Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
MozambiqueBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Mozambique — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
12
Draft 1 candidate lines for Mozambique
The Minister’s brief · for Carla Louveira · Mozambique
Minister Louveira, Mozambique holds what the continent cannot fake: Cahora Bassa, 2,075 megawatts of firm, dispatchable hydropower, the largest hydro plant in Southern Africa and among the cheapest and cleanest in the region. It delivered 12,351 gigawatt-hours in 2024 and already sells 8,319 of them across the border into Eskom. Alone among your endowments this is a finished product — not ore awaiting a smelter, but electricity, delivered. And it meets an acute hunger: the Southern African Power Pool runs short by some 11,000 megawatts among its operating members, against a 2023 peak shortfall of 8,936 megawatts. That shortfall is your claim on it. The Right of Supply gives Mozambique a twenty-five-year first right to feed that demand, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — only your power, priced honestly, chosen first. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Mozambique
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Carla Louveira, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Mozambique · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Louveira,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Mozambique — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Mozambique is in this room

Mozambique's strongest endowment is firm hydroelectric power. Cahora Bassa carries 2,075 MW of installed capacity and delivered approximately 12,351 GWh in 2024, of which 8,319 GWh went to Eskom, 3,451 GWh to EDM and 499 GWh to ZESA, making it the largest hydro plant in Southern Africa and an already-proven cross-border exporter into a Southern African Power Pool facing a shortfall of around 11,000 MW among operating members. Alone among Mozambican endowments it is a finished product, needing no further processing stage. The honest constraint is delivery rather than generation: there is still no transmission line carrying Zambezi power directly to southern load centres, which is precisely why the Mozal smelter had to source via Eskom and ultimately failed on tariff, and the reservoir fell to about 26% by December 2024, its lowest level in thirty years.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Mozambique, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Mozambique

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
12draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Mozambique’s draft bundle. 12 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Electricity (hydropower). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 1 continental anchor · 2 strong contender · 5 emerging · 1 aspirational · 3 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Mozambique is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 12 candidate lines proposed for Mozambique below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Mozambique. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Mozambique will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Mozambique will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
12 lines
Mozambique’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Mozambique at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Mozambique’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Mozambique’s own capability audit.

Primary aluminium (HS 7601)

Mozal produced 318,000 tonnes in 2024 but was placed on care and maintenance effective 15 March 2026 after no affordable power tariff could be agreed, and the audit downgrades the position from STRONG to GREY. The audit's own test is a signed, competitively priced long-term supply deal in 2026; absent that, it directs that aluminium be treated as lost.

Incumbency · production halted

Titanium minerals (HS 2614/2615)

Mozambique is the world's leading exporter of titanium ore, yet the material leaves as raw concentrate with zero beneficiation and the audit records negligible intra-African demand for the feedstock, which is destined mainly for global pigment.

Raw base · industrial screen

Natural gas and LNG (HS 2711)

Rovuma holds more than 160 tcf gross with one operational FLNG, but volumes are export-locked offshore under contract to overseas buyers, and the flagship domestic downstream projects — Yara fertilizer and Shell GTL — were both cancelled. The audit concludes it does not yet serve a continental supplier role.

Capability inversion · export-locked

Graphite as battery anode (HS 2504)

Balama is the largest high-grade flake deposit with about 79.5% battery-grade material, but there is no domestic spheronisation, purification or anode capacity; that work is done almost entirely in China, and output fell from 170,000 tonnes in 2022 to 75,000 tonnes in 2024 and roughly 60,000 tonnes in 2025.

Raw base · no finished stage

Prawns and seafood (HS 0306)

Total fisheries production reached about 508,808 tonnes in 2024, but export value fell to USD 46.5 million in 2025, down 20%, with shrimp at just USD 16.3 million. The audit records the sector as declining, not rising, and intra-African demand as low.

Scale-matching · declining base

Sesame, oilseeds and timber (HS 1207/4407)

Both are classed GREY. Sesame leaves Nampula and Zambezia as raw whole seed against low continental demand, and timber from the native miombo forests is exported mostly as raw or semi-processed logs under sustainability constraints.

Raw base · industrial screen
08 · Endowment
What Mozambique actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Mozambique. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Mozambique's endowment is defined by a small number of world-scale natural assets. In minerals, Balama in Cabo Delgado is the world's largest high-grade flake graphite deposit, with reserves of 108 million tonnes at 16% total graphitic carbon and a resource of 1.42 billion tonnes at 10% TGC, of which roughly 79.5% is battery-grade flake — the highest proportion of any African mine. National graphite reserves of 25 million tonnes rank fourth globally. At Moma, Kenmare produced approximately 1.0 million tonnes of ilmenite, 50,500 tonnes of zircon and record rutile in 2024, some 8% of global titanium feedstock, against a reserve life of more than a century. Moatize produced 16.3 million tonnes of coal in 2024, up from 14.9 million tonnes in 2023, against reserves of about 1.5 billion tonnes and a washery of roughly 50 million tonnes a year. Rubies at Montepuez, tantalum, gold, heavy sands and bentonite sit alongside these.

In energy the position is unusual for the continent. Cahora Bassa carries 2,075 MW of installed capacity across five 415-MW units, with the REABSUL II rehabilitation by ANDRITZ lifting each unit towards about 433 MW. It delivered 12,351 GWh in 2024, of which 8,319 GWh went to Eskom, 3,451 GWh to EDM and 499 GWh to ZESA. Offshore, Coral Sul FLNG has run at 3.4 mtpa since October 2022 and had passed one hundred cargoes by April 2025; Mozambique LNG on Area 1 (13.1 mtpa) has been under force majeure since April 2021 with restart under way from late 2025; Coral Norte (3.5 mtpa) has an approved development plan targeting 2028; and Rovuma LNG (15.2 to 18 mtpa) has seen final investment decision slip to 2026. Agriculture employs roughly 70% of the workforce and contributes 20 to 25% of GDP, with around 195,400 tonnes of cashew marketed in the 2024/25 campaign against a government plan to reach 689,000 tonnes by 2034, and four sugar estates producing some 380,000 tonnes.

The complexity picture is candid. The Economic Complexity Index stands at –1.04, rank 122 of 134 for 2023, roughly one standard deviation below the world mean, with OEC listing –0.75 for 2025 and rank 122 of 130 for 2024. Products with revealed comparative advantage above one are petroleum gas, coal, raw aluminium, titanium ore, electricity, gold clad metals, tobacco, cashews, sugar and prawns. Mozambique is the world's leading exporter of titanium ore and of gold clad metals. The Growth Lab groups Mozambique with Uganda and Tanzania as economies expected to grow more from population growth than from gains in complexity, and the Complexity Outlook Index is low because exports sit in the outskirts of the product space. Feasible adjacencies identified in the Atlas product space include potassic fertilizers, where revealed comparative advantage already stands at 1.01, aluminium scrap at 0.99, plastic pipes, cleaning products and phosphinates.

The endowment in depth

On minerals and metals, Mozambique's endowment is genuinely world-class but almost entirely unbeneficiated. Balama (Syrah Resources/Twigg) is the world's largest high-grade flake graphite deposit — reserves of 108 Mt at 16% TGC, a resource of 1.42 Bt at 10% TGC, and ~79.5% battery-grade flake, the highest of any African mine (USGS FS2024-3029); national reserves of 25 Mt rank fourth globally (USGS MCS 2025). Output has been erratic and falling: from 170,000 t (2022) to 75,000 t in 2024 (down 24%) and ~60,000 t in 2025, with Syrah reporting 67 kt produced and 55 kt sold ex-China in 2025 after running Balama in campaign mode through repeated 2023–24 suspensions before a June 2025 restart. Titanium mineral sands at Moma (Kenmare) produced ~1.0 Mt ilmenite plus 50,500 t zircon and record rutile in 2024 — around 8% of global titanium feedstock, on a reserve life exceeding 100 years, at revenue of $392.1M (2024, down 10% year on year on price). Moatize coking and thermal coal (Vulcan/Jindal) produced 16.3 Mt in 2024, up from 14.9 Mt in 2023, against ~1.5 Bt reserves and a ~50 Mt/yr washery. The endowment also spans rubies (Montepuez/Gemfields), tantalum, gold, heavy sands and bentonite.

On energy, the country holds two distinct assets. Cahora Bassa (HCB) is 2,075 MW installed across five 415-MW units, with the REABSUL II rehabilitation by ANDRITZ lifting units towards ~433 MW; it delivered 12,351 GWh in 2024, split between Eskom (8,319 GWh, 66%), EDM (3,451 GWh, ~30%) and ZESA (499 GWh, 4%). The Rovuma Basin gas resource is vast — Area 4 at ~85 tcf and Area 1 at ~75 tcf gross — but development is uneven: Coral Sul FLNG (Eni, 3.4 mtpa) has been operational since October 2022 with 100-plus cargoes by April 2025; Mozambique LNG (TotalEnergies, Area 1, 13.1 mtpa) has been under force majeure since April 2021 with a restart underway in late 2025; Coral Norte FLNG (3.5 mtpa, $7.2bn) had its development plan approved in 2025 with startup targeted for 2028; and Rovuma LNG (ExxonMobil/Eni/CNPC, Area 4, 15.2–18 mtpa) has slipped its FID to 2026.

On agriculture, fisheries and forestry, and the thin industrial base built on them, agriculture employs ~70% of the workforce and generates ~20–25% of GDP. Cashew marketed ~195,400 t in the 2024/25 campaign — near 1970s peaks — with record export revenue of $98.2M (2024, up 71%), drawing on ~1.05M families, 69 companies and ~7,287 processing workers, against a government plan to lift output to 689,000 t by 2034. Sugar exports reached $36M (2024, up 50%) from four estates — Xinavane, Mafambisse, Maragra and Marromeu — at ~380,000 t. Fisheries produced ~508,808 t in 2024, yet export value fell to $46.5M in 2025 (down 20%), with shrimp at just $16.3M, so the sector is contracting rather than growing; tobacco (€224.5M, 2025), cotton, sesame and macadamia ($39.9M, 2025) are largely raw-exported. Manufacturing is thin and now thinner: Mozal aluminium produced 318,000 t in 2024, historically ~half of manufacturing-sector output and ~one-third of manufacturing jobs on a constant 950 MW draw, but South32 placed it on care and maintenance effective 15 March 2026, with the IMF (February 2026) assessing it at ~4% of GDP, ~2,500 direct and ~21,000 indirect jobs, and a ~$372M impairment; Midal Cables (50 ktpa aluminium rods) depended on Mozal liquid metal.

On human capital and infrastructure — the two dimensions that would carry any move up the ladder — Mozambique is weak. Internet use is 20% (2025, World Bank), over 80% of employment is informal, mean years of schooling are low, and the Human Capital Index is low; UNCTAD's Productive Capacities Index (overall score 29.5, 2022) flags human capital, ICT and institutions as the weakest components. Logistics run through three corridors: Maputo (30.9 Mt handled in 2024, with MPDC planning expansion to 48 Mt by 2033); Beira (Cornelder), the Zimbabwe/Zambia/Malawi gateway; and Nacala, whose deep ~18m-plus natural channel needs no dredging but which used only 3.5 Mt of 10 Mt capacity (35%) in 2024, its container terminal reaching a 100,000 TEU milestone in December 2024. Only ~19–20% of the 30,000-plus km of roads are paved, and the corridors remain coal- and transit-focused rather than value-added.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Mozambique sits near the bottom of the global complexity distribution. Its Economic Complexity Index is –1.04, ranking 122 of 134 (2023, UNDP/Datawheel using Harvard Growth Lab Atlas data, in standard-deviation units — roughly one SD below the world mean); OEC separately lists –0.75 (Trade, 2025) and 122 of 130 (2024), all placing the country in the bottom decile. The Harvard Growth Lab groups Mozambique with Uganda and Tanzania as East African economies expected to grow more from population growth than from gains in economic complexity, and the Complexity Outlook Index is low because Mozambique's exports sit "in the outskirts of the product space," limiting nearby diversification. UNDP/Datawheel modelling puts baseline per-capita growth at ~3.8%/yr (ECI –0.95 by 2030), with a target diversification scenario lifting this to ~5.0%/yr (ECI –0.50 by 2030).

Its revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) is concentrated in primary goods — petroleum gas, coal, raw aluminium, titanium ore (world number one), electricity, gold clad metals — plus traditional agro exports (tobacco, cashews, sugar, prawns, cotton, wood). Feasible diversification within the Atlas 132-product set is modest and adjacent: potassic fertilisers (HS 3104, RCA already 1.01), aluminium scrap (HS 7602, RCA 0.99 and nearing specialisation), plastic pipes (HS 3917), cleaning products and detergents (HS 3402) and phosphinates/phosphonates (HS 2835). The foundational UNU-WIDER study additionally flags agro-industry, metals, and unexploited opportunities in machinery, vehicles and transport equipment, organised into clusters spanning agro-industrial transformation, foundational industries and infrastructure, the circular economy, light manufacturing, and specialised or technical products.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Mozambique's strongest and most defensible continental supply position is firm hydroelectric power — HS 2716 — from Cahora Bassa. At 2,075 MW installed and ~12,351 GWh delivered in 2024, it is the largest hydro plant in Southern Africa and an already-proven cross-border exporter: in 2024 it sold 8,319 GWh to South Africa's Eskom (66% of output) and 499 GWh to Zimbabwe's ZESA, with the balance to EDM. Crucially, unlike every other Mozambican endowment, this is a finished product — dispatchable electricity — already physically delivered across borders via the 1,400 km Songo–Apollo HVDC line into a Southern African Power Pool that, per the AfDB (September 2025), faces a generation shortfall of around 11,000 MW among operating members (against a 2023 system-peak shortfall of 8,936 MW). The power is competitive — among the cheapest and cleanest in the region, having avoided ~13.8 Mt CO₂ at 2023 peak output — and policy is actively reorienting it towards domestic and regional industrialisation, with the Energy Transition Strategy targeting repatriation of 8–10 TWh from Eskom from 2030 plus 2 GW of new national capacity by 2031, and Mphanda Nkuwa (1,500 MW) and Cahora Bassa North (1,250 MW) in the pipeline. The combination of unrivalled input advantage, zero processing gap, price competitiveness, proven deliverability and acute continental demand is met by no other line in the portfolio.

The honest limits are, however, material. Hydrological risk is real: the reservoir fell to ~26% by December 2024 — its lowest in 30 years, later quoted at 21.19%, against 78% a year earlier (AIM/STV). Transmission bottlenecks are structural, as there is still no line carrying Zambezi power directly to southern load centres, which is precisely why Mozal had to source via Eskom and ultimately failed. The unwinding of the very Eskom export contract that underpins current revenue is a further exposure, as is the execution and capital risk on the new dams. The trump card is therefore a finished, deliverable and demand-backed asset, but one whose realisation into domestic and regional industrial value depends on transmission, hydrology and financing that are not yet secured.

Current reality

GDP was USD 22.7 billion in 2024 with GDP per capita of about USD 690 in 2025, ranking roughly 187th of 193 globally, and the economy contracted by around 0.5% in 2025 amid post-election unrest, foreign-exchange shortages and fiscal stress. Population is approximately 35.6 million, growing at about 2.9% a year, and more than 80% of employment is informal. Total exports of some USD 14 billion in 2024 are highly concentrated in five primary commodities: petroleum gas at USD 3.33 billion, coal at USD 3.02 billion, raw aluminium at USD 1.86 billion, titanium ore at USD 947 million and electricity at USD 619 million. Destinations are India, China, Singapore, South Africa and South Korea, alongside a structural trade deficit with South Africa of USD 5.36 billion.

The manufacturing base is thin and has just become thinner. Mozal produced 318,000 tonnes of aluminium in 2024, historically representing about half of manufacturing output and a third of manufacturing jobs while drawing a constant 950 MW; South32 placed it on care and maintenance effective 15 March 2026 after failing to agree an affordable power tariff, with the IMF assessing the smelter at around 4% of GDP, some 2,500 direct and 21,000 indirect jobs, and a booked impairment of about USD 372 million. Fiscal space is close to absent: public debt is assessed as in distress and unsustainable, and 88% of 2025 tax revenue was absorbed by wages and interest. Logistics are underused, with Nacala at 3.5 million tonnes against 10 million tonnes of capacity, and only 19 to 20% of more than 30,000 km of roads paved. The insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the gas province, has displaced more than 800,000 people and repeatedly halted projects.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 12 candidate lines · will change

Mozambique’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Mozambique’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Mozambique will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Mozambique’s 12 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 1Strong Contender 2Emerging 5Aspirational 1Grey 3
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Natural gas/LNG

Rovuma 160+tcf gross, one operational FLNG; export-locked to overseas buyers · Maturity: Liquefied intermediate · Competitiveness: High as feedstock but contracted offshore
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas
271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane
271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes
271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene
271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711
271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas
271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Mozambique imported USD 70.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: OEC/Eni/AfDB · 2024

Sugar

Four estates ~380000t; exports $36M 2024 · Maturity: Refined · Competitiveness: High (SADC)
EMERGING
USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)
170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri
170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add
170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria USD 931.8 mSudan USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Source: Club of Mozambique · 2024

Coking coal

Moatize hard coking low-volatile, ~50Mt/yr washery; 16.3Mt 2024 · Maturity: Washed coal · Competitiveness: Moderate (limited African steel)
EMERGING
USD 3.41 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270111Coal; anthracite, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270112Coal; bituminous, whether or not pulverised, but not agglomerated
270119Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous), whether or not pulverised but not agglomerated
270120Briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels; manufactured from coal
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 25.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 1.38 bnEgypt USD 587 mSouth Africa USD 521.1 mSenegal USD 227 mKenya USD 128.9 mEthiopia USD 114.1 mDR Congo USD 100.9 mMauritius USD 94.8 m

Source: Vulcan/GEM · 2024

Electricity (hydropower)

Cahora Bassa 2075MW firm dispatchable baseload, proven cross-border exporter (8319 GWh to Eskom 2024) · Maturity: Final product · Competitiveness: Very high (SAPP ~11000 MW shortfall)
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 210 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique your own imports USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Mozambique is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: HCB Annual Report/AfDB/IHA · 2024

Timber

Native miombo forests, mostly raw logs; sustainability-constrained · Maturity: Mostly raw logs · Competitiveness: Moderate
GREY
USD 1.78 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, san
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped length
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped le
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 9 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 11.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 728.6 mAlgeria USD 312.7 mMorocco USD 287.1 mSouth Africa USD 114.3 mLibya USD 46.2 mSomalia USD 44.5 mKenya USD 41.3 mSenegal USD 36.2 m

Source: DTIS/multiple · 2024

Fertilizers (gas-based/potassic)

Gas feedstock + potassic RCA 1.01; Africa major importer · Maturity: Minimal/none · Competitiveness: Very high
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 782.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310410Carnallite, sylvite and other crude natural potassium salts (excluding those in pellet or similar...
310420Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium chloride
310430Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium sulphate
310490Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, n.e.c. in heading no. 3104
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Agricultural parastatals · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Mozambique imported USD 9.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 182.4 mMorocco USD 112.8 mEgypt USD 78.3 mCote dIvoire USD 58 mZimbabwe USD 57.3 mNigeria USD 38.1 mKenya USD 35.9 mMali USD 34.2 m

Source: UNDP/Atlas · 2025

Aluminium (primary)

Mozal produced 318kt 2024 but idled 15 Mar 2026 on power tariff · Maturity: Primary ingot HALTED · Competitiveness: High (Africa net-importer risk)
GREY
USD 724.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
760110Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed)
760120Aluminium; unwrought, alloys
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 395.9 mSouth Africa USD 82.8 mTunisia USD 50.8 mAlgeria USD 48.8 mNigeria USD 38.6 mEgypt USD 31.2 mKenya USD 22.1 mTanzania USD 21.4 m

Source: South32/IMF · 2026

Sesame/oilseeds

Nampula/Zambezia growing zones, exported raw · Maturity: Raw whole seed · Competitiveness: Low
GREY
USD 337.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 115.5 mGhana USD 46 mMorocco USD 42.7 mTunisia USD 27 mAlgeria USD 25.5 mKenya USD 19.1 mSouth Africa USD 12.6 mMozambique your own imports USD 8 m

Mozambique is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: FAO/IAOM · 2024

Prawns/seafood

Sofala Bank; seafood exports fell to $46.5M 2025 · Maturity: Frozen whole · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
EMERGING
USD 302.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
030611Crustaceans; frozen, rock lobsters and other sea crawfish (Palinurus spp., Panulirus spp., Jasus spp.), in shell or not,
030612Crustaceans; frozen, lobsters (Homarus spp.), in shell or not, smoked, cooked or not before or during smoking; in shell,
030613Frozen shrimps and prawns, whether in shell or not, incl. shrimps and prawns in shell, cooked...
030614Crustaceans; frozen, crabs, in shell or not, smoked, cooked or not before or during smoking; in shell, cooked by steamin
030615Crustaceans; frozen, Norway lobsters (Nephrops norvegicus), in shell or not, smoked, cooked or not before or during smok
030616Crustaceans; frozen, cold-water shrimps and prawns (Pandalus spp., Crangon crangon), in shell or not, smoked, cooked or
030617Crustaceans; frozen, shrimps and prawns, excluding cold-water varieties, in shell or not, smoked, cooked or not before o
030619Crustaceans; frozen, n.e.c. in item no. 0306.1, in shell or not, smoked, cooked or not before or during smoking; in shel
030621Rock lobster and other sea crawfish "Palinurus spp., Panulirus spp. and Jasus spp.", even smoked,...
030622Lobsters "Homarus spp.", even smoked, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, dried,...
030623Shrimps and prawns, whether in shell or not, live, dried, salted or in brine, incl. shrimps...
030624Crabs, even smoked, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, dried, salted or in brine,...
030626Cold-water shrimps and prawns "Pandalus spp., Crangon crangon", even smoked, whether in shell . . .
030627Shrimps and prawns, even smoked, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, dried, salted...
030629Crustaceans, even smoked, fit for human consumption, whether in shell or not, live, fresh,...
030631Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, rock lobsters and other sea crawfish (Palinurus spp., Panulirus spp., Jasus spp.), in shell or not
030632Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, lobsters (Homarus spp.), whether in shell or not
030633Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, crabs, whether in shell or not
030634Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, Norway lobsters (Nephrops norvegicus), in shell or not
030635Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, cold-water shrimps and prawns (Pandalus spp., Crangon crangon), in shell or not
030636Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, shrimps and prawns excluding cold-water varieties, in shell or not
030639Crustaceans; live, fresh or chilled, n.e.c. in item no. 0306.3, in shell or not
030691Crustaceans; rock lobsters and other sea crawfish (Palinurus spp., Panulirus spp., Jasus spp.), smoked, cooked or not, whether in shell or not, whether or not cooked before or during smoking
030692Crustaceans; lobsters (Homarus spp.), smoked, cooked or not, whether in shell or not, whether or not cooked before or during smoking
030693Crustaceans; crabs, smoked, cooked or not, whether in shell or not, whether or not cooked before or during smoking
030694Crustaceans; Norway lobsters (Nephrops norvegicus), smoked, cooked or not, whether in shell or not, whether or not cooked before or during smoking
030695Crustaceans; shrimps and prawns, smoked, cooked or not, whether in shell or not, whether or not cooked before or during smoking
030699Crustaceans; smoked, whole, cooked or not, n.e.c. in item no. 0306.9, in shell or not
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 122.8 mMorocco USD 101.3 mSouth Africa USD 38.5 mMauritius USD 17.1 mSeychelles USD 4.8 mTunisia USD 2.4 mAlgeria USD 1.6 mGhana USD 1.5 m

Source: Club of Mozambique/FAO · 2025

Cashew kernels

~195400t historic leader, exports $98.2M 2024, mostly raw RCN · Maturity: Raw concentrate (RCN) · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Source: IAM/Bank of Mozambique · 2024

Titanium minerals (ilmenite/zircon/rutile)

Moma world top-3, ~8% global feedstock, 100+ yr reserves · Maturity: Raw concentrate · Competitiveness: Low intra-Africa
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 13.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261400Titanium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 6.6 mEgypt USD 3.2 mMorocco USD 1.1 mAlgeria USD 1 mTunisia USD 0.4 mCameroon USD 0.3 mEthiopia USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.1 m

Source: Kenmare/USGS · 2024

Graphite (flake to anode)

Balama largest high-grade flake, ~79.5% battery-grade; output 75kt 2024 / ~60kt 2025 · Maturity: Raw concentrate, no domestic anode · Competitiveness: Emerging battery supply chain
EMERGING
USD 5.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
250410Graphite; natural, in powder or in flakes
250490Graphite; natural, in other forms, excluding powder or flakes
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mozambique imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Congo USD 2.6 mSouth Africa USD 0.9 mEgypt USD 0.3 mNiger USD 0.2 mTanzania USD 0.2 mGabon USD 0.2 mAlgeria USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MCS/Syrah · 2025

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Mozambique is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Mozambique buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Mozambique is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 10.01 bn

Mozambique’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

12

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierMozambique imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Electricity (hydropower)CONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 210 mUSD 2.24 bn
Natural gas/LNGSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 70.7 mUSD 10.27 bn
Coking coalEMERGINGUSD 25.8 mUSD 3.41 bn
TimberGREYUSD 11.1 mUSD 1.78 bn
Fertilizers (gas-based/potassic)ASPIRATIONALUSD 9.7 mUSD 782.2 m
Sesame/oilseedsGREYUSD 8 mUSD 337.6 m
Aluminium (primary)GREYUSD 0.8 mUSD 724.5 m
Cashew kernelsEMERGINGUSD 0.3 mUSD 155.7 m
SugarEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 8.84 bn
Prawns/seafoodEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 302.2 m
Titanium minerals (ilmenite/zircon/rutile)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 13.1 m
Graphite (flake to anode)EMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 5.4 m

Left-hand column: what Mozambique itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Mozambique’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 12 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Mozambique’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Mozambique. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Mozambique’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Mozambique’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01MoroccoUSD 5.94 bn
02EgyptUSD 5.81 bn
03South AfricaUSD 2.1 bn
04TunisiaUSD 1.96 bn
05AlgeriaUSD 1.36 bn
06NigeriaUSD 1.06 bn
07KenyaUSD 879.4 m
08SudanUSD 796.2 m
09Cote dIvoireUSD 471.8 m
10SomaliaUSD 441.3 m
11DjiboutiUSD 424.9 m
12SenegalUSD 263.2 m
13ZimbabweUSD 237.4 m
14GhanaUSD 231.5 m
15TanzaniaUSD 226.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Mozambique. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Mozambique would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Mozambique to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Zambezi-to-south transmission and new dams

For electricity — the anchor — a Zambezi-to-south transmission line must be built so the surplus reaches domestic and regional industry, with Mphanda Nkuwa (1,500 MW) and Cahora Bassa North (1,250 MW) completed on schedule; the threshold to watch is a committed transmission financing package and reservoir recovery above ~50%.

02

A viable domestic gas price

Gas downstream requires re-establishing a viable domestic gas price to revive fertiliser, GTL and petrochemical offtake, since both Yara and Shell walked away on price and security; without this, gas remains an export commodity rather than a continental supply asset.

03

Domestic graphite anode capacity

Graphite requires domestic spheronisation, purification and anode capacity — done almost entirely in China today, with peers Tanzania and Madagascar/Mauritius moving first — needing firm power, upwards of $100M capital per facility, and committed offtake.

04

A signed competitive Mozal power deal in 2026

Aluminium requires resolving the Mozal power tariff and restarting before care-and-maintenance becomes permanent, since smelter restarts are costly and often irreversible; the threshold is a signed, competitively priced long-term HCB/Eskom supply deal in 2026, absent which aluminium should be treated as lost.

05

Agro-processing up the ladder

Cashew, cotton and sugar must move up the ladder — roughly 90% of cashews and 80% of cotton are currently exported raw — with EU and China phytosanitary compliance fixed to unlock processed-food and kernel exports.

The binding constraints
·

Power delivery, not generation Despite a hydro surplus there is no transmission line from the Zambezi valley to southern industrial demand — the structural reason Mozal collapsed on price — and drought risk is now material, with the reservoir at ~26% in December 2024; the asset is abundant but mis-located relative to load.

·

Underused, transit-oriented logistics Ports are underutilised, with Nacala at just 35% of capacity, only ~19–20% of the 30,000-plus km of roads are paved, and corridors are coal- and transit-oriented with little value-add; cyclone exposure (Idai) and post-election blockades further disrupt flows.

·

No fiscal space Public debt is assessed 'in distress' and 'unsustainable', 88% of 2025 tax revenue was absorbed by wages and interest (World Bank), leaving almost no fiscal space, and the legacy 'hidden debt' / tuna-bond scandal still constrains borrowing.

·

A thin skills base With 20% internet penetration, over 80% informal employment and a thin technical and industrial base, the PCI human-capital and ICT components lag the sub-Saharan African average.

·

Insurgency and post-election violence The ISIS-linked insurgency in Cabo Delgado — the gas province — has displaced more than 800,000 people and repeatedly halted projects, while 2024–25 post-election violence disrupted mining, ports and the Lebombo border, and weak institutions depress the PCI institutions component.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Mozambique’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

The constraint is power delivery, not power generation. Despite a hydro surplus there is no transmission line from the Zambezi valley to southern industrial demand, which is the structural reason Mozal collapsed on price and had to source via Eskom. The asset is abundant but mis-located relative to load.

05

Hydrological risk against the anchor is now material. The Cahora Bassa reservoir fell to about 26% by December 2024, its lowest in thirty years and later quoted at 21.19%, against 78% a year earlier. The audit sets reservoir recovery above roughly 50% and a committed transmission financing package as the thresholds to watch.

06

There is almost no fiscal space to co-finance anything. Public debt is assessed as in distress and unsustainable, 88% of 2025 tax revenue was absorbed by wages and interest, and the legacy hidden-debt and tuna-bond scandal still constrains borrowing.

07

Security in the gas province is unresolved. The ISIS-linked insurgency in Cabo Delgado has displaced more than 800,000 people and repeatedly halted projects, while 2024–25 post-election violence disrupted mining, ports and the Lebombo border. Weak institutions depress the UNCTAD institutions component.

08

Execution capacity is the binding weakness in industrial policy. PRONAI, twenty-four planned agro-industrial special economic zones, Beluluane Industrial Park and the 2014 Petroleum Law's 25% domestic gas mandate all exist on paper, yet the flagship downstream gas projects, Yara fertilizer and Shell GTL, were both cancelled on price and security.

09

Human capital and connectivity lag badly. Internet use stands at 20% in 2025, more than 80% of employment is informal, mean years of schooling are low, and UNCTAD's Productive Capacities Index flags human capital, ICT and institutions as the weakest components against the sub-Saharan average.

10

Corridors move transit tonnage, not value. Nacala runs at 3.5 million tonnes against 10 million tonnes of capacity, only 19 to 20% of more than 30,000 km of roads are paved, and the corridors remain coal and transit oriented with little value added. Cyclone exposure and post-election blockades disrupt flows.

11

Downstream graphite requires capital Mozambique does not currently hold. Domestic spheronisation, purification and anode capacity requires firm power, upwards of USD 100 million of capital per facility and committed offtake, while Tanzania and Madagascar/Mauritius are moving first.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Mozambique's Draft 1 bundle rests on one finished good and a set of raw endowments awaiting a processing stage that does not yet exist domestically. The anchor is electricity: dispatchable, cheap, clean, already delivered across borders, and matched to an acute regional shortfall. Behind it sit positions that are world-scale in the ground and unfinished at the gate — Rovuma gas contracted offshore, Balama flake shipped without anode capacity, Moma titanium exported as raw concentrate, Moatize coal washed but sold into a continent with limited blast-furnace steel, and aluminium halted altogether from 15 March 2026. What must be proven is narrow and testable: a committed financing package for Zambezi-to-south transmission and reservoir recovery above roughly 50%; completion of Mphanda Nkuwa and Cahora Bassa North on schedule; a viable domestic gas price capable of reviving the fertilizer and petrochemical offtake that Yara and Shell walked away from; and movement of cashew, cotton and sugar up the ladder from the roughly 90% of cashews and 80% of cotton currently exported raw. Until those thresholds are met, capability should be read as endowment plus one deliverable product, not as an industrial base.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Mozambique is shown 12 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Mozambique to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2