Right of Supply — Rwanda

01 · Correspondence

From the Chair · to Yusuf Murangwa, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Rwanda · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Murangwa,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Rwanda — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Rwanda is in this room

Rwanda's strongest endowment is refined tin and the certified 3T beneficiation cluster around it. LuNa Smelter in Kigali is the first tin mill in Africa to hold RMAP certification, processing approximately 200 to 230 tonnes of cassiterite concentrate a month into refined tin of 99.97 per cent purity, supported by blockchain traceability and accredited assaying, and resting on genuine endowment: tin at some 4,100 tonnes of contained metal in 2024, tungsten at 1,300 tonnes and the largest output in Africa, and tantalum ranked second to third globally. The honest constraint is twofold. First, integrity: the UN Group of Experts report S/2024/969 and Global Witness document that Congolese 3T and gold are laundered through Rwanda and re-exported, so reported production overstates domestic geology and the European Union has placed its 2024 raw-materials partnership under review. Second, scale and cost: a single smelter, a sub-600 MW power system and two long land corridors that can consume 30 to 40 per cent of goods' value. Rwanda is a credible supplier of refined tin and 3T processing services, and a regional cement supplier; it is not yet a scale manufacturer.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Rwanda, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

02 · Executive summary

The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Rwanda

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports

620USD bn sourced off-continent

136.75USD bn measured procurement

13draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Rwanda’s draft bundle. 13 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Cement & clinker, Refined tin (metal), Tantalum/niobium ore. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 5 strong contender · 5 emerging · 2 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Rwanda is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance

What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 13 candidate lines proposed for Rwanda below.

Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
No claim value is stated for Rwanda. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Rwanda will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Rwanda will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize

709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn

Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources

The market

USD 620 bn

From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize

The prize

USD 136.75 bn

Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included

Band A

≈USD 207 bn total

Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated

Band B

13 lines

Rwanda’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2

Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Rwanda at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead

Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor

USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT

Band B · estimated tender layer

≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65

Strategic agriculture & food27.03

Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02

Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53

Infrastructure & transport6.60

Currency, governance & elections5.54

Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic

Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness

Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline

Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Rwanda’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin

Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana

Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline

What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Rwanda’s own capability audit.

Lithium and rare earths

Endowment indications exist and the Rwanda Development Board lists lithium and gemstone exploration, but there is no commercial production. The audit classifies this as grey and insufficient evidence, and states plainly that it should not be allocated.

Non-production screen

Refined tungsten products (APT and beyond)

Rwanda is Africa's largest tungsten producer at 1,300 tonnes of tungsten content in 2024, yet refining occurs offshore: the first Nyakabingo shipment reached Global Tungsten and Powders in Towanda, Pennsylvania on 30 September 2025, and by June 2026 more than 320 tonnes had been shipped. Value capture stays offshore until domestic APT processing exists, so the claim holds at concentrate stage only.

Capability inversion

Refined tantalum and niobium metal

A coltan refinery under Power Resources International was announced but its operational status is unconfirmed, which the audit marks aspirational. The allocation stands as raw concentrate under HS 2615 and is upgradeable only on a financed, operational refinery, not an announcement.

Raw base, not finished good

Value-added tea (blended, packaged, branded)

Some 97.3 per cent of Rwandan tea is exported raw and unblended, with 80 per cent moving through the Mombasa auction, leaving minimal value addition. Value-added tea is held as aspirational, with activation benchmarked to the value-addition share rising above roughly 10 per cent of made-tea exports.

Raw base, industrial screen

Lake Kivu methane products and light manufactures

Methane-derived products rest on genuine endowment but stand at power plus a pilot CNG stage, and light manufactures in the special economic zones are assembly and cut-make-trim only. Both are held as aspirational, with activation benchmarked to installed power reliably above 600 MW and a second tin smelter or a tantalum refinery online.

Scale-matching

The 520-tonne, second-largest tantalum claim

The widely circulated figure of 520 tonnes and second-largest producer does not appear in USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 or 2026, and the USGS tables list alphabetically and carry no rank statement. The audit instructs that it be treated as unverified.

Verification screen

08 · Endowment

What Rwanda actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Rwanda. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Rwanda's 3T mineralisation sits in the Mesoproterozoic Kibaran belt, in S-type granites and pegmatites, and is worked predominantly by artisanal and small-scale operators; more than 82 per cent of 3T output came from artisanal and small-scale mining in 2015. Tin is the largest mineral by mined volume historically, at an estimated 4,100 tonnes of tin content in 2024 and 4,600 tonnes for 2025e, a derived global rank of about 11th to 12th. Tungsten output of 1,300 tonnes of tungsten content in 2024 is the sole African entry in the USGS world tungsten table, confirming Rwanda as Africa's largest tungsten producer at a derived rank of roughly 6th to 7th; Trinity Metals, whose largest shareholder is the UK-based TechMet, produces about 120 tonnes of wolframite each month from the Nyakabingo mine in Rulindo district. Tantalum mine production was 374 tonnes of contained tantalum in 2024 with 400 tonnes estimated for 2025, a derived global rank of 3rd in 2024 and 2nd in 2025e, consistently behind the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The differentiator is domestic processing. LuNa Smelter in Kigali, a venture of Poland's Luma Holding and Rwanda's Ngali Holdings which redeveloped the former Karuruma/SOMIRWA smelter in 2018, is the first tin mill in Africa to be RMAP certified, qualified on 21 February 2020. It processes approximately 200 to 230 tonnes of cassiterite concentrate per month into refined tin of 99.97 per cent purity, supported by blockchain traceability and ISO/IEC 17025-accredited assaying. The Gasabo Gold Refinery in the Kigali Special Economic Zone carries nameplate capacity of about 96 tonnes of gold a year to 999.9 purity. CIMERWA at Rusizi is Rwanda's only integrated cement producer at 600,000 tonnes a year, acquired 99.94 per cent by National Cement of Kenya in January 2024, with a USD 190 million, 720,000-tonne-a-year clinker plant at Musanze announced. Lake Kivu holds approximately 60 billion cubic metres of methane and 300 billion cubic metres of carbon dioxide, one of only three such lakes globally, with methane that could add up to 960 megawatts of generating capacity; KivuWatt has run 26 MW since December 2015 and Shema Power Lake Kivu holds a 56 MW power purchase agreement generating around 37.5 MW.

Agriculture contributed about 25 per cent of GDP in 2024, with high altitude and fertile volcanic soils supporting year-round high-value cultivation. Made tea reached about 40,003 tonnes to June 2024, with exports of 38,467.7 tonnes worth USD 114.8 million in FY2023/24; some 97.3 per cent leaves raw and unblended and 80 per cent moves through the Mombasa auction, where Rwandan tea fetches premium prices. Coffee exports were about 20,000 tonnes worth some USD 116 million in FY2022/23, drawn from around 400,000 smallholder families, 97 per cent arabica, with specialty positioning at 85-plus cupping scores. Against this, the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas ranks Rwanda as the 120th most complex country, worsening 15 positions over a decade, driven by a lack of diversification of exports. Revealed comparative advantage above one sits in coffee and tea, stone and glass driven by gold and cement re-exports, foodstuffs, and 3T and niobium-tantalum ores. The Atlas implies few high-complexity adjacent jumps; the credible route is vertical, from ore to refined metal and from green leaf to blended and branded agro-products, rather than horizontal leaps into electronics or machinery.

The endowment in depth

Rwanda's mineral endowment is concentrated in the Mesoproterozoic Kibaran belt (S-type granites and pegmatites) and is predominantly artisanal and small-scale, with more than 82% of 3T output drawn from ASM in 2015 (Responsible Mines/IGF, 2018). Tin (cassiterite) is the largest mineral by mined volume historically, at an estimated 4,100 tonnes tin content in 2024 and 4,600 tonnes (2025e), a derived global rank of about 11th-12th (USGS MCS 2026). Tungsten (wolframite) stands at 1,300 tonnes W content (2024 and 2025e) — the sole African entry in the USGS world tungsten table, confirming Rwanda as Africa's largest tungsten producer, with Trinity Metals (largest shareholder the UK-based TechMet) producing about 120 tonnes of wolframite each month from the Nyakabingo mine in Rulindo district; the first WO3 shipment reached Global Tungsten & Powders' Towanda, Pennsylvania plant on 30 September 2025, and by June 2026 more than 320 tonnes had been shipped, up to 20% of the United States' monthly consumption of primary tungsten concentrate. Tantalum production was 374 tonnes contained Ta (2024) and 400 tonnes (2025e), a derived rank of 3rd in 2024 and 2nd in 2025e, consistently behind DRC. Gold was the largest mineral export by value at USD 1.5 billion in 2024, with total mineral exports rising roughly 500% from USD 373 million (2017) to USD 1.75 billion (2024) — the vast majority transit and re-export rather than domestic mine output. The differentiator is domestic processing: LuNa Smelter in Kigali (Polish Luma Holding with Rwandan Ngali Holdings, redeveloped from the former Karuruma/SOMIRWA smelter in 2018) is the first tin mill in Africa to be RMAP certified, processing approximately 200-230 tonnes of cassiterite concentrate per month into refined tin of 99.97% purity, alongside the Gasabo Gold Refinery (formerly Aldango, established 2017, Kigali SEZ) with nameplate capacity of about 96 tonnes of gold per year to 999.9 purity.

Rwanda's energy endowment is anchored by a globally rare resource. Installed generation capacity has risen from about 224.6 MW toward a stated 556 MW target (REG), with a mix of hydro (the regional Rusumo plant of 80 MW shared with Burundi and Tanzania; Nyabarongo II at 43.5 MW), Lake Kivu methane-to-power, solar (about 12.23 MW on-grid) and peat. Lake Kivu holds, per MIT Technology Review, approximately 60 billion cubic metres of methane and 300 billion cubic metres of carbon dioxide, and its methane could add up to 960 MW of generating capacity — more than six times Rwanda's current total. Operational today are KivuWatt (ContourGlobal) at 26 MW since December 2015 (with a designed expansion of a further 75 MW) and Shema Power Lake Kivu on a 56 MW PPA, generating about 37.5 MW. Lake Kivu is one of only three such lakes globally, though reliability and cost remain constraints for heavy industry, with preferential industrial tariffs offered in the SEZs.

Agriculture contributed about 25% of GDP in 2024 (NISR), with high altitude and fertile volcanic soils supporting year-round high-value cultivation. Tea reached roughly 40,003 tonnes of made tea (June 2024), with exports of 38,467.7 tonnes worth USD 114.8 million in FY2023/24 (NAEB/RDB), yet about 97.3% is exported raw and unblended and 80% moves through the Mombasa auction — minimal value addition — even as Rwanda was the 3rd-highest tea-export-dependent country (10.3% of exports, 2024) and its tea fetches premium prices. Coffee saw about 20,000 tonnes exported worth roughly USD 116 million (FY2022/23) across some 400,000 smallholder families, 97% arabica with specialty positioning at 85-plus cupping scores. Pyrethrum is a genuine niche where Rwanda has standing, though precise volume and rank are grey. Horticulture and floriculture span avocados, French beans, passion fruit, macadamia and cut flowers, the last rising 135% year-on-year from 2023 to 2024, while fisheries and aquaculture remain nascent.

The existing industrial base is emerging but thin. Manufacturing contributed 9.9% of GDP (CAGR 21.5%, 2018-2022, NISR), with broader industry at about 21-22% of GDP (2024), and UNIDO classifies Rwanda among emerging industrial economies. Named facilities include CIMERWA (the only integrated cement producer, 600,000 tonnes per year at Rusizi; National Cement of Kenya acquired 99.94% in January 2024, with a USD 190 million, 720,000-tonne-per-year clinker plant announced at Musanze), Mara Phones (smartphone assembly, opened October 2019) and C&H Garments (textiles), the latter two in the Kigali SEZ. Industrial parks comprise the Kigali SEZ (Phase 1 of 98 hectares fully booked with 31 firms, plus Phase 2), the Bugesera SEZ (335 hectares, a joint venture with ARISE IIP targeting 75-plus industries, 45,000 jobs, USD 1.2 billion value-add and USD 400 million FDI) and eight provincial parks, with more than 320 factories established and about 70% operational. Human capital remains majority-agrarian — 66% of the employed are in elementary agriculture, forestry and fishing occupations (2023) — served by a TVET system of eight IPRCs under Rwanda Polytechnic, with NST-2 targeting training of one million coders and 500,000 in advanced ICT over five years. Infrastructure is defined by the binding landlocked constraint: two long corridors (the Northern Corridor, Kigali-Mombasa, over 1,700 km, and the Central Corridor, Kigali-Dar es Salaam, about 1,495 km) where transport can consume 30-40% of goods' value, complemented by Kigali International Airport and the Bugesera International Airport under construction, with vulnerability exposed by the 2025 Dar es Salaam port closure that forced rerouting to Mombasa.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Rwanda's economic complexity is the single most important framing fact and it is unfavourable. Per the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas, Rwanda ranks as the 120th most complex country, worsening 15 positions over a decade, driven by a lack of diversification of exports; the Atlas nonetheless projects growth of about 4.3% annually, placing Rwanda in the top decile of countries globally — a reflection of income-versus-complexity catch-up rather than genuine complexity gains. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA greater than 1) sits in agricultural products (coffee, tea), stone and glass (driven by gold and cement re-exports), foodstuffs, and minerals (3T concentrates plus gold), with highly positive net exports in niobium/tantalum/zirconium ores (HS 2615).

The Atlas implies few high-complexity adjacent jumps from this base. The credible strategy is therefore vertical rather than horizontal: moving ore to refined metal (tin already achieved through LuNa; tantalum and tungsten the logical next steps) and green leaf or cherry to blended, roasted and branded agro-products, rather than horizontal leaps into electronics or machinery for which the export basket offers little proximity. The export structure remains dominated by re-exports (gold, refined petroleum) and primary commodities, with manufactured exports minor and a large structural trade deficit of roughly USD 1.5 billion in 2024.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Rwanda's most defensible continental supply position is refined tin and, more broadly, the role of Kigali as Africa's certified 3T beneficiation hub, anchored by LuNa Smelter. Per the Polish Investment & Trade Agency, LuNa is the first tin mill in Africa to be RMAP certified, processing approximately 200-230 tonnes of cassiterite concentrate per month into refined tin of 99.97% purity, with blockchain traceability (Minespider; some 50,000 tonnes of tin tracked) and ISO/IEC 17025-accredited assaying. This is a genuine move up the value chain from ore (HS 2609) to metal (HS 8001) — precisely the finished or semi-finished supplier the AU framework prizes. The underlying endowment is real: tin of about 4,100 tonnes (2024), tungsten of 1,300 tonnes — Africa's largest — and tantalum ranked 2nd-3rd globally, all per USGS MCS 2026, and Rwanda already runs the RMB due-diligence and traceability infrastructure that EU and US conflict-minerals regimes demand.

The position carries honest limits. First is a first-order integrity problem: the UN Group of Experts (S/2024/969) and Global Witness document that Congolese 3T is laundered through Rwanda and re-exported as Rwandan, which directly attacks the conflict-free selling proposition and triggered an EU review of the 2024 raw-materials partnership. Second is feedstock dependency on artisanal and cross-border supply, including from DRC, exposed by M23 conflict dynamics. Third is landlocked logistics that raise delivered cost, and fourth is thin smelting capacity — a single plant — against continental-scale demand. The runners-up reinforce rather than replace this card: CIMERWA cement and clinker is a credible regional supplier to DRC and Burundi once the Musanze clinker plant operates, and tungsten concentrate makes Rwanda Africa's largest producer, but value capture stays offshore, for example at GTP/Plansee in the United States, until domestic refining exists.

Current reality

Rwanda is a small, fast-growing, landlocked East African economy whose headline supply position rests on one defensible pillar, refined tin and a continental-leading 3T processing cluster, shadowed by a major integrity caveat: a large share of its reported mineral production is in fact Congolese ore transited and re-exported. GDP was USD 14.25 billion in current terms in 2024 on World Bank figures, or USD 14.8 billion after the NISR rebasing exercise; GDP per capita was USD 999.65 and real GDP grew 8.9 per cent in 2024, with a population of about 14.0 million. Manufacturing contributed 9.9 per cent of GDP and broader industry some 21 to 22 per cent. Rwanda is a credible continental supplier of refined tin and conflict-free-certified 3T processing services, and a regional cement, construction-materials and specialty-agro supplier, but it is not yet a scale manufacturer.

The binding structural constraint is that Rwanda is landlocked. Two long corridors serve it, the Northern Corridor to Mombasa at more than 1,700 kilometres and the Central Corridor to Dar es Salaam at about 1,495 kilometres; transport can consume 30 to 40 per cent of goods' value, and single-port shocks cascade, as the 2025 Dar es Salaam port closure demonstrated when traffic was forced onto Mombasa. Power remains a brake: the system sits below 600 MW, and industrial reliability and tariff levels constrain heavy industry despite Lake Kivu. Domestic capital markets are thin, foreign direct investment runs at about 4 per cent of GDP, external-financing dependence is large, and franc depreciation of around 4 per cent in 2025 raised imported-input costs, hitting CIMERWA margins. The labour force remains majority-agrarian, with 66 per cent of the employed in elementary agriculture, forestry and fishing occupations in 2023, and acknowledged TVET gaps in instructors, infrastructure and digital tools. Scale is thin throughout: one tin smelter, one gold refinery, one integrated cement plant, with limited redundancy and volume.

09 · The draft bundle

Draft 1 · 13 candidate lines · will change

Rwanda’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Rwanda’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Rwanda will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Rwanda’s 13 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 5Emerging 5Aspirational 2Grey 1

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Light manufactures (textiles/phones)

SEZ assembly (C&H, Mara); CMT only · Maturity: Assembly · Competitiveness: High import bill

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 11.21 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

851711Line telephone sets with cordless handsets

851712Wireless & Cellular Phones

851713Telephone sets; smartphones for cellular or other wireless networks

851714Telephone sets; other than smartphones, for cellular or other wireless networks

851718Telephone sets n.e.c. in item no. 8517.1

851719Line telephone sets; videophones (excluding line telephone sets with cordless handsets and...

851721Facsimile machines for line telephonhy

851722Teleprinters for line telegraphy

851730Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus

851750Apparatus for carrier-current line systems or digital line systems, for line telephony or line...

851761Base stations

851762Communication apparatus (excluding telephone sets or base stations); machines for the reception, conversion and transmis

851769Communication apparatus (excluding telephone sets or base stations); machines for the transmission or reception of voice, images or other data (including wired/wireless networks), n.e.c. in item no. 8517.6

851770Parts for Voice/Data Transmission Devices

851771Communication apparatus; parts, aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds, part suitable for use therewith

851779Communication apparatus; parts, other than aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds

851780Electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy (excluding telephone sets, videophones,...

851790Parts of electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy, incl. line telephone sets...

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Procuring agency (indicative): State + private telecoms · Telecom Infrastructure · control: shared. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Rwanda imported USD 117.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 3.13 bnEgypt USD 1.2 bnMorocco USD 998.6 mLibya USD 951 mNigeria USD 704.8 mAlgeria USD 563.4 mEthiopia USD 348.2 mSomalia USD 245.6 m

Source: Adrianople; visitrwanda · 2019-2024

Methane-derived energy/CNG

Lake Kivu ~60bn m3 methane; up to 960 MW potential; rare resource · Maturity: Power + pilot CNG · Competitiveness: Regional energy deficit

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas

271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane

271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes

271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene

271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711

271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas

271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Rwanda imported USD 5.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: MIT Tech Review; REG · 2024

Gold (refined)

Gasabo/Aldango refinery ~96 t/yr; feedstock largely transit; INTEGRITY-FLAGGED · Maturity: Refined 999.9 · Competitiveness: High (refining gap)

EMERGING

USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder

710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)

710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured

710820Gold, monetary

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Oakland Inst.; IGIHE · 2024-2025

Cement & clinker

CIMERWA 600,000 t/yr integrated; clinker plant announced · Maturity: Finished cement; clinker pending · Competitiveness: High (DRC/Burundi deficits)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)

252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured

252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured

252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers

252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 47.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: CIMERWA; Global Cement · 2024-2025

Coffee (arabica specialty)

85+ cupping; ~20,000 t exports · Maturity: Green bean · Competitiveness: Modest

EMERGING

USD 1.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

090111Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated

090112Coffee; decaffeinated, not roasted

090121Coffee; roasted, not decaffeinated

090122Coffee; roasted, decaffeinated

090190Coffee; husks and skins, coffee substitutes containing coffee in any proportion

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Algeria USD 322.4 mEgypt USD 217.4 mSudan USD 151.5 mMorocco USD 148 mSouth Africa USD 99.8 mLibya USD 77.7 mTunisia USD 34.5 mNamibia USD 9.7 m

Source: NAEB · 2023

Tea (black CTC)

38,467.7 t exports / USD 114.8m FY23-24; Mombasa premium; 97.3% raw · Maturity: Raw/unblended · Competitiveness: Modest

EMERGING

USD 919 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

090210Tea, green; (not fermented), in immediate packings of a content not exceeding 3kg

090220Tea, green; (not fermented), in immediate packings of a content exceeding 3kg

090230Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea, in immediate packings of a content not exceeding 3kg

090240Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea, in immediate packings of a content exceeding 3kg

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 310.3 mMorocco USD 187.4 mLibya USD 73.5 mAlgeria USD 72.6 mSouth Africa USD 35.1 mSudan USD 33.4 mMali USD 24.2 mMauritania USD 22.4 m

Source: NAEB/RDB · 2024

Pyrethrum extract

Niche natural-insecticide endowment; volume GREY · Maturity: Extract · Competitiveness: Niche

EMERGING

USD 173.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

130211Vegetable saps and extracts; opium

130212Vegetable saps and extracts; of liquorice

130213Vegetable saps and extracts; of hops

130214Vegetable saps and extracts; of ephedra

130219Vegetable saps and extracts; n.e.c. in item no. 1302.1

130220Pectic substances; pectinates and pectates

130231Mucilages and thickeners; agar-agar, whether or not modified, derived from vegetable products

130232Mucilages and thickeners; whether or not modified, derived from locust beans, locust bean seeds or guar seeds

130239Mucilages and thickeners; whether or not modified, derived from vegetable products, n.e.c. in item no. 1302.3

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Rwanda imported USD 0.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 33 mAlgeria USD 27.6 mEgypt USD 22.8 mCongo USD 19.9 mMorocco USD 11.6 mNigeria USD 8.4 mEthiopia USD 7.5 mTunisia USD 7.5 m

Source: RDB; trade.gov · 2024

Lithium/rare earths

Exploration indications only; no production · Maturity: None · Competitiveness: n/a

GREY

USD 35.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded

253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)

253040Natural micaceous iron oxides

253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 12.6 mSouth Africa USD 5.6 mMorocco USD 5 mAlgeria USD 3.2 mGhana USD 2.6 mNigeria USD 1.5 mTunisia USD 1.2 mZimbabwe USD 0.6 m

Source: RDB · 2024

Horticulture/cut flowers

Climate; Kigali air-freight; +135% YoY flowers · Maturity: Fresh/primary · Competitiveness: Growing (regional/Gulf)

EMERGING

USD 30.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

060310Fresh cut flowers and flower buds, for bouquets or for ornamental purposes

060311Flowers, cut; roses, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh

060312Flowers, cut; carnations, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh

060313Flowers, cut; orchids, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh

060314Flowers, cut; chrysanthemums, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh

060315Flowers, cut; lilies (Lilium spp.), flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fres

060319Flowers, cut; flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh, other than roses, carnatio

060390Flowers, cut; flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, dried, dyed, bleached, imp

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Rwanda imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Libya USD 9.8 mEgypt USD 3.8 mSouth Africa USD 3.6 mMauritius USD 2 mMorocco USD 1.8 mAlgeria USD 1.6 mNamibia USD 1.4 mBotswana USD 1 m

Source: RDB; worldstopexports · 2024

Refined tin (metal)

Africa's first RMAP-certified tin smelter (LuNa); 99.97% Sn; 200-230 t/mo feed · Maturity: Refined metal (semi-finished) · Competitiveness: High (solder/electronics/packaging imports)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 27.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

800110Tin; unwrought, not alloyed

800120Tin; unwrought, alloys

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Rwanda imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 11.4 mEgypt USD 4.7 mTunisia USD 2.8 mAlgeria USD 2.5 mMorocco USD 1.9 mAngola USD 1.7 mKenya USD 0.9 mUganda USD 0.5 m

Source: USGS MCS; PAIH · 2024-2026

Tantalum/niobium ore

2nd-3rd globally (mine+transit); coltan cluster; INTEGRITY-FLAGGED · Maturity: Concentrate; refinery unconfirmed · Competitiveness: High (electronics feed)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 9.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

261510Zirconium ores and concentrates

261590Niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Rwanda imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Ghana USD 2.3 mZambia USD 1.8 mSouth Africa USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.4 mAlgeria USD 1.1 mTanzania USD 1 mZimbabwe USD 0.3 mMorocco USD 0.2 m

Source: USGS MCS 2026; UN GoE S/2024/969 · 2024-2025

Tin ore/concentrate

~4,100 t tin content 2024; rank ~11th-12th · Maturity: Concentrate · Competitiveness: Moderate

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 0.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

260900Tin ores and concentrates

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Rwanda your own imports USD 0.3 m

Rwanda is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS MCS 2026 · 2024

Tungsten concentrate

Africa's largest tungsten producer; Nyakabingo (Trinity/TechMet) ~120 t/mo; 1,300 t W 2024 · Maturity: Concentrate (refining offshore) · Competitiveness: Critical-mineral feed

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 0.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

261100Tungsten ores and concentrates

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Rwanda imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 0.3 m

Source: USGS MCS 2026; Trinity · 2024-2026

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Rwanda is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance

What Rwanda buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Rwanda is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 2.27 bn

Rwanda’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product line	Strength tier	Rwanda imports, 2023	Continental demand, 2023
Light manufactures (textiles/phones)	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 117.2 m	USD 11.21 bn
Cement & clinker	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 47.6 m	USD 2.9 bn
Methane-derived energy/CNG	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 5.7 m	USD 10.27 bn
Gold (refined)	EMERGING	USD 1 m	USD 2.99 bn
Coffee (arabica specialty)	EMERGING	USD 1 m	USD 1.13 bn
Pyrethrum extract	EMERGING	USD 0.7 m	USD 173.7 m
Tin ore/concentrate	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0.3 m	USD 0.3 m
Tea (black CTC)	EMERGING	USD 0.2 m	USD 919 m
Horticulture/cut flowers	EMERGING	USD 0.1 m	USD 30.5 m
Lithium/rare earths	GREY	USD 0 m	USD 35.6 m
Refined tin (metal)	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0 m	USD 27.8 m
Tantalum/niobium ore	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0 m	USD 9.4 m
Tungsten concentrate	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0 m	USD 0.3 m

Left-hand column: what Rwanda itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion

The number this document refuses to print

What Rwanda’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 13 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Rwanda’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Rwanda. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Rwanda’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map

Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Rwanda’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023

01EgyptUSD 5.3 bn

02South AfricaUSD 4.77 bn

03MoroccoUSD 3.78 bn

04UgandaUSD 2.04 bn

05TunisiaUSD 1.75 bn

06LibyaUSD 1.34 bn

07AlgeriaUSD 1.04 bn

08NigeriaUSD 714.7 m

09Cote dIvoireUSD 686.8 m

10GhanaUSD 504.6 m

11EthiopiaUSD 355.7 m

12MaliUSD 326.9 m

13SomaliaUSD 245.6 m

14KenyaUSD 241.8 m

15TanzaniaUSD 206.1 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Rwanda. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence

What would have to be true

The conditions Rwanda would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Rwanda to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

Clean, auditable feedstock at scale

Fully implemented, independently verified traceability (ICGLR/RMI/blockchain) that survives UN Group of Experts scrutiny, plus a credible DRC supply-formalisation framework, so the conflict-free claim is defensible.

Expanded smelting and refining capacity

The announced LuNa expansion operational, a functioning tantalum/niobium refinery (currently aspirational), and ideally domestic tungsten (APT) processing rather than shipping concentrate to the US or EU.

Reliable industrial power

Reliable industrial supply well above current capacity, leveraging Lake Kivu methane (up to about 960 MW potential) and regional hydro at competitive tariffs.

Corridor and freight logistics

Standard Gauge Railway and corridor upgrades cutting Dar es Salaam and Mombasa transit time and cost, with Bugesera airport operational for high-value air freight.

Domestic clinker capacity

The CIMERWA Musanze clinker plant (USD 190 million, 720,000 tonnes per year) operational to end clinker-import dependence and enable net exports to DRC and Burundi.

Agro value-addition

A shift of tea from about 97% raw-auction sales toward blending, packaging and branding to capture margin and supply intra-African retail, matched by sustained FDI and TVET output aligned to metallurgical and agro-processing needs.

The binding constraints

Landlocked logistics Two long corridors (Mombasa about 1,700 km; Dar es Salaam about 1,495 km) mean transport can reach 30-40% of goods' value, and single-port shocks such as the 2025 Dar es Salaam closure cascade through the system. This is the binding constraint on cost-competitive heavy manufacturing.

Governance and integrity The 3T and gold laundering findings (UN Group of Experts S/2024/969; Global Witness 2026; Oakland Institute 2025) are a reputational and market-access risk — the EU partnership is under review and the US has sanctioned individuals — that could undermine the very conflict-free premium Rwanda sells.

Feedstock dependency Smelters and refineries rely on regional ore, including from DRC, while domestic geological output alone is modest; M23 conflict dynamics expose the fragility of this cross-border, largely artisanal supply.

Power reliability and cost A sub-600 MW system means industrial reliability and tariff levels remain a brake on heavy industry despite the Lake Kivu methane endowment.

Capital and currency Domestic capital markets are thin, FDI is around 4% of GDP, external-financing dependence is large, and franc depreciation of about 4% in 2025 raised imported-input costs, hitting CIMERWA margins.

Scale and redundancy One tin smelter, one gold refinery and one integrated cement plant provide limited redundancy and volume against continental-scale demand.

13 · Devil’s advocate

Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Rwanda’s favour.

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

The conflict-minerals integrity finding attacks the selling proposition itself. The UN Group of Experts midterm report S/2024/969 of 27 December 2024 records that at least 150 tonnes of coltan were fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, and Global Witness reported in June 2026 that at least 1,400 tonnes of coltan crossed from the DRC into Rwanda in the twelve months after M23 seized the Rubaya mines. This is a reputational and market-access risk that could undermine the very conflict-free premium Rwanda sells.

Reported production overstates domestic geology. Mineral production tonnages and ranks are firm as reported by USGS but must be read as indicative of domestic geology, because Tier-1 UN sources document substantial cross-border laundering of Congolese 3T and gold through Rwanda. Official Rwandan coltan exports were more than 2.5 times higher in 2025 than in 2021, and gold at USD 1.5 billion in 2024 is largely transit and re-export rather than domestic mine output.

Market access is already under formal review. The European Union has placed its 2024 raw-materials partnership with Rwanda under review, and the United States has imposed sanctions on individuals. The audit sets EU suspension of that partnership, or a sustained UN Group of Experts finding that laundered ore exceeds a defined share of throughput, as a trigger to downgrade the refined tin allocation.

Feedstock is dependent on artisanal and cross-border supply. Smelters and refineries rely on regional ore, including from the DRC, while domestic geological output alone is modest and predominantly artisanal. Fully implemented, independently verified traceability that survives UN scrutiny, plus a credible DRC supply-formalisation framework, would have to be in place for the conflict-free claim to be defensible.

Landlocked logistics are the binding constraint on cost. Two long corridors, Mombasa at more than 1,700 kilometres and Dar es Salaam at about 1,495 kilometres, with transport consuming 30 to 40 per cent of goods' value and corridor inefficiencies historically adding some USD 800 per container in clearing fees. Standard Gauge Railway and corridor upgrades, plus an operational Bugesera airport for high-value air freight, would have to materialise.

Power capacity sits below the threshold heavy industry requires. The system remains sub-600 MW, and industrial reliability and tariff levels remain a brake despite Lake Kivu. Reliable industrial supply well above current capacity would have to be delivered, drawing on the lake's up-to-960 MW potential and regional hydro at competitive tariffs; installed-capacity totals are themselves indicative, as sources conflate installed and target figures.

There is no redundancy at any stage of the chain. One tin smelter, one gold refinery and one integrated cement plant leave limited redundancy and volume against continental demand. Announced but not operational facilities, namely the tantalum refinery, the CIMERWA Musanze clinker plant and the LuNa expansion, are all provisional and cannot be counted as capacity.

14 · Synthesis

The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Rwanda's Draft 1 bundle rests on one genuine step up the value chain and one regional position: refined tin and 3T beneficiation services out of the Kigali cluster, and cement and clinker for the DRC and Burundi sub-market, with tungsten and tantalum concentrate held as raw-supply allocations only. What must be proven is, first, that feedstock is clean and auditable at scale, through independently verified traceability that survives UN Group of Experts scrutiny alongside a credible DRC supply-formalisation framework; second, that capacity is expanded beyond a single plant, with the LuNa expansion operational, a financed and functioning tantalum and niobium refinery rather than an announcement, and domestic APT processing in place of shipping tungsten concentrate abroad; third, that the CIMERWA Musanze clinker plant at USD 190 million and 720,000 tonnes a year comes into operation to end clinker-import dependence; and fourth, that reliable industrial power well above current capacity and materially cheaper corridor logistics are delivered. Until those conditions hold, the defensible claim is beneficiation capability and certified processing services, not volume, and the aspirational tiers of Lake Kivu methane products, light manufactures and value-added tea remain demand certainty against which capacity is still to be built.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Rwanda is shown 13 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Rwanda to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response

The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2

Minister — this document is unfinished on purpose.

Draft 1 exists to be marked up. Two of these take a single tap. The whole response takes a minute, and it tells the Chair exactly where Rwanda stands and what would move you. A single correction is worth more than agreement.

Where do you stand on this direction for Rwanda?

How strongly do you back the Right of Supply framework?

7/ 10

Not at allCompletely

How well does this draft bundle reflect Rwanda’s real strengths?

Tap to rate

In one word — are you happy with what you see?

Which single line matters most to your government?

What are we missing for Rwanda?

Your one instruction for Draft 2.

Collated live by the Office of the Chair of the AU STC-FMAEPI. Draft 2 will show, for each change, which member state asked for it.