Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
MaliBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Mali — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
14
Draft 1 candidate lines for Mali
The Minister’s brief · for Alousséni Sanou · Mali
Minister Sanou, Mali holds what the continent has shipped to Asia for a generation and can now keep: cotton, ginned to certifiable lint at continental scale through CMDT's eighteen ginneries at some 4,300 tonnes a day. Perennially Africa's first or second producer, this is not geological luck like gold doré or lithium concentrate; it is institutional discipline that has outlasted coups and price shocks, and it is Mali's alone. Africa exports 90% of its raw cotton to Asia, yet its own mills source barely 7% of their yarn and 6% of their fabric from within the continent. That gap is your claim. The Right of Supply turns Mali's lint into a twenty-five-year first right to feed Africa's spinning hubs, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — you supply only when you can meet the market. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; your correction, Minister, is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Mali
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Alousséni Sanou, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Mali · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Sanou,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Mali — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Mali is in this room

Mali's strongest endowment is cotton, and specifically ginned cotton lint with a pathway up into yarn. It is the one world-class endowment Mali already beneficiates domestically, at continental scale, through CMDT's 18 ginneries with combined capacity of around 4,300 tonnes a day, and it rests on institutional coordination rather than geological luck alone. Mali is perennially Africa's first or second cotton producer, and the continental substitution prize is well documented: African manufacturers source only 7% of their cotton yarn and 6% of their cotton fabric from within the continent, on ITC 2022 figures. The honest constraint is that this capability stops at lint. Roughly 1% of Malian cotton is processed into yarn or fabric, and moving further up the ladder is gated on a chronic power shortage of under 700 MW installed for some 22 million people, on landlocked transit through Dakar and Abidjan where regional logistics costs can reach 30% to 40% of goods value, and on corridor security. Mali's role in this bundle is as a raw-and-intermediate continental anchor, and it should be stated as such.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Mali, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Mali

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
14draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Mali’s draft bundle. 14 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Gold doré/unwrought, Live cattle/small ruminants, Cotton lint (ginned). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 3 strong contender · 5 emerging · 5 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Mali is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 14 candidate lines proposed for Mali below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Mali. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Mali will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Mali will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
14 lines
Mali’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Mali at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Mali’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Mali’s own capability audit.

Refined gold bullion to LBMA Good Delivery standard

The state-controlled refinery at Senou (SOROMA-SA, 62% state and 38% Russia's Yadran Group with a Swiss partner), designed at 200 tonnes a year and targeting LBMA Good Delivery, is announced and under construction rather than operational, on an roughly 18-month build from the June 2025 groundbreaking. The audit classifies it ASPIRATIONAL with niche intra-African demand, and no LBMA-certified refinery operated as of 2025.

Announced, not operational

Cotton woven fabric and garments

Fabric capacity is near-absent or sub-scale: COMATEX and ITEMA are legacy mills that exist but are small and underused, and roughly 1% of lint is processed domestically. ITC's Mohammed Kassem states that unless the garment manufacturing sector is developed, value addition will be limited since yarn is not transformed locally, and industry consensus holds that competitive spinning and garment value-addition remains concentrated in Asia.

Capability inversion, raw base versus finished good

Lithium chemical conversion and battery-chain value capture

Spodumene is exported as concentrate via Abidjan for conversion in China, with zero domestic lithium chemical conversion. Offtake is 100% pre-sold to Chinese buyers, so the deposit is durable as production but not as Malian value capture, and intra-African demand for the concentrate is assessed as low.

Raw base, industrial screen

Bovine meat, chilled or frozen

The herd base and proximity to meat-deficit coastal markets are real, but there is no scaled abattoir or cold chain. The audit classifies bovine meat under HS 0201 and 0202 as ASPIRATIONAL and near-absent in beneficiation stage; live animals under HS 0102 and 0104 are the tradeable form today.

Capability inversion, raw base versus finished good

Iron ore

Deposits are identified but development is unconfirmed and the resource is largely undeveloped, appearing in export data only at small volumes. The audit assigns iron ore a GREY tier explicitly on that basis.

Development unconfirmed

Cereals for continental supply

Rice, millet, sorghum and maize are largely subsistence and regional in orientation despite Office du Niger irrigation. The audit lists cereals as ASPIRATIONAL with a raw, subsistence-oriented beneficiation stage, notwithstanding heavy African rice imports.

Scale-matching
08 · Endowment
What Mali actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Mali. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Mali's productive structure rests on three endowments. The first is gold: Mali produced approximately 100 tonnes in 2024 including artisanal output, on the World Gold Council estimate, making it Africa's second-largest producer behind Ghana at 140.6 tonnes and ahead of South Africa at 98.9 tonnes. Official industrial output was roughly 51 to 65 tonnes in 2024, the gap being artisanal and unrecorded production, which SWISSAID estimates at 30 to 57 tonnes a year. Proven reserves stand at around 800 tonnes on the National Directorate for Geology and Mines figure of 2022, Africa's third-largest after South Africa and Ghana. The second is cotton: Mali is perennially Africa's first or second producer, oscillating with Benin. Seed cotton peaked at 777,000 tonnes in 2021/22 and reached 690,000 tonnes in 2023/24, when Mali regained the continental lead. The third is hard-rock lithium: Goulamina in the Bougouni region is one of the world's largest deposits, its resource raised to 267 Mt at 1.38% Li2O, roughly 9.11 Mt LCE, by 2024, with first spodumene production in December 2024.

The distinction that matters is between geological luck and institutional capability. Gold rests on the Birimian belt plus foreign anchor investors; lithium rests on a single anchor investor, Ganfeng, with offtake pre-sold to China. Cotton rests on something different: CMDT, 99.5% state-owned with Geocoton holding a minority, coordinates input credit, extension, guaranteed farm-gate pricing, ginning and marketing. It operates 18 ginneries with combined capacity of around 4,300 tonnes a day, with new ginning plants under construction at Kita and Kokofata. This is a durable institutional asset that has survived coups and price shocks, and it is what makes Malian cotton an organised, certifiable and scalable supply rather than a raw agricultural surplus. The sector sustains around 40% of Mali's rural population, nearly four million Malians, roughly one-fifth of the population.

Beyond these, Mali holds a large Sahelian herd of cattle, sheep and goats, historically a top-three export and already traded live into Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana along the central corridor. It is Africa's third-largest mango producer at more than 400,000 tonnes a year, and is among Africa's largest shea-kernel producers at roughly 31% of global shea-nut production in 2019. Iron ore, bauxite, manganese, phosphate, uranium at Falea and Kidal, and salt at Taoudenni are largely undeveloped.

The endowment in depth

Mali's mineral endowment is world-class but sold in its rawest form. Gold is the headline: the country produced roughly 100 t in 2024 including artisanal output (World Gold Council estimate), making it Africa's second-largest producer behind Ghana (140.6 t) and ahead of South Africa (98.9 t); official industrial output was ~51–65 t, with SWISSAID estimating a further 30–57 t/yr unrecorded through artisanal and smuggled channels. Proven reserves stand at ~800 t (National Directorate for Geology and Mines, 2022) — Africa's third-largest after South Africa (~5,000 t) and Ghana (~1,000 t) — with the government claiming geological potential up to 2,000 t. Alongside gold, Goulamina in the Bougouni region is one of the world's largest hard-rock lithium deposits, its resource raised to 267 Mt at 1.38% Li₂O (~9.11 Mt LCE) by 2024, first spodumene produced in December 2024, Stage 1 capacity 506,000 t/yr of concentrate and Stage 2 up to 1 Mt/yr, at a globally competitive C1 cash cost of ~USD 312/t; a second mine at Bougouni (Kodal Minerals, 51% Hainan Mining) entered production in early 2025. Iron ore, bauxite, manganese, phosphate, uranium (Falea, Kidal) and salt (Taoudenni) remain largely undeveloped. The processing position is essentially nil: gold has been exported as doré since 1980 to the UAE, South Africa and Switzerland, no LBMA-certified refinery operated as of 2025, and spodumene leaves as concentrate via Abidjan for conversion in China — world-class ore, near-zero beneficiation.

Energy is the binding constraint that gates any of this. Mali has no proven fossil-fuel reserves and is 100% import-dependent for petroleum (Côte d'Ivoire 57%, Senegal 37% in 2023). EDM owned or operated 365 MW at end-2024 and total national capacity is under 700 MW for roughly 22 million people; 2023 generation of 2,863 GWh was 62% non-renewable, 34% hydro and 2% solar. Hydro potential on the Niger and Senegal rivers is ~1,150 MW, of which around 800 MW is unexploited, alongside large solar potential. Reliability is chronic: demand grows ~10%/yr, brownouts and loadshedding are common, and the tariff of ~USD 0.16/kWh sits below the ~USD 0.24/kWh cost. Logistics compound the problem. Mali is landlocked and transit-dependent: the Dakar–Bamako corridor handles ~60% of import volumes (~2–3 Mt/yr, ~400 trucks/day) and the Abidjan–Bamako axis is the main complement (Port of Abidjan ~40.1 Mt throughput 2024), with Conakry and Lomé growing. Sub-Saharan logistics costs can run to 30–40% of goods value, the road network dominates, and the Dakar–Niger rail is degraded.

Agriculture is where scale meets some domestic value-addition. Cotton is perennially Africa's #1 or #2 crop: seed cotton peaked at 777,000 t in 2021/22, was 690,000 t in 2023/24 when Mali regained the continental lead, then fell back to ~433,700 t in 2025/26. The sector sustains around 40% of the rural population — nearly four million Malians, roughly one-fifth of the country. The livestock endowment is a major Sahelian herd of cattle, sheep and goats, historically a top-three export, with live cattle traded down the central corridor into Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. Mali is also Africa's third-largest mango producer at over 400,000 t/yr and among Africa's largest shea-kernel producers (~31% of global shea-nut production in 2019), while Niger river fisheries, though declining, support a smoked and dried fish trade; rice, millet, sorghum and maize are largely subsistence or regional. Processing is thin beyond cotton: lint is ginned domestically but only about 1% is worked into artisanal yarn or fabric.

The existing industrial base is narrow and built almost entirely on cotton. Manufacturing value-added is in the low single digits of GDP, the informal sector is ~33% of GDP (ISS, 2023), and UNIDO's Competitive Industrial Performance index places Mali in its lowest quintile. The genuine cluster is the cotton–textile complex: CMDT (99.5% state-owned, with Geocoton a minority holder) runs 18 ginneries with combined capacity of ~4,300 t/day (Ecofin, 2024), mills cottonseed oil, and is adding new ginning plants at Kita and Kokofata; the ITEMA and COMATEX textile mills exist but are small and underused. Cement is import-dependent with limited domestic grinding, and there is no special economic zone with a significant operating processing base. Human capital is a large, young, low-cost labour force — historically ~80% engaged in farming and fishing — but with a low tertiary and TVET base, youth unemployment of 31.5% and poverty of 43.9% (AfDB), and specialised skill clusters confined to CMDT-linked agronomy and ginning plus artisanal mining know-how.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Mali sits near the floor of global economic complexity. OEC records an ECI of approximately −2.21 (2022, HS96), the fourth-least-complex economy that year, and the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas places Mali in the bottom tier of its ~145-country universe, flags it among the economies with the most negative ECI change over the past decade, and assigns it to the "strategic bets" category of few adjacent diversification opportunities. The structure is a textbook commodity-concentration trap: gold and cotton dominate, export concentration is among the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Complexity Outlook Index is low, so few complex products lie "nearby" in the product space. Revealed comparative advantage above 1 is confined to gold (HS 7108), raw cotton (HS 5201/5203), oilseeds and shea (HS 1207), and to a lesser extent live animals.

Both Harvard's "strategic bets" diagnosis and World Bank guidance converge on the same realistic path: agri-based light manufacturing, above all moving up the cotton→yarn→fabric→garment ladder, supplemented by mineral beneficiation (gold refining and lithium conversion) where energy and capital allow. The audit is candid that these adjacencies are limited and that the diversification runway is short, which is why the cotton chain — the one endowment already beneficiated to an intermediate at continental scale — carries disproportionate strategic weight.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Mali's single most defensible continental supply position is cotton — specifically ginned cotton lint and the pathway up into yarn (HS Chapter 52) — not gold. On input base, Mali is perennially Africa's #1 or #2 cotton producer, with seed cotton peaking at 777,000 t in 2021/22 and reaching 690,000 t in 2023/24 when it regained the continental lead, and RCA comfortably above 1. What distinguishes cotton from the mineral endowments is the processing position: unlike gold exported as doré or lithium exported as concentrate, cotton is already beneficiated domestically to ginned lint through CMDT's 18 ginneries (~4,300 t/day combined capacity, Ecofin 2024) — a real, certifiable, scalable intermediate, not raw ore. The durability comes from mechanism rather than luck: CMDT is a coordinating parastatal supplying input credit, extension, guaranteed farm-gate pricing, ginning and marketing, an institutional capability that has survived coups and price shocks. The continental demand behind it is large and well-evidenced — Africa exports about 90% of its raw cotton to Asia yet sources only 7% of its cotton yarn and 6% of its cotton fabric from within the continent (ITC, 2022) — making a West African cotton anchor feeding continental spinning and garment hubs precisely the structure a regional-value-chain strategy is built to create.

The honest limits are equally clear. Production is volatile: output swung from 777,000 t to ~433,700 t within four seasons on weather, input-supply and security disruptions. There is a value-capture ceiling — Mali spins almost no yarn (~1% processed), so without spinning investment its "supply" stays at lint, the lowest-margin rung. Landlocked transit and AES/ECOWAS tariff friction raise the delivered cost of that lint. And the industry consensus, voiced by ITC's Mohammed Kassem of EXPOLINK/Destination Africa, is that competitive spinning and garment value-addition remain concentrated in Asia and are unlikely to relocate to Mali soon, so value addition stays limited until the garment-manufacturing sector is developed and yarn is transformed locally. A structural pull reinforces this: Chinese mills imported 1.2 million metric tons of African lint in 2025, 19% above 2024 volumes (Mordor Intelligence, 2026), keeping the raw lint flowing offshore. The realistic reading is that Mali is the natural raw-and-ginned cotton anchor for the continent, with the yarn rung available only if power, spinning investment and trade access are secured.

Current reality

Mali is a landlocked, low-income, resource-dependent economy with GDP of approximately USD 26.6 billion in 2024 on World Bank figures and a population of some 22 to 24 million. Its headline supply position is paradoxical: world-class raw endowments with almost no domestic beneficiation. Gold leaves as dore, and has done since 1980, bound for the UAE, South Africa and Switzerland; no LBMA-certified refinery operated as of 2025. Spodumene leaves as concentrate, shipped via Abidjan for conversion in China, with zero domestic lithium chemical conversion. Cotton is ginned domestically but the lint is exported, with roughly 1% processed into artisanal yarn or fabric. Manufacturing value added is a low single-digit share of GDP, the informal sector is around 33% of GDP on ISS 2023 figures, and Mali sits in the lowest quintile of the UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance ranking. There is no special economic zone with a significant operating processing base.

On economic complexity Mali sits near the global floor: OEC records an ECI of approximately minus 2.21 for 2022, the fourth-least-complex economy that year, and the Harvard Growth Lab Atlas places Mali in the bottom tier of roughly 145 countries, flags it among economies with the most negative ECI change over the past decade, and categorises it as a strategic bet with few adjacent diversification opportunities. Revealed comparative advantage above 1 is confined to gold under HS 7108, raw cotton under HS 5201 and 5203, oilseeds and shea under HS 1207, and to a lesser extent live animals. Gold accounts for roughly 72 to 80% of exports and, on AfDB 2024 figures, 80% of export earnings and 30% of tax revenue. Cotton is the second export, at nearly 7% of exports in 2023 on US ITA figures. Mali's realistic 25-year role is as a raw-and-intermediate continental anchor, not a finished-goods supplier.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 14 candidate lines · will change

Mali’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Mali’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Mali will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Mali’s 14 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 3Emerging 5Aspirational 5Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Cereals (rice/millet/sorghum)

Office du Niger irrigation · Maturity: Raw; subsistence-oriented · Competitiveness: High (Africa imports rice)
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 8.18 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
100610Cereals; rice in the husk (paddy or rough)
100620Cereals; husked (brown) rice
100630Cereals; rice, semi-milled or wholly milled, whether or not polished or glazed
100640Cereals; rice, broken
100810Cereals; buckwheat
100820Millet (excluding grain sorghum)
100821Cereals; millet, seed
100829Cereals; millet, other than seed
100830Cereals; canary seeds
100840Cereals; fonio (Digitaria spp.)
100850Cereals; quinoa (Chenopodium quinoa)
100860Cereals; triticale
100890Cereals; n.e.c. in chapter 10
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Procuring agency (indicative): Various Marketing Boards · Price Stabilization · control: mixed. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Mali imported USD 176.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Cote dIvoire USD 725 mBenin USD 653.5 mSouth Africa USD 638.2 mGhana USD 533.7 mSenegal USD 502 mKenya USD 399.7 mMozambique USD 349.5 mGuinea USD 335.5 m

Source: FAO; World Bank · 2024

Gold doré/unwrought

Africa #2 producer ~100t 2024; ~800t reserves · Maturity: Raw doré (refinery under construction) · Competitiveness: High value, thin intra-African final demand
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 2.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: WGC/USGS; Reuters · 2024–2025

Refined gold (LBMA)

Sénou refinery (announced) · Maturity: Under construction · Competitiveness: Niche intra-African
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 2.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Reuters · 2025

Iron ore

Identified deposits · Maturity: Largely undeveloped · Competitiveness: Moderate
GREY
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS/national · 2022–2024

Oilseeds/cottonseed oil

Cottonseed byproduct; CMDT milling · Maturity: Intermediate (some milling) · Competitiveness: Moderate (Africa imports vegetable oils)
EMERGING
USD 2.37 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
151211Vegetable oils; sunflower seed or safflower oil and their fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151219Vegetable oils; sunflower seed or safflower oil and their fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151221Vegetable oils; cotton-seed oil and its fractions; crude, whether or not gossypol has been removed, not chemically modified
151229Vegetable oils; cotton-seed oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Mali imported USD 5.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 772.4 mDjibouti USD 360.8 mEthiopia USD 181.9 mSouth Africa USD 180.2 mMorocco USD 162.9 mLibya USD 115.9 mTunisia USD 106.5 mGhana USD 65.8 m

Source: USDA · 2024

Bovine meat

Herd base; proximity to deficit markets · Maturity: Near-absent (no scaled abattoir/cold chain) · Competitiveness: High
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 1.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
020110Meat; of bovine animals, carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled
020120Meat; of bovine animals, cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), fresh or chilled
020130Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, fresh or chilled
020210Meat; of bovine animals, carcasses and half-carcasses, frozen
020220Meat; of bovine animals, cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), frozen
020230Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 831.8 mLibya USD 89.9 mAngola USD 37.7 mAlgeria USD 36.7 mMorocco USD 34.9 mGhana USD 27.2 mMauritius USD 22.9 mGabon USD 20.3 m

Source: FAO · 2024

Live cattle/small ruminants

Large Sahelian herd; established corridor trade · Maturity: Raw (live animals) · Competitiveness: High — coastal W. Africa meat-deficit
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.02 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010210Pure-bred breeding bovines
010221Cattle; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010229Cattle; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010231Buffalo; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010239Buffalo; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010290Bovine animals; live, other than cattle and buffalo
010410Sheep; live
010420Goats; live
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 309.4 mMorocco USD 250.9 mSouth Africa USD 148.1 mAlgeria USD 104.6 mLibya USD 88.7 mMauritius USD 21.5 mGuinea USD 14.2 mCote dIvoire USD 12.8 m

Source: FAO · 2024

Cotton woven fabric

Feedstock; COMATEX/ITEMA legacy · Maturity: Near-absent/sub-scale · Competitiveness: High African import
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 924.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520811Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, unbleached, plain weave, weighing not more than 100g/m2
520812Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, unbleached, plain weave, weighing more than 100g/m2 but not
520813Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, unbleached, 3-thread or 4-thread twill, including cross twil
520819Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, unbleached, of weaves n.e.c. in item no. 5208.1, weighing no
520821Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, bleached, plain weave, weighing not more than 100g/m2
520822Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, bleached, plain weave, weighing more than 100g/m2 but not mo
520823Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, bleached, 3-thread or 4-thread twill, including cross twill,
520829Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, bleached, of weaves n.e.c. in item no. 5208.2, weighing not
520831Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, dyed, plain weave, weighing not more than 100g/m2
520832Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, dyed, plain weave, weighing more than 100g/m2 but not more t
520833Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, dyed, 3-thread or 4-thread twill, including cross twill, wei
520839Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, dyed, of weaves n.e.c. in item no. 5208.3 weighing not more
520841Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, of yarns of different colours, plain weave, weighing not more than 100g/m2
520842Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, of yarns of different colours, weighing more than 100g/m2 but not more than 200g/m2
520843Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, of yarns of different colours, 3-thread or 4-thread twill, including cross twill, weighing not more than 200g/m2
520849Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, of yarns of different colours, of weaves n.e.c. in item no. 5208.4, weighing not more than 200g/m2
520851Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, printed, plain weave, weighing not more than 100g/m2
520852Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, printed, plain weave, weighing more than 100g/m2 but not more than 200g/m2
520853Woven fabrics of cotton, containing >= 85% cotton by weight and weighing <= 200 g/m², in three-thread...
520859Fabrics, woven; containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, printed, of weaves n.e.c. in item no. 5208.5, weighing not more than 200g/m2
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 15.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 247.2 mTunisia USD 145.5 mGhana USD 84.2 mGuinea USD 48 mTogo USD 47.5 mSouth Africa USD 46.4 mMadagascar USD 34.3 mSudan USD 33.4 m

Source: USDA; ITC · 2022–2024

Shea nuts/butter

~31% global shea-nut production 2019 · Maturity: Mostly raw nut; artisanal butter · Competitiveness: Moderate (largely extra-African)
EMERGING
USD 805.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
151710Margarine; excluding liquid margarine
151790Edible mixtures or preparations of animal, vegetable or microbial fats or oils or of fractions of different fats or oils of this Chapter, n.e.c. in heading 1517, other than edible fats and oils or their fractions of heading 15.16
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Mali imported USD 5.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 134 mAlgeria USD 104.3 mMorocco USD 93.9 mGhana USD 87.6 mLibya USD 36.1 mTunisia USD 32.4 mNigeria USD 24.6 mSouth Africa USD 24.1 m

Source: NEPC/Tridge; FAO · 2019–2024

Cotton yarn

Lint feedstock advantage; CMDT integration potential · Maturity: Near-absent (~1% processed) · Competitiveness: High — African net importer of yarn
EMERGING
USD 507.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520511Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring 714.29 decitex
520512Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 714.29 but not
520513Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 232.56 but not
520514Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 192.31 but not
520515Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring less than 125 d
520521Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring 714.29 decitex or
520522Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 714.29 but not le
520523Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 232.56 but not le
520524Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 192.31 but not le
520526Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 125 but not less
520527Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 106.38 but not le
520528Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring less than 83.33 d
520531Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.29 decitex or more (not exceeding 14 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520532Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.28 to 232.56 decitex (15 to 43 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520533Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 232.55 to 192.31 decitex (44 to 52 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520534Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 192.30 to 125 decitex (53 to 80 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520535Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 125 decitex (exceeding 80 metric number), per single yarn, not for retail sale
520541Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.29 decitex or more (not exceeding 14 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520542Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.28 to 232.56 decitex (15 to 43 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520543Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 232.55 to 192.31 decitex (44 to 52 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520544Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 192.30 to 125 decitex (53 to 80 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520546Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 124 to 106.38 decitex (81 to 94 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520547Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 106.37 to 83.33 decitex (95 to 120 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520548Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 83.33 decitex (exceeding 120 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520710Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, put up for retail sale
520790Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), containing less than 85% by weight of cotton, put up for retail sale
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Mali imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 234.6 mMorocco USD 111.1 mTunisia USD 38.4 mSouth Africa USD 36.1 mMauritius USD 36 mEswatini USD 13.5 mMadagascar USD 11 mTanzania USD 8.2 m

Source: ITC; USDA · 2022–2024

Mangoes

Africa #3 producer >400,000 t/yr · Maturity: Raw fresh · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 473.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080410Fruit, edible; dates, fresh or dried
080420Fruit, edible; figs, fresh or dried
080430Fruit, edible; pineapples, fresh or dried
080440Fruit, edible; avocados, fresh or dried
080450Fruit, edible; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 1.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 267.6 mEgypt USD 35.2 mSomalia USD 30.2 mNigeria USD 28.1 mGhana USD 19.3 mSouth Africa USD 11.9 mMauritania USD 9.5 mDjibouti USD 8 m

Source: mangoes.africa; FAO · 2023

Cotton lint (ginned)

Africa #1–2 cotton producer; CMDT ginning ~4,300 t/day; RCA>1 · Maturity: Intermediate (ginned lint) · Competitiveness: High — Africa sources only 7% yarn/6% fabric intra-continentally
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 404.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520100Cotton; not carded or combed
520300Cotton; carded or combed
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 282 mMauritius USD 41.4 mAlgeria USD 28.1 mLesotho USD 21.3 mMorocco USD 14.5 mTunisia USD 2.9 mBotswana USD 2.9 mSudan USD 2.8 m

Source: FAO/USDA; Ecofin; ITC · 2022–2024

Hides & skins

Livestock byproduct · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 112.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
410110Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing <= 8 kg when dried, <= 10 kg when dry-salted and . . .
410120Raw hides and skins; whole, unsplit, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin not exceeding 8kg when simply dri
410121Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing > 14 kg, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired . . .
410122Raw butts and bends of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split
410129Raw hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split . . .
410150Hides and skins; raw, whole, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin exceeding 16 kg
410190Hides and skins; other than whole, but including butts, bends and bellies, of bovine (including. buffalo) and equine ani
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 93.1 mEgypt USD 7.4 mGhana USD 5.1 mUganda USD 3.5 mKenya USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.2 mBenin USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 m

Source: FAO · 2024

Spodumene concentrate

World-class deposit; low cash cost · Maturity: Concentrate only (no Li conversion) · Competitiveness: Low intra-African
EMERGING
USD 35.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded
253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)
253040Natural micaceous iron oxides
253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Mali imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 12.6 mSouth Africa USD 5.6 mMorocco USD 5 mAlgeria USD 3.2 mGhana USD 2.6 mNigeria USD 1.5 mTunisia USD 1.2 mZimbabwe USD 0.6 m

Source: Mysteel; SCMP · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Mali is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Mali buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Mali is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 6.42 bn

Mali’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

14

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierMali imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Cereals (rice/millet/sorghum)ASPIRATIONALUSD 176.7 mUSD 8.18 bn
Cotton woven fabricASPIRATIONALUSD 15.2 mUSD 924.6 m
Shea nuts/butterEMERGINGUSD 5.5 mUSD 805.1 m
Oilseeds/cottonseed oilEMERGINGUSD 5.4 mUSD 2.37 bn
Gold doré/unwroughtSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 2.3 mUSD 2.99 bn
Refined gold (LBMA)ASPIRATIONALUSD 2.3 mUSD 2.99 bn
MangoesEMERGINGUSD 1.9 mUSD 473.4 m
Spodumene concentrateEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 35.6 m
Cotton yarnEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 507.7 m
Iron oreGREYUSD 0 mUSD 2.85 bn
Bovine meatASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 1.24 bn
Live cattle/small ruminantsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 1.02 bn
Cotton lint (ginned)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 404.3 m
Hides & skinsASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 112.6 m

Left-hand column: what Mali itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Mali’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 14 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Mali’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Mali. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Mali’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Mali’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01EgyptUSD 4.53 bn
02UgandaUSD 3.8 bn
03South AfricaUSD 2.43 bn
04MoroccoUSD 1.31 bn
05AlgeriaUSD 1.19 bn
06GhanaUSD 825.5 m
07LibyaUSD 772.8 m
08Cote dIvoireUSD 737.8 m
09BeninUSD 653.8 m
10SenegalUSD 502 m
11KenyaUSD 451.1 m
12TunisiaUSD 414.9 m
13GuineaUSD 397.7 m
14MozambiqueUSD 370.4 m
15DjiboutiUSD 368.8 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Mali. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Mali would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Mali to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Cotton moves up to yarn and fabric

At least one modern, reliably powered spinning mill (plus dyeing and weaving) with anchor offtake, CMDT or a JV guaranteeing lint feedstock at competitive cost, and AfCFTA rules-of-origin treatment that rewards Malian lint→yarn — with domestic processing rising materially above the current ~1%.

02

Stable, industrial-grade energy

A step-change in reliable generation — Niger and Senegal hydro plus utility-scale solar and storage — sufficient to power spinning, refining and lithium conversion without diesel back-up, lifting installed capacity and reliability from today's sub-700 MW base.

03

Gold refining commissioned and accredited

The Sénou refinery completed, commissioned and LBMA Good-Delivery accredited, fed by mandated domestic doré, so that gold can be supplied as refined bullion rather than raw doré.

04

Secured, lower-cost transit corridor

A secured, cheaper corridor via Dakar and/or Abidjan and Conakry with functioning rail and fewer checkpoints, plus enough de-escalation to allow reliable convoy movement past the blockade risk on routes such as Kayes–Nioro.

05

Resolved trade-access status

Resolution of the AES/ECOWAS tariff and transit position so Malian goods enter continental markets without punitive friction, following the January 2025 ECOWAS withdrawal and the March 2025 AES 0.5% levy on non-AES imports.

06

Abattoir and cold-chain for livestock

Investment in scaled slaughter and cold-chain capacity to move from live animals to chilled or frozen meat for the meat-deficit coastal West African markets.

The binding constraints
·

Energy is the decisive blocker Under 700 MW installed for roughly 22 million people, chronic loadshedding and 100% fuel-import dependence make reliable, competitively priced power the single constraint that most directly prevents spinning, gold refining and lithium conversion at industrial scale.

·

Landlocked transit and logistics cost Delivery depends on the Dakar corridor (~60% of imports) and Abidjan, with sub-Saharan logistics costs running to 30–40% of goods value and a degraded Dakar–Niger rail, all of which raise the delivered cost of any Malian export.

·

Active insurgency and corridor security An active jihadist insurgency (JNIM) has physically blockaded routes such as Kayes–Nioro, severing the Dakar corridor, and Bamako itself faced siege conditions in 2025 — a structural supply-reliability risk, not a background one.

·

Governance and trade-access uncertainty A military government, the January 2025 ECOWAS withdrawal, the AES 0.5% levy and AGOA-ineligibility since 2022 create tariff and transit uncertainty, while the Barrick mine takeover and a CEO arrest warrant signal expropriation risk.

·

Feedstock and buyer dependence Lithium output is 100% pre-sold to Chinese offtakers, gold has historically been foreign-operated, and cotton is exposed to a single global price benchmark — concentrating counterparty and price risk across all three headline endowments.

·

Thin capital and skills base A shallow domestic capital market, a low TVET and spinning-skills base, and no track record in textile manufacturing at scale together limit how quickly value-addition can be stood up even where demand exists.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Mali’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Energy is the binding constraint, not a background condition. EDM owned and operated 365 MW at end-2024 and total national capacity is under 700 MW for some 22 million people, with demand growing around 10% a year and chronic brownouts and loadshedding. Tariffs sit near USD 0.16/kWh against costs near USD 0.24/kWh, and the audit names energy the decisive blocker on spinning, refining and lithium conversion.

05

Landlocked transit dependence raises delivered cost on every tonne. The Dakar-Bamako corridor handles roughly 60% of import volumes at around 2 to 3 Mt a year and some 400 trucks a day, with Abidjan-Bamako the main complementary axis and the Dakar-Niger rail degraded. The World Bank finds sub-Saharan logistics costs can represent up to 30% to 40% of the value of goods against under 15% in many advanced economies.

06

Active insurgency has physically severed supply routes. JNIM blockades, including on the Kayes-Nioro axis, have disrupted the Dakar corridor, and Bamako itself faced siege conditions in 2025. This is a structural supply-reliability risk rather than an episodic one, and it bears directly on any commitment to scheduled delivery.

07

Trade access is in flux following the ECOWAS withdrawal. Withdrawal took effect on 29 January 2025 and Mali is a member of the Alliance of Sahel States confederation, which imposed a 0.5% levy on non-AES imports in March 2025. Mali has ratified AfCFTA but has been AGOA-ineligible since 2022, leaving transit-access and tariff arrangements unresolved.

08

Cotton output is volatile on a scale that undermines supply commitments. Seed cotton swung from 777,000 tonnes in 2021/22 to approximately 433,700 tonnes in 2025/26 within four seasons, on weather, input-supply and security disruptions. Any allocation resting on lint volume must be read against that band, not against the peak.

09

Feedstock and buyer dependence concentrates counterparty risk. Lithium is 100% pre-sold to Chinese offtakers, gold has historically been foreign-operated, and cotton is exposed to a single global price benchmark. A further structural pull keeps lint flowing offshore: Chinese mills imported 1.2 million tonnes of African lint in 2025, 19% above 2024 volumes, on Mordor Intelligence figures.

10

Capital and skills are thin against what beneficiation requires. The domestic capital market is thin, the TVET and spinning skills base is low, and there is no track record in textile manufacturing at scale. Youth unemployment stands at 31.5% and poverty at 43.9% on AfDB figures, with around 80% of the labour force historically engaged in farming and fishing.

11

Governance signals carry expropriation risk. The 2023 Mining Code and Local Content Law raise combined Malian state and private shareholding to as much as 35%, define a local company as at least 51% Malian-owned, require 35% Malian ownership of foreign subcontractors and suppliers, and apply immediately to existing projects. The Barrick mine takeover and CEO arrest warrant are cited by the audit as an expropriation-risk signal.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Mali's Draft 1 bundle rests on one intermediate product that already exists, cotton lint from CMDT's ginning base, supported by a live-cattle trade already flowing into meat-deficit coastal West Africa, and by a gold endowment whose continental supply value is contingent rather than present. Everything above lint in the cotton chain, everything past dore in gold, and everything past concentrate in lithium is aspiration held against constraints the audit describes as binding rather than incidental. What must be proven is a defined sequence: at least one modern, reliably powered spinning mill with anchor offtake and guaranteed lint feedstock, lifting domestic processing materially above the current 1%; a step-change in reliable generation from Niger and Senegal hydro, utility-scale solar and storage sufficient to run spinning and refining without diesel back-up; completion, commissioning and LBMA Good-Delivery accreditation of the Senou refinery with mandated domestic dore feed; a secured, lower-cost corridor with functioning rail and reduced checkpoints; resolution of AES and ECOWAS tariff status so that Malian goods enter continental markets without punitive friction; and abattoir and cold-chain investment to move livestock from live animals to chilled meat. Until those are demonstrated, Mali should be allocated on what it can gin, not on what it holds in the ground.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Mali is shown 14 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Mali to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2