Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
AlgeriaBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Algeria — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
17
Draft 1 candidate lines for Algeria
The Minister’s brief · for Abdelkrim Bouzred · Algeria
Minister Bouzred, Algeria alone converts the continent's largest proven gas reserves — roughly 4.5 trillion cubic metres — into ammonia and urea at Arzew and Annaba, three complexes that have exported the majority of their output for over a decade; fertilisers already stand at 78.6 per cent of your non-hydrocarbon exports, worth USD 3.97 billion in a single year. Africa imports roughly 80 per cent of its fertiliser — a continent that farms on barely 22 kilograms to the hectare cannot yet make enough for itself. That deficit is Algeria's claim. The Right of Supply gives you a twenty-five-year first right to meet it — disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract, only a standing invitation to be beaten on price. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional; the figures are ours, the correction is yours. Tell us where Algiers would sharpen it.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Algeria
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Abdelkrim Bouzred, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Algeria · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Bouzred,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Algeria — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Algeria is in this room

Algeria's strongest endowment for continental supply is nitrogen fertiliser made from gas. The country holds the largest proven gas reserves on the continent, at roughly 4.5 trillion cubic metres, and converts that feedstock into ammonia and urea at three large complexes at Arzew and Annaba, which together have exported the majority of their output for more than a decade; fertilisers now account for 78.6 per cent of Algeria's non-hydrocarbon exports. This capability exists today, unlike the iron ore and phosphate beneficiation projects still in pre-operational ramp-up. The honest constraint is reach rather than production: only about 5.3 to 5.5 per cent of Algeria's exports currently go to African markets, logistics performance ranked 117 out of 160 on the 2018 LPI with customs the weakest component, and the Morocco land border remains closed. What Algeria requires is not new capacity but demand aggregation, maritime corridor development and customs facilitation.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Algeria, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Algeria

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
17draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Algeria’s draft bundle. 17 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Nitrogen fertilizers (urea), Flat & long steel, Cement & clinker. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 4 continental anchor · 6 strong contender · 5 emerging · 2 aspirational.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Algeria is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 17 candidate lines proposed for Algeria below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Algeria. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Algeria will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Algeria will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
17 lines
Algeria’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Algeria at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Algeria’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Algeria’s own capability audit.

Natural gas and LNG as a supply category

The audit tiers gas as a STRONG CONTENDER (raw) and states plainly that hydrocarbon dependence crowds out complexity, so the supply opportunity lies in gas-derived and energy-intensive downstream products, not raw commodities. Algeria's value to the matrix is as a cost-advantaged supplier of energy-intensive semi-finished and finished goods.

Raw base · industrial screen

Phosphate rock

Algeria holds the world's fourth-ranked phosphate reserves at about 2.2 billion tonnes, yet output has averaged only around 1.24 million tonnes a year and ranked roughly 19th globally in 2018. The reserve base and the finished capability are inverted; the Bled El Hadba integrated complex remains pre-operational.

Capability inversion

Iron ore concentrate from Gara Djebilet

The audit tiers this as EMERGING and states that Gara Djebilet output figures are project targets, not current production, and must not be treated as installed capacity. The ore carries phosphorus near 0.8 per cent requiring dephosphorisation technology that is not yet proven at commissioning, with processing targeted for 2026 and capacity scaling only toward 2032.

Pre-operational · not installed capacity

Zinc and lead metal from Oued Amizour

The deposit is not yet in production and the audit tiers it ASPIRATIONAL, with the 129,300 tonnes a year of zinc and 26,000 tonnes a year of lead drawn from a 2018 feasibility projection rather than any operating plant.

Aspirational · pre-production

Solar PV glass and modules

The audit records this as a plan resting on a manufacturing proposal and cheap power, with beneficiation stage marked as planned and the tier set to ASPIRATIONAL. No installed manufacturing capacity is evidenced.

Aspirational · planned only

Cereals and staple food supply

Algeria is structurally deficit in cereals, producing about 3 million tonnes of wheat in 2024/25 and ranking among the world's largest wheat importers. The audit states directly that as a net importer it is not a supply candidate, and that water stress makes agriculture an unscalable food-supply base.

Net importer · scale-matching
08 · Endowment
What Algeria actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Algeria. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Algeria's defining endowment is gas. The audit records proven natural gas reserves of roughly 4.5 trillion cubic metres (about 159 Tcf, EIA), the ninth- to tenth-largest proven reserves in the world and the largest on the continent, with Algeria the largest gas producer in Africa. Marketed production ran at about 104 billion cubic metres in 2024, with exports of some 49 billion cubic metres, split approximately 35 billion by pipeline and 14 billion as LNG through the two Sonatrach-owned terminals at Arzew and Skikda. Proven crude reserves stand at about 12.2 billion barrels, with total liquid fuels output near 1.4 million barrels per day in 2023. Installed generation capacity is about 22.6 GW, roughly 97 per cent fossil-fuelled, with surplus power exported to Tunisia at around 500 MW and electricity priced at approximately USD 0.03 per kWh. Shale gas resources are the third-largest technically recoverable globally at some 707 Tcf, and remain undeveloped.

The mineral base is substantial but largely unconverted. Gara Djebilet in Tindouf holds around 3.5 billion tonnes of iron ore, of which roughly 1.7 billion tonnes are exploitable, at a grade of about 57 to 58 per cent iron but with high phosphorus near 0.8 per cent requiring dephosphorisation. The legacy mines at Ouenza (80.3 Mt at 59.5 per cent Fe) and Boukhadra (47.1 Mt at 48 per cent Fe) remain on the books. Phosphate rock reserves of about 2.2 billion tonnes rank fourth in the world after Morocco and Western Sahara and China, though output has averaged only around 1.24 million tonnes a year. Oued Amizour–Tala Hamza in Béjaïa carries a resource of 68.6 million tonnes at 4.6 per cent zinc and 1.1 per cent lead. In agriculture, date production of about 1.32 million tonnes in 2023 makes Algeria the world's third-largest producer after Egypt and Saudi Arabia, including some 800,000 tonnes of Deglet Nour.

Where the endowment has already been converted into industry, the capability is real and export-proven. Three large nitrogen complexes operate on gas feedstock: Sorfert at Arzew (1.6 Mt/yr ammonia, 1.26 Mt/yr urea), the Algerian-Omani AOA plant at Arzew (about 1.46 Mt/yr ammonia, running 4,000 tonnes a day of ammonia and 7,000 tonnes a day of urea), and Fertial at Arzew and Annaba producing ammonia, NPK and ammonium nitrate. National cement capacity is about 42 million tonnes a year against domestic demand near 30 million tonnes, leaving an exportable surplus of some 12 million tonnes; cement and clinker exports reached USD 747 million in 2023, up from USD 60 million in 2019. Tosyali Algérie at Bethioua, Oran runs an integrated gas-based DRI-EAF plant incorporating the world's largest twin DRI unit at 5 million tonnes, with current capacity around 6 million tonnes a year and a stated target of roughly 10 million tonnes of flat and long products.

The endowment in depth

Algeria's mineral and metal endowment is defined by scale in a handful of deposits with limited historic beneficiation. The Gara Djebilet field in Tindouf is one of the world's largest single iron ore deposits, holding roughly 3.5 Gt in total and about 1.7 Gt exploitable, at a grade of roughly 57-58% Fe but carrying high phosphorus (~0.8%) that requires dephosphorisation; first ore was extracted across the 2022-25 ramp, a processing and pre-processing unit was targeted for Q1-April 2026, and Sonarem's CEO Belkacem Soltani has guided capacity scaling to about 10 Mt/yr by 2032. The legacy iron mines at Ouenza (80.3 Mt at 59.5% Fe) and Boukhadra (47.1 Mt at 48% Fe) supplement this. On phosphate, reserves of about 2.2 Gt rank fourth in the world after Morocco/Western Sahara and China, though output has averaged only about 1.24 Mt/yr (roughly 19th globally in 2018); the Bled El Hadba integrated project in Tebessa, a state and Chinese joint venture of about USD 7bn, targets roughly 10 Mt/yr of phosphate and about 6 Mt of fertiliser. Zinc and lead sit at Oued Amizour-Tala Hamza in Bejaia, a resource of about 68.6 Mt at 4.6% Zn and 1.1% Pb, where Terramin's 2018 feasibility projected roughly 129,300 t/yr of zinc and 26,000 t/yr of lead over 21 years, and it is not yet in production. Barite, bentonite, diatomite, marble, gypsum (17th in the world), salt and LNG-linked helium round out the base. Beneficiation has historically been minimal, and most processing capacity remains pre-operational into 2026 and beyond.

Energy is the country's defining endowment. Proven natural gas reserves stand at about 4.5 Tcm (~159 Tcf, EIA), the largest on the continent, with marketed production of roughly 104 Bcm in 2024 and a dry gas record of 3.7 Tcf in 2023, making Algeria Africa's largest gas producer. Exports of about 49 Bcm in 2024 split into roughly 35 Bcm by pipeline and about 14 Bcm as LNG through the Sonatrach-owned Arzew and Skikda terminals; Algeria was the EU's fourth-largest gas supplier in 2024 at about 15% of imports, and its second-largest pipeline supplier at 18% in 2025 and 20% in Q1 2026. Proven crude reserves are about 12.2 bn bbl (early 2023) with total liquid fuels near 1.4 mn b/d, producing the low-sulphur Sahara Blend (43.2 degrees API); Sonatrach owns all refineries. Technically recoverable shale gas is the world's third-largest at about 707 Tcf but remains undeveloped. Installed power generation capacity is about 22.6 GW (2023; 24-27 GW on ministry figures), roughly 97% fossil-fuelled, with Algeria a surplus exporter to Tunisia of about 500 MW; renewables stood at only about 600 MW at end-2023 against a 22 GW renewable target for 2030, with 3 GW of solar tenders contracted in 2024.

In agriculture Algeria is the world's third-largest date producer at about 1.32 Mt (2023), behind Egypt and Saudi Arabia, of which roughly 800,000 t is the premium Deglet Nour variety; dates are the premier agricultural export at about USD 180m in 2024, though processing has historically been limited and shipments are mostly natural or fresh. Cereals are structurally in deficit, with wheat production of about 3 Mt in 2024/25 leaving Algeria among the world's largest wheat importers and a net importer rather than a supply candidate; refined sugar drove a 2023 food-export surge (USD 428m of food exports, up 59%). Fisheries and forestry are modest and not of continental scale. The existing industrial base is a low-middle performer (UNIDO CIP rank about 98th in 2020) but carries genuine heavy-industry weight. In steel, Tosyali Algerie at Bethioua near Oran runs an integrated DRI-EAF complex built around the world's largest twin DRI (5 Mt); the company states capacity of around 10 million tonnes of flat and long products, with current capacity near 6 Mt/yr, a target of 8 Mt by 2026 and 9.5 Mt once a USD 2.5bn expansion completes; in 2022 it produced 3 Mt and exported about 1.3 Mt worth over USD 800m, and it is Algeria's biggest private-sector employer outside hydrocarbons. State and JV complexes at El Hadjar/Annaba (SIDER) and Bellara/Jijel (AQS, a Qatari-Algerian JV) add further capacity. In fertilisers, Sorfert at Arzew (OCI/Sonatrach) runs 1.6 Mt/yr of ammonia and 1.26 Mt/yr of urea, the Algerian-Omani AOA plant adds about 1.46 Mt/yr of ammonia (4,000 t/d ammonia, 7,000 t/d urea), and Fertial at Arzew and Annaba makes ammonia, NPK and ammonium nitrate, with roughly 80% of output historically shipped to Western Europe and North America. Cement capacity of about 42 Mt/yr against roughly 30 Mt of demand leaves an exportable surplus near 12 Mt/yr; cement and clinker exports reached USD 747m in 2023, making Algeria the third-largest construction-materials exporter into Africa. Sonatrach/AEC petrochemical complexes at Arzew and Skikda and an early-stage Fiat assembly plant at Tafraoui/Oran (opened December 2023) complete the picture.

Human capital is broad but under-utilised. The labour force peaked at about 13.43 million in 2023, roughly 60% in services, with unemployment near 12.3%, youth unemployment about 31% and low female participation (17-20%); there are some 1.1-1.34 million tertiary students, only about 9.1% of them in STEM, and adult mean years of schooling of about 7.6 against 68% low educational attainment (2015). Engineering graduates are the most employable cohort (engineer unemployment about 14.8%), and the country offers low labour costs and heavily subsidised electricity at roughly USD 0.03/kWh. On logistics, the Mediterranean ports of Algiers, Oran, Annaba, Bejaia, Skikda and the expanding deepwater Djen Djen give proximity to Europe, but intra-African land links are weak; a new 950 km Bechar-Tindouf-Gara Djebilet mining railway and Annaba-Tebessa phosphate-line upgrades serve the beneficiation projects, and the 4,128 km Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (~30 Bcm/yr, ~USD 13bn) had its Algerian section launched in June 2026 with about 60% of the route laid by February 2026. The binding weakness is trade logistics: the World Bank LPI scored Algeria 2.45 for a rank of 117/160 in 2018, with customs the weakest component and the closed Morocco land border limiting regional integration.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Algeria is a textbook resource-rich, low-complexity economy. Its Economic Complexity Index sits at about -0.63 (2021), placing it in the global bottom tier at roughly 99th of ranked economies in 2023, though this has recovered modestly from about 115th in 2020 on the back of fertiliser and steel export growth. Hydrocarbon dependence, with the top five products accounting for about 95% of exports, suppresses measured complexity. Consistent with Harvard Growth Lab logic that natural-resource exporters are systematically richer than their complexity predicts, Algeria combines relatively high income per capita with a thin, undiversified export basket.

Revealed comparative advantage outside hydrocarbons is confined to nitrogen fertilisers and ammonia (78.6% of non-hydrocarbon exports, USD 3.97bn in 2023, Bank of Algeria), with cement, steel/iron products and dates emerging. The nearest adjacencies in the product space are all feedstock- and energy-intensive rather than knowhow-intensive: gas-to-chemicals (ammonia to urea to nitrates to NPK), iron ore to DRI to steel, and phosphate to phosphoric acid to DAP. The strategic implication for the AU matrix is that Algeria's continental supply value lies in energy- and feedstock-derived semi-finished and finished goods, where it holds genuine cost advantage, not in complex manufactures.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Nitrogen fertilisers, urea and ammonia, are Algeria's strongest defensible continental supply position, and the logic is structural and proven rather than aspirational. Algeria converts the continent's largest and cheapest gas reserves into ammonia and urea at three large complexes: Sorfert at Arzew (1.6 Mt/yr ammonia, 1.26 Mt/yr urea), the Algerian-Omani AOA plant (4,000 t/d ammonia, 7,000 t/d urea), and Fertial at Arzew and Annaba. These plants have exported the majority of their output for over a decade, and fertilisers already constitute 78.6% of Algeria's non-hydrocarbon exports (USD 3.97bn in 2023, Bank of Algeria). The continental demand case is compelling: Sub-Saharan Africa averaged just 22.3 kg/ha of fertiliser in 2018 against a global average of 139 kg/ha, the region imports roughly 80% of its fertiliser, and AfCFTA explicitly aims to reduce dependence on extra-continental suppliers.

The position is defensible because it rests on a feedstock cost advantage (subsidised, indexed gas), installed and proven export logistics through Arzew, and a state policy that prioritises fertiliser self-sufficiency and export. Unlike iron ore or phosphate beneficiation, both still in pre-2026 ramp-up, the fertiliser industry can supply multiple African markets at scale today. The honest limits are two: current export flows are oriented to Europe and North America and would need commercial redirection, and intra-African distribution is constrained by the closed Morocco border and thin logistics; the plants have also faced domestic gas curtailments historically, so guaranteed feedstock is a precondition.

Current reality

Algeria recorded GDP of USD 269.32 billion in 2024 with real growth of 3.6 per cent, decelerating from 4.1 per cent in 2023, GDP per capita of USD 5,753, and a population of 47.85 million. The export basket is narrow. Hydrocarbons account for roughly 90 to 91 per cent of exports; petroleum gas alone is 43.2 per cent, crude oil 29.6 per cent and refined petroleum 18.6 per cent, with the top five products making up 94.6 per cent of the total. Economic complexity sits in the global bottom tier, with an ECI score of about minus 0.63 (2021) and a rank near 99th in 2023, recovered from around 115th in 2020; UNIDO placed Algeria at approximately 98th on its Competitive Industrial Performance index. Non-hydrocarbon exports came to about USD 5.05 billion in 2023, of which nitrogen fertilisers and ammonia were 78.6 per cent, followed by food at 8.5 per cent.

The honest constraint is reach, not production. Only about 5.3 to 5.5 per cent of Algeria's exports go to African markets, and Algeria accounts for roughly 2.2 per cent of total intra-African trade. Europe takes around 58 per cent of exports, and fertiliser output has historically been directed some 80 per cent to Western Europe and North America. Logistics performance is weak, with an LPI score of 2.45 and a rank of 117 out of 160 in 2018, customs the weakest sub-component, and the Morocco land border closed. Fiscally, the IMF in 2025 rated sovereign stress risk as high, with a projected deficit of about 11.5 per cent of GDP and the fiscal stabilisation fund depleted, which limits the state's capacity to co-invest.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 17 candidate lines · will change

Algeria’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Algeria’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Algeria will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Algeria’s 17 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 4Strong Contender 6Emerging 5Aspirational 2
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum

Sonatrach refineries · Maturity: Semi-finished · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Algeria imported USD 146 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: EIA · 2023

Natural gas/LNG

Largest African reserves/producer · Maturity: Raw/semi · Competitiveness: Very high
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas
271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane
271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes
271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene
271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711
271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas
271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Algeria imported USD 75.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: EIA; OPEC · 2024

Refined sugar

Re-export processing; 2023 surge · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Medium
EMERGING
USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)
170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri
170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add
170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 931.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria your own imports USD 931.8 mSudan USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Bank of Algeria · 2023

Nitrogen fertilizers (urea)

Cheap gas feedstock; 3 export-proven plants · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very high
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 3.8 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310210Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, urea, whether or not in aqueous solution
310221Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium sulphate
310229Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other than ammonium sulphate
310230Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, ammonium nitrate, whether or not in aqueous solution
310240Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate or other inorganic non-fertilizing substances,
310250Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, sodium nitrate
310260Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, double salts and mixtures of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate
310270Calcium cyanamide (excluding that in pellet or similar forms, or in packages with a gross weight...
310280Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution
310290Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; nitrogenous, other kinds including mixtures not specified in the foregoing subheadings
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): ETBC (Ethiopia), SFFRFM (Malawi) · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Algeria imported USD 10.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 495.4 mSouth Africa USD 470.4 mZambia USD 456 mZimbabwe USD 239.8 mTanzania USD 235.6 mMorocco USD 200.8 mMalawi USD 194 mNigeria USD 143.3 m

Source: USGS; Bank of Algeria · 2019/2023

Flat & long steel

Tosyali integrated DRI-EAF scaling to ~10 Mt/yr · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very high
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 3.7 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
720810Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, with patterns in relief
720825Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, pickle
720826Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, pickle
720827Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, pickle
720836Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, of a t
720837Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, of a t
720838Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, of a t
720839Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils, without patterns in relief, flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, of a t
720840Iron or non-alloy steel; (not in coils), flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, with patterns in relief
720851Iron or non-alloy steel; (not in coils), flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, without patterns in relief,
720852Iron or non-alloy steel; (not in coils), flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, without patterns in relief,
720853Iron or non-alloy steel; (not in coils), flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, without patterns in relief,
720854Iron or non-alloy steel; (not in coils), flat-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, hot-rolled, without patterns in relief, of a thickness of less than 3mm
720890Iron or non-alloy steel; flat-rolled, hot-rolled, of a width 600mm or more, n.e.c. in heading no. 7208
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Algeria imported USD 350.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 886 mKenya USD 451.1 mTanzania USD 362 mAlgeria your own imports USD 350.2 mSouth Africa USD 274.2 mTunisia USD 262.2 mUganda USD 182.2 mEthiopia USD 163.9 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Tosyali; Midrex; GMK · 2024

Ammonium nitrate/NPK

Fertial integrated nitrogen · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 3.2 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310510Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight not exceeding 10kg
310520Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the three fertilizing elements nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium
310530Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate)
310540Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; ammonium dihydrogenorthophosphate (monoammonium phosphate) and mixtures thereof with d
310551Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing nitrates and phosphates
310559Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements nitrogen and phosphorus, other than nitrates a
310560Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; containing the two fertilizing elements phosphorus and potassium
310590Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; n.e.c. in heading no. 3105
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Ministry of Agriculture · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Algeria imported USD 134.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ethiopia USD 697.2 mKenya USD 274.1 mTanzania USD 217.3 mZambia USD 217 mEgypt USD 172.4 mMalawi USD 170.1 mSouth Africa USD 161.8 mCote dIvoire USD 148.5 m

Source: USGS; ICIS · 2019

Cement & clinker

42 Mt capacity, ~12 Mt surplus, coastal ports · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Very high
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 0.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Global Cement; AlgeriaInvest · 2023/2025

Iron ore concentrate

Gara Djebilet ~3.5 Gt, ramp 2026 · Maturity: Raw→beneficiated (planned) · Competitiveness: Medium
EMERGING
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 822.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria your own imports USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Sonarem; SteelOrbis · 2025

Electricity (interconnect)

Surplus capacity; regional links · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Medium-regional
EMERGING
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: EIA; ESI-Africa · 2023

Ammonia

~3.5 Mt/yr capacity on gas feedstock · Maturity: Semi-finished · Competitiveness: High
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 1.07 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
281410Ammonia; anhydrous
281420Ammonia; in aqueous solution
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 872.5 mTunisia USD 87.3 mSouth Africa USD 49.1 mMadagascar USD 25.1 mEgypt USD 19.5 mNamibia USD 4.5 mSenegal USD 4.2 mCameroon USD 1.6 m

Source: USGS; OCI · 2019/2020

Dates (Deglet Nour)

World #3 producer · Maturity: Raw/lightly processed · Competitiveness: Medium
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 473.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080410Fruit, edible; dates, fresh or dried
080420Fruit, edible; figs, fresh or dried
080430Fruit, edible; pineapples, fresh or dried
080440Fruit, edible; avocados, fresh or dried
080450Fruit, edible; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 1.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 267.6 mEgypt USD 35.2 mSomalia USD 30.2 mNigeria USD 28.1 mGhana USD 19.3 mSouth Africa USD 11.9 mMauritania USD 9.5 mDjibouti USD 8 m

Source: FAO · 2023

Zinc/lead metal

Oued Amizour pre-op · Maturity: Raw→smelted (planned) · Competitiveness: Medium
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 442.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
790111Zinc; unwrought, (not alloyed), containing by weight 99.99% or more of zinc
790112Zinc; unwrought, (not alloyed), containing by weight less than 99.99% of zinc
790120Zinc; unwrought, alloys
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 58 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 138.3 mEgypt USD 94.1 mAlgeria your own imports USD 58 mMorocco USD 34 mTunisia USD 22.8 mKenya USD 21.9 mNigeria USD 19.9 mEthiopia USD 19 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: Terramin; NS Energy · 2018

Solar PV glass

MFG plan; cheap power · Maturity: Planned · Competitiveness: Medium-high
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 332.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
700510Glass; float glass and surface ground or polished glass, in sheets, non-wired, having an absorbent reflecting or non-ref
700521Glass; float glass and surface ground or polished glass, in sheets, non-wired, coloured throughout the mass (body tinted
700529Glass; float glass and surface ground or polished glass, in sheets, non-wired, (other than coloured throughout the mass
700530Glass; float glass and surface ground or polished glass, in sheets, wired glass, whether or not having an absorbent or r
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Algeria imported USD 21.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 71.7 mEgypt USD 23.3 mTanzania USD 21.5 mAlgeria your own imports USD 21.5 mEthiopia USD 20.3 mKenya USD 19.8 mTunisia USD 18.3 mGhana USD 17 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: pv-magazine · 2024

Helium

LNG-linked; ~13% world output historically · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Low volume/high value
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 94.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
280410Hydrogen
280421Gases, rare; argon
280429Gases, rare; other than argon
280430Nitrogen
280440Oxygen
280450Boron; tellurium
280461Silicon; containing by weight not less than 99.99% of silicon
280469Silicon; containing by weight less than 99.99% of silicon
280470Phosphorus
280480Arsenic
280490Selenium
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 1.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 28.8 mNigeria USD 11.1 mMorocco USD 6.4 mEgypt USD 5.6 mAngola USD 5.3 mMozambique USD 3.8 mTunisia USD 3 mKenya USD 3 m

Source: USGS · 2019

Phosphoric acid/DAP

Bled El Hadba project (pre-op) · Maturity: Planned · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 81.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
280910Diphosphorus pentoxide
280920Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acids
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 11.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
DR Congo USD 15.1 mEgypt USD 13.3 mAlgeria your own imports USD 11.3 mSouth Africa USD 7.9 mEswatini USD 7.9 mMorocco USD 5.2 mCote dIvoire USD 3.8 mNigeria USD 2.5 m

Algeria is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: OBG; Or Noir · 2024

DRI/sponge iron

World's largest twin DRI; gas advantage · Maturity: Semi-finished · Competitiveness: Medium-high
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 74 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
720310Ferrous products; obtained by direct reduction of iron ore, in lumps, pellets or similar forms
720390Ferrous products; spongy ferrous products and iron having a minimum purity by weight of 99.94%, in lumps, pellets or sim
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 39.5 mKenya USD 13 mMorocco USD 12.2 mZambia USD 1.7 mSudan USD 1.6 mMauritius USD 1.5 mMadagascar USD 1.3 mCongo USD 1 m

Source: Midrex; GEM · 2024

Phosphate rock

4th world reserves; low output · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Medium
EMERGING
USD 11.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
251010Natural calcium phosphates, natural aluminium calcium phosphates and phosphatic chalk; unground
251020Natural calcium phosphates, natural aluminium calcium phosphates and phosphatic chalk; ground
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Algeria imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Senegal USD 4.7 mSouth Africa USD 2.9 mTunisia USD 1.5 mCote dIvoire USD 1.4 mGhana USD 0.5 mUganda USD 0.3 mNigeria USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.2 m

Source: USGS · 2019

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Algeria is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Algeria buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Algeria is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 41.71 bn

Algeria’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

17

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierAlgeria imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined sugarEMERGINGUSD 931.8 mUSD 8.84 bn
Iron ore concentrateEMERGINGUSD 822.5 mUSD 2.85 bn
Flat & long steelCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 350.2 mUSD 3.7 bn
Refined petroleumSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 146 mUSD 110.54 bn
Ammonium nitrate/NPKSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 134.8 mUSD 3.2 bn
Natural gas/LNGSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 75.5 mUSD 10.27 bn
Zinc/lead metalASPIRATIONALUSD 58 mUSD 442.7 m
Solar PV glassASPIRATIONALUSD 21.5 mUSD 332.4 m
Phosphoric acid/DAPEMERGINGUSD 11.3 mUSD 81.1 m
Nitrogen fertilizers (urea)CONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 10.5 mUSD 3.8 bn
Dates (Deglet Nour)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 1.2 mUSD 473.4 m
HeliumSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 1.1 mUSD 94.5 m
Cement & clinkerCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0.4 mUSD 2.9 bn
DRI/sponge ironSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.1 mUSD 74 m

Left-hand column: what Algeria itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Algeria’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 17 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Algeria’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Algeria. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Algeria’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Algeria’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01NigeriaUSD 21.13 bn
02South AfricaUSD 17.45 bn
03EgyptUSD 13.56 bn
04MoroccoUSD 12.66 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.81 bn
06KenyaUSD 5.82 bn
07LibyaUSD 5.1 bn
08GhanaUSD 4.99 bn
09TunisiaUSD 2.28 bn
10AlgeriaUSD 2.2 bn
11EthiopiaUSD 1.4 bn
12TanzaniaUSD 1.04 bn
13Cote dIvoireUSD 840.5 m
14SudanUSD 797.8 m
15ZambiaUSD 674.7 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Algeria. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Algeria would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Algeria to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Fertiliser redirected under AfCFTA

A portion of the roughly USD 4bn fertiliser export stream is contractually redirected to African buyers under AfCFTA terms, intra-African maritime and logistics corridors are funded, and gas feedstock is guaranteed to the plants.

02

Cement and steel allocated to Africa

The existing ~12 Mt cement surplus and Tosyali's steel output are allocated to African markets via long-term supply agreements, with port handling at Oran, Djen Djen and Annaba scaled for bulk continental dispatch.

03

Beneficiation projects reach output

Gara Djebilet's dephosphorisation technology is proven and its processing plant operational (2026+), the Bled El Hadba phosphate-fertiliser complex is commissioned (post-2026), and Oued Amizour zinc reaches production.

04

Logistics and fiscal reform

LPI and customs are reformed, the Morocco border or alternative corridors open, fiscal stabilisation sustains state co-investment, and private-sector participation broadens.

05

AU demand aggregation

An AU procurement framework guarantees offtake at scale to justify reorienting supply away from European markets.

The binding constraints
·

Logistics and integration The World Bank LPI ranked Algeria 117/160 in 2018 with customs the weakest component; the Morocco land border is closed and intra-African transport links are thin, with only about 5% of exports going to Africa. Continental supply would require maritime redirection and AfCFTA facilitation.

·

Export orientation Fertiliser, cement and steel flows are currently aimed at Europe; reorienting them to African buyers needs a commercial and policy push.

·

Fiscal fragility The IMF (2025) rates sovereign stress risk 'high', with a fiscal deficit of about 11.5% of GDP projected for 2025 and the FRR depleted, limiting state co-investment capacity.

·

Feedstock tension Domestic gas demand for power and air-conditioning competes with export and feedstock use, and the fertiliser plants have faced gas curtailments historically.

·

Project execution Gara Djebilet, Bled El Hadba and Oued Amizour all face technical risk (including the high-phosphorus ore), financing and timeline risk, and are not supply-ready before 2026-2032.

·

Governance and climate Bureaucracy, state dominance, the legacy 49/51 rule and private-sector crowding-out weigh on the business climate (IMF); separately, date oases and agriculture are water- and climate-stressed and cannot serve as a scalable food-supply base.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Algeria’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Logistics is the binding constraint, not production. Algeria's LPI score of 2.45 and rank of 117 out of 160 (2018), with customs the weakest sub-component, sit alongside thin intra-African transport links and a closed Morocco land border. The audit is explicit that continental supply requires maritime redirection and AfCFTA facilitation rather than new production capacity, which already exists in surplus.

05

Existing export flows point at Europe, not Africa. Fertiliser, cement and steel volumes are currently aimed at European and North American buyers, with Europe taking around 58 per cent of total exports and only 5.3 to 5.5 per cent going to African markets. Reorientation to African buyers would require both commercial and policy effort, and would need long-term supply agreements to justify moving away from established markets.

06

Fiscal fragility limits state co-investment. The IMF rated sovereign stress risk high in 2025, with a projected fiscal deficit of about 11.5 per cent of GDP and the fiscal stabilisation fund depleted. Any expectation that the Algerian state can co-finance corridor or capacity expansion should be tested against that position.

07

Gas feedstock is contested domestically. Domestic gas demand for power and air conditioning competes directly with export and feedstock use, and the audit records that fertiliser plants have faced gas curtailments historically. The audit sets an explicit benchmark: if curtailments to fertiliser plants recur, fertiliser reliability should be downgraded.

08

The beneficiation pipeline is unproven and years out. Gara Djebilet, Bled El Hadba and Oued Amizour all carry technical, financing and timeline risk, including the high-phosphorus ore problem, and none is supply-ready before the 2026 to 2032 window. The audit recommends promoting these categories only on confirmed commercial-scale output, not on project targets.

09

Governance and business climate remain a drag. The IMF flags bureaucracy, state dominance, the legacy 49/51 ownership rule and private-sector crowding-out. Broadened private-sector participation is listed among the conditions that would have to hold for Algeria to function as a supply anchor.

10

Demand certainty must come first. The audit states that an AU procurement framework would need to guarantee offtake at scale to justify reorientation away from European markets, alongside guaranteed gas feedstock to the plants and port handling at Oran, Djen Djen and Annaba scaled for bulk continental dispatch.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Algeria's Draft 1 bundle rests on three positions that are already operating and export-proven: nitrogen fertilisers and ammonia on subsidised gas feedstock, cement and clinker carrying an exportable surplus of some 12 million tonnes a year against 42 million tonnes of national capacity, and flat and long steel from the integrated gas-based DRI-EAF complex at Bethioua. It does not rest on the mineral endowment, which remains substantially unconverted; iron ore, phosphate rock, zinc and solar manufacturing are pre-operational or planned and should be held as emerging or aspirational until commercial-scale output is confirmed. What must be proven is not whether Algeria can produce, but whether it can deliver into African markets: that gas feedstock is guaranteed to the fertiliser plants against domestic curtailment, that port handling at Arzew, Oran, Djen Djen and Annaba is scaled for bulk continental dispatch, that customs and corridor reform lifts the intra-African export share from its present level near 5 per cent, and that guaranteed offtake at scale justifies the commercial reorientation away from European buyers. The decisive lever is demand aggregation and logistics, not production.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Algeria is shown 17 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Algeria to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2