaged, looted and depopulated, with Khartoum's population falling from about 6 million to 1 million, and Kenana's main Rabak refinery output falling from about 250,000 t to 125,000 t by 2024 before its ethanol plant was struck by RSF drones in May 2026. Human capital is large and young but lightly skilled, and the war has produced the world's largest displacement crisis — about 11.5 million internally displaced by December 2024 and more than 11.6 million displaced internally and abroad by early 2026 — while extreme poverty rose from 48% (2023) to 59% (2025) and government revenue collapsed from 10% of GDP (2022) to below 5% (2024–25). Logistics rest on a single maritime gateway at Port Sudan, now the de facto wartime capital under SAF control and also handling South Sudan's oil transit via Bashayer; the rail network (main line Port Sudan–Atbara–Khartoum, with branches to Nyala and Wadi Halfa) is dilapidated, carrying only about 6% of freight by 2009, and the road network is sparse and largely unpaved beyond the ~1,200 km Khartoum–Port Sudan highway.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Sudan ranks among the least complex economies in the world, 125th of 130 on the Economic Complexity Index (Trade, 2024, per OEC and the Atlas of Economic Complexity), reflecting an undiversified, raw-commodity export basket. The products carrying clear revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) and real export volume are gold, gum arabic, sesame and other oilseeds, sheep and goats, and groundnuts: in 2024 Sudan was the world's largest exporter of Sheep and Goats (US$727M), Other Oily Seeds (US$613M) and Ground Nut Meal (US$18.3M). The Atlas product space shows limited adjacency and the Complexity Outlook is constrained, with few complex products sitting near current capabilities. The realistic diversification frontier is therefore downstream agro-processing of the existing endowment — hulled and oil sesame, processed gum, chilled halal meat and leather, and refined sugar and ethanol — rather than leaps into complex manufacturing.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Sudan's clearest and most defensible right to be Africa's designated continental supplier is gum arabic (HS 1301.20). The advantage is structural rather than incidental: the country sits on the densest, highest-quality stretch of the Acacia senegal "gum belt", has supplied 70–80% of world gum arabic for decades (UNCTAD 2018 put its share at 66%, FAO and peer-reviewed studies cite 70–90%, and Al Jazeera in January 2026 confirmed a pre-war 70–80% market share), and produces the premium hashab grades that the global food, beverage and pharmaceutical industries treat as the benchmark E414 emulsifier and stabiliser. World import demand is real and growing — roughly US$0.5bn a year in HS 130120 trade, led by France, the United States, Germany, India and China — and gum arabic remains a critical input with no perfect synthetic substitute for many applications. The near-term processing step is technically modest: moving from raw lumps to cleaned and kibbled, then to spray-dried food- and pharma-grade powder, is achievable, and Sudan already holds cleaning, kibbling and limited powder capacity through the Gum Arabic Company, processors at Port Sudan and Afritec's partnership with France's Nexira. The value-capture prize is large — a 2025 peer-reviewed study records that France imported US$97M of raw gum in 2023 but exported US$205M of processed gum, a US$108M value-added, processing more than 60% of Europe's supply, with French export prices rising from US$1.58/kg to US$4.63/kg — value that onshore processing and SSMO certification could let Sudan capture.

The limits are equally clear, and they concern reliability rather than the endowment itself. The war has cut exports to about 48,000 tonnes in the 2023/24 season — roughly 40% of the pre-war level of 100,000–150,000 tonnes (Radio Dabanga/AllAfrica, February 2026) — collapsed Khartoum's processing and finance hub, and pushed gum increasingly into smuggling routes via Chad. Chad, the world's second supplier, and Nigeria are gaining share during Sudan's disruption, and the persistent raw-export default, together with desertification and climate risk to the belt, further erodes the position. None of these displaces the underlying endowment, but they weaken reliability and let competitors entrench; the defensible claim rests on the certainty of sustained global demand for a resource Sudan uniquely holds, not on any near-term guarantee of restored supply.

Current reality

Sudan is a top-tier raw-commodity supplier — gum arabic, gold, sesame, livestock — with almost no domestic value-addition, and an industrial base and logistics network now severely degraded by war. Nominal GDP was approximately US$49.9 billion in 2024. Real GDP contracted an estimated 29.4 per cent in 2023 and a further 14 per cent in 2024 after civil war erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. Manufacturing value added was just 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2019, essentially unchanged from 6.9 per cent in 2010, and below the COMESA average of 9.8 per cent. The Khartoum and Bahri industrial corridor — the manufacturing heartland — has been heavily damaged, looted and depopulated since April 2023; Khartoum's population fell from around 6 million to around 1 million.

The human and fiscal position is correspondingly constrained. Around 11.5 million people were internally displaced by December 2024, with more than 11.6 million displaced internally and abroad by early 2026 and returns beginning in 2025. Extreme poverty rose from 48 per cent in 2023 to 59 per cent in 2025, while government revenues collapsed from 10 per cent of GDP in 2022 to below 5 per cent in 2024 to 2025. Port Sudan on the Red Sea is the single maritime gateway and the de facto wartime capital; rail is dilapidated, carrying only around 6 per cent of freight by 2009, and the wider road network is sparse and largely unpaved. On this basis Sudan's allocations are aspirational — demand certainty against which capability is to be rebuilt, not near-term deliverable capacity.

Read under the South Sudan Principle

Sudan holds an aspirational allocation. Nothing on these pages is a near-term capacity claim. The bundle is the demand certainty against which capability is built, and it is deliberately held open while the state rebuilds.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 17 candidate lines · will change

Sudan’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Sudan’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Sudan will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Sudan’s 17 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 1Strong Contender 3Emerging 8Aspirational 3Grey 2
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Raw cane / refined sugar

Kenana world-class complex; Nile + Gulf anchors · Maturity: Refined produced; war-damaged · Competitiveness: Africa large net importer ~15 Mt/yr
EMERGING
USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)
170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri
170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add
170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 796.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria USD 931.8 mSudan your own imports USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Sudan is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: AfDB; IndexBox · 2017/2024

Gold (doré → refined bullion)

64.4 t 2024; 5th in Africa; refinery exists · Maturity: Doré/semi-refined; refinery underused · Competitiveness: Large continent-wide
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 2.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: SMRC; USGS; WGC · 2023/2024

Iron & steel (rebar)

Rebar plants; iron-ore reserves · Maturity: Limited rebar; war-damaged · Competitiveness: Large African
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 1.61 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
721410Iron or non-alloy steel; bars and rods, forged, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, but including those twisted after
721420Iron or non-alloy steel; bars and rods, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, containing indentations, ribs, grooves or
721430Iron or non-alloy steel; bars and rods, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, including those twisted after rolling, of
721491Iron or non-alloy steel; bars and rods, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, n.e.c. in heading no. 7214, of rectangula
721499Iron or non-alloy steel; bars and rods, hot-rolled, hot-drawn or hot-extruded, n.e.c. in heading no. 7214, other than of
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 14.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Djibouti USD 187.8 mSenegal USD 157.6 mEthiopia USD 151.7 mMozambique USD 89.1 mGuinea-Bissau USD 81.6 mMorocco USD 75.3 mSomalia USD 68.7 mGuinea USD 57.4 m

Source: USGS MYB · 2015

Ethanol / biofuel

Kenana ~65 m L/yr, 90% exported · Maturity: Produced; plant struck 2026 · Competitiveness: Growing continental
EMERGING
USD 511.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
220710Undenatured ethyl alcohol; of an alcoholic strength by volume of 80% vol. or higher
220720Ethyl alcohol and other spirits; denatured, of any strength
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 100.3 mCameroon USD 55.5 mGhana USD 54.6 mKenya USD 52.7 mAngola USD 42.1 mTanzania USD 39.2 mCote dIvoire USD 32.3 mDR Congo USD 15.9 m

Source: Kenana/IDE · 2016/2026

Cotton lint (→ yarn/textiles)

Historic long-staple; Gezira; Bt cotton · Maturity: Mostly raw lint; textile base decayed · Competitiveness: Large African apparel
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 392 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520100Cotton; not carded or combed
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 281.8 mMauritius USD 41.3 mAlgeria USD 23.8 mLesotho USD 21.2 mMorocco USD 14.4 mTunisia USD 2.6 mMozambique USD 2.4 mSouth Africa USD 2.1 m

Source: Gezira/Britannica · 2024

Gypsum / cement

Large gypsum reserves; cement plants · Maturity: Some cement; gypsum raw · Competitiveness: Regional construction
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 386.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252010Gypsum; anhydrite
252020Plasters; (consisting of calcined gypsum or calcium sulphate), whether or not coloured, with or without small quantities
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 176.6 mGhana USD 32.7 mCote dIvoire USD 18.3 mUganda USD 16.7 mCameroon USD 15.2 mBurkina Faso USD 14.6 mSenegal USD 12.1 mZambia USD 9.3 m

Source: USGS MYB · 2015

Groundnuts (raw → oil/meal)

US$343M exports; top groundnut-meal exporter · Maturity: Mostly raw; some meal · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 277.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120210Groundnuts in shell, not roasted or otherwise cooked
120220Shelled groundnuts, whether or not broken (excluding roasted or otherwise cooked)
120230Ground-nuts; seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, whether or not shelled or broken
120241Ground-nuts; other than seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, in shell
120242Ground-nuts; other than seed, not roasted or otherwise cooked, shelled, whether or not broken,
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Algeria USD 132.8 mSouth Africa USD 33.3 mUganda USD 25.6 mRwanda USD 19 mMorocco USD 17 mLibya USD 8.7 mKenya USD 8 mTunisia USD 5.8 m

Source: OEC · 2024

Sorghum / dried legumes

Large rain-fed output; legumes US$207M · Maturity: Raw grain/pulses · Competitiveness: Regional food-security
EMERGING
USD 220.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
100700Grain sorghum
100710Cereals; grain sorghum, seed
100790Cereals; grain sorghum, other than seed
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Sudan imported USD 33.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Kenya USD 45.5 mSudan your own imports USD 33.8 mSouth Sudan USD 31.4 mEritrea USD 27.3 mSouth Africa USD 24.5 mRwanda USD 18.3 mMadagascar USD 9.8 mZimbabwe USD 7 m

Sudan is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OEC; FAO CFSAM · 2024

Sesame seed (raw → hulled/oil)

World's largest producer 20.15%; top exporter · Maturity: Raw seed; negligible processing · Competitiveness: Moderate continental; large global
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 178.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Sudan imported USD 1.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 95 mTunisia USD 24.8 mMorocco USD 20.9 mAlgeria USD 18.9 mTogo USD 3.5 mLibya USD 3.5 mSouth Africa USD 3.1 mMozambique USD 2.4 m

Source: FAOSTAT; OEC · 2023/2024

Live sheep & goats

World's largest exporter US$727M · Maturity: Live; minimal processing · Competitiveness: Strong Gulf; modest intra-African
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 167.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010410Sheep; live
010420Goats; live
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 62.8 mSouth Africa USD 45.5 mLibya USD 42 mGuinea USD 3.4 mGhana USD 1.7 mMauritius USD 1.6 mKenya USD 1.6 mEgypt USD 1.5 m

Source: OEC; FAO · 2024

Hides, skins & leather

Tens of millions of hides; large herd · Maturity: Raw/poorly processed · Competitiveness: Continental + global tanning
EMERGING
USD 112.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
410110Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing <= 8 kg when dried, <= 10 kg when dry-salted and . . .
410120Raw hides and skins; whole, unsplit, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin not exceeding 8kg when simply dri
410121Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing > 14 kg, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired . . .
410122Raw butts and bends of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split
410129Raw hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split . . .
410150Hides and skins; raw, whole, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin exceeding 16 kg
410190Hides and skins; other than whole, but including butts, bends and bellies, of bovine (including. buffalo) and equine ani
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 93.1 mEgypt USD 7.4 mGhana USD 5.1 mUganda USD 3.5 mKenya USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.2 mBenin USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 m

Source: FAO; Wilson · 2018

Sheep/goat & cattle meat (halal chilled/frozen)

Huge herd; meat export tiny vs live · Maturity: Live-dominated; little abattoir/cold chain · Competitiveness: Large African + Gulf
EMERGING
USD 87.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
020410Meat; of sheep, lamb carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled
020421Meat; of sheep, carcasses and half-carcasses (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb), fresh or chilled
020422Meat; of sheep (including lamb), cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), fresh or chilled
020423Meat; of sheep (including lamb), boneless cuts, fresh or chilled
020430Meat; of sheep, lamb carcasses and half-carcasses, frozen
020441Meat; of sheep, carcasses and half-carcasses (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb), frozen
020442Meat; of sheep (including lamb), cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), frozen
020443Meat; of sheep (including lamb), boneless cuts, frozen
020450Meat; of goats, fresh, chilled or frozen
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Mauritius USD 24.5 mEgypt USD 16.9 mLiberia USD 11.6 mLibya USD 8 mSouth Africa USD 5.9 mGhana USD 3.9 mSeychelles USD 3.7 mTunisia USD 2.2 m

Source: FAO; OEC · 2024

Molasses & animal feed

Kenana feed/molasses exported to Gulf · Maturity: By-product produced · Competitiveness: Moderate continental
EMERGING
USD 34.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
170310Sugars; molasses, from sugar cane, resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar
170390Sugars; molasses, from sugar beet, resulting from the extraction or refining of sugar
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 10.6 mUganda USD 4.5 mTunisia USD 4 mMorocco USD 3.7 mSouth Africa USD 3 mMalawi USD 1.6 mNamibia USD 1.4 mBotswana USD 1.3 m

Source: Kenana/IDE · 2016

Silver

By-product of gold refining · Maturity: Semi-refined · Competitiveness: Niche
GREY
USD 27.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710610Metals; silver powder
710691Metals; silver, unwrought, (but not powder)
710692Metals; silver, semi-manufactured
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 10.5 mSouth Africa USD 5.6 mAlgeria USD 5.5 mTunisia USD 2.4 mMauritius USD 1.6 mMorocco USD 1.2 mGuinea USD 0.1 mLibya USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MYB · 2019

Gum arabic (raw + cleaned/kibbled)

70–80% world supply; unique Acacia belt · Maturity: Mostly raw; some kibbling/cleaning; minimal spray-drying · Competitiveness: Global input ~US$0.5bn import market; African demand modest
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 19.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
130120Gum Arabic
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Eswatini USD 7.1 mSouth Africa USD 4.4 mAlgeria USD 1.9 mEthiopia USD 1.7 mMorocco USD 1.5 mEgypt USD 1.1 mBurkina Faso USD 0.6 mTunisia USD 0.3 m

Source: UNCTAD; FAO; WITS/Comtrade · 2018/2023

Manganese

Occurrences Red Sea/Albeodh · Maturity: Minimal/raw · Competitiveness: Global steel/battery
GREY
USD 12 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260200Manganese ores and concentrates, including ferruginous manganese ores and concentrates with a manganese content of 20% o
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 8.8 mSouth Africa USD 2.4 mAngola USD 0.4 mCote dIvoire USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.1 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MYB · 2015

Chromite (ore → ferrochrome)

Ingessana resources ~1 Mt @ up to 60% Cr2O3 · Maturity: Raw ore export only · Competitiveness: Niche global stainless chain
EMERGING
USD 1.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261000Chromium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Sudan imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 1 mMorocco USD 0.2 mEgypt USD 0.2 mZambia USD 0.1 mAngola USD 0.1 mTunisia USD 0.1 mNigeria USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MYB · 2015

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Sudan is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Sudan buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Sudan is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 6.73 bn

Sudan’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

17

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierSudan imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Raw cane / refined sugarEMERGINGUSD 796.2 mUSD 8.84 bn
Sorghum / dried legumesEMERGINGUSD 33.8 mUSD 220.8 m
Iron & steel (rebar)ASPIRATIONALUSD 14.8 mUSD 1.61 bn
Gold (doré → refined bullion)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 2.2 mUSD 2.99 bn
Sesame seed (raw → hulled/oil)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 1.3 mUSD 178.4 m
Ethanol / biofuelEMERGINGUSD 1 mUSD 511.2 m
Gypsum / cementASPIRATIONALUSD 0.2 mUSD 386.9 m
Sheep/goat & cattle meat (halal chilled/frozen)EMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 87.8 m
Cotton lint (→ yarn/textiles)ASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 392 m
Groundnuts (raw → oil/meal)EMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 277.3 m
Live sheep & goatsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 167.5 m
Hides, skins & leatherEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 112.6 m
Molasses & animal feedEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 34.8 m
SilverGREYUSD 0 mUSD 27.3 m

Left-hand column: what Sudan itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Sudan’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 17 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Sudan’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Sudan. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Sudan’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Sudan’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01UgandaUSD 1.95 bn
02NigeriaUSD 1.35 bn
03EgyptUSD 1.3 bn
04MoroccoUSD 1.25 bn
05AlgeriaUSD 1.16 bn
06SudanUSD 830 m
07South AfricaUSD 799.4 m
08DjiboutiUSD 612.7 m
09KenyaUSD 500.4 m
10SomaliaUSD 462.4 m
11SenegalUSD 169.7 m
12EthiopiaUSD 153.4 m
13LibyaUSD 121.2 m
14MauritiusUSD 105.1 m
15GhanaUSD 98 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Sudan. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Sudan would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Sudan to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

A durable end to the war and unified institutions

A durable cessation of conflict and the restoration of unified institutions controlling minerals and trade.

02

A rebuilt or relocated processing hub

Reconstruction of the Khartoum/Bahri industrial and financial hub, or relocation of processing to secure Port Sudan.

03

Onshore gum-arabic processing and certification

Targeted investment in gum-arabic cleaning, kibbling and spray-drying, plus internationally recognised quality certification, so value-addition stays onshore.

04

Rehabilitated corridors and reopened borders

Rehabilitation of Port Sudan, rail and the Khartoum–Port Sudan corridor, and the re-opening of regional borders.

05

Reliable industrial power

Reliable power from rehabilitated Merowe and Roseires plus new solar, sufficient for agro-processing or smelting.

06

Formalised gold and livestock sectors

Formalisation of the gold sector by curbing smuggling and channelling output through the refinery, and of livestock through abattoirs, cold chain and disease-free zoning for chilled-meat export.

The binding constraints
·

The active civil war The overriding blocker is the civil war since April 2023 — destruction of the Khartoum/Bahri industrial base, RSF capture of the goldfields and the gum-growing Darfur and Kordofan regions, more than 11.5 million displaced, banking collapse and contested corridors.

·

Power, rail and a single exposed port Power is unreliable and war-damaged, rail is dilapidated and roads are sparse, and Port Sudan is the sole, strategically exposed maritime gateway.

·

Absent capital Capital is absent: foreign direct investment is frozen and government revenue fell below 5% of GDP in 2024–25.

·

Skills loss and brain drain Skills loss and brain drain are severe following the destruction of Khartoum's skilled-labour base and the collapse of education and health services.

·

Single-buyer and feedstock dependencies Feedstock and single-buyer dependencies are acute — livestock and gold are concentrated on Gulf and UAE buyers, and gum's processing and finance hub was a single point in Khartoum.

·

A war economy and corroded governance Governance and security are corroded by a war economy in which gold finances both belligerents.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Sudan’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

An aspirational allocation is not a capability claim. Sudan holds lines against which capability must still be built. Nothing here should be read as present capacity, and the instrument’s value to Sudan lies in the demand certainty, not in near-term supply.

05

The active civil war is the overriding blocker. Since April 2023 the conflict has destroyed the Khartoum and Bahri industrial base, placed goldfields and the gum-growing Darfur and Kordofan regions under RSF control, displaced more than 11.5 million people and collapsed the banking system. Corridors are contested.

06

Gum arabic output has already fallen sharply. Exports fell to around 48,000 tonnes in the 2023/24 season, roughly 40 per cent of pre-war levels of 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes, and gum is increasingly smuggled via Chad. Chad, the world's second supplier, and Nigeria are gaining share during Sudan's disruption.

07

Processing and finance sat at a single point. The gum arabic processing and finance hub was concentrated in Khartoum and has collapsed. Reconstruction of that hub, or relocation of processing to secure Port Sudan, is a precondition for any onshore value-addition.

08

Logistics are single-threaded and degraded. Port Sudan is the sole, strategically exposed maritime gateway; rail is dilapidated and roads sparse; the roughly 1,200 kilometre Khartoum to Port Sudan highway is the key artery. Border points to Chad, South Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia are contested or constrained.

09

Power is unreliable and war-damaged. Installed capacity was around 3,676 MW with about 3,400 MW available, roughly 48 per cent hydro and 52 per cent thermal, and electricity access was around 63 per cent in 2022. War has badly damaged generation, the grid and fuel supply.

10

Capital and fiscal capacity are absent. FDI into processing is minimal and now frozen, and government revenue fell below 5 per cent of GDP in 2024 to 2025. Gulf and Russian strategic interest in Red Sea access and gold persists and will shape any reconstruction.

11

Single-buyer dependencies are acute. Livestock and gold are concentrated on Gulf and UAE buyers; gold flows have historically accounted for around 99 per cent of official gold exports to the UAE. Governance is corroded by a war economy in which gold finances both belligerents.

12

The data environment is war-degraded. Official statistical series largely stop around 2022 to 2023 and Sudan reports irregularly to UN Comtrade, so 2023 to 2025 figures are estimates, mirror data, or from belligerent-controlled bodies, and should be treated as directional. Restored statistical capacity is required to support match-or-release procurement.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Sudan's Draft 1 bundle rests on endowments that are geological and biological rather than industrial: the Acacia gum belt, a gold resource ranked fifth in Africa, the world's largest sesame crop and one of Africa's largest livestock herds. What must be proven is the capacity to convert any of it onshore. The audit is explicit that beneficiation beyond gold refining is essentially absent, that manufacturing value added stood at 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2019, and that the country ranks 125th of 130 on economic complexity. The named preconditions are a durable cessation of conflict and unified institutions controlling minerals and trade; reconstruction of the Khartoum and Bahri hub or relocation of processing to Port Sudan; targeted investment in gum cleaning, kibbling and spray-drying with internationally recognised certification; rehabilitation of Port Sudan, rail and the Khartoum to Port Sudan corridor; reliable power from rehabilitated Merowe and Roseires plus new solar; formalisation of the gold and livestock sectors; and restored statistical capacity. The benchmarks that would change the tiering are equally specific: gum arabic output back above roughly 80,000 tonnes with operating powder capacity would consolidate the anchor position, a functioning export-grade abattoir and cold chain would move meat from emerging to strong, and refined sugar capacity restored to the pre-war level of around 500,000 tonnes with surplus would do the same for sugar.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Sudan is shown 17 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Sudan to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2