Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
GhanaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Ghana — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
11
Draft 1 candidate lines for Ghana
The Minister’s brief · for Cassiel Ato Forson · Ghana
Minister Forson, Ghana holds what most of the continent can only aspire to: real, installed cocoa-grinding capacity, here and running today — some 504,780 tonnes at Tema, operated by Barry Callebaut, Cargill and Olam, exporting 1.8 billion dollars of paste, butter and powder in 2025, shipped through a port that moved 1.668 million TEU in 2024. You are the world's second cocoa producer, with a revealed advantage in beans reported at 283.22, and, rarely on this continent, the plant already built rather than merely announced. Africa remains a net importer of chocolate and cocoa preparations even as it exports its own beans; that is a genuine substitution prize, and Ghana's rightful claim on it. The Right of Supply gives you a twenty-five-year first right to supply the continent, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction, Minister, is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Ghana
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Cassiel Ato Forson, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Ghana · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Forson,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Ghana — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Ghana is in this room

Ghana's strongest position is not gold but processed cocoa: it is the world's second cocoa producer, with an extreme revealed comparative advantage in beans reported at 283.22, and, uniquely within its portfolio, it holds real installed processing capacity today, roughly 504,780 tonnes of grinding in the Tema Free Zone operated by Barry Callebaut, Cargill and Olam, with cocoa product exports of paste, butter and powder reaching 1.8 billion dollars in 2025, delivered through a coastal port that handled some 1.668 million TEU in 2024. The constraint is equally plain and must be stated without softening: bean output has fallen roughly 40% since 2020/21 to some 600,000 tonnes, grinder utilisation is below 50%, and COCOBOD carries GH cedi 32.5 billion of debt with first-ever negative equity, so the capacity is real but currently under-fed, and its conversion into dependable continental supply rests on production recovery, recapitalisation of COCOBOD and processing finance at viable cost.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Ghana, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Ghana

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
11draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Ghana’s draft bundle. 11 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Cocoa paste/butter/powder, Cocoa beans (raw), Manganese ore. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 3 strong contender · 5 emerging · 3 aspirational.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Ghana is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 11 candidate lines proposed for Ghana below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Ghana. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Ghana will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Ghana will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
11 lines
Ghana’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Ghana at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Ghana’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Ghana’s own capability audit.

Gold as a supply story rather than a production statistic

Ghana is Africa's largest gold producer, but the audit records that until 2024 it exported gold essentially raw as dore or bullion, across more than a century of unrefined export. The Royal Ghana Gold refinery was commissioned in August 2024 at roughly 400 kg per day with LBMA accreditation in process but not achieved, and intra-African procurement of refined gold is thin.

Capability inversion

Manganese ore beneficiation

Ghana ranks fourth globally at 820,000 tonnes in 2024 with reserves of 13 million tonnes, but output is exported as ore from a single mine at Nsuta. The 450 million dollar Nsuta-Tarkwa battery-grade refinery is announced, not built, and the chain it feeds is mostly extra-African.

Raw base · industrial screen

Aluminium and the bauxite chain

No alumina refinery exists and all bauxite is exported raw. The VALCO smelter at Tema carries a 200,000 tonne nameplate but runs at roughly 35,000 to 40,000 tonnes, was fully shut in 2022, and imports its alumina; the some 600 million dollar modernisation to 300,000 tonnes is pending an investor search. The audit tiers this as aspirational.

Capability inversion

Lithium spodumene concentrate

Ewoyaa is pre-production: the mining lease was ratified in March 2026 but roughly 185 million dollars of financing and a final investment decision remain pending, the plan is for raw spodumene concentrate exported to the United States with no domestic conversion, and intra-African demand is described as negligible.

Pre-production

Raw cocoa beans as a continental offer

Ghana's bean position is strong in raw terms, but the audit records intra-African demand for beans as marginal; the leading destinations for cocoa products are the Netherlands, at over 139,000 tonnes, and the United States, at 59,500 tonnes. The existing market is extra-African, which is precisely why the audit points to intermediates rather than beans.

Raw base · industrial screen

Refined petroleum products at continental scale

Sentuo, commissioned in January 2024, ran at roughly 40,000 barrels per day and accounted for some 65% of locally refined products, while Tema Oil Refinery's 45,000 barrel per day nameplate runs intermittently. Ghana still imported roughly 97% of finished fuel as stated at the 2024 inauguration, so the audit tiers this as emerging and conditions any export role on Sentuo Phase 2 and 3 reaching surplus over domestic demand.

Scale-matching
08 · Endowment
What Ghana actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Ghana. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Ghana's endowment rests on three pillars: gold, cocoa and offshore oil and gas. On the mineral side it is Africa's largest gold producer, at 130 tonnes in 2024 on USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 figures, against South Africa's 100 tonnes, Mali's 70 tonnes and Burkina Faso's 60 tonnes, with reserves of 1,000 tonnes. The Ghana Chamber of Mines reports a higher 2024 figure of roughly 4.8 million ounces, or about 149 tonnes, once artisanal and small-scale output is included; the audit treats the position as a range of 130 to 149 tonnes for 2024. Manganese production was 820,000 tonnes in 2024 with reserves of 13 million tonnes, ranking Ghana fourth globally behind South Africa, Gabon and Australia, drawn from the single Nsuta mine operated by Ghana Manganese Company. Bauxite is mined at Awaso at roughly 1 million tonnes a year, with GIADEC citing some 920 million tonnes of resource potential across Awaso, Nyinahin and Kyebi. Lithium is emerging at Ewoyaa, a resource of 36.8 million tonnes at 1.24% Li2O, whose mining lease was ratified by Parliament in March 2026.

The agricultural endowment is the one the audit treats as decisive. Ghana is the world's second cocoa producer. The industry employs some 800,000 farm families across 10 of the country's 16 administrative regions and generates two billion dollars in foreign exchange annually, on USDA FAS GAIN 2025 figures. Uniquely within the portfolio, real installed processing capacity already exists: roughly 504,780 tonnes of grinding capacity on the USDA FAS 2025 measure, or about 514,000 tonnes on COCOBOD's, concentrated in the Tema Free Zone and operated by Barry Callebaut at some 67,000 tonnes, Cargill at some 65,000 tonnes and Olam at some 43,000 tonnes. Cocoa product exports of paste, butter, powder and cake reached 1.8 billion dollars in 2025 on GEPA figures, with paste at 789.3 million dollars, butter at 635.7 million dollars and powder at 233.8 million dollars. The audit records that this capacity was built by anchor multinational investors drawn to the Tema Free Zone by reliable port access, fiscal incentives and proximity to the world's second-largest bean supply, and judges it the most durable of Ghana's advantages because it embeds processing know-how rather than resource extraction alone.

Deliverability is a genuine asset. Tema Port handled some 1.668 million TEU in 2024, up 27.8% year on year, and a 1.5 billion dollar expansion is lifting capacity toward 3.7 million TEU with deep berths for Post-Panamax vessels; Takoradi serves as the oil, gas and dry-bulk hub. Transit cargo to landlocked Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger reached 738,604 tonnes between January and September 2024, up 55.3% year on year on Ghana Shippers' Authority figures, and the Tema-Mpakadan rail line was inaugurated in November 2024. On complexity, however, the picture is sober: Ghana ranks 124th on the Economic Complexity Index of the Harvard Growth Lab, having fallen some 24 positions over the decade, is described as less complex than expected for its income, and carries a projected growth rate of about 2.5% a year to 2034. Revealed comparative advantage above 1 is concentrated in primary and lightly processed goods. Cocoa-bean RCA is extreme, reported at 283.22 for Ghana in a peer-reviewed study by Nasruddeen and others in Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 2022, against 516.82 for Cote d'Ivoire. The product-space implication drawn by the audit is that Ghana's nearest feasible upgrades lie within the cocoa chain and agro-processing, not complex manufacturing.

The endowment in depth

Minerals and metals anchor the headline endowment but sit low on the beneficiation ladder. Gold production was 130 t in 2024 (USGS MCS 2025) against reserves of 1,000 t, making Ghana Africa's largest producer (130 t versus South Africa 100 t, Mali 70 t, Burkina Faso 60 t); the Ghana Chamber of Mines reports a higher ~4.8 million ounces (~149 t) including artisanal and small-scale output, so the figure is best read as a range of 130–149 t. Until 2024 the metal left the country essentially raw as doré or bullion, over a century of unrefined export; the Royal Ghana Gold refinery (RGGL, a Precious Minerals Marketing Company and Rosy Royal joint venture) was commissioned in August 2024 with capacity of ~400 kg/day targeting 99.99% LBMA good-delivery quality, though LBMA accreditation was in process, not yet achieved. The Bank of Ghana Domestic Gold Purchase Programme, running since 2021, had bought 88.4 t valued at USD 6.87 billion, lifting central-bank reserves to 73 t by June 2024 — reserve accumulation rather than export-grade beneficiation at scale. Manganese production was 820,000 t in 2024 against reserves of 13,000,000 t, ranked 4th globally behind South Africa, Gabon and Australia, from the single Nsuta mine operated by the Ghana Manganese Company (90% Consmin/Tianyuan Manganese Industry) and exported as ore; a USD 450 million Nsuta–Tarkwa battery-grade refinery is announced, not built. Bauxite comes from the Awaso mine at ~1 million t/yr with no alumina refinery, so all of it is exported raw, against a GIADEC-cited ~920 million t resource potential across Awaso, Nyinahin and Kyebi. Lithium at Ewoyaa (Atlantic Lithium/Elevra) holds a resource of 36.8 Mt at 1.24% Li₂O, with the mining lease ratified by Parliament in March 2026 and ~3.6 Mt of spodumene concentrate planned over 12 years, but ~USD 185 million of financing and a final investment decision remain pending and the concentrate would be exported raw to the United States with no domestic conversion.

Energy is a producer's endowment paired with a fragile grid. Oil output was 48.24 million barrels in 2024 (~132,000 bpd) across Jubilee (66%), Sankofa-Gye Nyame (20%) and TEN (14%), but production has declined for five consecutive years, fell ~25.9% year-on-year in H1 2025, and no new petroleum agreements have been signed since 2018 — the core upstream weakness. In refining, the state Tema Oil Refinery (45,000 bpd nameplate) runs intermittently, while the Chinese-owned Sentuo Oil Refinery at Tema, commissioned in January 2024, ran ~40,000 bpd and accounted for ~65% of locally refined products in 2024 with a Phase 2 underway toward 80,000–120,000 bpd; even so, Ghana imported ~97% of finished fuel. Installed generation capacity was 5,260 MW excluding embedded (Nov 2024, Energy Commission), 5,507 MW including embedded, with dependable capacity ~4,856 MW and a mix of ~66% thermal (gas) and ~33% hydro — Akosombo 1,020 MW, Bui 404 MW, Kpong 160 MW — and Ghana exports power to Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso, though the "dumsor" load-shedding crisis of 2012–2016 and recurring gas-supply and financial fragility remain the binding constraint on heavy manufacturing.

Agriculture, and cocoa specifically, is where installed processing capacity actually exists. Ghana is the world's #2 cocoa producer; 2024/25 output was ~600,000 t, down ~40% from the 1.04 million t peak of 2020/21, and MY 2023/24 at 530,873 t was COCOBOD's worst season in 15 years. The crop employs some 800,000 farm families across 10 of the country's 16 administrative regions and generates USD 2 billion in foreign exchange annually. Installed grinding capacity is ~504,780 t (USDA FAS 2025) or ~514,000 t (COCOBOD), but utilisation runs under 50% at roughly 210,000 t actual; the grinders are concentrated at the Tema Free Zone — Barry Callebaut ~67,000 t, Cargill ~65,000 t, Olam ~43,000 t — while the state-owned Cocoa Processing Company is largely stalled at 2,886 t of output in 2024. Cocoa product exports (paste, butter, powder, cake) reached USD 1.8 billion in 2025: paste USD 789.3 million, butter USD 635.7 million, powder USD 233.8 million and cake ~USD 140 million (GEPA 2025). Cashew, shea, tuna, timber and rubber are all significant but lightly processed.

The industrial base is thin, but human capital and logistics are genuine deliverability assets. Manufacturing value-added was ~11.2% of GDP (2023, World Bank), low and roughly flat; the VALCO aluminium smelter at Tema (200,000 t/yr nameplate) was running only ~35,000–40,000 t before it was fully shut in 2022, imports its alumina for want of a domestic refinery, and awaits a ~USD 600 million modernisation to 300,000 t pending an investor search, while the One District One Factory programme reports 321 supported projects of which 169 were fully functional by mid-2024, some ~170,000 jobs, on a mixed operational record with credible reporting of underperforming "white elephant" sites. The labour force is ~13 million with a ~59% employment rate (GSS 2022) and high vulnerable employment (around 2 in 3 workers), set against an established tertiary and TVET base, cocoa, mining and oil-services skill clusters, and a democratic stability that is a real if intangible asset. Tema Port handled ~1.668 million TEU in 2024 (+27.8% year-on-year) and a USD 1.5 billion expansion is lifting capacity toward 3.7 million TEU with deep berths for Post-Panamax vessels; Takoradi is the oil/gas and dry-bulk hub; transit cargo to landlocked Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger was 738,604 t in January–September 2024 (+55.3% year-on-year); and the Tema–Mpakadan rail line was inaugurated in November 2024, though Ghana competes for Sahel transit with a larger Abidjan (~40 million t throughput) and with Lomé.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Ghana ranks 124th on the Economic Complexity Index (Harvard Growth Lab, latest), having fallen roughly 24 positions over the decade — it diversified into lower-complexity products and is "less complex than expected" for its income, with projected growth of about 2.5%/yr to 2034. GDP per capita is USD 2,405 (USD 8,038 PPP; 2024, Harvard Growth Lab). Its revealed comparative advantage (RCA greater than 1) is concentrated in primary and lightly-processed goods: gold, cocoa beans, cocoa paste/butter/powder, manganese ore, cashew and crude oil.

The cocoa-bean RCA is extreme: a peer-reviewed study (Nasruddeen et al., Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 2022) reported Côte d'Ivoire at 516.82, Ghana at 283.22, Cameroon at 329.04 and Nigeria at 10.97 for cocoa-bean trade. The product-space implication is that Ghana's nearest feasible upgrades lie within the cocoa chain — paste, butter and powder toward finished chocolate — and in agro-processing, rather than in complex manufacturing.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Ghana's single most defensible continental supply position is processed cocoa intermediates — cocoa paste, butter and powder (HS 1803/1804/1805) — not gold. The Right of Supply rewards finished and intermediate products that Africa imports, and on every test cocoa intermediates score better than the obvious raw endowments. On input base, Ghana is the world's #2 cocoa producer with an extreme revealed comparative advantage in beans (RCA 283.22, 2014–18; Nasruddeen et al., Frontiers, 2022). On processing position, uniquely in the portfolio, real installed capacity already exists — ~504,780 t of grinding (USDA FAS 2025) operated by Barry Callebaut, Cargill and Olam in the Tema Free Zone, with product exports reaching USD 1.8 billion in 2025 (paste USD 789.3 million, butter USD 635.7 million, powder USD 233.8 million; GEPA 2025). On deliverability, it is coastal, with an expanding Tema Port (~1.668 million TEU, 2024). And on continental demand, Africa is a structural net importer of chocolate and cocoa preparations (HS 1806) even as it exports beans — a genuine substitution prize as African chocolate consumption rises and the kind of intermediate African food manufacturers procure. By contrast, raw gold (Africa's #1 producer, but refining is nascent and not yet LBMA-accredited) and manganese ore (4th globally, but exported entirely raw) are weak supply stories because they are unprocessed and not categories African governments procure.

The limits are honest and acute. The bean supply crisis is severe — output fell ~40% from 2020/21 to 2024/25, grinders run below 50% utilisation, and COCOBOD is effectively insolvent with GH₵32.5 billion of total debt, of which GH₵9.7 billion was due by end-September 2025, and a first-ever negative equity (President Mahama, State of the Nation Address, 27 February 2025); beans are smuggled to Côte d'Ivoire when Ivorian farmgate prices are higher. Without production recovery and processing finance the capacity is paper, not supply, and Côte d'Ivoire is a larger, faster-moving rival with ~700,000+ t of grinding. The runners-up sit behind: manganese ore (HS 2602), 4th globally and scalable but raw unless the Nsuta refinery is built, and gold refining (HS 7108), with unmatched feedstock that becomes a true supply story only if RGGL achieves LBMA accreditation and scale.

Current reality

Ghana is an 82.83 billion dollar economy of 34.4 million people on 2024 World Bank figures, with real GDP growth of 5.8% in 2024 and manufacturing value added at some 11.2% of GDP in 2023, low and roughly flat. The labour force is about 13 million with an employment rate of some 59% on 2022 Ghana Statistical Service figures and high vulnerable employment, at roughly two in three workers. Installed generation capacity was 5,260 MW excluding embedded generation in November 2024, or 5,507 MW including it, with dependable capacity of some 4,856 MW and a mix of roughly 66% thermal gas and 33% hydro. Ghana exports power to Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso. Oil production was 48.24 million barrels in 2024, about 132,000 barrels per day, and has declined for five consecutive years, with the first half of 2025 down some 25.9% year on year and no new petroleum agreements signed since 2018.

The honest position is that supply capability today is latent outside cocoa grinding and nascent fuel refining. Cocoa output has fallen roughly 40% since the 1.04 million tonne peak of 2020/21 to some 600,000 tonnes in 2024/25, with marketing year 2023/24 at 530,873 tonnes recorded as COCOBOD's worst season in 15 years; grinder utilisation runs below 50%, at roughly 210,000 tonnes actual, and the state-owned Cocoa Processing Company is largely stalled at 2,886 tonnes of output in 2024. COCOBOD is effectively insolvent, carrying GH cedi 32.5 billion of total debt. The grid retains a dumsor load-shedding history from 2012 to 2016 and recurring gas-supply and financial fragility, which the audit identifies as the binding constraint on heavy manufacturing. An IMF programme and recent sovereign debt restructuring constrain fiscal space. Most value-addition flagships, including the alumina refinery, the Nsuta manganese refinery, VALCO modernisation and gold refining at scale, are announced or under construction rather than operational.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 11 candidate lines · will change

Ghana’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Ghana’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Ghana will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Ghana’s 11 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 3Emerging 5Aspirational 3
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum

Sentuo+TOR Tema; coastal; 97% import-dependent · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Large African deficit
EMERGING
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Ghana imported USD 4.45 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana your own imports USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Ghana is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Sentuo; Energy Commission · 2024

Gold (refined)

Africa #1 producer; RGGL 400kg/day, LBMA pending · Maturity: Raw-to-intermediate · Competitiveness: Thin intra-African procurement
EMERGING
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 1.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: USGS MCS; Bank of Ghana · 2025;2024

Cement/clinker

Coastal grinding; Ghana imports clinker · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Large West African deficit
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 318.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana your own imports USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Ghana is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Ghana Statistical Service · 2024

Electricity

5,260MW installed; exports to Togo/Benin/Burkina · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Regional WAPP demand
EMERGING
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 4.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: Energy Commission · 2024

Aluminium (unwrought)

VALCO idle; no alumina refinery · Maturity: Raw bauxite exported · Competitiveness: Africa net importer aluminium
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 724.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
760110Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed)
760120Aluminium; unwrought, alloys
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 0.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 395.9 mSouth Africa USD 82.8 mTunisia USD 50.8 mAlgeria USD 48.8 mNigeria USD 38.6 mEgypt USD 31.2 mKenya USD 22.1 mTanzania USD 21.4 m

Source: GIADEC; VALCO · 2025;2024

Chocolate (finished)

Finishing nascent; artisanal only · Maturity: Aspirational · Competitiveness: Africa net importer of 1806
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 706.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
180610Cocoa; powder, containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
180620Chocolate & other food preparations containing cocoa; in blocks, slabs or bars weighing more than 2kg or in liquid, past
180631Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa; in blocks, slabs or bars, filled, weighing 2kg or less
180632Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa; in blocks, slabs or bars, (not filled), weighing 2kg or less
180690Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa; n.e.c. in chapter 18
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 6.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Libya USD 147.8 mSouth Africa USD 126.1 mMorocco USD 101.3 mEgypt USD 54.2 mNigeria USD 37.5 mMauritius USD 29.9 mNamibia USD 15.8 mAngola USD 14.6 m

Source: USDA FAS · 2025

Processed cashew/shea/fruit

Endowment + 1D1F agro-processing · Maturity: Mostly raw · Competitiveness: Regional food demand
EMERGING
USD 446.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
200811Nuts; ground-nuts, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200819Nuts and other seeds; whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit (excluding ground-nuts ex
200820Fruit; pineapples, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, othe
200830Fruit; citrus, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, other sw
200840Fruit; pears, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, other swe
200850Fruit; apricots, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200860Fruit; cherries, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200870Fruit; peaches, including nectarines, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007 and 2008, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200880Fruit; strawberries, prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in heading no. 2007, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200891Fruit, palm hearts; prepared or preserved, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200892Mixtures of fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved, whether or...
200893Fruit; cranberries (Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos); Iingonberries (Vaccinium vitis-idaea), prepared or preserved, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit
200897Fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants; mixtures (other than those of subheading no 2008.19); prepared or preserved in ways n.e.c. in headings 2007 and 2008, whether or not containing added sugar, or other sweetening matter or spirit, n.e.c.
200899Fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants; prepared or preserved, whether or not containing added sugar, other sweetening matter or spirit, n.e.c. in heading no. 2008
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Ghana imported USD 4.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 66.7 mMorocco USD 60.7 mEgypt USD 54.5 mAlgeria USD 52.9 mLibya USD 28.6 mEthiopia USD 23.6 mSomalia USD 20.1 mKenya USD 19.3 m

Source: Ghana Statistical Service · 2024

Cocoa paste/butter/powder

World #2 beans; ~504,780t grind at Tema FZ; product exports USD1.8bn · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Africa net importer of cocoa preparations
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 321.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
180310Cocoa; paste, not defatted
180320Cocoa; paste, wholly or partly defatted
180400Cocoa; butter, fat and oil
180500Cocoa; powder, not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 0.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 108.2 mAlgeria USD 86.4 mSouth Africa USD 57 mMorocco USD 33 mTunisia USD 13.3 mKenya USD 5.1 mLibya USD 3.9 mSenegal USD 3.3 m

Source: USDA FAS; COCOBOD; GEPA · 2025

Cocoa beans (raw)

World #2; RCA 283.22 · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Marginal intra-Africa
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 45.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
180100Cocoa beans; whole or broken, raw or roasted
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 17.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Tunisia USD 19.7 mGhana your own imports USD 17.1 mAlgeria USD 6.9 mSenegal USD 0.4 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 mUganda USD 0.2 mMadagascar USD 0.2 mDjibouti USD 0.2 m

Ghana is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Frontiers/Nasruddeen; USDA FAS · 2022;2025

Lithium spodumene

Ewoyaa 36.8Mt; lease ratified; FID pending · Maturity: Pre-production raw · Competitiveness: Negligible intra-African
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 35.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded
253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)
253040Natural micaceous iron oxides
253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 2.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 12.6 mSouth Africa USD 5.6 mMorocco USD 5 mAlgeria USD 3.2 mGhana your own imports USD 2.6 mNigeria USD 1.5 mTunisia USD 1.2 mZimbabwe USD 0.6 m

Ghana is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Atlantic Lithium · 2026

Manganese ore

4th globally 820kt; reserves 13Mt · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Feeds steel/battery, mostly extra-African
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 12 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260200Manganese ores and concentrates, including ferruginous manganese ores and concentrates with a manganese content of 20% o
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ghana imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 8.8 mSouth Africa USD 2.4 mAngola USD 0.4 mCote dIvoire USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.1 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MCS · 2025

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Ghana is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Ghana buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Ghana is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 21.18 bn

Ghana’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

11

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierGhana imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleumEMERGINGUSD 4.45 bnUSD 110.54 bn
Cement/clinkerEMERGINGUSD 318.1 mUSD 2.9 bn
Cocoa beans (raw)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 17.1 mUSD 45.3 m
Chocolate (finished)ASPIRATIONALUSD 6.6 mUSD 706.2 m
ElectricityEMERGINGUSD 4.4 mUSD 2.24 bn
Processed cashew/shea/fruitEMERGINGUSD 4.3 mUSD 446.2 m
Lithium spodumeneASPIRATIONALUSD 2.6 mUSD 35.6 m
Gold (refined)EMERGINGUSD 1.9 mUSD 2.99 bn
Cocoa paste/butter/powderSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.6 mUSD 321.2 m
Aluminium (unwrought)ASPIRATIONALUSD 0.4 mUSD 724.5 m
Manganese oreSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 12 m

Left-hand column: what Ghana itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Ghana’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 11 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Ghana’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Ghana. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Ghana’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Ghana’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01NigeriaUSD 20.02 bn
02South AfricaUSD 16.54 bn
03MoroccoUSD 8.48 bn
04DR CongoUSD 7.8 bn
05EgyptUSD 6.94 bn
06LibyaUSD 5.01 bn
07GhanaUSD 4.79 bn
08KenyaUSD 4.4 bn
09UgandaUSD 2.04 bn
10Burkina FasoUSD 401.2 m
11TunisiaUSD 351.5 m
12MaliUSD 302.7 m
13Cote dIvoireUSD 273.2 m
14AlgeriaUSD 241.6 m
15MozambiqueUSD 210 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Ghana. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Ghana would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Ghana to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Cocoa production and processing recover

Production recovers toward ~800,000+ t, grinder utilisation rises above 50%, COCOBOD is recapitalised, financing shifts from bean-collateral pre-finance to processing investment, and Ghana moves from intermediates toward branded chocolate for African markets.

02

Gold refining reaches accreditation and scale

RGGL achieves LBMA accreditation and multi-tonne refining throughput, with reliable doré aggregation from artisanal and large-scale miners.

03

The manganese refinery is built

The Nsuta USD 450 million refinery is built and producing battery-grade or ferroalloy product rather than exporting ore.

04

Aluminium is integrated end to end

An alumina refinery is built and VALCO is modernised to 300,000 t with competitively priced, reliable power.

05

Refined fuel reaches export surplus

Sentuo Phase 2/3 and TOR reach a surplus over the ~65,000–80,000 bpd of domestic demand to export regionally, competing with Nigeria's Dangote refinery.

06

Cross-cutting enablers hold

Stable, low-cost power is secured, AfCFTA market access is sustained, and processing finance is available at viable cost.

The binding constraints
·

Power reliability A thermal-dependent, gas-supply-fragile grid with a "dumsor" load-shedding history is the hidden gate on any energy-intensive supply, notably aluminium smelting and refining.

·

Feedstock collapse and single-buyer dependence Cocoa output is down ~40% and grinders import beans from Côte d'Ivoire to run, while COCOBOD is insolvent (GH₵32.5 billion debt); manganese, bauxite and lithium are each single-mine and single-offtaker dependent (Consmin/TMI; GBC; Elevra/Piedmont).

·

Capital and macro constraints The IMF programme, the recent sovereign debt restructuring and high financing costs constrain processing investment.

·

Beneficiation gap Flagship value-addition projects — the alumina refinery, the manganese refinery, VALCO modernisation and gold refining at scale — are announced or under construction, not operational.

·

Logistics cost and transit competition Elevated Tema port charges meet live competition from Abidjan and Lomé for Sahel transit, with Togo's alignment with the Sahel states a diversion risk.

·

Galamsey and governance Illegal mining degrades cocoa land and water — a direct threat to the trump-card feedstock.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Ghana’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

The feedstock is collapsing faster than the capacity can be filled. Cocoa output has fallen roughly 40% from the 1.04 million tonne peak of 2020/21 to some 600,000 tonnes in 2024/25, and grinders run below 50% utilisation, importing beans from Cote d'Ivoire in order to run. The audit is blunt that without production recovery and processing finance, the capacity is paper, not supply.

05

COCOBOD is effectively insolvent. Total debt stands at GH cedi 32.5 billion, of which GH cedi 9.7 billion was due by end-September 2025, with first-ever negative equity reported by President Mahama in the State of the Nation Address of 27 February 2025. The audit sets recapitalisation, and a shift from bean-collateral pre-finance to processing investment, as a precondition.

06

Power reliability is the hidden gate. The grid is thermal-dependent and gas-supply fragile, with a dumsor load-shedding history from 2012 to 2016. The audit identifies this as the binding constraint on any energy-intensive supply, naming aluminium smelting and refining, and lists stable, low-cost power as a cross-cutting condition.

07

The value-addition pipeline is announcement, not plant. The alumina refinery, the Nsuta manganese refinery, VALCO modernisation and gold refining at scale are all announced or under construction rather than operational. The audit instructs that supply capability be treated as latent, not realised, outside cocoa grinding and nascent fuel refining.

08

Single-mine and single-offtaker dependence runs through the mineral portfolio. Manganese, bauxite and lithium are each dependent on one mine and one offtaker, named as Consmin and Tianyuan Manganese Industry, GBC, and Elevra and Piedmont respectively. Concentration of this kind leaves no redundancy behind any mineral commitment.

09

Macro-fiscal space is constrained and financing is dear. An IMF programme, recent sovereign debt restructuring and high financing costs constrain processing investment, at the same moment that the trump-card sector requires recapitalisation and new plant finance.

10

A larger rival and a leaking border sit on the same product. Cote d'Ivoire is described as a larger, faster-moving rival with grinding capacity above 700,000 tonnes, and Ghanaian beans are smuggled across when Ivorian farmgate prices are higher. On logistics, elevated Tema port charges and live competition from Abidjan and Lome for Sahel transit compound the exposure.

11

Galamsey threatens the trump-card feedstock directly. Illegal mining degrades cocoa land and water. The audit records this as a governance failure that acts on the very asset base the defensible supply position depends upon.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Ghana's Draft 1 bundle rests on one asset that is already built and several that are not. The built asset is cocoa grinding at Tema: installed capacity, multinational operators, embedded processing know-how, coastal deliverability, and a continent that is a structural net importer of chocolate and cocoa preparations under HS 1806 even as it exports beans. Everything else in the portfolio, including gold, manganese, bauxite and aluminium, and lithium, is a raw-base position awaiting a plant that has been announced but not commissioned, and the audit is explicit that these should be read as latent rather than realised capability. What must therefore be proven is not the endowment but the throughput: that cocoa production recovers toward 800,000 tonnes or more, that grinder utilisation rises above 50%, that COCOBOD is recapitalised and financing shifts from bean-collateral pre-finance to processing investment, that RGGL achieves LBMA accreditation and multi-tonne throughput if gold is to count at all, and that power is stable and low in cost. On that showing, Ghana's claim is a claim of installed and demonstrable processing capability in one chain, currently under-fed, rather than a claim of breadth.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Ghana is shown 11 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Ghana to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2