Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
EthiopiaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Ethiopia — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
13
Draft 1 candidate lines for Ethiopia
The Minister’s brief · for Ahmed Shide · Ethiopia
Minister Shide, Ethiopia holds what the continent cannot manufacture: the largest hydropower fleet in Africa. The 5,150 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam lifts national capacity above 10 GW, and Ethiopian Electric Power already sells across borders to Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and, on trial, Tanzania — a record 1,274.42 GWh to Kenya alone last year, at little more than six cents a kilowatt-hour under a twenty-five-year agreement. This is no prospect; electricity is itself the finished, tradable product, with no beneficiation gap to climb behind it. East Africa's power deficits are acute and persistent, and your dam is a standing claim upon them. The Right of Supply turns that claim into a 25-year first right to supply, disciplined by Match-or-Release: never a subsidy, never a captive contract, yours to hold only while you meet the market. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional — built to be corrected. Your correction, Minister, is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Ethiopia
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Ahmed Shide, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Ethiopia · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Shide,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Ethiopia — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Ethiopia is in this room

Ethiopia's strongest endowment is electrical energy. The 5,150 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam lifts national installed capacity above roughly 10 GW, the largest hydropower fleet in Africa, and Ethiopian Electric Power generated some 29,000 GWh in FY2024/25. Critically, this is not a prospect but an existing cross-border trade: Ethiopia already supplies Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan, with trial sales to Tanzania, through the Eastern Africa Power Pool, selling to Kenya at roughly US$0.066 per kWh under a 25-year power purchase agreement and delivering a record 1,274.42 GWh to that market in the fiscal year ending June 2025. Electricity carries no beneficiation gap to climb, unlike gold, sesame and tantalum, since it is itself the finished, tradable product. The honest constraint is equally clear: deliverability is grid-bounded, so Ethiopia can supply only those states reached by interconnectors, making this a regional rather than pan-continental position; and it is a power exporter in which around 45 per cent of the population still lacks electricity access, so domestic claims on supply, together with hydrological risk and transmission build-out costs, bound what can be offered abroad.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Ethiopia, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Ethiopia

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
13draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Ethiopia’s draft bundle. 13 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Electrical energy, Coffee (green). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 continental anchor · 5 strong contender · 4 emerging · 2 aspirational.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Ethiopia is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 13 candidate lines proposed for Ethiopia below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Ethiopia. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Ethiopia will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Ethiopia will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
13 lines
Ethiopia’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Ethiopia at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Ethiopia’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Ethiopia’s own capability audit.

Gold (doré, HS 7108)

Gold generated US$3.5 billion, some 42 per cent of export revenue in FY2024/25, but the audit is explicit that Ethiopia has no LBMA-accredited refinery and that this is raw export, not beneficiated supply. Output is dominated by artisanal supply, continental import demand is low because gold is not an African import need, and supply chains run through contested Tigray, which supplied 18.9 tonnes or 51 per cent of output.

Raw base · no refining stage

Potash (HS 3104)

The Danakil and Dallol reserves are world-class, reported by Circum Minerals at 454 Mt at 23.8 per cent KCl with Allana/Dallol inferred resources of 105 Mt at 20.8 per cent KCl, but there has been zero commercial production to date. The audit classifies this as purely a reserve, not a supply capability, and rates it aspirational pending actual mine development.

Reserve, not production

Geothermal power (HS 2716, expansion)

Potential is placed at over 10,000 MW across 23 identified Rift Valley sites, but installed capacity is only the 7.3 MW Aluto-Langano pilot, with Tulu Moye at 150 MW and Corbetti at up to a 500 MW target still under development. The audit states plainly that potential is not installed and classifies the category as aspirational.

Potential, not installed

Coffee as a continental supply card (HS 0901)

Coffee is an unambiguous global production anchor and Africa's largest crop, but the audit judges it a weak right-of-supply card because Africa is a net coffee exporter, so intra-African import demand is marginal and the prize lies offshore rather than continentally. Green bean has accounted for 99.7 per cent of export volume over five years, with minimal roasting.

Continental demand screen

Tantalum concentrate (HS 2615)

Ethiopia was historically a globally significant producer at roughly 6 per cent of world mine output in 2015 and 12 per cent in 2011, but production at Kenticha is intermittent, the material moves as columbite-tantalite concentrate with about 80 per cent exported raw to China, and intra-African demand is low.

Raw concentrate · intermittent

Lithium and coal

The audit records exploration-stage mentions only, with unproven status, no HS reference and no continental demand assessment, and classifies the category as grey or insufficient. Nothing here should be claimed.

Grey · insufficient evidence
08 · Endowment
What Ethiopia actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Ethiopia. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Ethiopia's endowment rests first on energy. The 5,150 MW Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, built around thirteen Francis turbines with a design output of roughly 15,700 GWh a year, was inaugurated in September 2025 and declared fully complete in February 2026. National installed capacity now exceeds approximately 10 GW, around 90 per cent of it hydro, with Gibe III (1,870 MW) and Koysha (under construction, approximately 1,800 to 2,170 MW) adding to the cascade. Ethiopian Electric Power generated some 29,000 GWh in FY2024/25, exceeding a 25,000 GWh target, and roughly 7 per cent of that was exported through the Eastern Africa Power Pool to Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan, with trial sales to Tanzania. The Geological Survey of Ethiopia places geothermal potential at over 10,000 MW across 23 identified Rift Valley sites, against installed geothermal capacity of only the 7.3 MW Aluto-Langano pilot; Tulu Moye (150 MW) and Corbetti (up to a 500 MW target) are under development.

The second endowment is agro-ecological. Ethiopia is Africa's largest coffee producer and fifth in the world, with production forecast at 11.6 million 60-kg bags, roughly 694,000 tonnes, for MY2025/26, and a record 468,967 tonnes exported in FY2024/25 according to the Ethiopian Coffee and Tea Authority. It is Africa's second-largest cut-flower exporter after Kenya and among the top four or five globally, with more than 3,400 hectares under cultivation. It holds the largest livestock herd on the continent, roughly 59 million cattle plus tens of millions of sheep and goats, and is Africa's second-largest maize producer. On the mineral side, gold output rose from 3.9 tonnes in FY2023/24 to 38.87 tonnes in FY2024/25; tantalum has historically been globally significant, at roughly 6 per cent of world mine output in 2015 and 12 per cent in 2011; and the Danakil Depression holds world-class potash reserves reported by Circum Minerals at 454 Mt at 23.8 per cent KCl.

The third endowment is labour, together with a narrow but real industrial footing. Ethiopia has one of Africa's largest and lowest-cost labour forces across a population of roughly 120 to 130 million, and Hawassa demonstrated the rapid trainability of a rural female workforce for apparel. Cement is the clearest finished-goods position: Ethiopia is a net cement exporter with modern dry-process capacity at Dangote Mugher (2.5 Mta), Derba MIDROC, Messebo, National Cement and the new Lemi National Cement (approximately 5 Mta). Against this, manufacturing value added is only around 4 to 6 per cent of GDP and per-capita manufacturing value added is among the lowest globally. The economic complexity index sits at approximately minus 0.84, ranking around 101st on OEC 2023 trade data, and the Harvard Growth Lab records no overall improvement in absolute complexity over two decades, with revealed comparative advantage concentrated in coffee, cut flowers, sesame and oilseeds, dried pulses, khat, leather and, increasingly, electrical energy and gold.

The endowment in depth

Ethiopia's mineral endowment is real but almost entirely unbeneficiated. Gold has become the country's sharpest forex earner: output rose from 3.9 tons in FY2023/24 to 38.87 tons in FY2024/25, generating US$3.5 billion — 42% of total export revenue — with Tigray supplying 18.9 tons (51%) of the total. Supply is dominated by artisanal producers; the one significant hard-rock mine, Lega Dembi/Sakaro (Midroc), historically produced around 3,500 kg a year. Critically, Ethiopia has no LBMA-accredited refinery, so gold leaves as doré/raw rather than as a beneficiated product. Tantalum tells a similar story: historically a globally significant source — around 6% of world mine output in 2015 and 12% in 2011 (USGS) — mined at Kenticha in the Adola belt as columbite-tantalite concentrate, roughly 80% exported raw to China, with intermittent production. The Danakil/Dallol Depression holds world-class potash reserves (Circum Minerals: 454 Mt at 23.8% KCl, 2015; Allana/Dallol inferred: 105 Mt at 20.8% KCl), yet there is zero commercial production — a reserve, not a supply capability. Soda ash (Abijata-Shalla), opal, gypsum, pumice (~4% of world output, 2015) and Ogaden Basin natural gas (~4.6 Tcf, Calub/Hilala/Genale) round out an endowment that historically contributed under 1% of GDP.

Energy is the endowment that sets Ethiopia apart. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) carries 5,150 MW across 13 Francis turbines with a design output of ~15,700 GWh/yr, inaugurated in September 2025 and declared fully complete in February 2026; it lifts national installed capacity above ~10 GW, roughly 90% hydro, the largest hydropower fleet in Africa. Gibe III (1,870 MW) and Koysha (under construction, ~1,800–2,170 MW) extend the cascade. Ethiopian Electric Power generated ~29,000 GWh in FY2024/25, exceeding a 25,000 GWh target; about 7% was exported, earning US$118.1 million (Kenya US$86.3m, Djibouti US$30.9m, Sudan US$0.9m, plus trial sales to Tanzania) — some 20% of EEP revenue. Kenya buys at roughly US$0.066/kWh under a 25-year PPA signed in 2022 and imported a record 1,274.42 GWh in the fiscal year ending June 2025. Geothermal potential is assessed at over 10,000 MW across 23 Rift Valley sites, but only the 7.3 MW Aluto-Langano pilot is installed, with Tulu Moye (150 MW) and Corbetti (up to 500 MW target) under development. The paradox is stark: only ~55% of Ethiopians had electricity access in 2023, and the country remains a net fuel importer with no commercial oil/gas or operating refinery.

The agricultural base is deep and world-class in production. Coffee makes Ethiopia Africa's largest producer and 5th globally, forecast at 11.6 million 60-kg bags (~694,000 MT) for MY2025/26, with a record US$2.653 billion earned from 468,967 tonnes in FY2024/25 (ECTA) — a 147% value and 144% volume jump year-on-year; green bean has accounted for 99.7% of export volume over five years, with Saudi Arabia (15.9%) and Germany (15.2%) the top markets, and coffee representing ~30–43% of merchandise export earnings. Cut flowers make Ethiopia Africa's 2nd-largest exporter after Kenya and top-4/5 globally, on ~3,400+ ha; horticulture earned US$564.9 million in FY2024/25, of which cut flowers were ~US$285m, sold overwhelmingly into the EU via Dutch auctions. Oilseeds/sesame (~9%) and dried pulses (~9% of 2023 exports) are large but largely raw. The livestock herd is the largest in Africa — ~59 million cattle plus tens of millions of sheep and goats (CSA 2016/17) — though leather is underdeveloped and constrained by a wet-blue export ban. In cereals, teff, wheat and maize (Africa's 2nd-largest maize producer) underpin a wheat self-sufficiency claim said to save ~US$1 billion/yr in imports — an import-substitution, not export, story.

The manufacturing base is thin and the logistics binding. Manufacturing value added is only ~4–6% of GDP and per-capita MVA is among the lowest globally. Textiles and apparel cluster in industrial parks — Hawassa (the PVH/Calvin Klein anchor, which peaked at ~25,000–35,000 workers), Bole Lemi, Eastern Industry Zone, Adama, Kombolcha and Dire Dawa — but the January 2022 AGOA suspension was severe: ~18 foreign companies exited, ~11,500 jobs were lost and PVH withdrew (NBE, 2024), and the sector remains import-dependent for fabric. Cement is the bright spot in industry: Ethiopia is a net exporter with modern dry-process capacity across Dangote Mugher (2.5 Mta), Derba MIDROC, Messebo, National Cement and the new Lemi National Cement (~5 Mta), on a market of ~5.5 Mt (9M 2024). Human capital is one of Africa's largest, lowest-cost labour forces (~120–130 million); Hawassa demonstrated the rapid trainability of a rural female workforce, though skill depth in complex manufacturing is thin. The decisive constraint is that Ethiopia is landlocked: ~95% of trade routes through the Port of Djibouti via the electrified Addis Ababa–Djibouti Standard Gauge Railway (operational 2018; transit cut to ~10–12 hours), with logistics at 22–27% of final product cost and freight ~60% above neighbours. Sea-access alternatives — the January 2024 Somaliland MoU for ~19–20 km of coastal access and Berbera port use — remain politically contested, while Ethiopian Airlines and Bole airport form Africa's largest cargo hub, critical for perishable horticulture.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Ethiopia sits firmly in the low-complexity band. Its Economic Complexity Index is approximately −0.84, ranking ~101st (OEC, 2023 trade data); the Harvard Growth Lab placed it ~97th in the decade ending 2020, and World Population Review (citing Atlas/CID Harvard, 2021 data) reports an ECI of −0.88 with a Complexity Outlook Index of −0.73. The picture is of an economy that has improved modestly in rank over five years — around +17 positions on Atlas-lineage data — but remains in the bottom third and shows "no overall improvement" in absolute complexity over two decades (Growth Lab, "Pathways for Productive Diversification in Ethiopia," 2020). Revealed comparative advantage (RCA > 1) is concentrated in coffee (very high), cut flowers, sesame/oilseeds, dried pulses/leguminous vegetables, khat and leather, and — increasingly — in electrical energy and gold.

The diversification map is unforgiving. On the Growth Lab Atlas, nearby low-distance options sit in agriculture and textiles/apparel, which deliver little complexity gain, while the report recommends "longer jumps" into machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and electronics for higher complexity gain. A low Complexity Outlook Index signals few easy adjacencies in the product space, meaning diversification will not come from organic drift but from deliberate strategic bets. This is the analytical heart of Ethiopia's structural problem: its strongest current positions are in low-complexity raw commodities, and the pathway to higher complexity requires jumps its current capability set does not naturally support.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Ethiopia's single most defensible continental supply position is electrical energy (HS 2716), and it is the only category that satisfies every test of the analytical lens at once. The input base is the GERD's 5,150 MW, which lifts national installed capacity above ~10 GW — the largest hydropower fleet in Africa — generating ~29,000 GWh in FY2024/25. Its decisive advantage is that electricity is itself the finished, tradable product: there is no beneficiation gap to climb, the very weakness that undermines Ethiopia's gold, sesame and tantalum positions. Hydropower gives among the lowest marginal generation costs on the continent, and Ethiopia sells to Kenya at roughly US$0.066/kWh under a 25-year PPA. Uniquely, it already physically supplies four African states — Kenya (a record 1,274.42 GWh in the fiscal year ending June 2025), Djibouti, Sudan and, on a trial basis, Tanzania — through the Eastern Africa Power Pool, earning US$118.1 million in FY2024/25, about 20% of EEP revenue. No other Ethiopian product combines existing cross-border African supply, finished-product status, cost-competitiveness and scale.

The honest limits are equally clear. Deliverability is grid-bounded: Ethiopia can only supply countries reached by interconnectors, which makes this a regional rather than a pan-continental anchor. Hydrological risk is live — drought cut output in 2015/16 — and the ~45% of Ethiopians still without power mean that prioritising domestic demand could cap the exportable surplus. Transmission build-out costs are substantial, and counterparty payment and demand volatility are real, with Sudan and Kenya having undershot offtake targets in some years. The trump card is genuine and already in play, but it is a regional supply position bounded by wires, weather and the competing claims of an under-electrified home market.

Current reality

Ethiopia is a landlocked economy of roughly 120 to 130 million people with nominal GDP of US$149.74 billion in 2024 on World Bank data, GDP per capita of US$1,133.9 and growth of 7.6 per cent, though all dollar figures carry unusual uncertainty because the Birr was floated in mid-2024 under the IMF Extended Credit Facility. The audit is explicit that the only defensible continental supplier position in a finished product today is electrical energy: Ethiopia already exports power to four African states through the Eastern Africa Power Pool. The agricultural anchors of coffee, flowers and oilseeds are world-class in production but face weak intra-African import demand, and the manufacturing base remains thin and import-dependent. Reserves had recovered to only about US$4.7 billion, or 2.3 months of imports, in June 2025.

The binding constraint is deliverability. Roughly 95 per cent of trade routes run through the Port of Djibouti via the electrified Addis Ababa to Djibouti standard gauge railway, which has cut transit from about three days to ten to twelve hours; even so, logistics costs are around 22 to 27 per cent of final product cost and freight runs some 60 per cent above neighbouring countries. Alternative corridors remain unsettled: the January 2024 Ethiopia to Somaliland memorandum on roughly 19 to 20 km of coastal access and Berbera port use is politically contested, and the Berbera corridor is underutilised at some 20 to 30 per cent of capacity. Domestically, only around 55 per cent of Ethiopians had electricity access in 2023 and urban outages remain common, so a power-exporting nation still carries a substantial domestic deficit. Foreign direct investment into manufacturing fell during and after the Tigray conflict and the January 2022 AGOA suspension, which saw roughly 18 foreign companies exit with about 11,500 jobs lost and PVH withdrawing.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 13 candidate lines · will change

Ethiopia’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Ethiopia’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Ethiopia will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Ethiopia’s 13 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 2Strong Contender 5Emerging 4Aspirational 2
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Gold (doré)

38.87 t in 2024/25; US$3.5bn · Maturity: Raw doré; no refinery · Competitiveness: Low
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: President's Office; NBE · 2025

Cement

Net exporter; modern plants (Dangote 2.5 Mta, Lemi ~5 Mta) · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 1.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Dangote; industry · 2024

Electrical energy

Africa's largest hydro (GERD 5,150 MW); exports to 4 African states via EAPP · Maturity: Finished tradable product · Competitiveness: High regionally (grid-bounded)
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: EEP; Webuild/EEP · 2024/25

Geothermal power

>10,000 MW potential; 7.3 MW installed · Maturity: Potential not installed · Competitiveness: High regionally
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: Geological Survey of Ethiopia · 2020-24

Dried pulses

~9% of exports; large output · Maturity: Raw/cleaned · Competitiveness: Moderate-High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.83 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
071310Vegetables, leguminous; peas (pisum sativum), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071320Vegetables, leguminous; chickpeas (garbanzos), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071331Vegetables, leguminous; beans of the species vigna mungo (l.) hepper or vigna radiata (l.) wilczek, shelled, whether or
071332Vegetables, leguminous; small red (adzuki) beans (phaseolus or vigna angularis), shelled, whether or not skinned or spli
071333Vegetables, leguminous; kidney beans, including white pea beans (phaseolus vulgaris), shelled, whether or not skinned or
071334Vegetables, leguminous; bambara beans (Vigna subterranea or Voandzeia subterranea), shelled, whether or not skinned or s
071335Vegetables, leguminous; cow peas (Vigna unguiculata), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071339Vegetables, leguminous; n.e.c. in item no. 0713.3, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071340Vegetables, leguminous; lentils, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071350Vegetables, leguminous; broad beans (vicia faba var. major) and horse beans (vicia faba var. equina, vicia faba var. min
071360Vegetables, leguminous; pigeon peas (Cajanus cajan), shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
071390Vegetables, leguminous; n.e.c. in heading no. 0713, shelled, whether or not skinned or split, dried
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): OAIC (Algeria) · Food Security · control: monopoly. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Ethiopia imported USD 160.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 549.1 mAlgeria USD 344 mMorocco USD 180.8 mEthiopia your own imports USD 160.6 mSudan USD 108 mDjibouti USD 100.3 mKenya USD 74.4 mSouth Africa USD 38.1 m

Ethiopia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Comtrade · 2023

Coffee (green)

Africa's #1 producer, 5th global; US$2.653bn exports · Maturity: Raw green bean (99.7% of volume) · Competitiveness: Low intra-African
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 1.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
090111Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated
090112Coffee; decaffeinated, not roasted
090121Coffee; roasted, not decaffeinated
090122Coffee; roasted, decaffeinated
090190Coffee; husks and skins, coffee substitutes containing coffee in any proportion
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Algeria USD 322.4 mEgypt USD 217.4 mSudan USD 151.5 mMorocco USD 148 mSouth Africa USD 99.8 mLibya USD 77.7 mTunisia USD 34.5 mNamibia USD 9.7 m

Source: USDA FAS; ECTA; Comtrade · 2023–2025

Soda ash & industrial minerals

Abijata-Shalla; gypsum, pumice · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 946.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
283610Commercial ammonium carbonate and other ammonium carbonates
283620Carbonates; disodium carbonate
283630Carbonates; sodium hydrogen carbonate (sodium bicarbonate)
283640Carbonates; potassium carbonate
283650Carbonates; calcium carbonate
283660Carbonates; barium carbonate
283670Lead carbonates
283691Carbonates; lithium carbonate
283692Carbonates; strontium carbonate
283699Carbonates; n.e.c. in heading no. 2836 and other than lithium or strontium
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 29.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 203.3 mSouth Africa USD 201.3 mNigeria USD 107.6 mAlgeria USD 65.9 mMorocco USD 43.7 mTunisia USD 35.8 mTanzania USD 35.6 mEthiopia your own imports USD 29.1 m

Ethiopia is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: USGS · 2019

Potash

Danakil reserves 454 Mt @23.8% KCl · Maturity: None - zero production · Competitiveness: High
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 782.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310410Carnallite, sylvite and other crude natural potassium salts (excluding those in pellet or similar...
310420Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium chloride
310430Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium sulphate
310490Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, n.e.c. in heading no. 3104
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Agricultural parastatals · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Ethiopia imported USD 1.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 182.4 mMorocco USD 112.8 mEgypt USD 78.3 mCote dIvoire USD 58 mZimbabwe USD 57.3 mNigeria USD 38.1 mKenya USD 35.9 mMali USD 34.2 m

Source: USGS; Circum · 2015

Footwear

Leather base + low-cost labour · Maturity: Finished but sub-scale · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 531.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
640312Sports footwear; with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather, ski-boots,
640319Sports footwear; (other than ski-boots, snowboard boots or cross-country ski footwear), with outer soles of rubber, plas
640320Footwear; with outer soles of leather, uppers consisting of leather straps across instep and around the big toe
640330Footwear with leather uppers, made on a base or platform of wood, with neither an inner sole...
640340Footwear; with metal toe-cap, outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather, uppers of leather
640351Footwear; n.e.c. in heading no. 6403, with outer soles and uppers of leather, covering the ankle
640359Footwear; n.e.c. in heading no. 6403, (not covering the ankle), outer soles and uppers of leather
640391Footwear; n.e.c. in heading no. 6403, covering the ankle, outer soles of rubber, plastics or composition leather, uppers
640399Footwear; n.e.c. in heading no. 6403, (not covering the ankle), outer soles of rubber, plastics or composition leather,
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 2.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 225.5 mMorocco USD 34.6 mAlgeria USD 25.3 mLibya USD 25.1 mEgypt USD 17.5 mAngola USD 17.3 mKenya USD 16.2 mMozambique USD 14.8 m

Source: Capital · 2025

Sesame & oilseeds

Major global exporter; ~9% of exports · Maturity: Raw seed · Competitiveness: Moderate
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 337.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 115.5 mGhana USD 46 mMorocco USD 42.7 mTunisia USD 27 mAlgeria USD 25.5 mKenya USD 19.1 mSouth Africa USD 12.6 mMozambique USD 8 m

Source: Comtrade · 2023

Leather

Largest African herd; existing tanneries · Maturity: Intermediate (wet-blue) · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 211.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
410411Tanned or crust hides and skins; without hair on, bovine or equine, in the wet state (including wet-blue), full grains,
410419Tanned or crust hides and skins; bovine or equine, without hair on, in the wet state (including wet-blue), excluding ful
410429Bovine and equine leather, dehaired, tanned or pretanned only, whether or not split (excluding . . .
410439Bovine and equine leather, dehaired, prepared after tanning, incl. parchment-dressed (excluding . . .
410441Tanned or crust hides and skins; bovine or equine, without hair on, in the dry state (crust), full grains, unsplit; grai
410449Tanned or crust hides and skins; bovine or equine, without hair on, in the dry state (crust), (other than full grains, u
410711Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, including parchment-dressed leather, of bovine (including buffalo)
410712Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, including parchment-dressed leather, of bovine (including buffalo)
410719Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, including parchment-dressed, of bovine (including buffalo) or equin
410790Leather of antelopes, deer, elks, elephants and other animals, incl. sea animals, dehaired, . . .
410791Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, including parchment-dressed, of bovine (including buffalo) or equin
410792Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, including parchment-dressed, of bovine (including buffalo) or equin
410799Leather; further prepared after tanning or crusting, incl. parchment-dressed, of bovine (including buffalo) or equine animals, no hair, excluding leather of heading 41.14, and whole hides and skins, and sides, (full grains, unsplit and grain splits)
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Tunisia USD 117.7 mMorocco USD 49.8 mSouth Africa USD 25.5 mNigeria USD 4.7 mMadagascar USD 3.8 mMauritius USD 3.5 mZimbabwe USD 1.2 mNamibia USD 1 m

Source: FAO; Capital · 2025

Cut flowers

Africa's 2nd-largest exporter; ~US$285m · Maturity: Finished (cold-chain) · Competitiveness: Low intra-African
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 30.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
060310Fresh cut flowers and flower buds, for bouquets or for ornamental purposes
060311Flowers, cut; roses, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh
060312Flowers, cut; carnations, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh
060313Flowers, cut; orchids, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh
060314Flowers, cut; chrysanthemums, flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh
060315Flowers, cut; lilies (Lilium spp.), flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fres
060319Flowers, cut; flowers and buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, fresh, other than roses, carnatio
060390Flowers, cut; flowers and flower buds of a kind suitable for bouquets or ornamental purposes, dried, dyed, bleached, imp
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Libya USD 9.8 mEgypt USD 3.8 mSouth Africa USD 3.6 mMauritius USD 2 mMorocco USD 1.8 mAlgeria USD 1.6 mNamibia USD 1.4 mBotswana USD 1 m

Source: TRT/EHPEA · 2025

Tantalum concentrate

Historically 6-12% of world output · Maturity: Raw concentrate · Competitiveness: Low
EMERGING
USD 9.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261510Zirconium ores and concentrates
261590Niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Ethiopia imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 2.3 mZambia USD 1.8 mSouth Africa USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.4 mAlgeria USD 1.1 mTanzania USD 1 mZimbabwe USD 0.3 mMorocco USD 0.2 m

Source: USGS · 2011/2015

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Ethiopia is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Ethiopia buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Ethiopia is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 17.04 bn

Ethiopia’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

13

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierEthiopia imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Dried pulsesSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 160.6 mUSD 1.83 bn
Soda ash & industrial mineralsEMERGINGUSD 29.1 mUSD 946.5 m
FootwearEMERGINGUSD 2.5 mUSD 531.5 m
CementSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 1.7 mUSD 2.9 bn
PotashASPIRATIONALUSD 1.3 mUSD 782.2 m
Sesame & oilseedsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.2 mUSD 337.6 m
Coffee (green)CONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0.1 mUSD 1.13 bn
Gold (doré)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Electrical energyCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 2.24 bn
Geothermal powerASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 2.24 bn
LeatherEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 211.5 m
Cut flowersSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 30.5 m
Tantalum concentrateEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 9.4 m

Left-hand column: what Ethiopia itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Ethiopia’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 13 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Ethiopia’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Ethiopia. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Ethiopia’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Ethiopia’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 2.13 bn
02UgandaUSD 2.04 bn
03EgyptUSD 1.32 bn
04MoroccoUSD 1.12 bn
05AlgeriaUSD 829.2 m
06TunisiaUSD 706 m
07Burkina FasoUSD 597.3 m
08MozambiqueUSD 442.8 m
09ZimbabweUSD 419 m
10GhanaUSD 366.4 m
11LibyaUSD 337.9 m
12MaliUSD 336.9 m
13Cote dIvoireUSD 331 m
14BotswanaUSD 318.4 m
15SudanUSD 259.5 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Ethiopia. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Ethiopia would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Ethiopia to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Reliable cross-border transmission

Electricity becomes a durable continental anchor only with completed cross-border transmission — the Ethiopia–Kenya–EAPP build-out and the Hurso–Aysha 400 kV line among them — because the position is grid-bounded and can only reach countries physically interconnected.

02

Firm multi-year PPAs with creditworthy buyers

Power exports need firm, multi-year power-purchase agreements with creditworthy counterparties to de-risk revenue, given that some buyers (Sudan, Kenya) have undershot offtake targets in past years.

03

Drought-resilient generation mix

A generation mix that firms hydro with geothermal is required to withstand hydrological risk, alongside resolution of the tension between domestic access and exportable surplus.

04

Competitive export logistics for cement

Cement can serve regional markets competitively only with cheaper export logistics — corridor and rail tariffs — plus clinker and coal supply security.

05

Downstream processing and certification

Agro-processing (coffee roasting, oilseed crushing, leather-to-footwear) and mineral beneficiation demand investment in processing capacity, quality certification (LWG for leather, EUDR compliance for coffee) and vertical integration, plus actual mine development at Danakil and a domestic gold refinery.

06

Macro stabilisation, security and sea-access certainty

Cross-cutting delivery depends on macro stabilisation after the 2024 flotation, restored FDI confidence, security normalisation and certainty over sea access.

The binding constraints
·

Landlocked logistics Roughly 95% dependence on the Port of Djibouti, freight ~60% above neighbours and logistics at 22–27% of final product cost make deliverability the binding constraint; sea-access diversification via Somaliland/Berbera is politically fraught.

·

The power reliability paradox Ethiopia exports power while ~45% of its population lacks access and urban outages persist; domestic claims on supply can cap the exportable surplus.

·

Capital and forex fragility Post-flotation macro fragility, thin reserves at ~2.3 months of imports, and FDI into manufacturing depressed since the Tigray conflict constrain the financing of new capacity.

·

Shallow skills base The pool for complex manufacturing is shallow, and the apparel and leather sectors lost trained workers after the AGOA suspension.

·

Governance and security The Tigray war legacy plus Amhara (Fano) and Oromia insecurity bear directly on production — gold supply chains run through contested Tigray, and cement plants have faced violence.

·

The beneficiation gap and single-buyer dependence Gold (no refinery), sesame (no crushing), tantalum (raw concentrate) and potash (no production) are raw endowments without processing, while apparel relies on imported fabric and electricity exports concentrate on a few state buyers.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Ethiopia’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Deliverability is grid-bounded, not pan-continental. Ethiopia can only supply countries reached by interconnectors, which makes electricity a regional rather than continental anchor. Durability would require completion of cross-border transmission such as the Ethiopia to Kenya EAPP build-out and the Hurso to Aysha 400 kV line.

05

The power reliability paradox is unresolved. Around 45 per cent of Ethiopians still lack electricity access and urban outages persist, so domestic claims on supply could cap the exportable surplus. The audit lists resolution of the domestic-access-versus-export tension as a precondition for a durable anchor.

06

Hydrological and counterparty risk sit on the export book. Drought cuts output, as in 2015/16, and the audit flags counterparty payment and demand volatility, noting that Sudan and Kenya undershot targets in some years. Firm multi-year power purchase agreements with creditworthy buyers and a drought-resilient generation mix, with geothermal firming hydro, are named as what would have to be true.

07

Landlocked logistics tax every physical export. Roughly 95 per cent dependence on Djibouti, freight some 60 per cent above neighbours and logistics at 22 to 27 per cent of product cost weigh heavily, and sea-access diversification through Somaliland and Berbera is politically fraught. For cement specifically, cheaper export logistics through corridor and rail tariffs are a stated precondition.

08

Macro fragility follows the flotation. Post-flotation macro conditions remain fragile with reserves thin at around 2.3 months of imports, and foreign direct investment into manufacturing has been depressed since the conflict. The audit advises treating single-year FY2024/25 figures, particularly the US$8.3 billion export total and gold's tenfold jump, as reform-driven and partly one-off.

09

Security exposure runs through the productive base. The Tigray war legacy plus Amhara and Oromia insecurity are live risks; gold supply chains run through contested Tigray and cement plants have faced violence. Security normalisation is listed among the cross-cutting conditions.

10

Feedstock and single-buyer dependence narrow the base. Apparel relies on imported fabric with limited vertical integration, electricity exports are concentrated on a few state buyers, and gold is heavily reliant on artisanal and Tigray supply. Skills for complex manufacturing are shallow, and the apparel and leather sectors lost trained workers after the AGOA suspension.

11

The beneficiation gap is systemic, not incidental. Gold has no refinery, sesame no crushing, tantalum moves as raw concentrate and potash has no production at all. Climbing from raw to finished would require processing investment, quality certification such as LWG for leather and EUDR compliance for coffee, and vertical integration.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Ethiopia's Draft 1 bundle rests on one proven finished-product position and two production anchors that must still be matched to buyers. Electrical energy is the anchor because it is already flowing across borders to four African states, is cost-competitive on hydro, and requires no processing step. Cement is the strongest supporting card, a genuine finished-product manufacturing base already exporting into continental construction demand, constrained by landlocked logistics and a low value-to-weight ratio that favours inland regional markets. Coffee, cut flowers, sesame and pulses are world-class in production but sit at the raw end of the chain and face weak intra-African import demand. What must be proven is therefore threefold: that cross-border transmission and firm multi-year power purchase agreements with creditworthy buyers can convert Ethiopia's generation surplus into dependable regional supply without starving a domestic market where roughly 45 per cent still lack access; that corridor and rail tariffs, and eventually sea-access certainty, can make physical goods deliverable at competitive cost from a landlocked base; and that processing capacity and certification can begin to close a beneficiation gap that currently leaves gold, sesame, tantalum and potash as endowments rather than supply. Against this stands the macro caveat the audit itself insists on: FY2024/25 figures are reform-driven and partly one-off, and multi-year reads should be preferred.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Ethiopia is shown 13 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Ethiopia to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2