Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
Republic of the CongoBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Republic of the Congo — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
11
Draft 1 candidate lines for Republic of the Congo
The Minister’s brief · for Christian Yoka · Republic of the Congo
Minister Yoka, Congo holds what the continent cannot easily replicate: 22.4 million hectares of Congo Basin forest — okoumé and sapelli among the world's premium hardwoods — a quarter of the basin's log output, sawmills already producing some 303,000 cubic metres of sawnwood, and the deepwater berths of Pointe-Noire that your landlocked rivals lack. Africa sends USD 620 billion abroad every year buying what it could make at home; your sawnwood, advancing towards veneer and plywood, is Congo's rightful claim on that money. The Right of Supply gives you a twenty-five-year first right to serve African buyers, disciplined by Match-or-Release: match the best competing offer or the buyer walks free, so this is never a subsidy and never a captive contract, only a floor of demand against which mills, kilns and grading lines can be financed. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move, Minister.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Republic of the Congo
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Christian Yoka, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Republic of the Congo · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Yoka,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Republic of the Congo — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Republic of the Congo is in this room

The Republic of the Congo's strongest endowment for continental supply is its tropical hardwood: approximately 22.4 million hectares of forest covering some 65 per cent of land area, roughly a quarter of Congo Basin log production, and okoumé and sapelli species commanding premium markets. That endowment is complemented by the deepwater Port of Pointe-Noire — Congo is coastal, a real advantage over many Central African peers — which has handled more than 1 million TEU per year since 2022 and gives direct coastal access that landlocked timber economies lack. Processing already exists rather than being merely planned: ITTO recorded approximately 303,000 cubic metres of sawnwood production and about 222,000 cubic metres of sawnwood exports in 2020, and the log-export ban under Forest Code Law 33-2020, reinforced by the CEMAC decision effective 2023, legally mandates domestic transformation. The honest constraint is equally clear: under 1 per cent of Congolese timber currently goes to other African countries, with exports overwhelmingly directed to China, Asia and the European Union; secondary processing at approximately 29,000 cubic metres of veneer and 8,000 cubic metres of plywood in 2020 is thin and has fallen; and unreliable power, a decrepit railway and poorly connected northern forests stand between the endowment and the port.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Republic of the Congo, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Republic of the Congo

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
11draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Republic of the Congo’s draft bundle. 11 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Crude petroleum. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 1 continental anchor · 1 strong contender · 5 emerging · 3 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Republic of the Congo is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 11 candidate lines proposed for Republic of the Congo below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Republic of the Congo. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Republic of the Congo will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Republic of the Congo will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
11 lines
Republic of the Congo’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Republic of the Congo at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Republic of the Congo’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Republic of the Congo’s own capability audit.

Refined copper and tin ores (HS 7403 / 2609)

Congo operates no copper smelter. The large refined-copper and tin-ore export lines are overwhelmingly transit and re-export of DRC and Zambian metal through Pointe-Noire, not Congolese production, and the audit states they must not be read as Congolese manufacturing capability.

Capability inversion · transit re-export

Crude petroleum (HS 2709)

Crude is exported raw and unprocessed, predominantly to China, and the audit classifies it as globally rather than continentally traded. It is an endowment anchor, not a continental supply category.

Raw base · industrial screen

Potassic fertiliser (MOP, HS 3104)

No potash is currently produced; the Kola project is pre-production and under-financing, with the EPC contract only signed in November 2024. Kore Potash's stated main target market is Brazil, not Africa.

Aspirational · pre-production

Refined petroleum products (HS 2710)

Congo is currently a net importer of refined product, importing approximately USD 140 million in 2023, with CORAF meeting only about 70 per cent of domestic demand. The Fouta/Atlantic refinery is under construction and not operational.

Capability inversion · net importer

LNG and petroleum gases (HS 2711)

Congo LNG is operational but marketed by Eni and sold mainly to Europe, not intra-African. Off-take is controlled by the operator rather than by the state, and the audit flags single-buyer dependency.

Incumbency · controlled off-take

Iron ore (HS 2601)

Deposits are world-class but the sector is raw and pre-scale: Sapro's Mayoko mine delivered a first shipment of approximately 800 tonnes in August 2024, Mbalam-Nabeba began technical construction in November 2024, and legal disputes over expropriated permits are in ICSID and ICC arbitration.

Raw base · pre-scale
08 · Endowment
What Republic of the Congo actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Republic of the Congo. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

The Republic of the Congo holds three defining endowments. The first is offshore crude oil and associated gas: proven crude reserves of approximately 1,811 million barrels (OPEC, 2021) and production of around 265,000 barrels per day in 2024, making Congo the third-largest crude producer in Sub-Saharan Africa. Proved gas reserves stand at roughly 10 trillion cubic feet, and the Eni-operated Congo LNG project at Marine XII shipped its first cargo at the end of February 2024, with Tango FLNG capacity of about 0.6 million tonnes per annum and a Phase 2 Nguya FLNG targeting a combined 3 million tonnes per annum. The second is one of the densest tropical-hardwood forest estates in the Congo Basin: forest cover of approximately 22.4 million hectares, some 65 per cent of land area (MEF, 2020), of which about 14.7 million hectares are allocated as concessions. Congo accounts for roughly 24 per cent of Congo Basin log production (FRM, 2018), with okoumé and sapelli making up two-thirds of logs, and forestry is the second export sector after oil at around 5 per cent of GDP. The third is the Sintoukola potash basin in Kouilou, some 70 to 96 kilometres north of Pointe-Noire, hosting the Kola and Dougou deposits, where Kore Potash targets 2.2 million tonnes per annum of muriate of potash over a mine life of about 31 years.

Against these endowments sits a narrow processing base. Congo is a classic endowment-rich, processing-poor mineral economy, operating essentially no domestic smelting, refining or beneficiation of metals. In forestry, ITTO recorded sawnwood production of approximately 303,000 cubic metres in 2020, down from about 400,000 cubic metres in 2018, with sawnwood exports of roughly 222,000 cubic metres; veneer stood at about 29,000 cubic metres and plywood at about 8,000 cubic metres, indicating thin secondary processing. A log-export ban under Forest Code Law 33-2020, reinforced by a CEMAC decision effective 2023, is pushing primary processing onshore. In hydrocarbons, the CORAF refinery at Pointe-Noire processes about 1 million tonnes per year, with actual output around 840,000 tonnes, meeting roughly 70 per cent of domestic demand, leaving Congo a net importer of refined products. Manufacturing is small and concentrated in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, with named operating plants including CORAF, Dangote Cement Congo at Mfila at 1.5 million tonnes per annum, and SARIS Congo sugar at Nkayi at approximately 70,000 tonnes per year.

The country's standout deliverability asset is the deepwater Port of Pointe-Noire. Congo Terminal, operated by AGL with APM Terminals, has handled more than 1 million TEU per year since 2022 against capacity of about 1.2 million TEU, with a 270-metre quay at 16 metres depth taking vessels up to 8,500 TEU, and a Môle Est terminal of about 1.3 million TEU under construction. Pointe-Noire is a genuine transshipment and transit hub for landlocked DRC, the Central African Republic, Chad and eastern Gabon and Cameroon. On economic complexity, however, Congo sits in the bottom tier: OEC places its ECI at approximately minus 1.67, ranking around 125th of 130 in 2024, a rank that has worsened materially over the past decade. Revealed comparative advantage above unity is confined to crude petroleum and wood products. The product-space implication is that the realistic near-term diversification moves are short steps adjacent to what Congo already does: moving wood up the ladder from logs and rough wood to sawnwood and then panels and joinery, capturing downstream value in petroleum, and prospectively producing fertiliser from its own potash. High-complexity leaps are not credible on current capabilities.

The endowment in depth

Congo is a classic "endowment-rich, processing-poor" mineral economy — it holds world-class deposits but operates essentially no domestic smelting, refining or beneficiation of metals. The Sintoukola Basin in Kouilou (~70–96 km north of Pointe-Noire) hosts the Kola and Dougou/DX sylvinite (potash) deposits; Kore Potash (97% via Sintoukola Potash) targets 2.2 Mtpa of muriate of potash over a ~31-year mine life, and signed a fixed-price EPC contract with PowerChina in Brazzaville on 19 November 2024 priced at US$1.929 billion, of which approximately US$708.9 million is allocated to transport links and utility pipelines — though no potash is produced today and the project remains under-financed. Iron ore is present in multiple large banded-iron-formation deposits: Zanaga (Lékoumou) holds a 6.9-billion-tonne resource and 2.1-billion-tonne reserve at ~30–35% Fe; Avima and Badondo carry high-grade hematite (≈58–70% Fe); Nabeba is ≈1.5 billion tonnes. Sapro's Mayoko mine delivered a first ~800 tonnes in August 2024 and Mbalam-Nabeba (Sangha Mining) began technical construction in November 2024, but the sector is pre-scale and beset by ICSID/ICC arbitration over expropriated permits. Small-scale gold (~150 kg/yr) and diamonds (~50,000 carats/yr), polymetallic occurrences at Boko-Songho/Yanga-Koubenza, magnesium salts at Loémé and coastal-basin phosphate complete the mineral picture — with no domestic metal refining capacity.

Energy is the economy's centre of gravity. Proven crude reserves are ≈1,811 million barrels; production is ≈265,000 bopd in 2024 (OPEC reported 271,301 bbl/d for December 2023 against a 277,000 bpd 2024 quota), almost entirely offshore from the Moho-Bilondo, Nene and Djeno-area fields operated by TotalEnergies, Eni and Perenco alongside SNPC, and exported raw, predominantly to China. Proved gas reserves are ≈10 trillion cubic feet; the Eni-operated Congo LNG project (Marine XII; Eni 65%, Lukoil 25%, SNPC 10%) shipped its first cargo at end-February 2024 via Tango FLNG (≈0.6 Mtpa), with Phase 2 Nguya FLNG (2.4 Mtpa) targeting a combined ≈3 Mtpa — but that LNG is Eni-marketed and sold mainly to Europe, not intra-Africa. Congo flared ≈64 Bcf of gas in 2022. Downstream, the CORAF refinery at Pointe-Noire processes ≈1 million tonnes/yr (≈21,000 bpd; actual output ≈840,000 t/yr) and meets ≈70% of domestic demand, leaving Congo a net importer of refined product (≈USD 140 million imported in 2023); the USD 600 million Atlantic/Fouta refinery (2.5 Mtpa, expandable to 5 Mtpa) is under construction near Pointe-Noire but not yet operational.

Power capacity is ≈610 MW (2019): hydro at Imboulou (120 MW), Moukoukoulou (74 MW) and Liouesso (≈19–20 MW), a gas-fired plant at Pointe-Noire (≈300 MW) and a Brazzaville thermal plant (≈32.5 MW), against a technically feasible hydro potential reported as a wide range (≈3,942 MW per ANDRITZ, up to ≈22,000 MW theoretical); the grid is unreliable with very high technical and non-technical losses. Forestry is the second export sector after oil (~5% of GDP): forest cover is ≈22.4 million ha (≈65% of land area), ≈14.7 million ha allocated as concessions, and Congo supplies ~24% of Congo Basin log production. Sawnwood output was ≈303,000 m³ in 2020 (down from ≈400,000 m³ in 2018) with ≈222,000 m³ exported, while veneer (≈29,000 m³) and plywood (≈8,000 m³) remain thin; okoumé and sapelli account for two-thirds of logs, and a log-export ban (Forest Code Law 33-2020, reinforced by a CEMAC decision effective 2023) is forcing primary processing. Agriculture is largely subsistence — ≈5% of GDP but ≈40% of the workforce; cassava is the dominant staple, sugarcane and tobacco the main cash crops, SARIS Congo (SOMDIAA) at Nkayi produces ≈70,000 tonnes/yr of sugar, and the country is not food self-sufficient, importing more than FCFA 600 billion/yr of food.

The existing industrial base is small and concentrated in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire — processed foods (flour, sugar), brewing, cigarettes, soap, cement, sawn wood and refined petroleum. Named plants include CORAF, Dangote Cement Congo at Mfila (1.5 Mtpa, operational since September 2017; national cement output ≈2.3 Mt in 2023) and SARIS sugar at Nkayi. Four Special Economic Zones are designated — Pointe-Noire (≈3,544 ha; oil/port/petrochemical/metals), Brazzaville-Maloukou (≈164,100 ha phased; palm oil/agro-processing), Oyo-Ollombo and Ouesso (wood processing, agribusiness) — with an Arise IIP partnership advancing the Pointe-Noire zone, but most SEZ industrial capacity is pre-operational and manufacturing value-added per capita sits well below the world median (≈USD 548, UNIDO 2025). Human capital is young and urban (≈47% under 18; over half in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire) with specialised clusters around offshore oil services and timber, but the World Bank flags weak human capital and TVET misalignment, and jobs growth lags non-oil revenue growth (3% vs 11%). The standout deliverability asset is the deepwater Port of Pointe-Noire: Congo Terminal (AGL, ex-Bolloré, with APM Terminals) has handled more than 1 million TEU/yr since 2022 (capacity ≈1.2 million TEU; new 270 m quay at 16 m depth; vessels up to 8,500 TEU), with a ≈€400 million Môle Est terminal (≈1.3 million TEU) under construction — a genuine transshipment and transit hub for landlocked DRC, CAR, Chad and eastern Gabon/Cameroon, though the Congo-Ocean Railway (CFCO) to Brazzaville (≈510 km) is in poor condition and the northern timber and iron zones are weakly connected.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Congo sits in the bottom tier of global economic complexity. OEC places its ECI value at ≈ −1.67, ranking ≈125th of 130 in 2024, a rank that has worsened materially over the past decade (≈100th in 2017 on the legacy OEC series), driven by deepening oil concentration and the absence of export diversification. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) is confined narrowly to crude petroleum and wood products (sawn wood, rough wood). Top exports in 2024 were crude petroleum (USD 5.43B), "refined copper" (USD 1.85B), refined petroleum (USD 328M), tin ores (USD 146M) and sawn wood (USD 145M) — but the large refined-copper and tin-ore lines are overwhelmingly transit and re-export of DRC and Zambian metal through Pointe-Noire, not Congolese production, and must not be read as domestic manufacturing capability.

The product-space implication is stark. With so few embedded productive capabilities, the credible near-term diversification moves are short-distance steps adjacent to what Congo already does: moving wood up the ladder from logs and rough wood to sawnwood and then panels and joinery, capturing downstream value in petroleum (refined products, LPG) and, prospectively, fertiliser from its own potash. The Harvard Growth Lab Atlas characterises such oil-concentrated economies as having few feasible diversification opportunities from existing capabilities, and high-complexity leaps are not credible on current capabilities. (The Atlas's exact COG ECI value and rank could not be extracted directly, so the OEC figures are used as a labelled proxy.)

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

The trump card is tropical sawnwood (HS 4407), advancing toward veneer and plywood (4408/4412). It is chosen not for the biggest raw endowment but for the best combination of the five tests — input advantage, existing processing, competitiveness, deliverability and continental demand. The input base is genuinely world-class: ≈22.4 million ha of forest (≈65% of land area), with Congo supplying roughly a quarter of Congo Basin log output and okoumé and sapelli commanding premium markets. Crucially, processing already exists and is being forced up the ladder: ITTO recorded ≈303,000 m³ of sawnwood production and ≈222,000 m³ of sawnwood exports in 2020, and the 2020 Forest Code's log-export ban — reinforced by the CEMAC 2023 decision — legally mandates domestic transformation, a policy mechanism rather than a mere aspiration. Deliverability is real: Pointe-Noire is a deepwater port handling more than 1 million TEU with direct coastal access, unlike the landlocked timber economies against which Congo competes, and continental demand for sawn timber, panels and joinery in construction and furniture is large and currently met by extra-African imports.

The limits are honest. Today under 1% of Congolese timber goes to other African countries — the trade is China and EU-oriented — and secondary processing is thin and has actually fallen (veneer ≈29,000 m³, plywood ≈8,000 m³ in 2020). Illegality and governance risks pervade the sector, and the northern forests are poorly connected to the port. What would undermine the position is a failure to enforce the log ban (continued raw-log leakage), persistent power and rail constraints, and competition from Gabon's more advanced Nkok SEZ wood cluster. But on the criterion that matters most — existing operating processing plus coastal deliverability — sawnwood is the only category Congo can credibly supply to Africa in the near term, a judgement made on the balance of evidence rather than on a quantified market share.

Current reality

Congo is a small, coastal, hydrocarbon-dependent Central African economy of about 6.1 million people with GDP of roughly USD 15.7 billion on the OEC basis, against approximately USD 70.8 billion reported by the World Bank on a different national-accounts basis for 2024 — a discrepancy the audit reports rather than reconciles. Oil supplies about half of GDP and roughly 80 per cent of exports. Total exports were approximately USD 8.54 billion in 2024, with principal destinations China at around USD 4.21 billion, then India, Thailand, Singapore and Saudi Arabia — overwhelmingly extra-African and Asia-weighted. Intra-African exports are negligible for Congo, and under 1 per cent of its timber goes to other African countries. The audit is direct on the consequence: Congo's raw-commodity, Asia-weighted export structure is the antithesis of a continental finished-goods supplier today.

The operating environment constrains what can be built on that base. Installed power capacity is about 610 MW nationally, with an unreliable grid, very high technical and non-technical losses and frequent outages, repeatedly cited by the World Bank as the binding business constraint on industrialisation. The Congo-Ocean Railway linking Pointe-Noire to Brazzaville over about 510 kilometres is in poor condition, and the northern timber zones are weakly connected to the port. Public debt stands at approximately 97.4 per cent of GDP in 2025 and the country remains in debt distress, with legal insecurity in the extractive sector, a lapsed EITI membership, and foreign direct investment into genuine processing that remains thin and largely Chinese-financed. Four Special Economic Zones are designated — Pointe-Noire, Brazzaville-Maloukou, Oyo-Ollombo and Ouesso — but most SEZ industrial capacity is pre-operational.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 11 candidate lines · will change

Republic of the Congo’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Republic of the Congo’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Republic of the Congo will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Republic of the Congo’s 11 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 1Strong Contender 1Emerging 5Aspirational 3Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum products

Crude feedstock + CORAF + Fouta refinery (under construction) · Maturity: Operating sub-scale (net importer) · Competitiveness: Very large (>USD 120B/yr fuel & hydrocarbon-service imports)
EMERGING
USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)
271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....
271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.
271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c
271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara
271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 223.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: Energy Capital Power/OEC/APPO · 2023/2024/2026

Crude petroleum

3rd-largest SSA producer; ~1,811 Mbbl reserves · Maturity: Raw (exported unprocessed) · Competitiveness: Globally not continentally traded
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 11.08 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 4.81 bnCote dIvoire USD 2.89 bnEgypt USD 1.74 bnSenegal USD 952.2 mTunisia USD 506 mGhana USD 124.9 mZambia USD 55.6 mZimbabwe USD 2.5 m

Source: OPEC/World Bank · 2021/2025

LPG / petroleum gases & LNG

Marine XII gas; Congo LNG operational · Maturity: Operational, Europe-oriented · Competitiveness: Large (LPG cooking)
EMERGING
USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas
271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane
271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes
271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene
271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711
271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas
271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: EIA/Eni · 2024

Cane sugar

SARIS Nkayi ~70,000 t/yr surplus · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Regional
EMERGING
USD 8.84 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
170111Raw cane sugar (excluding added flavouring or colouring)
170112Sugars; beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170113Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing added flavouri
170114Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form, other than as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this chapter, not containing add
170191Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, containing added flavouring or colouring matter
170199Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form, not containing added flavouring or colouring matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 997.1 mNigeria USD 981.1 mAlgeria USD 931.8 mSudan USD 796.2 mEgypt USD 728.9 mDjibouti USD 424.9 mSomalia USD 393.7 mKenya USD 391.1 m

Source: SOMDIAA/FAOSTAT · 2023

Cement

Dangote Mfila 1.5 Mtpa operational; limestone · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Regional (CEMAC)
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 3.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Dangote/Trading Economics · 2017/2023

Iron ore

World-class deposits (Zanaga 6.9Bt; Avima/Badondo high-grade) · Maturity: Raw, pre-scale (Mayoko first 800t) · Competitiveness: Input to continental steel
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: Zanaga Iron Ore/USGS · 2020/2024

Tropical sawnwood (okoumé/sapelli)

Congo Basin forest endowment + existing sawmills + log-export ban + Pointe-Noire port · Maturity: Semi-finished (sawing); next step kiln-dried/graded · Competitiveness: Large, under-supplied; intra-African <1% today
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.78 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, san
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped length
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped le
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 9 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 728.6 mAlgeria USD 312.7 mMorocco USD 287.1 mSouth Africa USD 114.3 mLibya USD 46.2 mSomalia USD 44.5 mKenya USD 41.3 mSenegal USD 36.2 m

Source: ITTO; MEF; OEC · 2020/2024

Refined copper / tin ores (transit)

Pointe-Noire transit of DRC/Zambia metal, not domestic production · Maturity: Not Congolese capability · Competitiveness: n/a
GREY
USD 1.36 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260900Tin ores and concentrates
740311Copper; refined, unwrought, cathodes and sections of cathodes
740312Copper; refined, unwrought, wire-bars
740313Copper; refined, unwrought, billets
740319Copper; refined, unwrought, n.e.c. in item no. 7403.1
740321Copper; copper-zinc base alloys (brass) unwrought
740322Copper; copper-tin base alloys (bronze) unwrought
740323Copper-nickel base alloys "cupro-nickel" or copper-nickel-zinc base alloys "nickel silver" . . .
740329Copper; copper alloys n.e.c. in heading no. 7403 (other than master alloys of heading no. 7405)

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.1 bnSouth Africa USD 209.7 mAlgeria USD 20.1 mZimbabwe USD 12.7 mTunisia USD 8.8 mMorocco USD 4.5 mUganda USD 3.1 mTanzania USD 1.4 m

Source: OEC · 2024

Veneer & plywood

Same forest base; SEZ wood ambitions · Maturity: Light secondary; capacity thin/declining · Competitiveness: Large (panels imported)
EMERGING
USD 856.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440810Wood; coniferous, sheets for veneering (including those obtained by slicing laminated wood), for plywood or similar lami
440831Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, dark red meranti, light red meranti, meranti bakau, s
440839Wood, of tropical wood; as in Subheading note 2 to this Chapter, n.e.c. in heading no. 4408.31, sheets for veneer or ply
440890Wood; n.e.c. in heading no. 4408, sheets for veneer or plywood, other wood sawn lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or
441210Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood; of bamboo
441213Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood <= 6 mm thick, with at least one outer ply of tropical...
441214Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood <= 6 mm thick, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous...
441219Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood <= 6 mm thick (excluding plywood of subheading...
441222Veneered panels and similar laminated wood with at least one outer ply of tropical wood specified...
441223Veneered panels and similar laminated wood with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood...
441229Veneered panels and similar laminated wood with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood...
441231Plywood; consisting only of sheets of wood (not bamboo), each ply 6mm or thinner, with at least one outer ply of tropica
441232Plywood consisting solely of sheets of wood <= 6 mm thick, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous...
441233Plywood; with sheets of wood only; not bamboo; each ply 6mm or less, with at least one outer ply of alder, ash, beech, birch, cherry, chestnut, elm, eucalyptus, hickory, horse chestnut, lime, maple, oak, plane, poplar, aspen, robinia, tulipwood or walnut
441234Plywood; consisting only of sheets of wood (not bamboo), each ply 6mm or thinner, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood not listed in subheading 4412.33
441239Plywood; consisting only of sheets of wood (not bamboo), each ply 6mm or thinner, with both outer plies of coniferous wood
441241Plywood, veneered panels and similar laminated wood; laminated veneered lumber (LVL); with at least one outer ply of tropical wood
441242Laminated veneered lumber (LVL); with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood
441249Laminated veneered lumber (LVL); with both outer plies of coniferous wood
441251Blockboard, laminboard and battenboard; with at least one outer layer of tropical wood
441252Blockboard, laminboard and battenboard; with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood, (not containing particle board)
441259Blockboard, laminboard and battenboard; with both outer plies of coniferous wood
441291Plywood; n.e.c. in heading 4412, with at least one outer ply of tropical wood
441292Plywood; n.e.c. in heading 4412, with at least one outer ply of non-coniferous wood
441293Veneered panels and similar laminated wood with at least one layer of particle board (excluding...
441294Blockboard, laminboard and battenboard (not bamboo, and other than plywood consisting only of sheets of wood each ply 6mm or thinner)
441299Plywood; n.e.c. in heading 4412, with both outer plies of coniferous wood
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 286.5 mNigeria USD 159.8 mMorocco USD 80.3 mAlgeria USD 53.5 mSouth Africa USD 45.4 mSomalia USD 23.9 mMauritius USD 18 mGhana USD 16 m

Source: ITTO · 2020

Potassic fertiliser (MOP)

Globally significant Sintoukola sylvinite; coastal · Maturity: Pre-production (EPC 2024) · Competitiveness: Very large (Africa net importer; SSA top-5 import-reliant)
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 782.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
310410Carnallite, sylvite and other crude natural potassium salts (excluding those in pellet or similar...
310420Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium chloride
310430Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, potassium sulphate
310490Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; potassic, n.e.c. in heading no. 3104
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.
Procuring agency (indicative): Agricultural parastatals · Input Subsidy Programs · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Republic of the Congo imported USD 4.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 182.4 mMorocco USD 112.8 mEgypt USD 78.3 mCote dIvoire USD 58 mZimbabwe USD 57.3 mNigeria USD 38.1 mKenya USD 35.9 mMali USD 34.2 m

Source: Kore Potash/USGS/IFDC · 2024/2025

Builders' joinery & wooden furniture

Downstream of sawnwood; SEZ targets · Maturity: Largely absent · Competitiveness: Large
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 259.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
441810Windows, French-windows, frames, of wood
441811Wood; windows, French-windows and their frames; of tropical wood
441819Wood; windows, French-windows and their frames; (of other than tropical wood)
441820Doors, frames and thresholds, of wood
441821Wood; doors and their frames and thresholds, of tropical wood;
441829Wood; doors and their frames and thresholds, (of other than tropical wood)
441830wood; posts and beams other than products of subheadings 4418.81 to 4418.89
441840Wood; shuttering for concrete constructional work
441850Wood; shingles and shakes
441860Wood: posts and beams
441871Flooring panels for mosaic floors, assembled, of wood
441872Flooring panels, multilayer, assembled, of wood (excluding for mosaic floors)
441873Wood; assembled flooring panels, of bamboo or with at least the top layer (wear layer) of bamboo
441874Wood; assembled flooring panels, not of bamboo or with at least the top layer (wear layer) of bamboo, for mosaic floors
441875Wood; assembled flooring panels, not of bamboo or with at least the top layer (wear layer) of bamboo, multilayer
441879Wood; assembled flooring panels, n.e.c in headings 4418.73, 4418.74 or 4418.75
441881Wood; engineered structural timber products, glue-laminated timber (glulam)
441882Wood; engineered structural timber products, cross-laminated timber (CLT or X-lam)
441883Wood; engineered structural timber products, I beams
441889Wood; engineered structural timber products, other than glue-laminated timber (glulam), cross-laminated timber (CLT or X-lam), or I beams
441890Builders' joinery and carpentry, of wood, incl. cellular wood panels (excluding windows, French...
441891Wood; builders' joinery and carpentry of wood n.e.c. in heading no. 4418, of bamboo
441892Wood; builders' joinery and carpentry of wood n.e.c. in heading no. 4418, cellular wood panels
441899Wood; builders' joinery and carpentry of wood n.e.c. in heading no. 4418, other than of bamboo or cellular wood panels
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 68.3 mLibya USD 25.1 mSouth Africa USD 20.8 mAlgeria USD 16.4 mNigeria USD 11 mEgypt USD 10 mEthiopia USD 7.7 mBotswana USD 7 m

Source: zes.gouv.cg · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Republic of the Congo is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Republic of the Congo buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Republic of the Congo is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 4.63 bn

Republic of the Congo’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

11

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierRepublic of the Congo imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleum productsEMERGINGUSD 223.6 mUSD 110.54 bn
Potassic fertiliser (MOP)ASPIRATIONALUSD 4.3 mUSD 782.2 m
CementEMERGINGUSD 3.9 mUSD 2.9 bn
Builders' joinery & wooden furnitureASPIRATIONALUSD 0.9 mUSD 259.3 m
Veneer & plywoodEMERGINGUSD 0.7 mUSD 856.8 m
LPG / petroleum gases & LNGEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 10.27 bn
Cane sugarEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 8.84 bn
Crude petroleumCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0.1 mUSD 11.08 bn
Iron oreASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 2.85 bn
Tropical sawnwood (okoumé/sapelli)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 1.78 bn
Refined copper / tin ores (transit)GREYUSD 0 mUSD 1.36 bn

Left-hand column: what Republic of the Congo itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Republic of the Congo’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 11 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Republic of the Congo’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Republic of the Congo. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Republic of the Congo’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Republic of the Congo’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01South AfricaUSD 21.35 bn
02NigeriaUSD 21.13 bn
03EgyptUSD 16.21 bn
04MoroccoUSD 11.52 bn
05DR CongoUSD 7.8 bn
06LibyaUSD 5.17 bn
07KenyaUSD 5.12 bn
08GhanaUSD 5.09 bn
09Cote dIvoireUSD 3.63 bn
10TunisiaUSD 2.17 bn
11AlgeriaUSD 2.16 bn
12SenegalUSD 988.4 m
13SudanUSD 796.2 m
14SomaliaUSD 462.1 m
15DjiboutiUSD 424.9 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Republic of the Congo. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Republic of the Congo would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Republic of the Congo to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Enforce the log-export ban

Rigorous enforcement of the 2020 Forest Code log-export ban (reinforced by the CEMAC 2023 decision) is needed to keep raw logs in-country and force domestic transformation; continued raw-log leakage would undermine the whole sawnwood-to-panels ladder.

02

Build kiln-drying, grading and panel lines

Investment in kiln-drying, grading, veneer and plywood lines is required, with SEZ Ouesso and Pointe-Noire secured as operating tenants with anchor investors, plus reliable power to run the mills.

03

Rehabilitate rail and northern corridors

The decrepit CFCO railway and northern road corridors must be rehabilitated to connect the timber and iron zones to Pointe-Noire, as those zones are today weakly linked to the port.

04

AfCFTA certification and harmonised standards

AfCFTA rules-of-origin certification, together with phytosanitary and grading standards harmonised for African buyers, is a prerequisite for supplying sawn timber, panels and joinery to the continent.

05

Kola potash to financial close and construction

For potassic fertiliser, Kola must reach financial close and complete construction (2.2 Mtpa MOP) with the marine export facility and grid/gas links delivered, and off-take diversified toward African buyers rather than a single global financier and a Brazil-first marketing plan.

06

Commission the Fouta refinery at scale

For refined products, the Fouta refinery must be commissioned at scale and run reliably, CORAF modernised, product-quality (sulphur) standards met for regional markets, and surplus beyond the ≈1.2 Mtpa domestic deficit made available for export.

The binding constraints
·

Power An unreliable grid of ~610 MW installed capacity carries very high technical and non-technical losses and frequent outages, and is repeatedly cited by the World Bank as the binding business constraint on industrialisation.

·

Logistics The CFCO railway is decrepit, the northern timber and iron zones are weakly linked to Pointe-Noire, and cross-border corridors remain incomplete.

·

Capital and macro fragility Public debt is ≈97.4% of GDP (2025) with the country in debt distress and carrying arrears; FDI is thin and largely Chinese-tied, and project-finance costs are high.

·

Skills Weak human capital and TVET misalignment leave a thin engineering and processing labour pool outside the oil sector.

·

Governance and security Pervasive illegality in forestry, legal insecurity in extractives, a lapsed EITI membership and weak institutions raise delivery risk across the board.

·

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency Crude and LNG flow to single off-takers (China; Eni-marketed LNG to Europe), CORAF depends on SNPC as sole crude buyer, and potash off-take is pre-committed to one financier under a Brazil-first marketing plan.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Republic of the Congo’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Power is the binding constraint. Installed capacity is approximately 610 MW with very high technical and non-technical losses and frequent outages. The World Bank repeatedly cites the unreliable grid as the binding business constraint on industrialisation, and reliable power for mills is a stated precondition for any move up the wood value ladder.

05

Logistics do not reach the resource. The Congo-Ocean Railway is decrepit and the northern timber and iron zones are weakly linked to Pointe-Noire, with cross-border corridors incomplete. Rehabilitation of the CFCO and the northern road corridors is a precondition for sawnwood and panels to become a continental supply.

06

Macro fragility limits project finance. Public debt stands at approximately 97.4 per cent of GDP in 2025, the country remains in debt distress with arrears, and FDI is thin and largely Chinese-tied, carrying high project-finance costs. Stabilising debt is listed as a cross-cutting condition.

07

The skills base is thin outside oil. The World Bank flags weak human capital and a TVET and higher-education base poorly aligned to labour-market needs as a structural constraint, with a thin engineering and processing labour pool outside oil. Jobs growth lags non-oil revenue growth at 3 per cent against 11 per cent.

08

Governance risk is concentrated in the trump-card sector. Illegality is pervasive in forestry, with legal insecurity in extractives, a lapsed EITI membership and weak institutions. Failure to enforce the log-export ban, permitting continued raw-log leakage, is named as one of the things that would undermine the sawnwood position.

09

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency runs through every energy line. Crude and LNG flow to single off-takers — China for crude, Eni-marketed LNG to Europe — CORAF depends on SNPC as sole crude buyer, and potash off-take is pre-committed to one financier under a Brazil-first marketing plan.

10

Special Economic Zones remain paper designations. Four SEZs are designated but most SEZ industrial capacity is pre-operational, and converting paper designations into operating tenants is listed as a cross-cutting condition. Secondary wood processing capacity is not only thin but has fallen, and Gabon's more advanced Nkok SEZ wood cluster is named as direct competition.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

The Republic of the Congo's Draft 1 bundle rests on one category that is operational rather than announced — tropical sawnwood, supported by an existing sawmilling base, a legally mandated log-export ban and deepwater coastal deliverability at Pointe-Noire — with veneer and plywood as the adjacent step and cement and cane sugar as finished goods already serving regional markets. Everything larger in the endowment is either raw, controlled by an external off-taker, or not yet built: crude is exported unprocessed, LNG is Eni-marketed to Europe, refined product leaves Congo a net importer, iron ore is pre-scale and in arbitration, and the globally significant Sintoukola potash basin produces nothing today and is targeted first at Brazil. What must be proven is therefore narrow and testable: rigorous enforcement of the log-export ban; investment in kiln-drying, grading, veneer and plywood lines with anchor tenants in the Ouesso and Pointe-Noire zones; reliable power for mills; rehabilitation of the CFCO and northern road corridors; and AfCFTA rules-of-origin certification with harmonised phytosanitary and grading standards for African buyers. On the potash and refining lines, the conditions are financial close and commissioning respectively, with off-take diversified toward African buyers rather than a single global trader — until then they are prizes against which capability is built, not capacity that can be claimed.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Republic of the Congo is shown 11 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Republic of the Congo to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2