Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
LibyaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Libya — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
14
Draft 1 candidate lines for Libya
The Minister’s brief · for Khaled al-Mabrouk Abdullah · Libya
Minister al-Mabrouk, Libya's claim on Africa's industrial future is written not in crude but in steel. At Misurata you hold what no other African state combines: an integrated, gas-fed direct-reduction works running the Midrex process, its own captive export port, and a proven reach across 38 countries — a record 210,000 tonnes of hot briquetted iron shipped in the first quarter of 2025, and a record 861,000 tonnes of billets produced across the year, already reaching Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. As the AfCFTA drives construction and industrialisation, intra-African demand for rebar, wire rod and reduced-iron feedstock is structural and under-supplied — the steel of a building Africa is Libya's rightful share. The Right of Supply grants a twenty-five-year first right to serve it, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract, only a floor of certainty against which capability is built. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Libya
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Khaled al-Mabrouk Abdullah, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Libya · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister al-Mabrouk,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Libya — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Libya is in this room

Libya's strongest endowment for continental supply is not its oil but its steel. The Libyan Iron and Steel Company at Misurata is one of Africa's largest integrated steelworks, running gas-based direct reduction on the Midrex process with around 1.7 million tonnes of liquid steel design capacity, its own captive export port, and a demonstrated record of shipping to 38 countries including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria — a record 210,000 tonnes of HBI in the first quarter of 2025 and a record 861,000 tonnes of billets across 2025. The honest constraint is equally clear: Libya has signed but not ratified the AfCFTA and has not submitted its schedule of tariff concessions, a legal precondition for receiving continental allocations, and delivery reliability remains structurally compromised by dual governments, a bifurcated Central Bank and a blockade history that cut output to around 400,000 barrels per day in both 2020 and 2024. Any allocation named here is therefore demand certainty against which capability is to be built, not capacity that can be called upon today.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Libya, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Libya

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
14draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Libya’s draft bundle. 14 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Crude petroleum, Hot briquetted iron / DRI. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 continental anchor · 1 strong contender · 4 emerging · 4 aspirational · 3 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Libya is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 14 candidate lines proposed for Libya below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Libya. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Libya will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Libya will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
14 lines
Libya’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Libya at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Libya’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Libya’s own capability audit.

Crude petroleum (HS2709)

Libya holds Africa's largest reserves at 48.36 billion barrels, but the audit finds crude flows overwhelmingly to Europe, which took around 78 per cent of crude exports, making it only weakly relevant to intra-African supply. The audit classes continental demand for Libyan crude as low and states that Libya's continental relevance is not its crude.

Raw base · continental relevance screen

Refined petroleum products (HS2710)

Five refineries carry combined nameplate capacity of around 380,000 barrels per day but effective output is only about 180,000 barrels per day, and Libya is a net importer of refined products at $3.98bn in 2024. Ras Lanuf, at 220,000 barrels per day nameplate, has been shut since 2013 due to arbitration, and Zawiya suffered force majeure in December 2024 after armed clashes.

Capability inversion

Iron ore (HS2601)

The Wadi ash-Shati deposit is recorded at 795 million tonnes at approximately 52 per cent Fe but remains unmined because it lies some 900 km from the nearest port. The audit marks it GREY on insufficient evidence as an export category, and notes that LISCO imports its iron ore pellets from Brazil, Canada and Sweden despite the domestic reserve.

Raw base · industrial screen

Acyclic hydrocarbons and downstream petrochemicals (HS2901)

The Ras Lanuf complex carries ethylene and polyethylene units of 160,000 tonnes a year but has been largely inactive since 2011. The audit tiers this ASPIRATIONAL on that basis.

Idle-asset screen

Sea salt (HS2501) and gypsum (HS2520)

Both are marked GREY on insufficient evidence. The audit records solid resource data — coastal extraction near Benghazi and Misurata, and around 18 gypsum deposits — but states that export data is absent and no clean Tier 1 line items exist.

Evidence screen

Unwrought gold line item (approximately $730m)

The audit flags this ITC mirror-derived figure as a probable re-export or mirror artefact, absent from OEC's top five exports. Libya is a well-known intermittent non-reporter to UN Comtrade, so non-oil export line items are the least reliable and most affected by mirror reconstruction.

Data-artefact screen
08 · Endowment
What Libya actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Libya. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Libya's endowment is dominated by hydrocarbons but is not confined to them. It holds Africa's largest proven crude oil reserves at 48.36 billion barrels, unchanged since 2013 and representing roughly 41 per cent of Africa's total, alongside proven natural gas reserves of about 53 trillion cubic feet, or some 1.5 trillion cubic metres, the fifth-largest on the continent. The non-hydrocarbon endowment is significant but largely stranded. The Wadi ash-Shati iron ore deposit in Fezzan is estimated at 795 million tonnes at approximately 52 per cent Fe grade, with some estimates ranging up to 1.6 billion tonnes; it remains unmined because it lies some 900 km from the nearest port at Misurata. Gypsum resources are distributed across around 18 locations in the Bir al-Ghanam formation, and salt is extracted along the Mediterranean coast near Benghazi and Misurata. Phosphate in the Murzuq Basin, potash in the Sirte Basin, silica, limestone, magnesium and potassium salts, and sulphur as a refinery by-product at roughly 13,000 tonnes a year are recorded but barely exploited. The National Mining Corporation targets making mining a pillar of the economy by 2033.

The one genuinely diversified industrial asset is the Libyan Iron and Steel Company at Misurata, one of Africa's largest integrated steelworks. Founded in 1979 with production from 1989, it uses DRI/EAF technology based on the Midrex process and local natural gas. Historic nameplate capacity was about 1.324 million tonnes of liquid steel; the company now cites approximately 1.7 million tonnes of liquid steel design capacity across long steel and DRI/HBI, producing rebar, hot-rolled coils, wire rod, sections, HBI/DRI and billets. In 2025 Steel Plant No. 1 produced a record 861,000 tonnes of billets, and the first quarter of 2025 saw a record 210,000 tonnes of HBI exported via 16 ships, with H1 2025 DRI production reaching 557,671 tonnes. Export markets span 38 countries in total, including Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon and Albania. LISCO operates its own captive port, and a 2024 Danieli memorandum of understanding targets a further two million tonnes of expansion. Notably, iron ore pellets are imported from Brazil, Canada and Sweden despite the domestic Wadi ash-Shati reserves. Beyond steel, the Libyan Cement Company in the east holds around 2.9 million tonnes of capacity across six lines, supplying more than one-third of national demand, and the Marsa el-Brega petrochemical complex holds installed methanol capacity of around 1,750 tonnes per day at its First Methanol Plant, with fertiliser capacity of approximately 900,000 tonnes a year of urea and 700,000 tonnes a year of ammonia.

Agriculture is structurally marginal at around 5.6 per cent of GDP historically, and the country is deeply food-import-dependent: domestic agricultural production met only 25 per cent of national demand in 2018, and Libya imported 92 per cent of its cereal needs in 2020. Arable land is confined to the coastal strip and oases and depends almost entirely on the Great Man-Made River, recognised by Guinness World Records as the world's largest irrigation project, comprising 2,820 km of underground pipes fed by more than 1,300 wells, most over 500 metres deep, and supplying 6,500,000 cubic metres of fresh water per day from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer. Key products are dates, at roughly 188,300 tonnes in 2025 and operating below capacity owing to instability, olives and olive oil at about 8,000 tonnes, citrus, vegetables, wheat and barley. On logistics, the Misurata Free Zone, established in 2000, is the principal non-oil gateway, handling around 60 to 65 per cent of all Libyan container trade and roughly 700,000 TEU in 2025, with a $2.7bn public-private partnership signed in 2025 aiming to lift capacity toward four million TEU. Libya joined Afreximbank as its 53rd member in December 2024, opening a path toward PAPSS integration.

The endowment in depth

Libya's endowment is overwhelmingly subsurface. It holds Africa's largest proven crude oil reserves at 48.36 billion barrels — unchanged since 2013 (OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2025) and roughly 41% of Africa's total (EIA, 2024) — alongside proven natural gas of about 53 trillion cubic feet, or some 1.5 trillion cubic metres, Africa's fifth-largest (EIA, 2021; Eni, 2024). The non-hydrocarbon mineral base is materially significant but almost entirely stranded. The Wadi ash-Shati iron ore deposit in Fezzan is estimated at 795 million tonnes at a ~52% Fe grade (USGS, via bne IntelliNews, 2024), with some estimates ranging up to 1.6 billion tonnes, yet it remains unmined because it lies roughly 900 km from the nearest port at Misurata. Gypsum is distributed across some 18 locations in the Bir al-Ghanam formation; salt is extracted along the Mediterranean coast near Benghazi and Misurata; and phosphate (Murzuq Basin), potash (Sirte Basin), silica, limestone, magnesium and potassium salts, and sulphur (a refinery by-product at ~13,000 tonnes per year) are recorded but barely exploited. The National Mining Corporation has set a target of making mining a pillar of the economy by 2033.

On the energy side, capacity is real but volatile. Crude production ran at roughly 1.1 mb/d in 2021, dipped below 700,000 b/d in 2022 during blockades, stabilised near 1.13 mb/d in 2024 (OPEC ASB, 2025), and averaged about 1.37 mb/d in 2025 — the strongest in over a decade — reaching 1.38–1.4 mb/d by early 2026 (NOC). It collapsed to about 400,000 b/d during the August–September 2024 Central Bank crisis. NOC targets 2 mb/d by 2030 and Libya is exempt from OPEC+ quotas owing to instability. Refining is the weak link: five refineries carry a combined nameplate of ~380,000 b/d but effective output is only ~180,000 b/d, and Libya is a net importer of refined products ($3.98bn, OEC 2024). Ras Lanuf (220,000 b/d nameplate) has been shut since 2013 over the LERCO/NOC arbitration; Zawiya (120,000 b/d) is the largest operational refinery but suffered force majeure in December 2024; Tobruk, Brega and Sarir are small. NOC plans to raise capacity to 660,000 b/d. Dry gas production fell from 423 Bcf (2022) to 394 Bcf (2023), and GreenStream pipeline exports to Italy fell to ~1 bcm in 2025 from 1.4 bcm in 2024; the ~$8bn Structures A&E project (Eni/NOC, first gas 2026–2027) and the Bahr Essalam/Sabratha compression expansion aim to reverse the decline, with Eni's BESS 2 and BESS 3 discoveries (>1 Tcf in place) announced in March 2026. The grid stands at ~8,200 MW (GECOL, 2023), entirely fossil-fuelled and chronically short of gas; installed renewables were under 0.1 GW in 2022 against a target of 4 GW of solar and wind and 20% renewables by 2035.

Agriculture is structurally marginal — historically about 5.6% of GDP — and Libya is deeply food-import-dependent: domestic production met only 25% of national demand in 2018 (USDA FAS), the country imports roughly $3bn of agricultural goods a year, and it imported 92% of its cereal needs in 2020 (FAO, via OECD, 2024). Arable land is confined to the Mediterranean coastal strip and the oases, and the sector depends almost entirely on the Great Man-Made River, recognised by Guinness World Records as the world's largest irrigation project — the largest underground network of pipes at 2,820 km, fed by more than 1,300 wells (most over 500 m deep) and supplying 6,500,000 m³ of fresh water per day from the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer (phases completed 1991 and 1996). The principal oasis crop is dates, at roughly 188,300 tonnes in 2025 (FAO-cited) and operating below capacity owing to instability; olives yield about 8,000 tonnes of olive oil (FAOSTAT, 2019), with recent record harvests reported from high-density Spanish and Greek varieties in GMMR-linked state projects at Tarhuna and Abu Aisha; citrus, vegetables, wheat and barley round out the base. Mediterranean fisheries along a 1,770 km coastline include a nascent tuna sector managed under ICCAT rules, while forestry is negligible at under 1% forest cover.

The manufacturing base is dominated by state assets, at the centre of which sits LISCO, the Libyan Iron and Steel Company at Misurata — founded in 1979, in production from 1989, using DRI/EAF technology on the Midrex process and local natural gas. Historic nameplate was ~1.324 million tonnes of liquid steel; the company now cites ~1.7 million tonnes of design capacity across long steel and DRI/HBI. In 2025 it set records — 861,000 tonnes of billets from Steel Plant No. 1, and 210,000 tonnes of HBI exported via 16 ships in Q1 alone, with H1 2025 DRI reaching 557,671 tonnes — and a 2024 Danieli MoU targets a further +2 million tonnes. LISCO runs its own captive port yet imports iron ore pellets from Brazil, Canada and Sweden despite the domestic Wadi ash-Shati reserves. Beyond steel, the Libyan Cement Company (Benghazi/Hawari/Al-Fataiah) holds ~2.9 million tonnes of capacity across six lines — more than a third of national demand — with a €200m plan to reach 3 Mt/yr, while a Tosyalı SULB DRI complex in Benghazi (planned ~8.1 Mt/yr) began investment in 2024. Petrochemicals centre on the Marsa el-Brega complex (Sirte Oil Company/LIFECO), producing methanol (First Methanol Plant, ~1,750 t/day), ammonia and urea — capacity of ~900,000 t/yr urea and ~700,000 t/yr ammonia — with the Ras Lanuf ethylene/polyethylene units (160,000 t/yr) largely inactive since 2011; LIFECO restarted its second urea plant in late 2024. Human capital is mixed: literacy is high by regional standards and Misrata University has more than 55,000 students, but the private sector employs only 14% of the workforce, public employment dominates, youth unemployment is high, and NOC launched a $200m fund in June 2025 to train 10,000 oil-and-gas workers. On logistics, the Misurata Free Zone (established 2000) handles 60–65% of the country's container trade and roughly 700,000 TEU in 2025, and a landmark $2.7bn PPP with Terminal Investment Limited (MSC) and Maha Capital Partners aims to lift capacity toward 4 million TEU; Libya joined Afreximbank as its 53rd member in December 2024, opening a path toward PAPSS integration, even as the Central Bank bifurcation, an April 2025 dinar devaluation and a planned Libya–Chad–Niger road define the remaining logistics and settlement agenda.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Libya is a textbook resource-curse economy. It ranks 98th of 130 on OEC's Economic Complexity Index (2024) — among the least complex economies measured — yet sits 69th globally in total exports on the strength of a single commodity, with an export basket that is roughly 89% crude petroleum. Products with a clear revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) are the hydrocarbons — crude, petroleum gas, refined petroleum and acyclic hydrocarbons — and, distinctively, iron reductions/HBI from LISCO (HS7203). The precise Harvard Growth Lab Atlas rank could not be cleanly extracted and is marked GREY, as Atlas and OEC use different methodologies and publish different ranks; economic complexity has been essentially flat-to-declining given the erosion of any non-oil tradeable base.

The comparative-advantage story has exactly two legs. The dominant one — hydrocarbons — is world-scale but offers little complexity upgrading and remains hostage to political shocks; crucially it is Europe-facing (Europe took ~78% of crude exports, EIA 2023) and therefore only weakly relevant to intra-African supply. The second, far smaller but strategically distinct, is steel: LISCO gives Libya a genuine, revealed HS72/HS7203 advantage that already serves 38 export markets including the African destinations of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Petrochemicals — methanol, ammonia and urea — represent a latent third leg dependent on gas monetisation. Against the Right of Supply logic, Libya's continental relevance is therefore not its crude but its steel long products and DRI/HBI, and potentially fertilizers, where intra-African demand is structural and Libya holds installed, proven capacity.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Libya's one credible continental anchor is not crude but steel — DRI/HBI and long products from LISCO (HS7203/HS72). Uniquely in Africa, Libya combines an integrated, gas-based direct-reduction steelworks with cheap stranded natural gas, a captive export port at Misurata, and a demonstrated, diversified export record: a record 210,000 tonnes of HBI shipped in Q1 2025 alone via 16 ships, a record 861,000 tonnes of billets across 2025, and H1 2025 DRI of 557,671 tonnes, already reaching 38 countries including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. This is Libya's only non-hydrocarbon, proven, scalable and continentally-relevant industrial capability, and a 2024 Danieli MoU targets a further +2 million tonnes of capacity.

The case rests on demand certainty rather than any near-term claim on Libyan capacity. As the AfCFTA drives construction and industrialisation, intra-African demand for rebar, wire rod and EAF feedstock is structural and under-supplied, and LISCO already exports precisely these goods. Steel is thus the category where Libya could plausibly fulfil binding continental supply allocations — but only provided gas supply, power and political stability hold, since the works is gas-fed on a grid that is already gas-short. The honest limits are visible in the plant itself: LISCO imports iron ore pellets from Brazil, Canada and Sweden even as the 795-million-tonne Wadi ash-Shati deposit sits stranded some 900 km from port, so the advantage is a beneficiation-and-gas story rather than a domestic-ore one, and it stands or falls on delivery reliability.

Current reality

Libya is a hydrocarbon rentier state of 7,381,023 people with GDP of about $48.5bn and GDP per capita ranking 112th of 193 globally. Oil and gas dominate absolutely: hydrocarbons were 65 per cent of GDP, 93 per cent of exports and 72 per cent of government revenue in 2024. The economy grew only about 1.9 per cent in 2024 amid a Central Bank governance crisis, then rebounded around 13.4 per cent in 2025 on recovering oil output. Structurally, the non-oil private sector accounts for only 14 per cent of the workforce; manufacturing is dominated by state assets. Libya ranks 98th of 130 on the Economic Complexity Index, among the least complex economies, and its export basket is approximately 89 per cent crude petroleum out of some $30.6bn of exports in 2024. Top destinations are overwhelmingly European, with Europe taking around 78 per cent of crude exports. The industrial verdict of the audit is that Libya is a mono-export petro-state with one genuinely continental-grade industrial asset and large stranded mineral and gas endowments held back by political fragmentation.

Delivery reliability is the binding constraint, not endowment. Rival authorities in Tripoli and the east create parallel institutions and contested oil-revenue control; the Central Bank has been severely bifurcated, with a unified governor appointed in late 2024 and into 2025 and the dinar devalued in April 2025; and production history shows real, un-smoothed swings, with output falling to around 400,000 barrels per day during the 2020 blockade and again during the August to September 2024 Central Bank crisis. Critically, Libya has signed but not ratified the AfCFTA and has not submitted its schedule of tariff concessions, which the audit identifies as a legal precondition for participating in continental supply and allocation mechanisms. Any allocation to Libya is therefore demand certainty against which capability must be built, not capacity that can be drawn upon today.

Read under the South Sudan Principle

Libya holds an aspirational allocation. Nothing on these pages is a near-term capacity claim. The bundle is the demand certainty against which capability is built, and it is deliberately held open while the state rebuilds.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 14 candidate lines · will change

Libya’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Libya’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Libya will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Libya’s 14 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 2Strong Contender 1Emerging 4Aspirational 4Grey 3
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum

5 refineries 380kb/d nameplate · Maturity: Under-utilised ~180kb/d actual · Competitiveness: HIGH
EMERGING
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Libya imported USD 4.61 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya your own imports USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Libya is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: NOC/Ecofin; OEC · 2024-2026

Crude petroleum

Africa's largest reserves 48.36bn bbl; ~1.37 mb/d · Maturity: Raw crude · Competitiveness: LOW (Europe/Asia-facing)
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 11.08 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 4.81 bnCote dIvoire USD 2.89 bnEgypt USD 1.74 bnSenegal USD 952.2 mTunisia USD 506 mGhana USD 124.9 mZambia USD 55.6 mZimbabwe USD 2.5 m

Source: OPEC ASB; OEC · 2024-2025

Petroleum gas / LNG / LPG

53 Tcf reserves; GreenStream · Maturity: Processed gas · Competitiveness: MODERATE
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas
271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane
271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes
271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene
271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711
271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas
271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Libya imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: EIA; Al Majalla · 2024-2026

Urea

LIFECO ~900kt/yr capacity · Maturity: Restarting · Competitiveness: HIGH
EMERGING
USD 3.8 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310210Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, urea, whether or not in aqueous solution
310221Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium sulphate
310229Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other than ammonium sulphate
310230Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium nitrate, whether or not in aqueous solution
310240Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate or other inorganic non-fertilizing substances,
310250Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, sodium nitrate
310260Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, double salts and mixtures of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate
310270Calcium cyanamide (excluding that in pellet or similar forms, or in packages with a gross weight...
310280Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution
310290Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other kinds including mixtures not specified in the foregoing subheadings
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): ETBC (Ethiopia), SFFRFM (Malawi) · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Libya imported USD 5.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 495.4 mSouth Africa USD 470.4 mZambia USD 456 mZimbabwe USD 239.8 mTanzania USD 235.6 mMorocco USD 200.8 mMalawi USD 194 mNigeria USD 143.3 m

Source: AFA; Energy Capital Power · 2024

Cement

LCC ~2.9Mt; Tosyalı DRI Benghazi · Maturity: Domestic; rehabilitating · Competitiveness: HIGH
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 166.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya your own imports USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Libya is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: LCC; Global Cement · 2019-2024

Iron ore

Wadi ash-Shati 795Mt @52% Fe · Maturity: Unmined (900km from port) · Competitiveness: HIGH
GREY
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 324.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya your own imports USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Libya is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS/bne IntelliNews · 2024

Ammonia

LIFECO ~700kt/yr; Brega · Maturity: Partially operational · Competitiveness: MODERATE
EMERGING
USD 1.07 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
281410Ammonia; anhydrous
281420Ammonia; in aqueous solution
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 872.5 mTunisia USD 87.3 mSouth Africa USD 49.1 mMadagascar USD 25.1 mEgypt USD 19.5 mNamibia USD 4.5 mSenegal USD 4.2 mCameroon USD 1.6 m

Source: AFA; Offshore-technology · 2024

Methanol

First Methanol Plant ~1750 t/day · Maturity: Modernising · Competitiveness: MODERATE
EMERGING
USD 704.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
290511Alcohols; saturated monohydric, methanol (methyl alcohol)
290512Alcohols; saturated monohydric, propan-1-ol (propyl alcohol) and propan-2-ol (isopropyl alcohol)
290513Alcohols; saturated monohydric, butan-1-ol (n-butyl alcohol)
290514Alcohols; saturated monohydric, butanols excluding item no. 2905.13
290515Pentanol "amyl alcohol" and isomers thereof
290516Alcohols; saturated monohydric, octanol (octyl alcohol) and isomers thereof
290517Alcohols; saturated monohydric, dodecan-1-ol (lauryl alcohol), hexadecan-1-ol (cetyl alcohol) and octadecan-1-ol (steary
290519Alcohols; saturated monohydric, n.e.c. in item no. 2905.1
290522Alcohols; unsaturated monohydric, acyclic terpene alcohols
290529Alcohols; acyclic, unsaturated monohydric, (other than acyclic terpene alcohols)
290531Alcohols; acyclic, diols; ethylene glycol (ethanediol)
290532Alcohols; acyclic, diols; propylene glycol (propane-1, 2-diol)
290539Alcohols; acyclic, diols, other than ethylene glycol (ethandiol) or propylene glycol (propane-1,2-diol)
290541Alcohols; polyhydric, 2-ethyl-2- (hydroxymethyl) propane-1,3-diol (trimethylolpropane)
290542Alcohols; polyhydric, pentaerythritol
290543Alcohols; polyhydric, mannitol
290544Alcohols; polyhydric, d-glucitol (sorbitol)
290545Alcohols; polyhydric, glycerol
290549Alcohols; polyhydric, n.e.c. in item no. 2905.4
290550Halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives of acyclic alcohols
290551Alcohols; acyclic; halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives thereof, ethchlorvynol (INN)
290559Alcohols; acyclic; halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives thereof, other than ethchlorvynol (INN)
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Libya imported USD 0.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 274.3 mSouth Africa USD 126.8 mNigeria USD 53.1 mAngola USD 38.2 mAlgeria USD 22.9 mCote dIvoire USD 20.5 mCongo USD 17.6 mMorocco USD 17.2 m

Source: Energy Capital Power · 2024

Dates

~188kt (2025) · Maturity: Unprocessed/domestic · Competitiveness: MODERATE
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 473.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080410Fruit, edible; dates, fresh or dried
080420Fruit, edible; figs, fresh or dried
080430Fruit, edible; pineapples, fresh or dried
080440Fruit, edible; avocados, fresh or dried
080450Fruit, edible; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 6.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 267.6 mEgypt USD 35.2 mSomalia USD 30.2 mNigeria USD 28.1 mGhana USD 19.3 mSouth Africa USD 11.9 mMauritania USD 9.5 mDjibouti USD 8 m

Source: FAO-cited · 2025

Gypsum

~18 deposits; NMC · Maturity: Basic · Competitiveness: MODERATE
GREY
USD 386.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252010Gypsum; anhydrite
252020Plasters; (consisting of calcined gypsum or calcium sulphate), whether or not coloured, with or without small quantities
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 3.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 176.6 mGhana USD 32.7 mCote dIvoire USD 18.3 mUganda USD 16.7 mCameroon USD 15.2 mBurkina Faso USD 14.6 mSenegal USD 12.1 mZambia USD 9.3 m

Source: bne IntelliNews · 2024

Sea salt

Coastal extraction · Maturity: Basic · Competitiveness: MODERATE
GREY
USD 303.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
250100Salt (including table salt and denatured salt); pure sodium chloride whether or not in aqueous solution; sea water
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 1.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 38.2 mCote dIvoire USD 22.9 mUganda USD 21.9 mSouth Africa USD 19.6 mZimbabwe USD 18.5 mMalawi USD 15.1 mZambia USD 13.6 mGhana USD 12.9 m

Source: bne IntelliNews · 2024

Acyclic hydrocarbons

Ras Lanuf complex · Maturity: Largely inactive since 2011 · Competitiveness: MODERATE
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 210.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
290110Acyclic hydrocarbons; saturated
290121Acyclic hydrocarbons; unsaturated, ethylene
290122Acyclic hydrocarbons; unsaturated, propene (propylene)
290123Acyclic hydrocarbons; unsaturated, butene (butylene) and isomers thereof
290124Acyclic hydrocarbons; unsaturated, buta-1,3-diene and isoprene
290129Acyclic hydrocarbons; unsaturated, n.e.c. in heading no. 2901
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Libya imported USD 2.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 57.1 mGhana USD 44.2 mSouth Africa USD 29.2 mAlgeria USD 27 mMorocco USD 20.2 mNigeria USD 7.4 mTunisia USD 4.1 mZambia USD 3.8 m

Source: OEC · 2024

Olive oil

~8kt; coastal groves · Maturity: Small-scale · Competitiveness: LOW-MODERATE
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 138 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
150910Olive oil, virgin
150920Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, extra virgin olive oil, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
150930Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, virgin olive oil, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
150940Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, virgin olive oils n.e.c. in heading 1509, whether or not refined, but not c
150990Vegetable oils; olive oil and its fractions, other than virgin, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 1.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 59.6 mSouth Africa USD 15.9 mSeychelles USD 8.2 mMauritius USD 5.6 mMali USD 5.3 mCabo Verde USD 5 mAngola USD 4.7 mGhana USD 4.1 m

Source: FAOSTAT · 2019

Hot briquetted iron / DRI

LISCO gas-based DRI; record 210kt exported Q1 2025 · Maturity: Beneficiated DRI/HBI · Competitiveness: HIGH
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 74 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
720310Ferrous products; obtained by direct reduction of iron ore, in lumps, pellets or similar forms
720390Ferrous products; spongy ferrous products and iron having a minimum purity by weight of 99.94%, in lumps, pellets or sim
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Libya imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 39.5 mKenya USD 13 mMorocco USD 12.2 mZambia USD 1.7 mSudan USD 1.6 mMauritius USD 1.5 mMadagascar USD 1.3 mCongo USD 1 m

Source: LISCO/AISU; OEC · 2024-2025

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Libya is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Libya buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Libya is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 23.26 bn

Libya’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

14

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierLibya imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleumEMERGINGUSD 4.61 bnUSD 110.54 bn
Iron oreGREYUSD 324.4 mUSD 2.85 bn
CementASPIRATIONALUSD 166.4 mUSD 2.9 bn
DatesASPIRATIONALUSD 6.7 mUSD 473.4 m
UreaEMERGINGUSD 5.6 mUSD 3.8 bn
GypsumGREYUSD 3.5 mUSD 386.9 m
Acyclic hydrocarbonsASPIRATIONALUSD 2.5 mUSD 210.3 m
Sea saltGREYUSD 1.6 mUSD 303.1 m
Olive oilASPIRATIONALUSD 1.1 mUSD 138 m
MethanolEMERGINGUSD 0.9 mUSD 704.9 m
AmmoniaEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 1.07 bn
Petroleum gas / LNG / LPGSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.1 mUSD 10.27 bn
Crude petroleumCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 11.08 bn
Hot briquetted iron / DRICONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 74 m

Left-hand column: what Libya itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Libya’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 14 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Libya’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Libya. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Libya’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Libya’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 21.5 bn
02NigeriaUSD 20.39 bn
03EgyptUSD 13.71 bn
04MoroccoUSD 11.42 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.8 bn
06GhanaUSD 5.19 bn
07LibyaUSD 5.1 bn
08KenyaUSD 4.66 bn
09Cote dIvoireUSD 3.63 bn
10TunisiaUSD 2.26 bn
11SenegalUSD 968.5 m
12AlgeriaUSD 872.4 m
13ZambiaUSD 540 m
14EthiopiaUSD 495.4 m
15TanzaniaUSD 440.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Libya. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Libya would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Libya to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Political-institutional unification

Enough unity between the GNU in Tripoli and the eastern/HoR-LNA authorities to guarantee uninterrupted operation of LISCO, the ports and gas supply — or, failing full unification, a durable technocratic ring-fence around the export industries.

02

AfCFTA ratification and tariff concessions

Libya has signed but not ratified the AfCFTA and has not submitted its schedule of tariff concessions, a legal precondition for legally receiving continental supply allocations.

03

Reliable gas and power

Sustained gas and electricity to LISCO and the petrochemical plants, since DRI, ammonia, urea and methanol are all gas-fed and the ~8,200 MW grid is already gas-short.

04

Banking normalisation

A genuinely unified Central Bank and live PAPSS/Afreximbank integration to enable intra-African trade settlement after the bifurcation and the April 2025 dinar devaluation.

05

Logistics upgrade

Completion of the Misurata Free Zone expansion toward 4 million TEU and a functioning Sahel corridor via the planned Libya–Chad–Niger road to reach African markets overland and by sea.

06

Fertilizer capacity restoration

Sustained LIFECO urea and ammonia operation — capacity of ~900,000 t/yr urea and ~700,000 t/yr ammonia — to serve African agriculture.

The binding constraints
·

Political fragmentation (master risk) Rival authorities — the GNU in Tripoli and eastern/HoR-LNA authorities aligned with the House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army — create parallel institutions, contested oil-revenue control and recurrent standoffs (Crisis Group, 2024).

·

Delivery reliability and blockade history Repeated force majeure and field/port shutdowns — the 2020 blockade cut output to ~400,000 b/d and the August 2024 CBL crisis repeated the pattern — mean delivery reliability is structurally compromised, with real, un-smoothed swings rather than a steady export line.

·

Oil-revenue dependence Hydrocarbons were 93% of exports and 72% of government revenue in 2024 (World Bank), leaving fiscal capacity and foreign exchange hostage to price and production swings.

·

Banking bifurcation The split Central Bank, the April 2025 dinar devaluation, liquidity shortages and an opaque, partly barter-based oil economy impede trade finance and PAPSS readiness.

·

Infrastructure damage Ras Lanuf refinery has been shut since 2013, petrochemical units idle since 2011, the power grid is gas-starved, and the Wadi ash-Shati ore is stranded some 900 km from port.

·

AfCFTA non-ratification Libya has neither ratified the AfCFTA nor tabled tariff concessions, a legal precondition for participating in continental supply and allocation mechanisms.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Libya’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

An aspirational allocation is not a capability claim. Libya holds lines against which capability must still be built. Nothing here should be read as present capacity, and the instrument’s value to Libya lies in the demand certainty, not in near-term supply.

05

Political fragmentation is the master risk. Rival authorities — the Government of National Unity in Tripoli and eastern authorities aligned with the House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army — create parallel institutions, contested oil-revenue control and recurrent standoffs. The audit requires political-institutional unification sufficient to guarantee uninterrupted operation of LISCO, ports and gas supply, or failing that a durable technocratic ring-fence around export industries.

06

Libya has signed but not ratified the AfCFTA. It has neither ratified the agreement nor tabled its schedule of tariff concessions, which the audit identifies as a legal precondition for participating in continental supply and allocation mechanisms. Deposit of the instrument of ratification is named as a benchmark that would change the assessment.

07

Delivery reliability is structurally compromised by blockade history. Repeated force majeure and field and port shutdowns have produced real, un-smoothed swings: the 2020 blockade cut output to around 400,000 barrels per day, and the August 2024 Central Bank crisis repeated the pattern.

08

Banking bifurcation impedes trade settlement. The split Central Bank, the April 2025 dinar devaluation, liquidity shortages and an opaque, partly barter-based oil economy impede trade finance and PAPSS readiness. The audit requires a genuinely unified Central Bank balance sheet and live PAPSS and Afreximbank integration.

09

Every candidate industry is gas-fed, and the grid is already gas-short. DRI, ammonia, urea and methanol all depend on natural gas, while grid capacity of around 8,200 MW is entirely fossil-fuelled with chronic outages from gas shortages. Dry gas production fell from 423 Bcf in 2022 to 394 Bcf in 2023, and pipeline exports to Italy fell to around 1 bcm in 2025 from 1.4 bcm in 2024.

10

Infrastructure damage runs deep across the industrial base. The Ras Lanuf refinery has been shut since 2013, petrochemical units have been idle since 2011, the power grid is gas-starved, and the Wadi ash-Shati ore body is stranded 900 km from port. Rehabilitation of Ras Lanuf and Zawiya, and sustained LIFECO urea and ammonia operation, are both listed as preconditions.

11

Sovereign investment capacity is frozen and contested. The Libyan Investment Authority, among Africa's largest sovereign wealth funds, has been under a UN asset freeze since 2011, with at least half of a network valued at around $70bn still frozen. Documented governance and transparency deficiencies further constrain its developmental role, limiting domestic financing of diversification.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Libya's Draft 1 bundle rests on a single proven non-hydrocarbon industrial capability — DRI and hot briquetted iron under HS7203 and long steel products under HS72 — supported by latent gas-fed petrochemical and fertiliser capacity in urea, ammonia and methanol, and by the Misurata Free Zone as the country's principal non-oil gateway. What must be proven is institutional rather than industrial. Libya must deposit its instrument of AfCFTA ratification and table tariff concessions; secure reliable gas and power to LISCO and the petrochemical plants; normalise banking to a single Central Bank balance sheet with live PAPSS settlement; and demonstrate that LISCO can sustain output above 1.5 million tonnes a year with a rising intra-African export share. Absent the first two conditions, the audit's own conclusion holds: Libya remains an anchor only in Europe-facing crude, with steel as its sole credible continental play.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Libya is shown 14 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Libya to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2