Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
NigerBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Niger — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
14
Draft 1 candidate lines for Niger
The Minister’s brief · for Mamane Laouali Abdou Rafa · Niger
Minister Abdou Rafa, Niger holds something the continent cannot make for itself: finished fuel. Since 2011 your SORAZ refinery at Zinder has turned Agadem crude into gasoline, diesel and LPG, and for over a decade some 15,000 barrels a day of surplus have crossed by road into northern Nigeria, Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso — proven supply, without a coast. Africa spends more than USD 120 billion a year, APPO reports, importing the refined petroleum products Niger already delivers — fuel even oil-rich Nigeria still buys. The Right of Supply turns that proof into a 25-year first right to supply the continent, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract: you hold it only while you match the market. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; it is your document, not ours, and your correction is the next move, Minister.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Niger
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Mamane Laouali Abdou Rafa, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Niger · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Abdou Rafa,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Niger — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Niger is in this room

Niger's strongest position for the continent is not its uranium but its refined fuel. The SORAZ refinery at Zinder has converted Agadem crude into gasoline, diesel and LPG since 2011, and with domestic demand absorbing only about 5,000 barrels per day of its 20,000, roughly 15,000 barrels per day of surplus has crossed land borders into northern Nigeria, Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso for over a decade — proven supply, by road, without a coast, into a continent that APPO reports spends more than USD 120 billion annually importing refined petroleum products and hydrocarbon-related services. The honest constraint is that this rests on a single, modest-scale plant controlled by one anchor investor, CNPC, with feedstock and revenue pledged against Chinese loans, corridors exposed to insecurity and border politics following the ECOWAS withdrawal of January 2025, and a power system of around 400 MW with 20 per cent access that caps any deepening of processing.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Niger, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Niger

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
14draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Niger’s draft bundle. 14 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Uranium ores & concentrates. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 1 continental anchor · 5 strong contender · 4 emerging · 3 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Niger is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 14 candidate lines proposed for Niger below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Niger. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Niger will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Niger will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
14 lines
Niger’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Niger at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Niger’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Niger’s own capability audit.

Uranium ores and concentrates (HS 2612) as a continental supply category

Niger's uranium is its strongest global card but a weak continental one: intra-African demand is near-zero, since only South Africa operates reactors today and Egypt's El Dabaa is under construction. The product also remains raw and un-enriched.

Continental demand · demand-flagged

Uranium conversion or enrichment capability

Niger produces uranate or yellowcake, a milled intermediate, but has no conversion or enrichment. Concentrate is trucked roughly 1,600 kilometres to Parakou, railed to Cotonou and shipped to France for conversion.

Raw base · industrial screen

The 100,000 bpd Dosso refinery as installed capacity

The Dosso refinery was announced via memorandum of understanding in October 2024 with a Canadian firm, Zimar. The audit states plainly that it is announced, not built, and that announced refineries should not be treated as installed capacity.

Announced, not built

A national gold refinery and refined gold output

National gold production was around 2.4 tonnes in 2023, of which only 177.54 kilogrammes came from industrial mining at Samira Hill, the sole industrial mine, which was nationalised in August 2025. A state gold refinery was announced in April 2025 but has not been built, so the position remains raw to semi-manufactured with limited standing as an intra-African supply category.

Raw base · announced, not built

Millet and sorghum as an export supply category

Niger is the world's second-largest millet producer, yet millet is a dietary staple with little export surplus and Niger is a structural net cereal importer, notably of rice. Continental cereal demand is large but Niger is food-deficit, so the audit tiers this aspirational.

Capability inversion · food-deficit

The Dasa uranium project as near-term output

Global Atomic's Dasa project, 80 per cent Global Atomic and 20 per cent state, continues with state support, but first production has slipped to 2027 or 2028 on financing and logistics constraints and should not be treated as installed capacity.

Not yet operational
08 · Endowment
What Niger actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Niger. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Niger's endowment rests on three pillars. The first is uranium of world-class grade: Africa's highest-grade ores, cumulative production of 158,889 tonnes of uranium over 1945 to 2024, and ninth place globally on cumulative output. Identified resources are approximately 336,000 tonnes of uranium recoverable up to USD 130 per kilogram on the OECD-NEA/IAEA Red Book basis, with the World Nuclear Association citing around 454,000 tonnes of total identified resources and Enerdata reporting 518 kilotonnes recoverable below USD 260 per kilogram — a range tied to differing cost cut-offs rather than a single reserve figure. Two significant mines have historically supplied about 5 per cent of world mine output. Global Atomic's Dasa deposit, at 109.6 million pounds of triuranium octoxide at 0.49 per cent, is the highest-grade uranium deposit in Africa.

The second pillar is a newly commercial oil complex. The Agadem Rift Basin holds estimated reserves of around 1 billion barrels. The 1,950 kilometre Niger–Benin Export Pipeline, the longest in Africa, was built by CNPC as part of an investment of roughly USD 4.6 billion at 110,000 barrels per day of capacity and began exports in May 2024; more than 14 million barrels have since been evacuated via Benin, and output is rising toward approximately 106,000 barrels per day. Crucially, Niger already refines: the SORAZ refinery at Zinder, 20,000 barrels per day, 60 per cent CNPC and 40 per cent state-owned, has operated since 2011 and produces roughly 306,200 tonnes of gasoline, 505,400 tonnes of gas oil and diesel, and 69,900 tonnes of LPG each year.

The third pillar is a pastoral and legume agricultural base. Niger is the world's second-largest cowpea producer at 2.66 million tonnes on the world's largest harvested area of 5.97 million hectares, and the world's second-largest millet producer after India. The 2013 census recorded roughly 10.7 million cattle, 10.7 million sheep, 14.3 million goats and 1.7 million camels, with livestock contributing about 14 per cent of GDP. The Violet de Galmi onion is prized across West Africa. Agriculture generates about 40 per cent of GDP and employs some 87 per cent of the labour force. On economic complexity, however, Niger ranks around 97th on the OEC index using 2022 trade data, and its revealed comparative advantage sits almost entirely in raw products — uranium ore, gold, onions, cowpeas and live animals. Feasible product-space adjacencies extend into mining and energy services and basic agro-processing, not sophisticated manufacturing.

The endowment in depth

Niger's mineral endowment is anchored by uranium of exceptional grade: it holds Africa's highest-grade uranium ores, with cumulative production of 158,889 tU across 1945–2024, ranking it 9th globally on a cumulative basis (World Nuclear Association, 2026). Identified resources are reported across a range tied to differing cost cut-offs — approximately 336,000 tU recoverable up to USD 130/kgU (OECD-NEA/IAEA Uranium 2024 "Red Book"), ~454,000 tU total identified (WNA, 2023), and 518 kt recoverable below USD 260/kgU (Enerdata, 2023). Two significant mines supply about 5% of world mining output. On the WNA's 2024 table Niger ranked 8th at 962 tU against a world total of 60,213 tU (~1.6%), though that single-year figure is distorted by the March 2021 closure of COMINAK and the 2024 export halt under post-coup sanctions and the Benin border closure. Critically, the processing position is RAW only: Niger mills uranate/yellowcake but has no conversion or enrichment, and concentrate is trucked some 1,600 km to Parakou (Benin), railed to Cotonou and shipped to France (Comurhex) for conversion. Gold is secondary — 2023 output of about 2.4 tonnes, of which only 177.54 kg came from the industrial Samira Hill mine (nationalised August 2025) and roughly 2.2 tonnes from artisanal miners on the Tera greenstone belt; a state gold refinery was announced in April 2025 but not built. Coal (~0.2 Mt, 2023) feeds the SONICHAR power station, alongside minor gypsum, limestone, salt, tin and silver, all largely raw.

The energy endowment is being transformed by the newly-commercial Agadem oil complex. The Agadem Rift Basin holds estimated reserves of ~1 billion barrels (APPO, 2024); production, historically ~20,000 bpd routed to the SORAZ refinery, is rising toward ~106,000 bpd near the capacity of the 1,950 km Niger–Benin Export Pipeline — the longest in Africa, built by CNPC within a ~USD 4.6 billion investment at 110,000 bpd capacity, with exports beginning in May 2024. More than 14 million barrels had been evacuated via Benin by 2025 (the Nigerien state's share 3,553,802 barrels, the remainder CNPC's). The SORAZ refinery at Zinder (20,000 bpd, 60% CNPC / 40% state, operating since 2011) already produces gasoline (~306,200 t/yr), gas oil/diesel (~505,400 t/yr) and LPG (~69,900 t/yr); domestic demand absorbs only ~5,000 bpd, leaving ~15,000 bpd of surplus, and the plant sits 260 km from the Nigerian border. A 100,000 bpd refinery at Dosso (Canadian firm Zimar) was announced by MoU in October 2024 but remains unbuilt. Power, by contrast, is a binding constraint: installed capacity is only ~400 MW (2024), electricity access was 20.1% (2023), and Niger imported ~86% of its electricity from Nigeria in 2022 — a supply cut from the usual 80 MW to 46 MW in 2025 (~42%) depressed output. Hydro potential of 0.8 TWh is undeveloped, the 130 MW Kandadji project is suspended, gas production (40 mcm, 2023) goes entirely to domestic power, and solar is being scaled toward a ~15% mix target.

Agriculture generates about 40% of GDP and employs ~87% of the labour force, resting on a vast pastoral and legume base. Niger is the world's 2nd-largest cowpea (niébé) producer at 2.66 million MT (2021, FAOSTAT) on the world's largest harvested area of 5.97 million ha, behind Nigeria's 3.63 million MT, and the world's 2nd-largest millet producer after India (2022) — both traded as raw grain. The "Violet de Galmi" onion is prized across West Africa, with onion/shallot exports of ~USD 11.5 million (2023) despite post-harvest losses exceeding 30% from poor storage and transport. The livestock herd is large: the 2013 census recorded ~10.7 million cattle, 10.7 million sheep, 14.3 million goats and 1.7 million camels, and livestock contributes ~14% of GDP through a substantial informal cross-border trade into Nigeria, with premium demand at Eid al-Adha — but processing is minimal, with animals moving live and only one modern abattoir at Niamey. Sorghum, cassava and rice are subsistence crops, and Niger remains a structural net cereal importer, notably of rice.

The existing industrial base is thin and stagnant: manufacturing value added was ~USD 1.08 billion (2022), and UNIDO's Competitive Industrial Performance Index ranked Niger 140th of 150 economies (2018, CIP score 0.0022), with actual industry limited to the SORAZ refinery, cement, agro-processing and small consumer goods, and no significant special economic zone or industrial park hosting heavy industry. Human capital is young but under-developed — a population of ~27 million with ~70% under age 25 and fertility near 7 births per woman; 93% of jobs were classed as vulnerable in 2022, primary enrollment was ~61–65% gross (2023–24), the TVET base is very thin, and specialised skill clusters exist only around uranium mining at Arlit/Akokan and the SORAZ refinery at Zinder. Infrastructure compounds the difficulty: Niger is landlocked and transit-dependent on corridors to Cotonou (Benin), Lomé (Togo) and through Nigeria, with uranium alone hauled ~1,600 km to port. The most significant recent structural change is Niger's formal withdrawal from ECOWAS effective 29 January 2025 (with Mali and Burkina Faso) to consolidate the Alliance of Sahel States, which has announced a 0.5% import levy on non-member imports while Niger remains in WAEMU and keeps the CFA franc — raising trade-corridor and border friction on the very coastal routes it depends on.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Niger ranks among the world's least-complex economies — #97 on the OEC Economic Complexity Index (2022 trade data, HS96) — while the Harvard Atlas rank could not be confirmed, Niger likely falling below the Atlas inclusion threshold for population and trade coverage in recent vintages. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA > 1) is concentrated in uranium ore, gold, onions, cowpeas and dried legumes, and live animals — all raw, with little or no domestic value addition. A Columbia/academic analysis found Niger's ECI improved over 2019–2022 alongside GDP recovery, but feasible product-space adjacencies extend only into mining and energy services and basic agro-processing rather than complex manufacturing.

A distinction the AU committee should weigh is that the May 2024 pipeline opening raises export value but reduces measured complexity, since crude is a low-complexity product: total goods exports rose toward ~USD 1 billion in 2024 with crude at ~74% of value, yet this headline growth is not the same as capability deepening. The Right of Supply framework rewards finished goods that substitute African imports, not raw volume, so Niger's measured export surge overstates the deepening of its productive base.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Niger's single most defensible CONTINENTAL supply position is refined petroleum products (HS 2710 — diesel, gasoline, LPG), not raw uranium, despite uranium being its larger global asset. The input base is abundant: the Agadem basin holds ~1 billion barrels (APPO, 2024) and production is rising toward ~106,000 bpd (World Bank, 2025–26). Processing already exists — the SORAZ refinery at Zinder (20,000 bpd, operating since 2011, 60% CNPC / 40% state) converts crude into gasoline, diesel and LPG, a genuine finished good rather than an ore. Deliverability is proven: domestic demand absorbs only ~5,000 bpd, leaving ~15,000 bpd of surplus that has been exported across land borders to northern Nigeria, Mali, Benin and Burkina Faso for over a decade — cross-border supply by road, without a coast. Continental demand is vast: APPO Secretary General Farid Ghezali stated (Nigerian International Energy Summit, February 2026) that Africa spends more than USD 120 billion annually importing refined petroleum products and hydrocarbon-related services, so the substitution prize is large and even oil producers such as Nigeria import refined product. The mechanism of advantage is an anchor investor (CNPC) combined with geographic proximity to the fuel-short markets of the central Sahel and northern Nigeria.

The position has honest limits. SORAZ is a single, modest-scale, CNPC-controlled plant, and the announced 100,000 bpd Dosso refinery (Zimar) is unbuilt. Crude feedstock and export revenue are pledged against Chinese loans, including a USD 400 million facility, constraining the state's freedom of action. The Niger–Benin pipeline has suffered sabotage (June 2024) and Benin border closures, and Niger's ECOWAS exit raises tariff and corridor friction on the very routes fuel must travel. By contrast, the runner-up cards are weaker continentally: uranium is a world-class GLOBAL endowment but faces near-zero intra-African demand — only South Africa operates reactors today and Egypt's El Dabaa is under construction — and remains raw and un-enriched; while Niger's vast herds and #2-world cowpea output feed a large but largely informal cross-border trade into Nigeria, held back by zero processing and high post-harvest loss.

Current reality

Niger is a landlocked Sahelian economy of roughly USD 19.5 billion GDP in 2024 and about 27.0 million people, growing near 3.3 per cent annually. Its most defensible continental supply position is in refined petroleum products and in live animals and cowpeas; its uranium is a world-class global asset but has almost no intra-African demand to supply. Manufacturing value added was approximately USD 1.08 billion in 2022, a low and stagnant share of GDP, and UNIDO's Competitive Industrial Performance Index ranked Niger 140th of 150 economies in its 2018 edition. Actual manufacturing is thin — the SORAZ refinery, cement and agro-processing, and small consumer goods — with no significant special economic zone or industrial park hosting operating heavy industry.

Energy is a binding constraint on any heavy manufacturing. Installed capacity is around 400 MW, electricity access was 20.1 per cent in 2023, and Niger imported roughly 86 per cent of its electricity consumption from Nigeria in 2022; the Energy Minister confirmed in April 2025 that Nigeria was delivering only 46 megawatts instead of the usual 80. Hydro potential of 0.8 TWh is undeveloped and the 130 MW Kandadji project is suspended. Logistics are equally binding: all exports depend on the Cotonou, Lomé or Nigeria corridors, and uranium concentrate alone is hauled some 1,600 kilometres by road to Parakou before rail to Cotonou. Niger formally withdrew from ECOWAS effective 29 January 2025 to consolidate the Alliance of Sahel States, while remaining in WAEMU and keeping the CFA franc — raising trade-corridor and border friction on the very coastal routes it depends upon.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 14 candidate lines · will change

Niger’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Niger’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Niger will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Niger’s 14 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 1Strong Contender 5Emerging 4Aspirational 3Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum products

Agadem crude + operating SORAZ refinery; ~15k bpd proven cross-border surplus · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very large (Africa imports >USD120bn/yr refined+services, APPO)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Niger imported USD 106.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: SORAZ/Energy Voice/World Bank/APPO · 2011-2026

Crude petroleum oils

~1bn bbl reserves; pipeline; ~106k bpd · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate; mostly extra-African
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 11.08 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 4.81 bnCote dIvoire USD 2.89 bnEgypt USD 1.74 bnSenegal USD 952.2 mTunisia USD 506 mGhana USD 124.9 mZambia USD 55.6 mZimbabwe USD 2.5 m

Source: World Bank/APPO/Energynews.pro · 2024-2025

Coal

SONICHAR deposits · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Marginal
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 3.41 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270111Coal; anthracite, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270112Coal; bituminous, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270119Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous), whether or not pulverised but not agglomerated
270120Briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels; manufactured from coal
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 17 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 1.38 bnEgypt USD 587 mSouth Africa USD 521.1 mSenegal USD 227 mKenya USD 128.9 mEthiopia USD 114.1 mDR Congo USD 100.9 mMauritius USD 94.8 m

Source: Enerdata · 2023

Gold

Tera greenstone; ~2.4t mostly artisanal · Maturity: Raw/semi-manufactured · Competitiveness: Limited
EMERGING
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Niger Min. Mines/capmad · 2025

Hydraulic cement

Domestic limestone/gypsum; plants · Maturity: Finished (domestic) · Competitiveness: Large intra-African
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 37.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Enerdata/USGS · 2023

Cowpeas (dried)

World #2 producer 2.66m MT · Maturity: Raw grain · Competitiveness: Large in W. Africa
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.83 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
071310Vegetables, leguminous; peas (pisum sativum), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071320Vegetables, leguminous; chickpeas (garbanzos), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071331Vegetables, leguminous; beans of the species vigna mungo (l.) hepper or vigna radiata (l.) wilczek, shelled, whether or
071332Vegetables, leguminous; small red (adzuki) beans (phaseolus or vigna angularis), shelled, whether or not skinned or spli
071333Vegetables, leguminous; kidney beans, including white pea beans (phaseolus vulgaris), shelled, whether or not skinned or
071334Vegetables, leguminous; bambara beans (Vigna subterranea or Voandzeia subterranea), shelled, whether or not skinned or s
071335Vegetables, leguminous; cow peas (Vigna unguiculata), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071339Vegetables, leguminous; n.e.c. in item no. 0713.3, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071340Vegetables, leguminous; lentils, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071350Vegetables, leguminous; broad beans (vicia faba var. major) and horse beans (vicia faba var. equina, vicia faba var. min
071360Vegetables, leguminous; pigeon peas (Cajanus cajan), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071390Vegetables, leguminous; n.e.c. in heading no. 0713, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): OAIC (Algeria) · Food Security · control: monopoly. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Niger imported USD 0.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 549.1 mAlgeria USD 344 mMorocco USD 180.8 mEthiopia USD 160.6 mSudan USD 108 mDjibouti USD 100.3 mKenya USD 74.4 mSouth Africa USD 38.1 m

Source: FAOSTAT · 2021

Live bovine animals

~10.7m cattle; cross-border trade to Nigeria · Maturity: Live · Competitiveness: Large in W. Africa
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 849.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010210Pure-bred breeding bovines
010221Cattle; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010229Cattle; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010231Buffalo; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010239Buffalo; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010290Bovine animals; live, other than cattle and buffalo
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 307.9 mMorocco USD 188.2 mAlgeria USD 103.9 mSouth Africa USD 102.6 mLibya USD 46.7 mMauritius USD 19.9 mCote dIvoire USD 12.3 mTunisia USD 12.1 m

Source: FAO/FAS · 2013-2025

Onions & shallots

Violet de Galmi; RCA>1 · Maturity: Raw fresh · Competitiveness: Regional
EMERGING
USD 395.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
070310Vegetables, alliaceous; onions and shallots, fresh or chilled
070320Vegetables, alliaceous; garlic, fresh or chilled
070390Vegetables, alliaceous; leeks and other kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 0703, fresh or chilled
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Niger imported USD 0.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Cote dIvoire USD 55.8 mSenegal USD 51.9 mGuinea USD 45.5 mMauritania USD 24.7 mMozambique USD 24.4 mMorocco USD 18.5 mGhana USD 14.4 mSouth Africa USD 14.3 m

Source: WITS/Comtrade · 2023

Gypsum

Known deposits · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Modest
EMERGING
USD 386.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252010Gypsum; anhydrite
252020Plasters; (consisting of calcined gypsum or calcium sulphate), whether or not coloured, with or without small quantities
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 1.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 176.6 mGhana USD 32.7 mCote dIvoire USD 18.3 mUganda USD 16.7 mCameroon USD 15.2 mBurkina Faso USD 14.6 mSenegal USD 12.1 mZambia USD 9.3 m

Source: USGS · 2023

Salt

Traditional production · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Marginal
GREY
USD 303.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
250100Salt (including table salt and denatured salt); pure sodium chloride whether or not in aqueous solution; sea water
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 6.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 38.2 mCote dIvoire USD 22.9 mUganda USD 21.9 mSouth Africa USD 19.6 mZimbabwe USD 18.5 mMalawi USD 15.1 mZambia USD 13.6 mGhana USD 12.9 m

Source: export.gov · undated

Live sheep & goats

~10.7m sheep, 14.3m goats; Eid demand · Maturity: Live · Competitiveness: Large
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 167.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010410Sheep; live
010420Goats; live
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 62.8 mSouth Africa USD 45.5 mLibya USD 42 mGuinea USD 3.4 mGhana USD 1.7 mMauritius USD 1.6 mKenya USD 1.6 mEgypt USD 1.5 m

Source: FAO/Ecofin · 2013-2025

Hides, skins & leather

Large herds; Hausa leather tradition · Maturity: Raw/semi · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 112.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
410110Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing <= 8 kg when dried, <= 10 kg when dry-salted and . . .
410120Raw hides and skins; whole, unsplit, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin not exceeding 8kg when simply dri
410121Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing > 14 kg, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired . . .
410122Raw butts and bends of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split
410129Raw hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split . . .
410150Hides and skins; raw, whole, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin exceeding 16 kg
410190Hides and skins; other than whole, but including butts, bends and bellies, of bovine (including. buffalo) and equine ani
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 93.1 mEgypt USD 7.4 mGhana USD 5.1 mUganda USD 3.5 mKenya USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.2 mBenin USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 m

Source: export.gov · 2024

Millet & sorghum

World #2 millet producer · Maturity: Raw grain · Competitiveness: Large but Niger food-deficit
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 48.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
100810Cereals; buckwheat
100820Millet (excluding grain sorghum)
100821Cereals; millet, seed
100829Cereals; millet, other than seed
100830Cereals; canary seeds
100840Cereals; fonio (Digitaria spp.)
100850Cereals; quinoa (Chenopodium quinoa)
100860Cereals; triticale
100890Cereals; n.e.c. in chapter 10
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 9.8 mKenya USD 7.3 mLibya USD 4.5 mSenegal USD 4 mAlgeria USD 4 mSouth Africa USD 3.5 mCote dIvoire USD 2.8 mUganda USD 2 m

Source: FAOSTAT · 2022

Uranium ores & concentrates

9th cumulative global producer; Africa's highest-grade ore · Maturity: Raw/milled intermediate; no conversion · Competitiveness: Negligible intra-African
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 0 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261210Uranium ores and concentrates
261220Thorium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Niger imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Source: WNA/OECD-NEA-IAEA/USGS · 2024-2026

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Niger is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Niger buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Niger is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 3.14 bn

Niger’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

14

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierNiger imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleum productsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 106.2 mUSD 110.54 bn
Hydraulic cementEMERGINGUSD 37.6 mUSD 2.9 bn
CoalASPIRATIONALUSD 17 mUSD 3.41 bn
SaltGREYUSD 6.8 mUSD 303.1 m
GypsumEMERGINGUSD 1.9 mUSD 386.9 m
Cowpeas (dried)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.7 mUSD 1.83 bn
Onions & shallotsEMERGINGUSD 0.4 mUSD 395.9 m
Millet & sorghumASPIRATIONALUSD 0.2 mUSD 48.2 m
Crude petroleum oilsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 11.08 bn
GoldEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Live bovine animalsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 849.4 m
Live sheep & goatsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 167.5 m
Hides, skins & leatherASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 112.6 m
Uranium ores & concentratesCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 0 m

Left-hand column: what Niger itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Niger’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 14 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Niger’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Niger. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Niger’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Niger’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 21.41 bn
02NigeriaUSD 20.25 bn
03EgyptUSD 9.86 bn
04MoroccoUSD 9.51 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.9 bn
06GhanaUSD 4.96 bn
07LibyaUSD 4.92 bn
08KenyaUSD 4.57 bn
09Cote dIvoireUSD 3.27 bn
10UgandaUSD 2.08 bn
11SenegalUSD 1.25 bn
12TunisiaUSD 562.7 m
13AlgeriaUSD 495.3 m
14MaliUSD 302.7 m
15EthiopiaUSD 274.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Niger. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Niger would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Niger to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Dosso refinery or SORAZ expansion financed and built

The Dosso refinery (or a SORAZ expansion) must actually be financed and built, lifting exportable surplus well beyond ~15,000 bpd.

02

Secured product-export corridors

Reliable product-export corridors or pipelines to northern Nigeria and the Sahel must be secured against insecurity and border politics.

03

Feedstock and revenue freed from CNPC pledges

Crude feedstock and export revenue must be freed from over-pledging to CNPC so the state has room to direct product to continental markets.

04

Stabilised power supply

Power supply must be stabilised beyond the current ~400 MW installed base and 86% import dependence on Nigeria to enable any processing or manufacturing.

05

Continental nuclear demand and a move to conversion

For uranium to matter continentally, African nuclear demand (Egypt and others) must materialise and Niger must move up to conversion — neither is near-term.

06

Livestock and cowpea value-addition

Investment in abattoirs, cold chain, feedlots, storage and phytosanitary compliance is needed to convert informal raw flows into formal, value-added supply.

The binding constraints
·

Power ceiling Installed capacity is only ~400 MW with about 20% access and an 86% import dependence on Nigeria that was cut ~42% (from the usual 80 MW to 46 MW) in 2025 — a hard ceiling on any processing or manufacturing.

·

Landlocked, single-corridor logistics All exports depend on the Cotonou, Lomé and Nigeria corridors, with uranium alone moving ~1,600 km to port; single-corridor exposure is acute.

·

ECOWAS exit and AES friction Withdrawal from ECOWAS effective January 2025 introduces tariff and border friction on the coastal corridors Niger depends on, partly offset by continued WAEMU and CFA membership.

·

Security and insurgency A jihadist insurgency in Tillabéri and the tri-border zone (a 2025 attack killed gold-mine workers) and 2024 pipeline sabotage threaten sites and export routes.

·

Governance and political risk Post-2023 coup nationalisations (Somaïr, Samira Hill), ICSID disputes with Orano and abrupt permit revocations have sharply raised investor risk even as the state asserts sovereign control.

·

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency CNPC controls oil production, the pipeline and SORAZ, and oil revenue is pledged against a USD 400 million Chinese loan, all against a thin TVET base and 93% vulnerable employment.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Niger’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Power is a hard ceiling, not a soft constraint. Installed capacity is roughly 400 MW with 20 per cent access and an 86 per cent import dependence on Nigeria that was cut by about 42 per cent in 2025, from 80 to 46 megawatts. The audit treats this as a hard ceiling on any processing or manufacturing.

05

Landlocked logistics leave single-corridor exposure. All exports depend on the Cotonou, Lomé or Nigeria corridors, and uranium alone moves some 1,600 kilometres to port. The audit describes single-corridor exposure as acute.

06

The ECOWAS exit cuts across the routes Niger depends on. Withdrawal effective January 2025 introduces tariff and border friction on coastal corridors, with the AES announcing a 0.5 per cent import levy and tariffs on non-member imports including coastal ECOWAS states such as Nigeria. This is partly offset by continued WAEMU and CFA membership.

07

Security risk is live on both the mining and the pipeline assets. A jihadist insurgency persists in Tillabéri and the tri-border zone, with a 2025 attack killing gold-mine workers, and the Niger–Benin pipeline suffered sabotage in 2024.

08

Governance and expropriation risk has sharply raised the cost of capital. Since the July 2023 coup the state has revoked Orano's Imouraren permit, withdrawn GoviEx's Madaouela licence, and nationalised Somaïr in June 2025 and Samira Hill in August 2025, with Orano pursuing ICSID arbitration. The net effect is a sharp deterioration in foreign-investor confidence even as the state asserts sovereign control.

09

A single counterparty controls the trump-card value chain. CNPC controls oil production, the pipeline and the SORAZ refinery, and oil revenue is pledged against a USD 400 million Chinese loan. The audit requires that feedstock and revenue be freed from over-pledging before refined petroleum can become a real continental supply.

10

Capital and skills are thin, and value addition depends on assets not yet built. The TVET base is thin, 93 per cent of jobs were classified as vulnerable in 2022, and domestic capital for processing investment is minimal. Converting livestock and cowpea flows from informal raw trade into formal, value-added supply would require investment in abattoirs, cold chain, feedlots, storage and phytosanitary compliance.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Niger's Draft 1 bundle rests on one genuinely finished good and a set of large but raw endowments. Refined petroleum products are the anchor: real processing capacity, a decade of proven cross-border delivery, and a continental import bill that dwarfs available supply. Live cattle, sheep and goats and the world's second-largest cowpea crop constitute real regional supply capability, held back by zero processing and post-harvest losses exceeding 30 per cent in the onion trade. Uranium is a world-class global endowment that the continent cannot currently absorb, and the 2024 pipeline opening raises export value while reducing measured complexity, since crude is a low-complexity product — headline growth is not the same as capability deepening, and the Right of Supply rewards finished goods, not raw volume. What must be proven is therefore narrow and specific: that refinery capacity is actually financed and built beyond SORAZ, that product-export corridors to northern Nigeria and the Sahel are secured against insecurity and border politics, that feedstock and revenue are freed from over-pledging, that power supply is stabilised, and that abattoirs, cold chain, storage and phytosanitary compliance convert informal raw agricultural flows into formal, value-added supply.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Niger is shown 14 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Niger to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2