Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
Democratic Republic of the CongoBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Democratic Republic of the Congo — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
13
Draft 1 candidate lines for Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Minister’s brief · for Doudou Fwamba Likunde Li-Botayi · Democratic Republic of the Congo
Minister Fwamba, Congo holds what a continent racing to electrify cannot do without: copper, and increasingly refined copper. You mined 3.3 million tonnes in 2024 — Africa's largest producer, the world's second — on reserves of 80 million tonnes, and unlike cobalt you have begun to refine at home: at Kamoa-Kakula your own 500,000-tonne smelter poured its first 99.7% anodes on 29 December, already moving to Europe by the Lobito Corridor. Africa imports copper wire, cable and semis in volume — buying abroad what states like yours could supply; refined Congolese copper is your claim on that flow. The Right of Supply converts the endowment into a 25-year first right to supply the continent's grids and cables — disciplined by Match-or-Release, so you meet the open market price or release the order. It is never a subsidy and never a captive contract; it holds only while you deliver. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction, Minister, is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Democratic Republic of the Congo
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Doudou Fwamba Likunde Li-Botayi, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Democratic Republic of the Congo · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Fwamba,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Democratic Republic of the Congo — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Democratic Republic of the Congo is in this room

The Democratic Republic of the Congo's strongest and most defensible endowment is copper. It mined 3.3 million tonnes in 2024, making it Africa's largest and the world's second-largest producer on reserves of 80 million tonnes, and unlike cobalt it has begun to climb the beneficiation ladder at home: the Kamoa-Kakula complex commissioned a 500,000 tonne per year direct-to-blister smelter that produced its first 99.7%-pure anodes on 29 December 2025, with those anodes already moving to Europe via the Lobito Corridor. The honest constraint is power and distance. Only about 1,775 MW is installed against roughly 42,000 MW of potential at Inga, electricity access reached only some 21% of the population in 2021, and the mineral belt lies more than 2,000 km from a port served by a shallow-draft river terminal at Matadi while Banana and Lobito are still ramping. Cobalt tells the same story in sharper form: an unrivalled position of roughly 76% of world mined supply, yet approximately 99% by value leaves as oxides and hydroxides with no refinery operating in-country.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Democratic Republic of the Congo, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Democratic Republic of the Congo

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
13draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s draft bundle. 13 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Refined copper (cathode/anode), Copper ore & concentrate, Cobalt hydroxide/intermediates. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 3 continental anchor · 4 strong contender · 3 emerging · 3 aspirational.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Democratic Republic of the Congo is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 13 candidate lines proposed for Democratic Republic of the Congo below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Democratic Republic of the Congo. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Democratic Republic of the Congo will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Democratic Republic of the Congo will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
13 lines
Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Democratic Republic of the Congo at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Democratic Republic of the Congo’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Democratic Republic of the Congo’s own capability audit.

Refined cobalt and battery-grade cobalt sulphate

The DRC holds roughly 76% of world mined cobalt supply and 55% of reserves, yet approximately 99% by value leaves as oxides and hydroxides and there is no operational refinery in-country. A sulphate refinery is planned only for around 2030, so the audit classes this as ASPIRATIONAL and not current capability.

Capability inversion

Complex manufactured goods

Manufacturing value added is about 8.2% of GDP and falling, and the ECI rank is 144 with complexity worsening over the decade. The audit states plainly that the DRC cannot credibly be allocated complex manufactured goods, and that product-space adjacencies run only towards refined metals and basic mineral chemicals.

Raw base · industrial screen

Palm oil

The DRC was the world's second-largest producer in the 1960s but is now a net importer, with domestic output around 300,000 tonnes a year against demand above 500,000 tonnes. PHC is the main industrial producer at roughly 30,000 hectares planted and about 90,000 tonnes crude, with a refinery only planned for 2028.

Capability inversion

Lithium conversion products

Manono is a world-class deposit but is pre-production, with first output scheduled for June 2026 and initial exports limited to spodumene concentrate and lithium sulphate rather than battery-grade material. Title is also contested through the Manono and AVZ arbitration.

Pre-production timing

Cross-border hydroelectric power

The Inga site offers roughly 42,000 MW of potential but only about 1,775 MW is installed and runs well below capacity. Inga 3 remains in development, with the World Bank approving a US$250 million first phase of a US$1 billion programme in June 2025, so the audit marks this ASPIRATIONAL.

Scale-matching

Tantalum, tin and gold at volume

These are world-leading or Africa-leading positions but remain raw and heavily artisanal, with conflict-mineral and smuggling concerns including M23 occupation of the Rubaya deposit. The audit conditions any allocation on conflict-free, traceable sourcing so nominees can pass the Cell Phone Test on warranty and reputational service, not just price.

Traceability
08 · Endowment
What Democratic Republic of the Congo actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Democratic Republic of the Congo. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo's endowment is documented at Tier 1 and is not in dispute. On cobalt it is an unrivalled global position: 220,000 tonnes mined in 2024, approximately 76% of world mine production, on reserves of 6,000,000 tonnes, around 55% of the global total, per the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries of January 2025. On copper it is Africa's largest and the world's second-largest producer at 3.3 million tonnes mined in 2024, roughly 11% of global output, on reserves of 80 million tonnes. On tantalum it ranks first in the world at 980 tonnes in 2023, about 41% of world supply, though heavily artisanal and concentrated in North and South Kivu and Maniema. Kibali is Africa's largest gold mine, sustaining roughly 750,000 ounces a year. Kipushi added 50,307 tonnes of zinc in 2024, and diamond output stood at 11.7 million carats in 2022. Beyond minerals, the country holds Africa's largest hydropower potential at the Inga site, approximately 42,000 MW, 155 million hectares of forest representing 60% of the Congo Basin and about 18% of the world's tropical forest, some 80 million hectares of largely uncultivated arable land, and the world's second-largest cassava crop at roughly 45.2 million tonnes in 2023.

The defining feature of this profile is the beneficiation gap. Approximately 99% by value of Congolese cobalt leaves the country as oxides and hydroxides, and there is no operational cobalt refinery; a sulphate refinery is planned only for around 2030. Copper, by contrast, has just crossed a threshold: the Kamoa-Kakula complex commissioned a 500,000 tonne per year direct-to-blister smelter that produced its first 99.7%-pure copper anodes on 29 December 2025, and those anodes have already moved to a Belgian refinery via the Lobito Corridor. Kamoa-Kakula itself produced 437,061 tonnes in 2024. The Lualaba Copper Smelter and legacy Gécamines facilities sit alongside it. Policy is explicitly directed at value addition, through the 2013 concentrate-export ban, the February 2025 cobalt export ban, 2026 to 2027 quotas of 87,000 tonnes a year, and a strategic quota reserved for value-adding national projects.

On economic complexity the audit is unsparing. The DRC ranks 144th on the Harvard Atlas Economic Complexity Index, and complexity has worsened over the decade for want of export diversification. Revealed comparative advantage is concentrated entirely in copper, cobalt and tin minerals and their first-stage chemicals: refined copper, cobalt, copper ore, raw copper, tin ores, cobalt oxides and hydroxides, and cobalt ore. Income sits above what complexity would predict because of natural-resource rents. Product-space adjacencies are thin, and the Atlas records few opportunities to diversify; realistic adjacencies run towards other refined metals and basic mineral chemicals rather than complex manufactures. The strategic implication the audit draws is precise: the DRC cannot credibly be allocated complex manufactured goods, but it has an unusually strong claim to refined metals and basic mineral and battery chemicals, the immediate rungs above its current raw exports, provided power and processing are built.

The endowment in depth

The Democratic Republic of the Congo's endowment is, first and above all, a mineral one, and it is documented at Tier-1 confidence. On cobalt it is an outright global monopoly: 220,000 tonnes mined in 2024 on USGS figures, roughly 76% of world mine supply, sitting on reserves of 6,000,000 tonnes — about 55% of the global total. Yet almost the entire flow, some 99% by value, leaves the country as cobalt oxides and hydroxides (HS 2822) or unwrought intermediates (HS 8105), with no operational refining in-country and a sulphate refinery only planned for around 2030; the February 2025 export ban and the 2026–27 quota of 87,000 tonnes a year are a deliberate attempt to force domestic value addition. On copper the DRC is the world's second-largest producer behind Chile and Africa's largest, at 3.3 million tonnes in 2024 (about 11% of global output) on reserves of 80 million tonnes. The Kamoa-Kakula complex alone produced 437,061 tonnes in 2024 and has commissioned a 500,000 tonne-a-year direct-to-blister smelter that cast its first 99.7%-pure copper anodes on 29 December 2025, alongside the Lualaba Copper Smelter and legacy Gécamines facilities. Beyond the copper-cobalt core the country is the world's leading tantalum (coltan) source — 980 tonnes in 2023, about 41% of world supply, but heavily artisanal across North and South Kivu and Maniema and shadowed by conflict, including M23 occupation of the Rubaya deposit. Kibali (Barrick/AngloGold/SOKIMO) is Africa's largest gold mine, sustaining roughly 750,000 ounces a year; the portfolio is completed by world-class lithium at Manono, 11.7 million carats of diamond (2022), and tin, tungsten and zinc, with Kipushi producing 50,307 tonnes of zinc in 2024.

Energy is at once the country's latent super-strength and its binding constraint. The Inga site offers around 42,000 MW of potential and the national technically-feasible total is close to 100,000 MW, yet only Inga I (351 MW, 1972) and Inga II (1,424 MW, 1982) are built — about 1,775 MW installed, and running well below nameplate. Grand Inga / Inga 3 (2,000–11,000 MW) is in development, with the World Bank approving a US$250 million first phase of a US$1 billion programme in June 2025. Electricity access is among the lowest in the world: about 21% of the population in 2021 on World Bank figures, with the IEA placing it nearer 9% in 2022 on a different methodology, against a National Energy Compact / Mission 300 target of 62% by 2030. Hydropower supplies roughly 86% of electricity; crude oil output is modest at about 7.5 million barrels in 2022 with negligible domestic refining, and renewables are mostly mining-linked, such as the Manono Phase I solar farm.

The agricultural and forestry base is vast but almost entirely unprocessed. The DRC is the world's second-largest cassava producer at about 45.2 million tonnes in 2023, behind Nigeria's 60.8 million tonnes, but the crop is overwhelmingly subsistence, with minimal industrial starch processing. Palm oil tells the sharpest cautionary tale: a country that was the world's #2 producer in the 1960s is now a net importer, producing about 300,000 tonnes a year against demand above 500,000 tonnes, with PHC (roughly 30,000 hectares planted and about 90,000 tonnes of crude) the main industrial producer and a refinery only planned for 2028. Forestry is continental in scale — 155 million hectares, 60% of the Congo Basin and about 18% of the world's tropical forest, holding prized hardwoods such as Afrormosia, Wenge, Sapele and Iroko — yet a national FSC standard was adopted only in 2025, very little area is certified, and most timber still leaves as logs or sawnwood. Around 80 million hectares of arable land is largely uncultivated, alongside coffee, cocoa, rubber and maize.

The industrial, human-capital and logistics base is thin and, in manufacturing, shrinking. Manufacturing value added is about 8.2% of GDP in 2024 and has been falling for five years, with MVA per capita far below the world median at roughly US$548 (UNIDO 2025). Industrial activity is concentrated in special economic zones — the Maluku pilot SEZ near Kinshasa (operators including Varun Beverages, Saphir Ceramics, Sopaco, K Timber and Refriango), the Kin-Malebo SEZ (ARISE IIP), the PPC/DRC Manufacturing S.A. cement plant near Kimpese at 400,000–500,000 tonnes a year, and newer zones at Kinsevere, Lubero and Musienene — with a US$12 billion China-Congo Industrial City planned at Maluku. Human capital rests on a labour force of about 38.5 million in 2024 with roughly 65% participation but around 73% underemployment; skills cluster in large-scale and artisanal mining (some 2 million artisanal miners in 2022), agriculture and river/rail logistics, with emerging technical training such as the Kamoa Center of Excellence. Logistics remain the structural handicap: the country is effectively landlocked, with only about 37 km of coastline and a mineral belt more than 2,000 km from any port. Matadi (river, 8.2 m draft, about 170,000 TEU a year) handles some 90% of containers but cannot take large vessels; the Banana deep-sea port is under construction (DP World / Mota-Engil / BII) with a 600 m quay, 17.5 m draft and 450,000 TEU capacity, expected to cut trade costs by about 12% and create some 85,000 jobs; and the Lobito Atlantic Railway, about 1,739 km to Angola's Atlantic coast, has been operational since 2024, carrying the first DRC copper to the United States in August 2024 and the first refined anodes to Belgium, with the competing TAZARA route to Dar es Salaam being modernised.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

The DRC is a textbook resource-dependent, low-complexity economy. It ranks 144th on the Harvard Growth Lab's Economic Complexity Index, and its complexity has worsened over the past decade, driven by a lack of export diversification; its income sits above what its complexity would predict only because of natural-resource rents. The extractive sector is about 39% of GDP, 95% of exports and 42% of fiscal revenue. Revealed comparative advantage is concentrated entirely in the copper-cobalt-tin complex and its first-stage chemicals — the DRC records RCA above 1, in fact world-leading export shares, in refined copper, cobalt, copper ore, raw copper, tin ores, cobalt oxides/hydroxides and cobalt ore, and is the world's largest exporter of several of these (OEC 2024). The 2024 trade structure bears this out: refined copper at US$19.5 billion, cobalt at US$3.05 billion, copper ore at US$3.03 billion, raw copper at US$1.12 billion and tin ores at US$602 million, with destinations heavily concentrated — China took roughly US$21.6 billion, about 69% of exports in 2023 — and the intra-African share very small.

Product-space adjacencies are thin: the knowhow embedded in current exports offers, in the Atlas's phrase, "few opportunities to diversify," and realistically runs toward other refined metals and basic mineral chemicals rather than complex manufactures. The strategic implication for an AU Right-of-Supply matrix is precise: the DRC cannot credibly be allocated complex manufactured goods, but it has an unusually strong claim to refined metals and basic mineral or battery chemicals — the immediate, defensible rungs above its current raw exports — provided power and processing are built.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

The DRC's single strongest defensible and improving continental supply position is refined and semi-refined copper (HS 7402/7403). The endowment is Tier-1 and unambiguous: 3.3 million tonnes mined in 2024 makes the country the world's second-largest copper producer and Africa's largest, about 11% of global output, on reserves of 80 million tonnes (USGS / Mining Data Online, 2025). Crucially — and unlike cobalt — copper is now genuinely climbing the beneficiation ladder inside the country: the Kamoa-Kakula complex (Ivanhoe / Zijin / DRC government) commissioned a 500,000 tonne-a-year direct-to-blister smelter that produced its first 99.7%-pure copper anodes on 29 December 2025, and those anodes have already moved to a Belgian refinery via the Lobito Corridor.

This matters because Africa imports large volumes of copper wire, cable and semis, so a continental supplier of cathode, anode and wire-rod is strategically valuable for grids, construction and electrification under AfCFTA. Copper also passes the Cell Phone Test better than any other Congolese product: it is a globally fungible, exchange-graded commodity in which Kamoa-Kakula's low-cost, high-grade, hydro-powered output can match open-market price, quality and delivery. The limits should be stated honestly. The runners-up are weaker — cobalt intermediates are an outright global monopoly but stuck pre-refining, and tantalum is world #1 but artisanal and conflict-tainted — while copper's own advance is recent: anode production began only in late December 2025 and should not be presented as established finished-goods capacity, and the smelter's roughly 240 MW power need must be met reliably without diesel backup.

Current reality

Gross domestic product stood at approximately US$77.7 billion in 2024 on World Bank current figures, with real growth of 6.2% in 2024 per the AfDB, driven by an extractive sector that accounts for roughly 39% of GDP, 95% of exports and 42% of fiscal revenue. GDP per capita is about US$721 nominal, or roughly US$1,890 in PPP terms, among the world's lowest; the Human Development Index reading is 0.481, ranked 180 of 193, and about 73.5% of the population lives on less than US$2.15 a day. The population is approximately 109.3 million, the fourth largest in Africa, with a labour force of about 38.5 million and participation near 65%. Underemployment is around 73% per the AfDB. Manufacturing value added is approximately 8.2% of GDP and has been falling over the last five years, with manufacturing value added per capita far below the world median of roughly US$548 on UNIDO 2025 benchmarks.

The binding constraint is power. Inga I and Inga II together provide about 1,775 MW of installed capacity against a national technically feasible potential of roughly 100,000 MW, and both operate well below nameplate. Around 21% of the population had electricity access in 2021 on World Bank figures, one of the lowest rates in the world; the IEA places it near 9% in 2022 on a different methodology, and both are reported rather than averaged. Logistics are improving from a very low base: the mineral belt sits more than 2,000 km from any port, Matadi is a river port of 8.2 metres draft handling around 90% of containers at about 170,000 TEU a year, the Banana deep-sea port is under construction, and the Lobito Atlantic Railway of roughly 1,739 km has been operational since 2024. Exports are heavily concentrated, with China taking around 69% of them, and intra-African export share is very small.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 13 candidate lines · will change

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Democratic Republic of the Congo’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Democratic Republic of the Congo will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 13 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 3Strong Contender 4Emerging 3Aspirational 3
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Palm oil

Historic #2; now net importer · Maturity: Net importer · Competitiveness: High
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 6.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
151110Vegetable oils; palm oil and its fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151190Vegetable oils; palm oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 6 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 18.7 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.32 bnKenya USD 838.9 mEthiopia USD 491.4 mSouth Africa USD 462 mDjibouti USD 451.6 mUganda USD 311.4 mMozambique USD 250.1 mSomalia USD 201.9 m

Source: USDA; Pulitzer · 2024

Gold (doré/refined)

Kibali Africa's largest ~750koz/yr + large ASM · Maturity: Semi (doré) · Competitiveness: High
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Barrick; USGS · 2025

Hydroelectric power (cross-border)

~42GW Inga potential; ~1.8GW installed · Maturity: Under-built · Competitiveness: Very high
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
271600Electrical energy
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 46.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: World Bank · 2025

Sawnwood/tropical hardwood

60% of Congo Basin forest · Maturity: Raw-to-semi · Competitiveness: Moderate-high
EMERGING
USD 1.78 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, san
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped length
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped le
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 9 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 728.6 mAlgeria USD 312.7 mMorocco USD 287.1 mSouth Africa USD 114.3 mLibya USD 46.2 mSomalia USD 44.5 mKenya USD 41.3 mSenegal USD 36.2 m

Source: FSC; FAO · 2025

Industrial diamond

Large producer · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Niche
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.75 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710210Diamonds; whether or not worked, but not mounted or set, unsorted
710221Diamonds; industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set
710229Diamonds; industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set
710231Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set
710239Diamonds; non-industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Botswana USD 970.9 mSouth Africa USD 578.4 mNamibia USD 111.7 mMauritius USD 76 mMorocco USD 5.8 mTunisia USD 3 mLiberia USD 1.2 mEgypt USD 0.9 m

Source: USGS · 2022

Refined copper (cathode/anode)

World #2 producer 3.3Mt; 500kt anode smelter live Dec 2025 · Maturity: Intermediate-to-refined · Competitiveness: High
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 1.36 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
740200Copper; unrefined, copper anodes for electrolytic refining
740311Copper; refined, unwrought, cathodes and sections of cathodes
740312Copper; refined, unwrought, wire-bars
740313Copper; refined, unwrought, billets
740319Copper; refined, unwrought, n.e.c. in item no. 7403.1
740321Copper; copper-zinc base alloys (brass) unwrought
740322Copper; copper-tin base alloys (bronze) unwrought
740323Copper-nickel base alloys "cupro-nickel" or copper-nickel-zinc base alloys "nickel silver" . . .
740329Copper; copper alloys n.e.c. in heading no. 7403 (other than master alloys of heading no. 7405)
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.1 bnSouth Africa USD 210.1 mAlgeria USD 20.1 mZimbabwe USD 12.7 mTunisia USD 9 mMorocco USD 4.5 mUganda USD 3.1 mTanzania USD 1.4 m

Source: USGS MCS; Ivanhoe Mines · 2025

Lithium spodumene conc./sulfate

Manono world-class; first output June 2026 · Maturity: Pre-production · Competitiveness: Very high
EMERGING
USD 982.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
253010Vermiculite, perlite and chlorites; unexpanded
253020Kieserite, epsomite (natural magnesium sulphates)
253040Natural micaceous iron oxides
253090Mineral substances; n.e.c. in chapter 25
283610Commercial ammonium carbonate and other ammonium carbonates
283620Carbonates; disodium carbonate
283630Carbonates; sodium hydrogen carbonate (sodium bicarbonate)
283640Carbonates; potassium carbonate
283650Carbonates; calcium carbonate
283660Carbonates; barium carbonate
283670Lead carbonates
283691Carbonates; lithium carbonate
283692Carbonates; strontium carbonate
283699Carbonates; n.e.c. in heading no. 2836 and other than lithium or strontium
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 4.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 215.9 mSouth Africa USD 206.8 mNigeria USD 109.1 mAlgeria USD 69 mMorocco USD 48.7 mTunisia USD 37 mTanzania USD 35.7 mEthiopia USD 29.2 m

Source: Zijin; Ecofin · 2026

Refined cobalt/sulphate

Refinery planned ~2030 · Maturity: Not yet produced · Competitiveness: Very high
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 360.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
283311Sodium sulphates; disodium sulphate
283319Sodium sulphates; other than disodium sulphate
283321Sulphates; of magnesium
283322Sulphates; of aluminium
283323Sulphates of chromium
283324Sulphates; of nickel
283325Sulphates; of copper
283326Sulphate of zinc
283327Sulphates; of barium
283329Sulphates; n.e.c. in item no. 2833.2
283330Alums
283340Peroxosulphates (persulphates)
810520Cobalt; mattes and other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy, unwrought cobalt, powders
810530Cobalt; waste and scrap
810590Cobalt; articles n.e.c. in heading no. 8105
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Procuring agency (indicative): Water utilities · Water Treatment · control: predominant. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 28.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 53 mEgypt USD 43.6 mMorocco USD 37.6 mNigeria USD 29.9 mDR Congo USD 28.1 mZambia USD 18.7 mTanzania USD 15.9 mAlgeria USD 14 m

Source: Fastmarkets; S&P Global · 2025

Copper ore & concentrate

Massive high-grade reserves 80Mt · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: High
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 353.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260300Copper ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 5 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Namibia USD 250.5 mZambia USD 103 mSouth Africa USD 0.3 mTanzania USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS MCS; OEC · 2024

Cassava & starch

World #2 producer ~45.2Mt · Maturity: Raw/subsistence · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 207.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
071410Vegetable roots and tubers; manioc (cassava), with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, wheth
071420Vegetable roots and tubers; sweet potatoes, with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether
071430Vegetable roots and tubers; yams (Dioscorea spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, w
071440Vegetable roots and tubers; taro (Colocasia spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, w
071450Vegetable roots and tubers; yautia (Xanthosoma spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried
071490Vegetable roots and tubers; arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes and similar roots and tubers (not manioc, sweet potat
110811Starch; wheat
110812Starch; maize (corn) starch
110813Starch; potato
110814Starch; manioc (cassava)
110819Starch; n.e.c. in item no. 1108.11 to 1108.14
110820Inulin
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Tanzania USD 35.3 mNigeria USD 21.7 mSouth Africa USD 21.7 mAlgeria USD 19.7 mKenya USD 13.5 mEgypt USD 9.3 mMorocco USD 9.2 mTunisia USD 7.6 m

Source: FAOSTAT · 2024

Cobalt hydroxide/intermediates

~76% world mine supply; 55% reserves · Maturity: Intermediate (no refining) · Competitiveness: High
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR
USD 136.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
282200Cobalt oxides and hydroxides; commercial cobalt oxides
810520Cobalt; mattes and other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy, unwrought cobalt, powders
810530Cobalt; waste and scrap
810590Cobalt; articles n.e.c. in heading no. 8105
Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Zambia USD 62.3 mNamibia USD 61.8 mTunisia USD 5.2 mSouth Africa USD 5 mMorocco USD 0.9 mEgypt USD 0.4 mGabon USD 0.3 mAlgeria USD 0.3 m

Source: USGS MCS; AfDB · 2025

Tantalum (coltan) ore/conc

World #1 ~41% supply · Maturity: Raw (artisanal) · Competitiveness: Niche
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 9.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
261510Zirconium ores and concentrates
261590Niobium, tantalum, vanadium ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 2.3 mZambia USD 1.8 mSouth Africa USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.4 mAlgeria USD 1.1 mTanzania USD 1 mZimbabwe USD 0.3 mMorocco USD 0.2 m

Source: USGS MCS · 2024

Tin ore (cassiterite)

World-leading exporter · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 0.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260900Tin ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Democratic Republic of the Congo imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Rwanda USD 0.3 m

Source: OEC; USGS · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Democratic Republic of the Congo is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Democratic Republic of the Congo buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Democratic Republic of the Congo is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 17.69 bn

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

13

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierDemocratic Republic of the Congo imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Hydroelectric power (cross-border)ASPIRATIONALUSD 46.6 mUSD 2.24 bn
Refined cobalt/sulphateASPIRATIONALUSD 28.1 mUSD 360.4 m
Palm oilASPIRATIONALUSD 18.7 mUSD 6.9 bn
Lithium spodumene conc./sulfateEMERGINGUSD 4.3 mUSD 982.1 m
Cassava & starchEMERGINGUSD 0.3 mUSD 207.6 m
Refined copper (cathode/anode)CONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0.2 mUSD 1.36 bn
Sawnwood/tropical hardwoodEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 1.78 bn
Gold (doré/refined)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Industrial diamondSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 1.75 bn
Copper ore & concentrateCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 353.9 m
Cobalt hydroxide/intermediatesCONTINENTAL ANCHORUSD 0 mUSD 136.7 m
Tantalum (coltan) ore/concSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 9.4 m
Tin ore (cassiterite)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 0.3 m

Left-hand column: what Democratic Republic of the Congo itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 13 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Democratic Republic of the Congo’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Democratic Republic of the Congo. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Democratic Republic of the Congo’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01EgyptUSD 3.55 bn
02South AfricaUSD 2.66 bn
03UgandaUSD 2.21 bn
04BotswanaUSD 1.13 bn
05KenyaUSD 893.7 m
06MoroccoUSD 677 m
07EthiopiaUSD 520.6 m
08AlgeriaUSD 480.3 m
09MozambiqueUSD 460.1 m
10DjiboutiUSD 451.6 m
11NamibiaUSD 424 m
12TunisiaUSD 329.7 m
13SomaliaUSD 246.4 m
14Burkina FasoUSD 196.1 m
15ZimbabweUSD 193.1 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Democratic Republic of the Congo. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Democratic Republic of the Congo would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Democratic Republic of the Congo to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Reliable industrial power to the copper belt

Inga 3 and/or dedicated hydro and solar must deliver reliable multi-hundred-MW blocks to the copper belt, and the Kamoa smelter's roughly 240 MW need must be met without diesel backup.

02

Export logistics at volume and reliability

Banana port completed and the Lobito and TAZARA corridors scaled to move refined metal reliably at volume, with the Lobito Atlantic Railway targeting 20 trains a week by 2027.

03

Processing capacity actually built

The planned cobalt sulphate refinery (around 2030) financed and built, copper anode-to-cathode-to-wire-rod capacity expanded, and tantalum and lithium conversion added.

04

Security and conflict-free traceability

The eastern conflict contained and transparent, ASM-free, conflict-free traceability established so Congolese metal can satisfy the Cell Phone Test on warranty and service, not just price.

05

Regional integration that favours Congolese metal

AfCFTA rules-of-origin and offtake arrangements that prioritise Congolese refined metal for African buyers over re-export to Asia.

The binding constraints
·

Power deficit Around 21% electrification in 2021 and chronic under-supply, in an economy where refining and smelting are power-intensive; this is the single biggest blocker to value addition.

·

Landlocked geography The mineral belt lies more than 2,000 km from the coast, Matadi is shallow-draft, and the Banana port and Lobito corridor are still ramping up.

·

Conflict and governance M23 and armed-group activity across the eastern 3T zones, corruption, weak rule of law and contested mining titles, such as the Manono/AVZ arbitration.

·

Chinese lock-in About 80% of copper and 76% of cobalt are Chinese-controlled, with refining capacity sited in China, limiting the DRC's freedom to redirect its value chains.

·

Concentration risk Roughly 69% of exports go to China and 95% of exports are commodities, leaving extreme exposure to a single buyer and to commodity-price swings.

·

Human capital and industrial base Low formal skills, manufacturing at about 8% of GDP and falling economic complexity leave a weak foundation for value addition.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Democratic Republic of the Congo’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Power is the single biggest blocker to value addition. Electrification stood at roughly 21% in 2021 with chronic under-supply, while refining and smelting are power-intensive. Inga 3 or dedicated hydro and solar must deliver reliable multi-hundred-MW blocks to the copper belt, and the Kamoa smelter's requirement of about 240 MW must be met without diesel backup.

05

The geography is against the mineral belt. The country is effectively landlocked with only about 37 km of Atlantic coastline, and the mineral wealth of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba sits more than 2,000 km from any port. Matadi is shallow-draft at 8.2 metres, while Banana and Lobito are still ramping; the Lobito Atlantic Railway is targeting 20 trains a week by 2027.

06

Conflict and governance remain unresolved. M23 and armed-group activity persists in the eastern 3T zones, alongside corruption, weak rule of law and contested mining titles such as the Manono and AVZ arbitration. The audit requires the eastern conflict to be contained and transparent, conflict-free traceability to be established.

07

Chinese control limits freedom to redirect value chains. Roughly 80% of copper mines and about 76% of cobalt are Chinese-controlled, and refining capacity sits in China. The audit notes that any AU allocation assumes this can be partially redirected, which is not yet demonstrated.

08

Export concentration is extreme. Around 69% of exports go to China, and commodity dependence runs to 95% of exports. Intra-African export share is very small, with regional trade consisting mostly of imports from South Africa and Zambia.

09

Human capital and the industrial base are thin. Formal skills are low, manufacturing sits at roughly 8% of GDP and complexity is falling. TVET and tertiary technical capacity are weak and were marked GREY in the audit for want of citable data; underemployment runs at about 73%.

10

Several headline strengths are forward-looking, not established. The copper smelter only began anode production in late December 2025, Manono lithium starts mid-2026 and the cobalt refinery is a plan for around 2030. The audit is explicit that these should not be presented as established finished-goods capacity.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

The DRC's Draft 1 bundle rests on one operating, exchange-graded position and a set of documented but unprocessed endowments behind it. Refined and semi-refined copper is the anchor because endowment, an operating domestic smelter and global fungibility now coincide; cobalt intermediates anchor as feedstock rather than finished battery material; copper ore and concentrate, tantalum, tin, gold and industrial diamond hold at the raw and semi stage. What must be proven is narrow and testable: the Kamoa-Kakula smelter sustaining at least 400,000 tonnes a year of 99.7% anode and demonstrating cathode and wire-rod output by 2027; financial close on the planned cobalt sulphate refinery with reliable power to it; Banana port operational and Lobito sustaining 20 trains a week; and electrification moving past roughly 40%. Lithium, cross-border hydropower, sawnwood, cassava starch and palm oil should be carried as capability-building allocations, valid as motivation rather than current capacity, with their own benchmarks: Manono first sulphate shipment in 2026, Inga 3 financial close, first FSC-certified Congolese sawnwood exports, and a commissioned palm-oil refinery in 2028. Escalation of the eastern conflict or loss of the Kamoa power supply would move the assessment downward.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Democratic Republic of the Congo is shown 13 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Democratic Republic of the Congo to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2