Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
NigeriaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Nigeria — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
15
Draft 1 candidate lines for Nigeria
The Minister’s brief · for Taiwo Oyedele · Nigeria
Minister Oyedele, Nigeria holds what coastal West Africa is compelled to buy. Beneath your southern belts lies limestone your neighbours simply lack — 647 million tonnes at Obajana alone — and you have converted it into fully integrated, quarry-to-customer capacity of some 65 million tonnes against barely 30 million in domestic demand. Ghana alone spends over half a billion dollars a year importing the clinker you already make; in 2024 you shipped a record 1.2 million tonnes, carrying Nigeria from the world's second-largest cement importer to Africa's largest exporter. Each year the continent sends USD 620 billion abroad to buy what it could source at home, and this is your defensible claim upon it. The Right of Supply grants Nigeria a twenty-five-year first right to meet that demand, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Nigeria
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Taiwo Oyedele, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Nigeria · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Oyedele,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Nigeria — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Nigeria is in this room

Nigeria's strongest endowment for continental supply is cement and clinker. Abundant, high-quality limestone in the southern belts, with 647 million tonnes of reserves at Obajana alone, sits precisely where the coastal West African states of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Liberia have little or none and are obligatory clinker importers, and Nigeria has converted that endowment into fully integrated quarry-to-customer capacity of roughly 65 million tonnes nationally against some 30 million tonnes of domestic demand, exporting a record 1.2 million tonnes in 2024. The honest constraint is concentration and power: the position is overwhelmingly held by a single promoter, and it survives the grid only because the plants run captive generation at a time when available national generation is around 4,000 to 5,300 MW against 13,625 MW installed.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Nigeria, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Nigeria

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
15draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Nigeria’s draft bundle. 15 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Nitrogenous fertiliser (urea), Cement & clinker. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 continental anchor · 3 strong contender · 5 emerging · 4 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Nigeria is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 15 candidate lines proposed for Nigeria below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Nigeria. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Nigeria will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Nigeria will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
15 lines
Nigeria’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Nigeria at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Nigeria’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Nigeria’s own capability audit.

Tantalum and columbite concentrate (HS 2615)

Nigeria is among the world's top producers at 390 tonnes of tantalum content in 2024, roughly second to third globally behind the Democratic Republic of Congo, but the material is exported as raw concentrate with effectively zero domestic refining. Continental demand is low, the pull being global rather than intra-African.

Raw base · industrial screen

Tin, cassiterite (HS 2609/8001)

Mine production of some 7,000 tonnes of tin content in 2024 makes Nigeria a mid-tier global producer at around tenth to eleventh, but output is mostly raw and intra-African demand is low. USGS has flagged Nigerian tin among figures with significant revisions pending in its 2026 edition.

Raw base · evidence vintage

Cassava derivatives (HS 1108/0714)

Nigeria is the world's largest cassava producer at approximately 63 million tonnes, some 18 to 20 per cent of world output, yet processing and exports are low and production is overwhelmingly consumed domestically, with Thailand dominating global cassava trade. The audit tiers this ASPIRATIONAL.

Capability inversion

Cocoa beans (HS 1801/1806)

Nigeria is the world's fourth-largest cocoa producer with premium beans, but exports are largely raw and grinding capacity is limited. Intra-African demand is low because the demand centre is the European Union, so the strength is a global raw position rather than a continental supply position.

Raw base · demand geography

Lithium concentrate and chemicals (HS 2530/2836)

Pegmatite deposits in Kaduna, Nasarawa and Kebbi carry cited Li₂O grades of 1.4 to 2.3 per cent and several concentrator plants were announced or under construction in 2024 and 2025 under a raw-ore export ban, but status is largely pre-operational and the flagship Kangimi plant was reported non-operational in mid-2025. Intra-African demand is low.

Pre-operational

Gold (HS 7108) and aluminium products (HS 76)

Gold is not separately listed by USGS, being folded into other countries, and domestic output is mostly artisanal on the schist belt. Aluminium is a small exporter at USD 301 million in 2023. The audit marks both GREY, insufficient evidence.

Grey · insufficient evidence
08 · Endowment
What Nigeria actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Nigeria. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Nigeria's endowments are large but unevenly converted. In hydrocarbons it holds Africa's largest gas reserves at 211.1 trillion cubic feet and 37.5 billion barrels of proven oil (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2025), with crude output of roughly 1.5 million barrels per day of crude and condensate in 2024 and marketed gas production of about 44.3 billion cubic metres. In minerals the picture inverts: the solid-minerals sector contributes under 1 per cent of GDP and is dominated by artisanal and small-scale mining engaging more than 10 million people. Nigeria produced 7,000 tonnes of tin content and 390 tonnes of tantalum content in 2024 (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025), placing it roughly second to third globally in tantalum behind the Democratic Republic of Congo, yet this is exported as raw concentrate with effectively zero domestic refining. Its agricultural base is similarly vast and similarly raw: the world's largest cassava producer at approximately 63 million tonnes (FAOSTAT 2023), the world's largest yam producer, and the world's fourth-largest cocoa producer at some 280,000 to 300,000 tonnes, exported largely as beans. The one mineral endowment that has been fully converted is limestone, abundant across the southern belts, which underpins Africa's largest cement industry.

The industrial base that has emerged from these endowments is concentrated and integrated rather than diffuse. In cement, Dangote Cement operates 35.25 million tonnes per annum of installed capacity in Nigeria, including Obajana in Kogi at 16.25 million tonnes, Africa's largest single plant, alongside Ibese at 12, Gboko at 4 and Okpella at 3; BUA Cement at approximately 17 million tonnes and Lafarge Africa at approximately 10.5 million tonnes lift national capacity to around 65 million tonnes against roughly 30 million tonnes of domestic demand. Nigerian cement exports reached a record 1.2 million tonnes in 2024, up 69 per cent, shipped as cement and clinker to Ghana and Cameroon. In fertiliser, Dangote Fertiliser at Ibeju-Lekki is Africa's largest granulated urea complex at some 3.0 to 3.4 million tonnes per annum, with Indorama Eleme at 1.4 million tonnes and Notore taking national urea capacity to approximately 6.5 to 7.0 million tonnes; Nigeria produced around 3.7 million tonnes of urea in 2024, and urea exports rose from 660,000 tonnes in 2017 to more than 3 million tonnes in 2024. In refining, the Dangote Refinery at Lekki, a 650,000 barrels per day single train, reached full nameplate capacity in February 2026 and processed some 82 million barrels during 2025, while the four state NNPC refineries of roughly 445,000 barrels per day combined nameplate have been largely shut in since 2020 and should be assessed as effectively non-operational. NLNG at Bonny Island runs six trains at 22 million tonnes per annum, with Nigeria ranked sixth globally among LNG exporters in 2024.

The mechanism behind all three lead positions is the same. Cement, fertiliser and refining were built by a single anchor investor, Dangote, with Indorama in fertiliser, deploying multi-billion-dollar integrated plants in the Lekki free zone, exploiting cheap domestic feedstock of limestone for cement and stranded or cheap gas for urea and refinery utility, and running captive power to bypass the unreliable grid. That model is institutional and anchor-driven rather than diffuse, which makes it durable but dangerously concentrated. It also explains the central tension in Nigeria's complexity profile: its Economic Complexity Index is among the world's lowest, ranked approximately 129th of 132 for trade in 2023, with poor product-space adjacency, so the credible near-term moves up the value chain lie within hydrocarbon derivatives, from refined products towards petrochemicals and plastics and from gas through ammonia to urea and NPK, and within cement and clinker, rather than into machinery or electronics.

The endowment in depth

Nigeria's solid-minerals sector contributes under 1% of GDP (mining ~0.3–0.5%) and is dominated by artisanal and small-scale mining, with more than 10 million people engaged. The endowment is genuine but largely unprocessed. Tin (cassiterite) stands at 7,000 t of tin content in 2024 (USGS MCS 2025), a mid-tier global position (~10th–11th) rooted in the Jos Plateau legacy district. Tantalum (columbite-tantalite) at 390 t of tantalum content places Nigeria among the world's top producers, roughly 2nd–3rd behind DR Congo, yet it is exported entirely as raw concentrate with effectively zero domestic refining. Gold is mostly artisanal on the schist belt and is not separately listed by USGS. Lithium is emerging, in pegmatite deposits across Kaduna, Nasarawa and Kebbi at Li₂O grades of 1.4–2.3%, with several Chinese-backed concentrator plants (Ming Xin/Kangimi, Avatar New Energy/Nasarawa, Ganfeng) announced under a raw-ore export ban but largely pre-operational — the flagship Kangimi plant was reported non-operational in mid-2025. Abundant limestone in the southern belts, coal (~246 million short tons of bituminous reserves, ~2.7 Mt/yr output), iron ore (~3 bn t indicated), barite, gypsum and bitumen complete the base, all with minimal beneficiation. The assessment is world-class limestone plus a meaningful tin/tantalum endowment, but thin-to-absent metals processing.

Energy is the defining endowment. Proven oil reserves stand at 37.5 bn bbl (OPEC ASB 2025), the crude mostly light, sweet and premium-grade, though production had fallen to ~1.5 Mb/d of crude and condensate in 2024, down roughly 31% on 2015 owing to theft, vandalism and mature fields. Gas reserves of 211.1 Tcf are Africa's largest and roughly 8th globally, with marketed production of ~44.3 bcm in 2024 but heavy flaring of ~229 Bcf, the 7th-highest in the world. NLNG's Bonny Island complex runs six trains at 22 Mtpa and ranked Nigeria 6th globally among LNG exporters in 2024, with Train 7 under construction. In refining, the Dangote Refinery at Lekki — a 650,000 b/d single train — reached full nameplate capacity in February 2026, having processed ~82 million barrels in 2025, while the four state NNPC refineries (Port Harcourt, Warri, Kaduna; ~445,000 b/d combined nameplate) have been largely shut-in since 2020 and should be assessed as effectively non-operational. Power is the binding gate: installed capacity is ~13,625 MW (NERC 2024) yet available/dispatched generation averaged only ~4,000–5,300 MW through 2024, with ~61% household electricity access in 2023 and a mix of ~77% gas and ~23% hydro.

The agricultural base is vast in volume but thin in processing. Nigeria is the world's largest cassava producer at ~63 Mt (FAOSTAT 2023), around 18–20% of world output, yet the crop is overwhelmingly consumed domestically with low processing and exports, and Thailand dominates global cassava trade. It is the world's 4th-largest cocoa producer at ~280–300k t in 2023/24, exported largely as raw beans (cocoa and products at $906.9m in Q1 2025) with limited grinding capacity; the world's largest yam producer; and a notable raw exporter of sesame, cashew and other oil seeds (oil seeds ~$107m, edible fruit/nuts ~$114m, Q1 2025). Rice remains a net deficit and oil palm a net import position against Indonesia and Malaysia. Across the board the pattern holds — enormous tonnages, but outputs mostly raw or domestic.

The industrial base is anchored by processed commodities. Manufacturing is ~13.5% of GDP (2024), but UNIDO's CIP ranks Nigeria ~8th in Africa and ~98th globally, with manufacturing value-added per capita of ~$216, far below South Africa ($645) and Egypt ($524). The flagship is cement: Dangote Cement operates 35.25 Mta of installed capacity in Nigeria — Obajana in Kogi at 16.25 Mta is Africa's largest single plant, alongside Ibese (12), Gboko (4) and Okpella (3) — which with BUA (~17 Mt) and Lafarge (~10.5 Mt) lifts national capacity to ~65 Mt against ~30 Mt of domestic demand. Fertiliser and petrochemicals follow the same template: Dangote Fertiliser at Ibeju-Lekki (~3.0–3.4 Mtpa granulated urea), Indorama Eleme (1.4 Mtpa, with Train 3 lifting to 4.2 Mt by 2026) and Notore give ~6.5–7.0 Mt of national urea capacity, with ~3.7 Mt produced in 2024. Human capital is a genuine constraint: a labour force of 60m+ and a young, low-cost population, but a weak tertiary/TVET base relative to population and specialised oil-and-gas technical clusters only around Port Harcourt and Lagos, offset by a large, highly skilled diaspora in medicine, engineering and technology. Infrastructure is improving from a weak base — the coastline is a structural advantage, and the Lekki Deep Sea Port (opened 2023; 16.5 m draft, up to 2.5m TEU, Nigeria's only fully automated port, ~47% of regional cargo throughput in Q3 2025) materially upgrades deliverability for the Lekki-based refinery and fertiliser output, alongside the congested legacy hubs at Apapa and Tin Can and improving standard-gauge rail to Ibadan and Kano.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Nigeria's Economic Complexity Index is among the world's lowest, ranked ~129th of 132 for trade (2023, OEC/Harvard), with a historically deeply negative ECI of around −1.6, in the bottom decile. The export basket is narrow and raw-commodity dominated: revealed comparative advantage above 1 clusters in crude petroleum, petroleum gas/LNG, nitrogenous fertilisers (urea), cocoa beans, oil seeds (sesame) and — regionally — cement and clinker. Product-space adjacency is poor: Nigeria sits in a sparse region of the product space, so few "nearby" complex products are within easy reach.

The credible near-term moves up the value chain are therefore within hydrocarbon derivatives (refined products → petrochemicals → plastics; gas → ammonia → urea → NPK) and cement/clinker, not into machinery or electronics. This is the central tension of the Nigerian position: its defensible continental supply strengths are precisely its low-complexity, scale-and-feedstock-driven processed commodities, so the pull towards diversification and the pull towards defensibility run in opposite directions.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Cement and clinker (HS 2523) is Nigeria's single most defensible continental supply position because it is the only category that scores YES on every dimension of the analytical lens simultaneously, and has already proven it at continental scale. The resource base is abundant, high-quality limestone in the southern belts — Obajana alone holds 647 Mt of reserves — precisely where neighbouring coastal West African states (Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Liberia) have little or none and are obligatory clinker importers; Ghana spends over US$0.5bn a year importing clinker, per Prof. Alex Dodoo, Director-General of the Ghana Standards Authority. The processing position is fully integrated quarry-to-customer rather than raw export: Dangote runs 35.25 Mta in Nigeria including Obajana at 16.25 Mta, Africa's largest single plant, which with BUA and Lafarge gives ~65 Mt of national capacity against ~30 Mt of domestic demand. On competitiveness, Aliko Dangote states Nigeria has gone from the world's second-largest cement importer to Africa's largest cement exporter, with record exports of 1.2 Mt in 2024 (+69%) shipped as cement and clinker to Ghana and Cameroon; deliverability rests on coastal plants, captive power, a large distribution-truck fleet and ECOWAS duty-free access; and continental demand is structural, with SSA installed cement capacity projected to grow from ~280 Mt in 2025 to over 500 Mt by 2030 against 4%+ urbanisation as AfCFTA harmonises standards.

The limits are real and must be named. First, the position is overwhelmingly a single firm — Dangote — so a corporate, governance or succession shock would hit the whole national position at once. Second, the very coastal competitors that now import clinker are building their own grinding and calcined-clay (LC3) capacity to cut those imports, exemplified by Ghana's new Tema LC3 plant. Third, cement is highly energy-intensive and therefore exposed to gas, diesel and FX volatility. Fourth, carbon-border and green-cement pressures loom over what is effectively a 25-year lock. The runners-up sit behind it for concrete reasons: nitrogenous urea (Dangote/Indorama >6.5 Mt capacity into a continent that imports ~90% of its fertiliser) is weaker only because current exports flow to Brazil, the US and India rather than Africa; and refined petroleum products — the Dangote refinery sold 12 cargoes totalling 456,000 tonnes (~608m litres) of Euro 5 petrol and diesel to Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Tanzania, Ghana and Togo since February 2026 against Africa's >$120bn annual fuel import bill — carry the highest upside but are the newest and least proven for sustained operation.

Current reality

Nigeria is an economy of approximately USD 243 billion on rebased nominal 2024 GDP (NBS, July 2025; ₦372.8 trillion), Africa's fourth-largest behind South Africa, Egypt and Algeria, and its most populous nation at some 228 million people. Manufacturing accounts for about 13.5 per cent of GDP, but on the UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Index Nigeria ranks approximately eighth in Africa and 98th globally, with manufacturing value added per capita of around USD 216, far below South Africa at USD 645 and Egypt at USD 524. Its defensible continental supply strengths are downstream and processed hydrocarbon-and-mineral derivatives, namely cement, nitrogenous fertiliser and, newly, refined petroleum products, built on cheap gas and limestone feedstock at anchor-investor scale, and not raw minerals, of which it processes almost none.

Two structural facts qualify everything above. Power is the binding constraint: installed capacity stands at roughly 13,625 MW (NERC, 2024) but available and dispatched generation averaged only about 4,000 to 5,300 MW through 2024, with the World Bank citing 4,087 MW, and only about 61 per cent of households had electricity access in 2023. Heavy manufacturing is viable only with captive power, which the flagship plants have and smaller firms do not. Second, orientation: 2023 exports of some USD 63.1 billion were dominated by crude petroleum at USD 45.6 billion and petroleum gas at USD 8.26 billion, with crude and gas together exceeding 80 per cent of exports, while intra-African trade was only about 6.4 per cent of total trade in 2023, down from 13.9 per cent in 2019. Nigeria's exports are raw hydrocarbons to non-African destinations, a weak intra-continental orientation that any continental supply framework would have to reverse.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 15 candidate lines · will change

Nigeria’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Nigeria’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Nigeria will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Nigeria’s 15 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 2Strong Contender 3Emerging 5Aspirational 4Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum products

Dangote 650k b/d full capacity Feb2026; 456000t exported to 5 African markets · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very high — Africa >$120bn/yr hydrocarbon imports
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Nigeria imported USD 19.94 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria your own imports USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Nigeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: EIA; Punch/Businessday · 2025/2026

LNG / petroleum gas

Africa's largest gas reserves; NLNG 22Mtpa; 6th global LNG exporter · Maturity: Intermediate/finished · Competitiveness: Moderate intra-Africa
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas
271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane
271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes
271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene
271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711
271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas
271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Nigeria imported USD 27.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: OPEC ASB; Energy Institute · 2024/2025

Nitrogenous fertiliser (urea)

Cheap gas feedstock; Dangote+Indorama >6.5Mt capacity; >3Mt exports · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very high — ~90% SSA fertiliser imported
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 3.8 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310210Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, urea, whether or not in aqueous solution
310221Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium sulphate
310229Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other than ammonium sulphate
310230Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium nitrate, whether or not in aqueous solution
310240Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate or other inorganic non-fertilizing substances,
310250Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, sodium nitrate
310260Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, double salts and mixtures of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate
310270Calcium cyanamide (excluding that in pellet or similar forms, or in packages with a gross weight...
310280Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution
310290Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other kinds including mixtures not specified in the foregoing subheadings
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): ETBC (Ethiopia), SFFRFM (Malawi) · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Nigeria imported USD 143.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 495.4 mSouth Africa USD 470.4 mZambia USD 456 mZimbabwe USD 239.8 mTanzania USD 235.6 mMorocco USD 200.8 mMalawi USD 194 mNigeria your own imports USD 143.3 m

Nigeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Africa Fertilizer; World Bank; AfDB · 2024

Coal (bituminous)

~246m short tons reserves · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Low
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 3.41 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270111Coal; anthracite, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270112Coal; bituminous, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270119Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous), whether or not pulverised but not agglomerated
270120Briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels; manufactured from coal
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 5.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 1.38 bnEgypt USD 587 mSouth Africa USD 521.1 mSenegal USD 227 mKenya USD 128.9 mEthiopia USD 114.1 mDR Congo USD 100.9 mMauritius USD 94.8 m

Source: EIA · 2023

Urea-based NPK blends

PFI >80 blending plants; domestic urea feedstock · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High — SSA fertiliser deficit
EMERGING
USD 3.2 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310510Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10kg
310520Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the three fertilizing elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium
310530Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate)
310540Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium dihydrogenorthophosphate (monoammonium phosphate) and mixtures thereof with d
310551Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing nitrates and phosphates
310559Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements nitrogen and phosphorus, other than nitrates a
310560Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements phosphorus and potassium
310590Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; n.e.c. in heading no. 3105
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Ministry of Agriculture · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Nigeria imported USD 59.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 697.2 mKenya USD 274.1 mTanzania USD 217.3 mZambia USD 217 mEgypt USD 172.4 mMalawi USD 170.1 mSouth Africa USD 161.8 mCote dIvoire USD 148.5 m

Source: IFDC; NTU-CAS · 2024/2025

Gold (refined)

Schist-belt resource; artisanal · Maturity: Raw/artisanal · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
GREY
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Cement & clinker

Abundant limestone + Dangote 35.25Mta Nigeria capacity; record 1.2Mt exports 2024 · Maturity: Finished/intermediate · Competitiveness: Very high — coastal W.Africa imports clinker (Ghana >$0.5bn/yr)
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 8.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Dangote Cement FY2024; CemNet; WITS · 2024

Ammonia/petrochemical intermediates

Gas feedstock; fertiliser co-production; refinery polypropylene · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 1.07 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
281410Ammonia; anhydrous
281420Ammonia; in aqueous solution
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 1.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 872.5 mTunisia USD 87.3 mSouth Africa USD 49.1 mMadagascar USD 25.1 mEgypt USD 19.5 mNamibia USD 4.5 mSenegal USD 4.2 mCameroon USD 1.6 m

Source: Dangote/Indorama · 2024/2025

Sesame & oil seeds

Established raw exporter · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
EMERGING
USD 337.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 2.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 115.5 mGhana USD 46 mMorocco USD 42.7 mTunisia USD 27 mAlgeria USD 25.5 mKenya USD 19.1 mSouth Africa USD 12.6 mMozambique USD 8 m

Source: TradeInt; OEC · 2023/2025

Cassava derivatives

World's largest cassava producer 63Mt · Maturity: Raw/low processing · Competitiveness: Moderate import-substitution
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 187.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
110811Starch; wheat
110812Starch; maize (corn) starch
110813Starch; potato
110814Starch; manioc (cassava)
110819Starch; n.e.c. in item no. 1108.11 to 1108.14
110820Inulin
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Nigeria imported USD 21.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Tanzania USD 35.3 mNigeria your own imports USD 21.6 mAlgeria USD 19.7 mSouth Africa USD 19.5 mKenya USD 13.4 mEgypt USD 9.3 mMorocco USD 9.1 mTunisia USD 7.6 m

Nigeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: FAOSTAT · 2023

Cashew kernels

Rising producer; new processing · Maturity: Mostly raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 4.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria your own imports USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Nigeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: TradeInt · 2025

Cocoa beans & products

World's 4th-largest cocoa producer; premium beans · Maturity: Raw; minimal grinding · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa; high global
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 45.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
180100Cocoa beans; whole or broken, raw or roasted
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Tunisia USD 19.7 mGhana USD 17.1 mAlgeria USD 6.9 mSenegal USD 0.4 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 mUganda USD 0.2 mMadagascar USD 0.2 mDjibouti USD 0.2 m

Source: ICCO; OEC · 2023

Lithium concentrate/chemicals

Pegmatite deposits; plants under construction; raw-export ban · Maturity: Pre-processing · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 35.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded
253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)
253040Natural micaceous iron oxides
253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 1.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 12.6 mSouth Africa USD 5.6 mMorocco USD 5 mAlgeria USD 3.2 mGhana USD 2.6 mNigeria your own imports USD 1.5 mTunisia USD 1.2 mZimbabwe USD 0.6 m

Nigeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Min. Solid Minerals · 2025

Tantalum/columbite concentrate

~2nd-3rd global producer 390t · Maturity: Raw concentrate · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
EMERGING
USD 9.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261510Zirconium ores and concentrates
261590Niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 2.3 mZambia USD 1.8 mSouth Africa USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.4 mAlgeria USD 1.1 mTanzania USD 1 mZimbabwe USD 0.3 mMorocco USD 0.2 m

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Tin (cassiterite)

~7000t mine production · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
EMERGING
USD 0.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260900Tin ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Nigeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Rwanda USD 0.3 m

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Nigeria is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Nigeria buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Nigeria is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 60.58 bn

Nigeria’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

15

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierNigeria imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleum productsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 19.94 bnUSD 110.54 bn
Nitrogenous fertiliser (urea)CONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 143.3 mUSD 3.8 bn
Urea-based NPK blendsEMERGINGUSD 59.6 mUSD 3.2 bn
LNG / petroleum gasSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 27.2 mUSD 10.27 bn
Cassava derivativesASPIRATIONALUSD 21.6 mUSD 187.5 m
Cement & clinkerCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 8.3 mUSD 2.9 bn
Coal (bituminous)ASPIRATIONALUSD 5.6 mUSD 3.41 bn
Cashew kernelsASPIRATIONALUSD 4.3 mUSD 155.7 m
Sesame & oil seedsEMERGINGUSD 2.9 mUSD 337.6 m
Lithium concentrate/chemicalsASPIRATIONALUSD 1.5 mUSD 35.6 m
Ammonia/petrochemical intermediatesEMERGINGUSD 1.4 mUSD 1.07 bn
Cocoa beans & productsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.1 mUSD 45.3 m
Gold (refined)GREYUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Tantalum/columbite concentrateEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 9.4 m

Left-hand column: what Nigeria itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Nigeria’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 15 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Nigeria’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Nigeria. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Nigeria’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Nigeria’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01NigeriaUSD 20.11 bn
02South AfricaUSD 17.9 bn
03MoroccoUSD 12.58 bn
04EgyptUSD 11.01 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.9 bn
06KenyaUSD 5.03 bn
07GhanaUSD 5.02 bn
08LibyaUSD 4.84 bn
09UgandaUSD 2.04 bn
10TunisiaUSD 1.85 bn
11EthiopiaUSD 1.31 bn
12Cote dIvoireUSD 835.3 m
13TanzaniaUSD 694.3 m
14ZambiaUSD 674.8 m
15MalawiUSD 364.1 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Nigeria. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Nigeria would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Nigeria to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Reliable industrial power

Grid-power reform to close the gap between ~13,625 MW installed and the ~4,000–5,300 MW actually dispatched (NERC 2024); the flagships survive only on captive power, which raises costs and excludes SMEs.

02

Sustained cement feedstock and access

Continued limestone and captive-power supply plus preserved ECOWAS/AfCFTA duty-free access, and defence of clinker-export share as coastal competitors build their own grinding and calcined-clay capacity.

03

Producer diversification

A widening of the cement, fertiliser and refining bases beyond a single promoter (Dangote) to de-risk the national position against a corporate, governance or succession shock.

04

Workable domestic gas pricing

Reliable domestic gas at prices that keep urea and ammonia viable, when producers are otherwise incentivised to export gas at international prices, plus completion of Indorama Train 3 and the Dangote fertiliser expansion.

05

Reorientation to intra-African trade

A deliberate shift of urea and refined-product flows away from Brazil, the US and India toward African markets, with investment in regional distribution and farmer access, reversing intra-African trade of only ~6.4% of the total.

06

Proven refinery operation

Sustained reliable crude feedstock to the Dangote refinery and demonstrated continuous operation at nameplate over multiple years — EIA cautioned as recently as November 2025 that the plant was still ramping with interruptions — plus Euro V quality and warranty/service infrastructure.

The binding constraints
·

Power is the binding constraint Available generation of ~4,000–5,300 MW against 13,625 MW installed (NERC 2024) means heavy manufacturing is viable only with captive power, which the flagships have but which raises costs and excludes SMEs.

·

Single-firm concentration Cement, fertiliser and refining each rest heavily on one promoter, Dangote. Concentrated capability is durable but fragile to a corporate, governance or succession shock that would hit the entire national position at once.

·

Feedstock dependency The refinery needs reliable crude, yet output has run below quota and theft persists; urea needs reliable domestic gas at regulated prices, while producers are incentivised to export that gas at international prices instead.

·

Logistics friction Legacy port congestion at Apapa, plus customs and FX friction, weigh on deliverability — though the Lekki Deep Sea Port materially improves the position for Lekki-based output.

·

Governance and security Oil-region insecurity, pipeline vandalism, FX volatility following the 2023 naira float, policy inconsistency and illegal mining all raise delivery risk.

·

Low complexity and extra-African orientation A very low ECI and weak product-space adjacency cap diversification beyond feedstock-driven commodities, while current trade flows are extra-African — building genuine continental supply chains requires reversing a deep structural bias.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Nigeria’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Power is the binding constraint, not a background condition. Available generation ran at roughly 4,000 to 5,300 MW against 13,625 MW installed (NERC, 2024). Heavy manufacturing is viable only with captive power, which the flagship plants have but which raises costs and excludes smaller firms.

05

The national position rests on one promoter. Cement, fertiliser and refining each depend heavily on Dangote. Concentrated capability is durable but fragile: a corporate, governance or succession shock would strike the whole national position at once.

06

Feedstock supply to the flagships is not assured. The refinery needs reliable crude at a time when output has run below quota and theft persists, while urea needs reliable domestic gas at regulated prices, and gas producers are incentivised to export at international prices instead.

07

Refining capacity is recent and not multi-year proven. Full 650,000 barrels per day operation rests on February 2026 company statements and trade press, while the EIA cautioned as recently as November 2025 that the plant was still ramping with operational interruptions. Sustained nameplate operation over multiple years remains to be demonstrated.

08

Trade orientation runs away from the continent. Intra-African trade was only about 6.4 per cent of total trade in 2023, down from 13.9 per cent in 2019, and current urea exports flow to Brazil, the United States and India rather than African markets. Building continental supply chains requires reversing a deep structural bias.

09

The cement position faces active substitution by its own customers. Coastal competitors are building their own grinding and calcined-clay capacity to cut clinker imports, including Ghana's new Tema LC3 plant, while cement's high energy intensity exposes it to gas, diesel and foreign-exchange volatility and to carbon-border and green-cement pressure over a long horizon.

10

Complexity and skills cap diversification. A very low Economic Complexity Index at around 129th of 132 and weak product-space adjacency limit movement beyond feedstock-driven commodities, with a tertiary and technical training base weak relative to population and skills a constraint for advanced manufacturing.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Nigeria's Draft 1 bundle rests on three processed, feedstock-driven positions rather than on raw endowment: cement and clinker as continental anchor, nitrogenous fertiliser as continental anchor on the strength of some 6.5 to 7.0 million tonnes of national urea capacity into a continent importing around 90 per cent of its fertiliser, and refined petroleum products as a strong contender moving towards anchor status. All three were built on the same anchor-investor model with captive power and cheap domestic feedstock, and the raw mineral and agricultural endowments, however large, do not yet carry supply capability because processing is thin to absent. What must be proven is therefore narrow and specific: sustained reliable crude to the refinery and demonstrated continuous operation at nameplate over multiple years; reliable domestic gas at workable prices for urea, with export flows reoriented from Brazil, the United States and India towards African markets; defence of clinker-export share as coastal competitors build grinding and calcined-clay capacity, with producer diversification to de-risk single-firm dependency; and, across the board, grid-power reform, port and logistics efficiency, foreign-exchange and policy stability, and a deliberate shift from extra-African to intra-African trade orientation.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Nigeria is shown 15 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Nigeria to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2