Right of Supply — Djibouti

01 · Correspondence

From the Chair · to Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Djibouti · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Dawaleh,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Djibouti — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Djibouti is in this room

Djibouti's contribution to the continental bundle is infrastructural rather than material. Its strongest endowment is a chokepoint position on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and the port, transit and transshipment capacity built upon it: Doraleh Container Terminal handled 1,236,769 TEU in 2024, around half of it transshipment; UNCTAD records Djibouti as one of only two African countries where the median ship time in port in 2021 was around one day; and the 756-km electrified Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway, the first cross-border electrified line in Africa, connects the terminals to a hinterland that routes more than 95 per cent of Ethiopian trade through Djibouti. The honest constraint is that this is a service and not a tradeable good, and the goods position behind it is thin: merchandise exports were roughly USD 194 million in 2024, manufacturing value-added is about 5.2 per cent of GDP, generation capacity is around 120 MW at a business tariff near USD 0.31/kWh, and the IMF assesses external public debt as in distress and unsustainable. Djibouti should therefore be seated as the enabling logistics and transit corridor through which continental goods substitution flows, with its physical-goods position — salt, chlorides and bromides from Lake Assal — treated as emerging rather than established.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Djibouti, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

02 · Executive summary

The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Djibouti

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports

620USD bn sourced off-continent

136.75USD bn measured procurement

10draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Djibouti’s draft bundle. 10 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Marine bunkering / ship refuelling services, Live animals (sheep/goats/cattle/camels). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 strong contender · 2 emerging · 3 aspirational · 3 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Djibouti is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance

What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 10 candidate lines proposed for Djibouti below.

Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
No claim value is stated for Djibouti. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Djibouti will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Djibouti will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize

709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn

Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources

The market

USD 620 bn

From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize

The prize

USD 136.75 bn

Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included

Band A

≈USD 207 bn total

Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated

Band B

10 lines

Djibouti’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2

Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Djibouti at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead

Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor

USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT

Band B · estimated tender layer

≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65

Strategic agriculture & food27.03

Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02

Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53

Infrastructure & transport6.60

Currency, governance & elections5.54

Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic

Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness

Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline

Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Djibouti’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin

Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana

Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline

What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Djibouti’s own capability audit.

Flax yarn and palm oil revealed comparative advantage

OEC 2022 records high revealed comparative advantage in flax yarn (around 1,040) and palm oil (around 225), and palm oil dominated the 2022 export basket at USD 299 million. The audit is explicit that these are re-export and transit artefacts rather than domestic production, and strips them out of genuine domestic capability.

Re-export artefact · capability screen

LNG re-export and the energy-hub thesis

The POLY-GCL LNG terminal and the Horn of Africa oil pipeline were both cancelled, with Ethiopia terminating the Ogaden gas and LNG project in June 2025. The audit records this as a material downgrade to the energy-hub thesis and classes LNG re-export as grey or insufficient.

Cancelled project · incumbency screen

Refined petroleum products and cement

The Damerjog refinery plans (Ajyal at 300,000 barrels per day; Chimbusco at 2.5 million tonnes) and the planned 600,000-tonne-per-year cement plant are announced or under construction, not operational. The audit classes both as aspirational and notes flagship industrial projects have not reached operation.

Announced, not operational · industrial screen

Live animals as a domestic supply base

Damerjog quarantine clears in the order of 1.4 million head per year, but the animals are sourced largely from Ethiopia and Somalia, the trade is Gulf-oriented with low intra-African demand, and there is essentially no domestic meat-processing or abattoir value-addition. The strength is transit-based, and the finished good is absent.

Capability inversion · raw transit versus finished good

Geothermal capacity

Installed geothermal capacity was zero as of 2025 and the Fiale and Gale-le-Koma systems remain pre-commercial. The audit records the frequently cited figure of around 1,000 MWe as an upper-bound national number, against a peer-reviewed estimate of 115–329 MWe for the Asal systems.

Pre-commercial · enabler screen

Fisheries and construction minerals

Catch was only around 2,300 tonnes in 2014 against a sustainable potential historically targeted at around 5,000 tonnes, artisanal only with no industrial fishing. Gypsum, perlite and pumice deposits are listed but raw with negligible processing. Both are classed grey or insufficient.

Insufficient evidence · scale-matching screen

08 · Endowment

What Djibouti actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Djibouti. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Djibouti's defining endowment is not a mineral or a crop but a geographic chokepoint. Its deep-water coastline commands the Bab-el-Mandeb strait and serves as the maritime gateway for landlocked Ethiopia, which routes more than 95 per cent of its trade through Djibouti (World Bank, 2023). Doraleh Container Terminal handled 1,236,769 TEU in 2024, passing one million TEU for the first time, against a capacity of about 1.6 million TEU that is expandable to 3.5 million by 2030; roughly half that throughput is transshipment. The Doraleh Multipurpose Port, opened in 2017 at about USD 590 million, handles bulk, general cargo, oil and livestock. Inland connection runs on the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Standard Gauge Railway, some 756 km electrified and the first cross-border electrified railway in Africa, which carried 9.5 million tonnes of freight between 2018 and 2024. Per UNCTAD, Djibouti is one of only two African countries where the median time ships spent in port in 2021 was around one day.

Beyond the chokepoint, two material physical endowments exist. Lake Assal is reported to hold roughly 2 billion tonnes of salt minerals (AidData, citing concession documents, 2017), with surface salinity of 276.5 g/L rising to 398 g/L at 20 m depth, approximately ten times ocean salinity, at 155 m below sea level, the lowest point in Africa. Bromine and sodium bromide are present in the same brine and form part of the salt concession. The Port of Ghoubet, inaugurated in June 2017 at about USD 64 million, accommodates vessels up to 100,000 DWT and yearly traffic up to 5 million tonnes, served by a 17.5-km, USD 52 million conveyor. The second endowment is geothermal potential: a peer-reviewed estimate (Houssein et al.) places all Asal high-temperature hydrothermal systems at 115–329 MWe, tempering the frequently cited figure of around 1,000 MWe, which is an upper-bound national number. Installed geothermal capacity was zero as of 2025.

The third strand is the live-animal trade. The Damerjog Regional Livestock Quarantine, established in 2006, clears in the order of 1.4 million head per year (FAO, 2025), historically cited as high as around 2 million per year (IGAD, 2008), mostly sheep and goats plus cattle and camels, primarily to Gulf markets and sourced largely from Ethiopia and Somalia. On economic complexity, Djibouti sits among the world's least complex economies, with a peripheral product space; the precise Harvard Atlas value and rank could not be confirmed from a primary static source and is treated as indicative. Once re-export and transit artefacts such as flax yarn and palm oil are stripped out, genuine domestic comparative advantage reduces to salt, chlorides and bromides from Lake Assal, and live animals. The honest read recorded in the audit is that Djibouti's comparative advantage lies in services, which goods-based complexity metrics do not capture well.

The endowment in depth

Djibouti's hard-mineral endowment is very limited. The principal resource is salt and brine at Lake Assal, reported to hold roughly 2 billion tonnes of salt minerals (AidData, citing concession documents, 2017). The lake's salinity reaches 276.5 g/L at the surface and up to 398 g/L at 20 m depth — about ten times ocean salinity — at 155 m below sea level, the lowest point in Africa. Bromine and sodium bromide are present in the brine and form part of the salt concession held by CCCC/SIS. Other listed but largely unexploited resources include gypsum, limestone, perlite, pumice/scoria, diatomite, clay and marble; perlite mining reportedly began around 2009, but salt is the only mineral exported at scale, and there is no domestic metal smelting or refining. On energy, there are no commercial oil or gas reserves or production. Installed domestic generation is only ~120–126 MW (thermal, heavy-fuel-oil/diesel, Électricité de Djibouti), rising to ~220–230 MW including private wind, solar and self-generation. Roughly 60–80% of electricity is imported from Ethiopia over a 283-km, 230-kV interconnector inaugurated in 2011, with transfers rising from 155 GWh (2011) to 532 GWh (2020) (AfDB); Ethiopian hydropower at ~USD 0.065/kWh compares with Djibouti thermal at up to ~USD 0.26/kWh. Renewable capacity is anchored by the ~59 MW Ghoubet wind farm (commissioned ~2023, the first IPP), while installed geothermal remained zero as of 2025.

Arable land covers less than 4% of the territory, domestic food production meets only ~15% of demand, and forest area is ~0.3% (World Bank 2023). The dominant agro activity is pastoralism and, above all, the live-animal export and transit trade. The Damerjog Regional Livestock Quarantine (established 2006) clears on the order of 1.4 million head per year (FAO, 2025), historically cited as high as ~2 million/yr (IGAD, 2008) — mostly sheep and goats plus cattle and camels, primarily to Gulf markets and sourced largely from Ethiopia and Somalia. There is essentially no domestic meat-processing or abattoir value-addition yet, though FAO is promoting a modern Damerjog abattoir under its Hand-in-Hand Initiative. Fisheries are significantly underexploited: along a coastline of ~314–372 km, the catch was only ~2,300 tonnes (2014) against an FAO-assessed sustainable potential historically targeted at ~5,000 tonnes, and the sector remains artisanal with no industrial fishing.

The existing industrial base is thin. Manufacturing value-added is ~5.2% of GDP (2021, World Bank), with services around three-quarters of GDP and dominated by ports and logistics; UNIDO classifies Djibouti among LDCs with negligible MVA per capita. Actual manufacturing is limited to construction materials, some food and beverage processing, packaging and light assembly or re-packaging inside free zones. Named industrial nodes include the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ; China Merchants/Dalian Port/DPFZA; phase-1 ~240 ha, ~404 enterprises, 100% warehouse occupancy), the Djibouti Damerjog Industrial Development zone (DDID; heavy industry — oil jetty, tank farm, planned refinery, cement, ship repair, livestock port), the older Djibouti Free Zone (~40 ha, ~180 companies) and the PK-12 zone. Human capital is concentrated in a ports/logistics/maritime skill cluster: the Centre de Ressources et de Compétences (CRC, opened Nov 2024 with AFD/EU funding) has trained ~3,000 people since 2019, with ~70% securing employment, and China launched Africa's first Luban Workshop in Djibouti in 2019. The wider TVET and tertiary base is thin, unemployment is high (~26% modelled ILO 2025), urbanisation exceeds 78%, and English is the working language inside Doraleh/DIFTZ.

Infrastructure and logistics are the defining capability. The Doraleh Container Terminal (SGTD) handled 1,236,769 TEU in 2024 — its first year above one million — against capacity of ~1.6 M TEU, expandable to 3.5 M by 2030, with roughly half its throughput as transshipment; the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (opened 2017, ~USD 590m) handles bulk, general cargo, oil and livestock. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti Standard Gauge Railway (~756 km electrified, the first cross-border electrified railway in Africa; Ethiopia 75%/Djibouti 25%) carried 9.5m tonnes of freight over 2018–2024 but runs well below its ~6.3 M t/yr capacity, with only 15 of 32 locomotives operational in 2024. Djibouti commands the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, through which the IEA (2025) reports about 4.2 million barrels of crude and petroleum liquids crossed per day and ~14% of global maritime trade passes in normal times, and UNCTAD notes it is one of only two African countries where the median ship time in port (2021) was around one day. Multiple foreign military bases (US Camp Lemonnier, France, China's first overseas base, Japan, Italy) act as economic anchors and rent sources, and submarine cables including the PEACE Cable land here, supporting a data-hub ambition.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Djibouti is among the world's least economically complex economies; the precise Harvard Atlas ECI value and global rank could not be confirmed from a primary static source and should be treated as indicative (the Atlas 10.0 release uses trade data through 2022). Export concentration is high and the product-space position peripheral. OEC RCA specialisations for 2022 include Chlorides (RCA ~996), Flax Yarn (~1,040), Slag/Dross (~301), Other Animals (~253) and Palm Oil (~225) — but several of these, notably flax yarn and palm oil, are re-export or transit artefacts rather than domestic capability, so the genuine domestic comparative advantages reduce to salt/chlorides/bromides (Lake Assal) and live animals.

Atlas/OEC-flagged feasible-diversification "nearby" products — Gold, Cassava, Sorghum, Cocoa Beans and Tropical Fruits — all carry very low relatedness (~0.07 or below), signalling that organic diversification into new tradeable goods is structurally difficult and confirming a sparse, peripheral product-space position with distant diversification options. The honest read is that Djibouti's true comparative advantage lies in services — transport and logistics — which the goods-based economic-complexity metrics do not capture well; services exports in 2019 (Transportation USD 615M, Government services USD 362M) dwarfed merchandise exports.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Djibouti's single most defensible continental position is its function as the maritime gateway to the Horn of Africa and, above all, to landlocked Ethiopia, which routes more than 95% of its import-export trade through Djibouti (World Bank, 2023). The evidence is unambiguous and Tier-1: the Doraleh Container Terminal handled 1,236,769 TEU in 2024, roughly half as transshipment; per UNCTAD, Djibouti is one of only two African countries where the median ship time in port (2021) was around one day; it sits on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, through which the IEA reports ~4.2m bbl/day of crude and products crossed in 2025 and ~14% of global maritime trade passes in normal times; and it is connected inland by the first cross-border electrified railway in Africa. The mechanism is a stack that no single rival easily replicates — chokepoint geography, Ethiopia's structural dependence (landlocked, ~120m people), Chinese anchor capital under the BRI, and political stability reinforced by foreign military-base rents (US Camp Lemonnier, France, China, Japan, Italy).

The central tension for the "Right of Supply" frame is that this is a service, not a tradeable good: it cannot substitute Africa's external goods-import bill directly, so it merits anchor status as a logistics and transit allocation rather than a goods allocation — it is the enabling infrastructure through which continental goods substitution must flow. Its durability is real but not unconditional. What would undermine it: a durable peace and port build-out at Eritrea's Assab/Massawa or Somaliland's Berbera (DP World) diverting Ethiopian transit; prolonged Red Sea/Bab-el-Mandeb insecurity re-routing ships around the Cape; Djibouti's debt distress and Chinese exposure forcing asset concessions; and the unresolved DP World arbitration over Doraleh. Even in normal operation the model is capital-intensive and creates little employment, and the underlying goods that move through it — fuel for bunkering, animals for the livestock transit — are largely imported rather than domestically produced.

Current reality

Djibouti is a small, arid, resource-poor service economy: GDP of about USD 4.15 billion (current US$, 2024, World Bank/OEC) and a population of roughly 1.18 million. Services account for around three-quarters of GDP, dominated by ports and logistics, while manufacturing value-added stands at about 5.2 per cent of GDP (2021, World Bank), with UNIDO classifying the country among least developed countries with negligible manufacturing value-added per capita. Actual manufacturing is thin: construction materials, some food and beverage processing, packaging, and light assembly or re-packaging inside free zones such as the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, the older Djibouti Free Zone and the Damerjog industrial development zone. Trade openness stands at around 340 per cent of GDP, the fourth-highest globally, but total merchandise exports are small and volatile at roughly USD 194 million in 2024 against USD 542 million in 2022, the volatility itself reflecting the re-export and transit nature of the basket.

Energy is a binding constraint. Installed domestic generation is roughly 120–126 MW of thermal, heavy-fuel-oil and diesel capacity under Electricité de Djibouti, with total domestic capacity including private, wind and solar self-generation at around 220–230 MW. Between 60 and 80 per cent of electricity consumption is imported from Ethiopia over a 283-km, 230-kV interconnector inaugurated in 2011, with transfers rising from 155 GWh in 2011 to 532 GWh in 2020 (AfDB). Ethiopian hydropower costs around USD 0.065/kWh against Djibouti thermal generation at up to about USD 0.26/kWh, and the business tariff is cited at roughly USD 0.31/kWh, among the highest in the region. Electricity access reaches about 65 per cent of the population (2023, World Bank). Arable land is under 4 per cent of territory, domestic food production meets only about 15 per cent of demand, and the country is acutely arid and desalination-dependent. Unemployment runs at around 26 per cent (modelled ILO, 2025), with a thin tertiary and TVET base offset only partly by a specialised ports and logistics skills cluster.

09 · The draft bundle

Draft 1 · 10 candidate lines · will change

Djibouti’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Djibouti’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Djibouti will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Djibouti’s 10 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 2Emerging 2Aspirational 3Grey 3

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Marine bunkering / ship refuelling services

Chokepoint location; Red Sea Bunkering; ~35,000 ships/yr · Maturity: Service operating; fuel imported · Competitiveness: High (Red Sea/Cape reroute)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)

271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....

271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c

271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara

271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Djibouti imported USD 332.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: Next is Africa; Reuters/MarineLink · 2024-2026

Refined petroleum / bunker fuels

Damerjog refinery plans (Ajyal 300kbd; Chimbusco 2.5Mt) · Maturity: Announced/under-construction · Competitiveness: Very high (~2.5m bbl/d products)

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)

271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....

271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c

271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara

271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Djibouti imported USD 332.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: papaverAI; OBG; Next is Africa · 2018-2024

LNG re-export

POLY-GCL terminal cancelled 2025 · Maturity: Cancelled · Competitiveness: NA

GREY

USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas

271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane

271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes

271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene

271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711

271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas

271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Djibouti imported USD 1.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: Global Energy Monitor · 2025

Cement / construction materials

Planned Damerjog cement plant 600kt/yr · Maturity: Announced; not operational · Competitiveness: High

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)

252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured

252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured

252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers

252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Djibouti imported USD 1.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Next is Africa; DPFZA · 2024

Live animals (sheep/goats/cattle/camels)

Damerjog quarantine ~1.4m head/yr; regional sourcing · Maturity: Live export, raw, no slaughter · Competitiveness: Low intra-African (Gulf-oriented)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 1.02 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

010210Pure-bred breeding bovines

010221Cattle; live, pure-bred breeding animals

010229Cattle; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals

010231Buffalo; live, pure-bred breeding animals

010239Buffalo; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals

010290Bovine animals; live, other than cattle and buffalo

010410Sheep; live

010420Goats; live

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Djibouti imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 309.4 mMorocco USD 250.9 mSouth Africa USD 148.1 mAlgeria USD 104.6 mLibya USD 88.7 mMauritius USD 21.5 mGuinea USD 14.2 mCote dIvoire USD 12.8 m

Source: FAO; IGAD; OEC · 2008-2025

Gypsum/perlite/pumice/construction minerals

Listed deposits; perlite since ~2009 · Maturity: Raw; negligible processing · Competitiveness: Marginal

GREY

USD 433.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

251310Pumice stone, whether or not heat treated

251311Pumice stone, crude or in irregular pieces, incl. crushed pumice "bimskies"

251319Pumice stone, crushed or ground

251320Emery, natural corundum, natural garnet and other natural abrasives, whether or not heat-treated

252010Gypsum; anhydrite

252020Plasters; (consisting of calcined gypsum or calcium sulphate), whether or not coloured, with or without small quantities

253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded

253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)

253040Natural micaceous iron oxides

253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25

Djibouti imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 178.7 mGhana USD 35.3 mCote dIvoire USD 18.7 mUganda USD 16.8 mEgypt USD 16.2 mCameroon USD 15.7 mBurkina Faso USD 14.8 mSenegal USD 12.3 m

Source: Moody's/USGS-derived; AZoMining · 2010-2024

Salt (crude/industrial)

Lake Assal ~2bn t; Ghoubet terminal ≤5m t/yr; conveyor; CCCC/Jinfa plant · Maturity: Raw to intermediate; plant under build · Competitiveness: Moderate (Ethiopia + Asia)

EMERGING

USD 303.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

250100Salt (including table salt and denatured salt); pure sodium chloride whether or not in aqueous solution; sea water

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Djibouti imported USD 0.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 38.2 mCote dIvoire USD 22.9 mUganda USD 21.9 mSouth Africa USD 19.6 mZimbabwe USD 18.5 mMalawi USD 15.1 mZambia USD 13.6 mGhana USD 12.9 m

Source: AidData; Dawan/CCCC; OEC · 2017-2025

Fish / seafood

Underexploited stocks; catch ~2,300 t · Maturity: Raw, artisanal · Competitiveness: Moderate

GREY

USD 286 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

030211Fish; fresh or chilled, trout (Salmo trutta, Oncorhynchus mykiss, Oncorhynchus clarki, Oncorhynchus aguabonita, Oncorhyn

030212Fresh or chilled Pacific salmon Oncorhynchus nerka, Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, Oncorhynchus keta,...

030213Fish; fresh or chilled, Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka, Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, Oncorhynchus keta, Oncorhynchus tsch

030214Fish; fresh or chilled, Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) and Danube salmon (Hucho hucho), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0

030219Fish; fresh or chilled, salmonidae, n.e.c. in item no. 0302.1, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish off

030221Fish; fresh or chilled, halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides, Hippoglossus hippoglossus, Hippoglossus stenolepis), excl

030222Fish; fresh or chilled, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of s

030223Fish; fresh or chilled, sole (Solea spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 03

030224Fish; fresh or chilled, turbots (Psetta maxima, Scophthalmidae), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish o

030229Fish; fresh or chilled, flat fish, n.e.c. in item no. 0302.2, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offa

030231Fish; fresh or chilled, albacore or longfinned tunas (Thunnus alalunga), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edibl

030232Fish; fresh or chilled, yellowfin tunas (Thunnus albacares), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal

030233Fish; fresh or chilled, skipjack tuna (stripe-bellied bonito) (Katsuwonus pelamis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030234Fish; fresh or chilled, bigeye tunas (Thunnus obesus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030235Fish; fresh or chilled, Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tunas (Thunnus thynnus, Thunnus orientalis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030236Fish; fresh or chilled, southern bluefin tunas (Thunnus maccoyii), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030239Fish; fresh or chilled, tuna, n.e.c. in item no. 0302.3, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030240Fresh or chilled herrings (Clupea harengus, clupea pallasii)

030241Fish; fresh or chilled, herrings (Clupea harengus, Clupea pallasii), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030242Fish; fresh or chilled, anchovies (Engraulis spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030243Fish; fresh or chilled, sardines (Sardina pilchardus, Sardinops spp.), sardinella (Sardinella spp.), brisling or sprats (Sprattus sprattus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030244Fish; fresh or chilled, mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scomber australasicus, Scomber japonicus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030245Fish; fresh or chilled, jack and horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030246Fresh or chilled cobia "Rachycentron canadum"

030247Fish; fresh or chilled, swordfish (Xiphias gladius), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030249Fish; fresh or chilled, n.e.c. in item no. 0302.4, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030250Fresh or chilled cod (gadus morhua, gadus ogac, gadus macrocephalus)

030251Fish; fresh or chilled, cod (Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac, Gadus macrocephalus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030252Fish; fresh or chilled, haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030253Fish; fresh or chilled, coalfish (Pollachius virens), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030254Fish; fresh or chilled, hake (Merluccius spp., Urophycis spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030255Fish; fresh or chilled, Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030256Fish; fresh or chilled, blue whitings (Micromesistius poutassou, Micromesistius australis),excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030259Fish; fresh or chilled, n.e.c. in item no. 0302.5, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030261Fresh or chilled sardines (Sardina pilchardus, Sardinops spp.), sardinella (Sardinella spp.),...

030262Fresh or chilled haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus)

030264Fresh or chilled mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scomber australasicus, Scomber japonicus)

030265Fresh or chilled dogfish and other sharks

030269Fresh or chilled freshwater and saltwater fish (excluding salmonidae, flat fish, tunas, skipjack...

030270Fresh or chilled fish livers and roes

030271Fish; fresh or chilled, tilapias (Oreochromis spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030272Fish; fresh or chilled, catfish (Pangasius spp., Silurus spp., Clarias spp., Ictalurus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030273Fish; fresh or chilled, Carp (as specified by the WCO.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030274Fish; fresh or chilled, eels (Anguilla spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030279Fish; fresh or chilled, Nile perch (Lates niloticus) and snakeheads (Channa spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030281Fish; fresh or chilled, dogfish and other sharks, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030282Fish; fresh or chilled, rays and skates (Rajidae), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030283Fish; fresh or chilled, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030284Fish; fresh or chilled, seabass (Dicentrarchus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030285Fish; fresh or chilled, seabream (Sparidae), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030289Fish; fresh or chilled, n.e.c. in heading 0302, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0302.91 to 0302.99

030290Fresh or chilled fish livers and roes

030291Fish; fresh or chilled, livers, roes and milt

030292Fish; fresh or chilled, shark fins

030299Fish; fresh or chilled, fish fins (other than shark fins), heads, tails, maws and other edible fish offal

030410Fresh or chilled fillets and other fish meat, whether or not minced

030411Fresh or chilled fillets and other meat whether or not minced" of swordfish "Xiphias gladius"

030419Fresh or chilled fillets and other fish meat whether or not minced" (excluding swordfish and . . .

030420Frozen fish fillets

030429Frozen fish fillets (excluding swordfish and toothfish)

030431Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, tilapias (Oreochromis spp.)

030432Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, catfish (Pangasius spp., Silurus spp., Clarias spp., Ictalurus spp.)

030433Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, Nile perch (Lates niloticus)

030439Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, carp (as specified by the WCO), eels (Anguilla spp.), and snakeheads (Channa spp.)

030441Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, salmon, Pacific (Oncorhynchus nerka, Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, Oncorhynchus keta, Oncorhynchus tschawytscha, Oncorhynchus kisutch, Oncorhynchus masou and Oncorhynchus rhodurus), Atlantic (Salmo salar), Danube (Hucho hucho)

030442Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, trout (Salmo trutta, Oncorhynchus mykiss, Oncorhynchus clarki, Oncorhynchus aguabonita, Oncorhynchus gilae, Oncorhynchus apache and Oncorhynchus chrysogaster)

030443Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, flat fish (Pleuronectidae, Bothidae, Cynoglossidae, Soleidae, Scophthalmidae and Citharidae)

030444Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, of the families Bregmacerotidae, Euclichthyidae, Gadidae, Macrouridae, Melanonidae, Merlucciidae, Moridae, and Muraenolepididae

030445Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, swordfish (Xiphias gladius)

030446Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.)

030447Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, dogfish and other sharks

030448Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, rays and skates (Rajidae)

030449Fish fillets; fresh or chilled, other than fish of heading 0304.4

030451Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, tilapias, catfish, carp, eels, Nile perch, and snakeheads

030452Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, salmonidae

030453Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, of the families Bregmacerotidae, Euclichthyidae, Gadidae, Macrouridae, Melanonidae, Merlucciidae, Moridae, and Muraenolepididae

030454Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, swordfish (Xiphias gladius)

030455Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.)

030457Fish meat; excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, rays and skates (Rajidae)

030459Fish meat; excluding fillets, whether or not minced; fresh or chilled, of fish n.e.c. in item no. 0304.5

030461Fish fillets; frozen, tilapias (Oreochromis spp.)

030462Fish fillets; frozen, catfish (Pangasius spp., Silurus spp., Clarias spp., Ictalurus spp.)

030463Fish fillets; frozen, Nile Perch (Lates niloticus)

030469Fish fillets; frozen, carp (Cyprinus/Carassius/Ctenopharyngodon idellus/Hypophthalmichthys/Cirrhinus/Mylopharyngodon piceus/Catla catla/Labeo/Osteochilus hasselti/Leptobarbus hoeveni/Megalobrama), eels (Anguilla) and snakeheads (Channa)

030471Fish fillets; frozen, cod (Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac, Gadus macrocephalus)

030472Fish fillets; frozen, haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus)

030473Fish fillets; frozen, coalfish (Pollachius virens)

030474Fish fillets; frozen, hake (Merluccius spp., Urophycis spp.)

030475Fish fillets; frozen, Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma)

030479Fish fillets; frozen, of the families Bregmacerotidae, Euclichthyidae, Gadidae, Macrouridae, Melanonidae, Merlucciidae, Moridae and Muraenolepididae other than cod, haddock, coalfish, hake, and Alaska pollock

030481Fish fillets; frozen, salmon, Pacific (Oncorhynchus nerka, Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, Oncorhynchus keta, Oncorhynchus tschawytscha, Oncorhynchus kisutch, Oncorhynchus masou, Oncorhynchus rhodurus), Atlantic (Salmo salar), and Danube (Hucho hucho)

030482Fish fillets; frozen, trout (Salmo trutta, Oncorhynchus mykiss, Oncorhynchus clarki, Oncorhynchus aguabonita, Oncorhynchus gilae, Oncorhynchus apache and Oncorhynchus chrysogaster)

030483Fish fillets; frozen, flat fish (Pleuronectidae, Bothidae, Cynoglossidae, Soleidae, Scophthalmidae and Citharidae)

030484Fish fillets; frozen, swordfish (Xiphias gladius)

030485Fish fillets; frozen, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.)

030486Fish fillets; frozen, herrings (Clupea harengus, Clupea pallasii)

030487Fish fillets; frozen, tunas (of the genus Thunnus), skipjack tuna (stripe-bellied bonito) (Katsuwonus pelamis)

030488Fish fillets; frozen, dogfish, other sharks, rays and skates (Rajidae)

030489Fish fillets; frozen, of fish n.e.c. in heading 0304.8

030490Frozen fish meat, whether or not minced (excluding fillets)

030491Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, swordfish (Xiphias gladius)

030492Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.)

030493Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, tilapias, catfish, carp, eels, Nile perch, and snakeheads

030494Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, Alaska Pollock (Theragra chalcogramma)

030495Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, of the families Bregmacerotidae, Euclichthyidae, Gadidae, Macrouridae, Melanonidae, Merlucciidae, Moridae and Muraenolepididae, other than Alaska Pollock (Theragra chalcogramma)

030496Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, dogfish and other sharks

030497Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, rays and skates (Rajidae)

030499Fish meat, excluding fillets, whether or not minced; frozen, n.e.c. in item no. 0304.9

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Djibouti imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 67.7 mNigeria USD 40.7 mEgypt USD 36.7 mMorocco USD 32.8 mGhana USD 20.3 mAlgeria USD 18.2 mLibya USD 15.9 mMauritius USD 11.8 m

Source: FAO · 2014

Chlorides/bromides

Lake Assal brine; RCA ~996 (2022); #2 export · Maturity: Raw/intermediate; bromine park planned · Competitiveness: Marginal-moderate

EMERGING

USD 148.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

282710Chlorides; of ammonium

282720Chlorides; of calcium

282731Chlorides; of magnesium

282732Chlorides; of aluminium

282733Iron chlorides

282734Cobalt chlorides

282735Chlorides; of nickel

282736Zinc chloride

282738Barium chloride

282739Chlorides; other than of ammonium, calcium, magnesium, aluminium and nickel

282741Chloride oxides and chloride hydroxides; of copper

282749Chloride oxides and chloride hydroxides; other than of copper

282751Bromides; of sodium or of potassium

282759Bromides and bromide oxides; other than item no. 2827.51

282760Iodides and iodide oxides

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Djibouti imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 22.2 mNigeria USD 21.7 mAngola USD 20.4 mGhana USD 10.3 mCameroon USD 8.2 mEgypt USD 8 mCongo USD 7.7 mSenegal USD 6.8 m

Source: OEC; AidData · 2022-2024

Processed/chilled-frozen meat

Quarantine base + FAO abattoir plan · Maturity: Absent; pre-investment · Competitiveness: High (African meat imports)

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 146.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

020110Meat; of bovine animals, carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled

020120Meat; of bovine animals, cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), fresh or chilled

020130Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, fresh or chilled

020410Meat; of sheep, lamb carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled

020421Meat; of sheep, carcasses and half-carcasses (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb), fresh or chilled

020422Meat; of sheep (including lamb), cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), fresh or chilled

020423Meat; of sheep (including lamb), boneless cuts, fresh or chilled

020430Meat; of sheep, lamb carcasses and half-carcasses, frozen

020441Meat; of sheep, carcasses and half-carcasses (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses of lamb), frozen

020442Meat; of sheep (including lamb), cuts with bone in (excluding carcasses and half-carcasses), frozen

020443Meat; of sheep (including lamb), boneless cuts, frozen

020450Meat; of goats, fresh, chilled or frozen

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Djibouti imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Mauritius USD 31.3 mEgypt USD 29.1 mAlgeria USD 21.1 mLiberia USD 11.6 mMozambique USD 8.5 mLibya USD 8 mSouth Africa USD 6.4 mSeychelles USD 6 m

Source: FAO · 2025

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Djibouti is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance

What Djibouti buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Djibouti is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 5.11 bn

Djibouti’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product line	Strength tier	Djibouti imports, 2023	Continental demand, 2023
Marine bunkering / ship refuelling services	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 332.8 m	USD 110.54 bn
Refined petroleum / bunker fuels	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 332.8 m	USD 110.54 bn
Cement / construction materials	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 1.7 m	USD 2.9 bn
LNG re-export	GREY	USD 1.1 m	USD 10.27 bn
Gypsum/perlite/pumice/construction minerals	GREY	USD 1 m	USD 433.2 m
Salt (crude/industrial)	EMERGING	USD 0.7 m	USD 303.1 m
Fish / seafood	GREY	USD 0.1 m	USD 286 m
Live animals (sheep/goats/cattle/camels)	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0 m	USD 1.02 bn
Chlorides/bromides	EMERGING	USD 0 m	USD 148.3 m
Processed/chilled-frozen meat	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 0 m	USD 146.5 m

Left-hand column: what Djibouti itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion

The number this document refuses to print

What Djibouti’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 10 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Djibouti’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Djibouti. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Djibouti’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map

Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Djibouti’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023

01NigeriaUSD 40.16 bn

02South AfricaUSD 31.42 bn

03MoroccoUSD 17.86 bn

04EgyptUSD 16.85 bn

05DR CongoUSD 15.59 bn

06LibyaUSD 9.49 bn

07GhanaUSD 9.48 bn

08KenyaUSD 8.95 bn

09TunisiaUSD 1.66 bn

10Cote dIvoireUSD 741.2 m

11MaliUSD 302.7 m

12Burkina FasoUSD 219.9 m

13TanzaniaUSD 205.1 m

14UgandaUSD 179 m

15CameroonUSD 168.8 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Djibouti. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence

What would have to be true

The conditions Djibouti would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Djibouti to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

Sustained Bab-el-Mandeb security

The logistics and transit anchor scales as Africa's gateway only with sustained security in the strait; prolonged Red Sea insecurity (Houthi attacks) re-routes ships around the Cape.

Completed power and rail-to-port links

Completion of the second Ethiopia power interconnection and the rail-to-port links, targeted for November 2026, is required to lift import capacity toward ~230 MW.

Railway fleet restored

The railway locomotive fleet must be restored to handle its ~6.3 M t/yr capacity; only 15 of 32 locomotives were operational in 2024.

DP World arbitration resolved

The unresolved DP World arbitration over Doraleh, with multiple rulings against Djibouti, must be settled.

Sustainable debt path with China

A negotiated, sustainable debt path with China is needed; Chinese institutions hold over half of the ~USD 2.6bn external debt and the debt-service moratorium runs out around 2027.

Mechanised salt plant commissioned

For salt (HS 2501/2827) to become a real continental supplier, the CCCC/Jinfa plant and Ghoubet conveyor must be commissioned, with consistent product chemistry, food-grade iodisation and competitively priced power for refining and bromine chemistry.

The binding constraints

Energy: small, costly and import-dependent Domestic generation is tiny (~120 MW) and expensive, with a business tariff around USD 0.31/kWh — among the highest in the region; ~60–80% of power is imported from Ethiopia, a dependency that caps heavy, energy-intensive manufacturing, and geothermal remains 0 MW installed despite decades of exploration (Asal estimate 115–329 MWe per Houssein et al.).

Acute water scarcity The country is acutely arid and desalination-dependent, which constrains both industrial processing and population growth.

Debt distress and Chinese exposure The IMF/World Bank 2024 Article IV DSA assesses Djibouti's overall and external public debt as in distress and unsustainable, reflecting sizeable external arrears; external public debt was ~68% of GDP (2023), Chinese institutions hold over half of the ~USD 2.6bn external debt, arrears to Exim Bank China run at ~5% of GDP, and the debt-service moratorium expires around 2027.

Single-buyer / feedstock dependency The economy hinges on Ethiopian transit; any diversion to Somaliland's Berbera or Eritrea's Assab is an existential revenue risk.

Thin skills base and jobless growth The TVET and tertiary base is thin and youth unemployment is high, while the capital-intensive port model creates little employment — a pattern of jobless growth.

Almost no manufacturing base to build on MVA is ~5% of GDP with almost no existing processing capacity, and flagship industrial projects (refinery, cement, LNG) are announced, under-construction or cancelled rather than operational.

13 · Devil’s advocate

Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Djibouti’s favour.

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

Power is scarce, imported and expensive. Domestic generation is roughly 120 MW and the business tariff is cited at about USD 0.31/kWh, among the highest in the region, while 60–80 per cent of electricity is imported from Ethiopia. The audit treats this as a binding constraint that caps heavy and energy-intensive manufacturing.

External public debt is assessed as in distress and unsustainable. The IMF and World Bank 2024 Article IV debt sustainability analysis states that Djibouti's overall and external public debts are in distress and unsustainable, reflecting the accumulation of sizeable external arrears, reaffirmed in the 2025 Article IV. External public debt stood at around 68 per cent of GDP in 2023, Chinese institutions hold over half of the roughly USD 2.6 billion external debt, arrears to Exim Bank China equal about 5 per cent of GDP, and the debt-service moratorium runs out around 2027.

The economy rests on a single transit relationship. Revenue hinges on Ethiopian transit, and the audit names any diversion to Berbera or Assab as an existential revenue risk. A durable peace and port build-out at Eritrea's Assab or Massawa, or at Somaliland's Berbera under DP World, would divert the flows on which the anchor depends.

Red Sea insecurity can reroute the traffic entirely. Prolonged Bab-el-Mandeb insecurity from Houthi attacks re-routes ships around the Cape. The IEA figure of about 4.2 million barrels per day crossing the strait in 2025 is itself roughly half the 8.7 million barrels per day recorded for full-year 2023, reflecting Red Sea diversions already under way.

Water scarcity constrains any processing ambition. The country is acutely arid and desalination-dependent, which the audit records as a direct constraint on processing capacity and on population. Reliable power and water are named preconditions for the proposed Damerjog abattoir and cold chain.

There is almost no manufacturing base to build on. Manufacturing value-added is around 5 per cent of GDP with almost no existing processing capacity, and the flagship industrial projects — refinery, cement, LNG — are announced, under construction or cancelled rather than operational.

Rail capacity is under-utilised and legal disputes are unresolved. The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway is running well below its capacity of around 6.3 million tonnes per year, with only 15 of 32 locomotives operational in 2024. The DP World–Doraleh arbitration remains unresolved with multiple rulings against Djibouti, and the audit makes its resolution a precondition for the logistics anchor to scale.

Growth has been capital-intensive and jobless. The TVET and tertiary base is thin, youth unemployment is high, and the audit notes that the capital-intensive port model creates little employment. Unemployment is around 26 per cent on modelled ILO figures for 2025, with some estimates of adult joblessness considerably higher.

14 · Synthesis

The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Djibouti's Draft 1 bundle rests on one finished capability operating at continental scale — port, transit and transshipment logistics — supported by a marine bunkering position at the same chokepoint, a transit-based live-animal trade clearing in the order of 1.4 million head per year, and an emerging salt and brine position at Lake Assal whose resource is reported at roughly 2 billion tonnes and whose Ghoubet export terminal can take up to 5 million tonnes per year. Everything beyond that is pre-investment. What must be proven is specific and testable: sustained Bab-el-Mandeb security; completion of the second Ethiopia power interconnection and the rail-to-port links targeted for November 2026; restoration of the railway locomotive fleet to handle its 6.3 million tonnes per year capacity; resolution of the DP World arbitration; a negotiated and sustainable debt path with China; commissioning of the mechanised salt plant and conveyor with consistent product chemistry, food-grade iodisation and competitively priced power for refining and bromine chemistry; construction of the proposed Damerjog abattoir and cold chain if live export is to become processed meat; and movement of Fiale and Gale-le-Koma from drilling to a first 20–50 MW of commercial geothermal generation. Until those conditions are met, Djibouti's place in the allocation is as the corridor, not the factory.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Djibouti is shown 10 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Djibouti to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response

The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2

Minister — this document is unfinished on purpose.

Draft 1 exists to be marked up. Two of these take a single tap. The whole response takes a minute, and it tells the Chair exactly where Djibouti stands and what would move you. A single correction is worth more than agreement.

Where do you stand on this direction for Djibouti?

How strongly do you back the Right of Supply framework?

7/ 10

Not at allCompletely

How well does this draft bundle reflect Djibouti’s real strengths?

Tap to rate

In one word — are you happy with what you see?

Which single line matters most to your government?

What are we missing for Djibouti?

Your one instruction for Draft 2.

Collated live by the Office of the Chair of the AU STC-FMAEPI. Draft 2 will show, for each change, which member state asked for it.