Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
Central African RepublicBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Central African Republic — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
10
Draft 1 candidate lines for Central African Republic
The Minister’s brief · for Hervé Ndoba · Central African Republic
Minister Ndoba, beneath the Central African Republic lies something no policy can manufacture and no rival can replicate: alluvial diamonds of which roughly four in five are gem-quality, valued near USD 227 a carat against the Democratic Republic of Congo's USD 16 — a premium written in geology, not in law. On 15 November 2024 the eleven-year Kimberley Process embargo was fully lifted, and your legal channel to the world reopened. Yet roughly three in ten of your stones still leak to Cameroon or Darfur, driven by a 12 per cent diamond tax against 3.25 in the DRC — leakage that is yours to reclaim. The Right of Supply grants Central African Republic a twenty-five-year first right to supply, disciplined by Match-or-Release so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — demand certainty against which your beneficiation can be built, stone by stone. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Central African Republic
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Hervé Ndoba, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Central African Republic · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Ndoba,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Central African Republic — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Central African Republic is in this room

The Central African Republic's strongest endowment is gem-quality rough diamonds. Roughly 80 per cent of its alluvial output is gem-quality, and Kimberley Process 2019 statistics record an average of about USD 227 per carat against the Democratic Republic of Congo's USD 16, a premium grounded in geology rather than policy; the eleven-year export embargo was fully lifted on 15 November 2024, restoring full participation in the legal rough trade. The honest constraint is that the beneficiation stage is raw, with no cutting, polishing or gold refining in the country, and that delivery is bounded by 131 MW of installed capacity, a 1,450 km corridor to Douala with transit often exceeding 20 days, and governance weakness reflected in the EITI suspension of November 2024. On this basis most of the country's allocations are properly classed Aspirational or Emerging, with gem-quality rough diamonds and gold its strongest contenders.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Central African Republic, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Central African Republic

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
10draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Central African Republic’s draft bundle. 10 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Gold (unwrought/dore), Gem-quality rough diamonds. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 strong contender · 2 emerging · 4 aspirational · 2 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Central African Republic is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 10 candidate lines proposed for Central African Republic below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Central African Republic. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Central African Republic will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Central African Republic will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
10 lines
Central African Republic’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Central African Republic at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Central African Republic’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Central African Republic’s own capability audit.

Cut and polished diamonds

There is no diamond cutting or polishing capability in the country and the supply is rough stones, not finished gems. Global cutting and polishing demand sits in India and the Gulf, not Africa, so the continental substitution prize for finished diamonds is limited.

Capability inversion

Refined gold to LBMA standard

There is no gold refining to LBMA standard in the country, so the position is raw or semi-processed dore only. Production is opaque and the Ndassima chain is controlled by foreign military-commercial actors, with Midas Ressources sanctioned by OFAC in June 2023.

Raw base · industrial screen

Wood-based panels and furniture

Feedstock is present and the value-add is labour-intensive, but the beneficiation stage today is recorded as absent. The audit classes this as Aspirational, with most value-add currently occurring offshore.

Capability inversion

Uranium concentrate from Bakouma

The Bakouma deposit holds 36,500 tonnes of uranium as inferred resources but has never been mined, and Areva, now Orano, suspended the project in 2012. Continental demand is niche with few African buyers.

Raw base · industrial screen

Iron ore

Historic deposits of around 3.5 million tonnes at Bangassou and Berberati are unmined and exploitation has ceased; the audit classes the category as grey or insufficient. Global demand is high but the landlocked penalty is decisive.

Scale-matching

Cassava and food staples

Output of 200,000 to 300,000 tonnes a year is a domestic staple surplus in raw form, and the audit classes the category as grey or insufficient against regional demand. No processing capability is documented.

Scale-matching
08 · Endowment
What Central African Republic actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Central African Republic. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

The Central African Republic's endowment is geological rather than industrial. The country is documented to host roughly 470 mineral occurrences and sites (World Bank, 2024), including diamond, gold, uranium, iron ore, copper, manganese, limestone, rutile, ilmenite and rare-earth occurrences. The defining asset is alluvial diamonds: roughly 80 per cent of output is gem-quality, an unusually high share, and Kimberley Process 2019 statistics record an average value of about USD 227 per carat against the Democratic Republic of Congo's USD 16 per carat. Reported production was 92,772 carats in 2021, against a historic reported range of 300,000 to 470,000 carats a year over the past decade. Mining is almost entirely artisanal, with an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 people working as artisanal diamond and gold miners. The Kimberley Process export embargo imposed in 2013 was fully lifted on 15 November 2024 at the annual plenary in Dubai, restoring the country as a full participant in the legal rough trade.

Gold is the second pillar. Reported production was around 900 kg in 2021, with actual output estimated at two to five tonnes a year. Ndassima, in Ouaka, is the nation's only industrialised gold mine, with a deposit valued by the government at an estimated USD 2.8 billion. It has been operated since about 2020 by Midas Ressources, linked to the Wagner Group and Africa Corps; OFAC sanctioned Midas Ressources in June 2023 for illicit gold dealings. Beyond the precious metals, the Bakouma uranium deposit holds inferred conventional resources of 36,500 tonnes of uranium recoverable to USD 260 per kilogramme, but it has never been mined and Areva, now Orano, suspended the project in 2012. Iron ore deposits at Bangassou and Berbérati, historically around 3.5 million tonnes, are no longer exploited.

The third endowment is forest. Central Africa holds around 40 per cent of Africa's forest and woodland area, and the country produced approximately 530,000 cubic metres of logs in 2017, of which nearly 280,000 cubic metres were exported as raw logs and around 80 per cent of sawnwood produced was exported. Agriculture accounts for about 43 per cent of GDP and employs roughly 75 per cent of the labour force, with cassava at 200,000 to 300,000 tonnes a year as the staple, cotton historically at 25,000 to 45,000 tonnes a year, and robusta coffee exports of about 2,100 tonnes in 2021, down more than 60 per cent from the 1990s. Revealed comparative advantage lies entirely in raw extractives and primary forestry. The country is not ranked in the Economic Complexity Index, falling below the Atlas inclusion threshold of population above one million and average trade above USD 1 billion, so no published diversification pathway exists.

The endowment in depth

Minerals and metals form the country's defining base, real in the ground but barely processed. The World Bank documents roughly 470 mineral occurrences and sites (2024), spanning diamond, gold, uranium, iron ore, copper, manganese, limestone, rutile, ilmenite and rare-earth occurrences. Diamond output was reported at 92,772 carats in 2021 (USGS Minerals Yearbook 2020–21), against a historic reported range of 300,000–470,000 carats per year over the past decade; roughly 80% is gem-quality (IPIS/USGS), and Kimberley Process 2019 statistics put CAR's average stone at around USD 227 per carat versus DRC's USD 16 per carat — an unusual quality premium. Mining is almost entirely artisanal, with an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 people working as artisanal diamond and gold miners (World Diamond Council via JCK 2024). The Kimberley Process export embargo imposed in 2013 was fully lifted on 15 November 2024 at the KP plenary in Dubai. Gold was reported at about 900 kg in 2021, with actual production estimated at 2–5 tonnes per year; Ndassima in Ouaka is the nation's only industrialised gold mine, its deposit valued by the CAR government at an estimated USD 2.8 billion, operated since about 2020 by Midas Ressources (linked to the Wagner Group/Africa Corps and sanctioned by OFAC in June 2023), with CSIS estimating output of up to USD 290 million in gold annually. The Bakouma uranium deposit holds inferred conventional resources of 36,500 tU recoverable to USD 260/kgU but has never been mined, Areva (now Orano) having suspended the project in 2012; iron deposits at Bangassou/Berbérati (historically ~3.5 Mt) and copper, manganese and rare-earth showings remain occurrences only. Crucially, the processing position is raw: no diamond cutting or polishing, no gold refining to LBMA standard, and no base-metal smelting exists in the country.

Energy is the binding constraint on any manufacturing ambition. Installed capacity rose from about 41 MW (2015–2020) to 91 MW (2021–22) and 131 MW (2023), with generation of 183 GWh in 2023 (up from 145 GWh in 2017), almost entirely hydropower. The backbone is the Boali I/II/III complex (~38.75 MW nameplate) on the Mbali River supplying Bangui, supplemented by a 25 MWp solar plant with storage at Danzi commissioned with World Bank support in 2023. There is no oil or gas production; all petroleum fuel is imported via the Douala corridor or barged on the Oubangui, and Russia donated 30,000 tonnes of diesel in early 2025 (roughly six months of consumption, per Coface). Hydropower potential is large — about 30 identified sites, with planned projects at Lobaye (75 MW), Dimoli (180 MW), Kotto (40 MW) and Lancrenon (20 MW) — but these are announced or planned, not installed.

Agriculture, forestry and fisheries anchor livelihoods: agriculture is about 43% of GDP (2017) and employs roughly 75% of the labour force. Food crops dominate, with cassava at 200,000–300,000 tonnes per year as the staple. Cash crops are weak and conflict-damaged: cotton ran 25,000–45,000 tonnes per year historically at yields of about 288 kg/ha (low by African standards), with processing limited to ginning (SOCADETEX) and much capacity looted or idle; robusta coffee exports were about 2,100 tonnes in 2021, down more than 60% from the 1990s against a 1988/89 peak of about 20,000 tonnes. Forestry is the standout renewable endowment — Central Africa holds about 40% of Africa's forest and woodland area (FAO), and CAR produced roughly 530,000 m³ of logs in 2017, of which nearly 280,000 m³ were exported as raw logs and about 80% of sawnwood produced was exported, meaning most value-addition occurs offshore.

The existing industrial base, human capital and logistics enablers are all thin. Industry including construction was 20.71% of GDP (2023, World Bank), but manufacturing value added is small and concentrated near Bangui — sawmills, breweries, cotton ginning and small food and beverage processing — with no operational special economic zone or industrial park and a UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance ranking at or near the bottom globally. Human capital is a fundamental constraint: the labour force is about 1.9 million (Verité, 2019) with roughly 77% in agriculture, the Human Capital Index stood at 0.26 (2020), the country ranked 191st of 193 on the HDI (2022), and literacy and TVET bases are extremely weak with infrastructure looted and teachers displaced. Infrastructure compounds this: the country is landlocked and transit-dependent, with only about 900 km paved of some 24,500 km of road (under 4%), a single paved corridor of roughly 1,450 km from Bangui to the Port of Douala with transit times often exceeding 20 days and more than 50 checkpoints reported, an Oubangui river route navigable only about six months a year, no railway at all, and Douala–Bangui transport costs more than double West African comparators.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

The Central African Republic has no Economic Complexity Index value, rank, trajectory or Atlas growth projection. The OEC states explicitly that CAR "does not have data regarding Economic Complexity Index" (2023 data), because the country falls below the Atlas of Economic Complexity inclusion threshold, which requires a population above one million and average trade above USD 1 billion. No published Atlas product-space diversification list or feasible-diversification pathway exists for it. In product-space terms, CAR sits in the sparse periphery with very few adjacent capabilities, and its revealed comparative advantage lies entirely in unprocessed primary goods — gold, gem diamonds, rough wood, sawn wood and marginal cotton — the export profile of a low-complexity, commodity-dependent economy.

That profile is confirmed by the trade structure. Total merchandise exports were about USD 113.6 million in 2023, composed (HS4) of unwrought gold at 63.9%, diamonds at 12.5%, rough wood at 6.68% and sawn wood at 4.16%, flowing principally to the UAE (40.9%), Pakistan (19.8%), Italy (12.6%), France (9%) and Cameroon (7.2%), with the trade balance structurally in deficit at about 20.6% of GDP (2022). Any complexity gain must therefore come from the most basic value-addition steps — cotton ginning to yarn, logs to kiln-dried sawnwood and furniture, artisanal gold to assayed doré, and rough diamond sorting and valuation towards cutting.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

The single most defensible continental supply position is gem-quality rough diamonds (HS 7102). Roughly 80% of CAR's diamond output is gem-quality (IPIS/USGS), and per Kimberley Process 2019 statistics the country's stones averaged around USD 227 per carat versus DRC's USD 16 per carat — a striking quality premium grounded in geology, not policy. Historic reported production ranged 300,000–470,000 carats per year (with 92,772 carats reported for 2021), and the eleven-year KP export embargo was fully lifted on 15 November 2024, restoring CAR as a full participant in the legal rough trade. This is the one category where the country holds a genuine, geologically-grounded and internationally-recognised endowment of above-average quality, an existing if informal production and valuation chain (BECDOR and the bureaux d'achat), and a re-opened legal export channel — a matter of demand certainty for a well-corroborated endowment rather than any near-term claim on installed capacity, since continental cutting demand sits largely offshore.

The honest qualifiers are heavy. The beneficiation stage is raw — the supply is rough stones, not finished gems, and global cutting and polishing demand lies in India and the Gulf rather than Africa, so the continental substitution prize for finished diamonds is limited. About 30% of output is smuggled to Cameroon or Sudan's Darfur region, driven by CAR's 12% diamond tax against 3.25% in DRC (IPIS via JCK). Governance is weak, with EITI suspended in November 2024, and rebel and Wagner influence over mining zones means much value is captured outside state and legal channels. What would undermine the position is renewed conflict, KP re-suspension over traceability failures, persistent smuggling, and the continued absence of any domestic value-addition that would let CAR offer finished product rather than raw stones.

Current reality

The Central African Republic is a landlocked, conflict-affected economy of roughly USD 2.75 billion GDP (2024, World Bank) and about 5.7 million people, among the poorest and most fragile states on earth, with roughly 67.5 per cent of the population living under USD 3 a day in 2024. It is today a raw-commodity exporter with near-zero domestic beneficiation. There is no diamond cutting or polishing, no gold refining to LBMA standard, and no base-metal smelting in the country. Industry including construction was 20.71 per cent of GDP in 2023, but actual manufacturing consists of sawmills, breweries, cotton ginning and small food and beverage processing concentrated near Bangui, with no operational special economic zone or industrial park of note. Total merchandise exports were approximately USD 113.6 million in 2023, composed of unwrought gold at 63.9 per cent, diamonds at 12.5 per cent, rough wood at 6.68 per cent and sawn wood at 4.16 per cent, with principal destinations the UAE at 40.9 per cent, Pakistan at 19.8 per cent, Italy at 12.6 per cent, France at 9 per cent and Cameroon at 7.2 per cent.

Energy and logistics are the binding constraints. Installed capacity reached 131 MW in 2023, with generation of 183 GWh, almost entirely hydropower, against chronic deficits and load-shedding. The paved road network is around 900 km of some 24,500 km in total, under 4 per cent; the single paved international corridor runs approximately 1,450 km from Bangui to the Port of Douala with transit times often exceeding 20 days and more than 50 checkpoints reported; the Oubangui River route is navigable only around six months a year; and there is no railway. Human Capital Index stands at 0.26, among the lowest worldwide, with the country ranked 191st of 193 on the HDI in 2022 and no specialised industrial skill clusters. Under the fragile-state inclusion principle, most allocations are honestly classed Aspirational or Emerging rather than reflecting real present capability.

Read under the South Sudan Principle

Central African Republic holds an aspirational allocation. Nothing on these pages is a near-term capacity claim. The bundle is the demand certainty against which capability is built, and it is deliberately held open while the state rebuilds.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 10 candidate lines · will change

Central African Republic’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Central African Republic’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Central African Republic will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Central African Republic’s 10 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 2Emerging 2Aspirational 4Grey 2
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Gold (unwrought/dore)

Ndassima industrial mine (~USD2.8bn deposit) + 2-5 t/yr artisanal · Maturity: Raw/semi · Competitiveness: Very high
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: USGS MYB; CSIS · 2020-21; 2023

Iron ore

Historic ~3.5 Mt deposits; occurrences · Maturity: Unmined · Competitiveness: High globally; landlocked penalty
GREY
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS · 2024

Wood-based panels / furniture

Feedstock present; labour-intensive value-add · Maturity: Absent · Competitiveness: High
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 1.87 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, san
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped length
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped le
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
442110Wood; clothes hangers
442120Wood; coffins
442190Other articles of wood, n.e.s.
442191Wood; of bamboo, articles n.e.c. in heading no. 4414 to 4420 (excluding clothes hangers)
442199Wood; not of bamboo, articles n.e.c. in heading no. 4414 to 4420 (excluding clothes hangers)
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Central African Republic imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 740.8 mAlgeria USD 318.6 mMorocco USD 296 mSouth Africa USD 124.8 mLibya USD 51 mKenya USD 50.7 mSomalia USD 45.1 mSenegal USD 37.5 m

Source: AfDB · 2021

Sawn wood / lumber

Existing sawmills; ~80% sawnwood exported · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: High
EMERGING
USD 1.78 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440710Coniferous wood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded...
440711Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, san
440712Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440713Wood; coniferous species, of S-P-F (spruce (Picea spp.), pine (Pinus spp.) and fir (Abies spp.)), sawn or chipped length
440714Wood; coniferous species, of Hem-fir (western hemlock (Tsuga heterophylla) and fir (Abies spp.))
440719Wood; coniferous species, other than of pine (Pinus spp.) or fir (Abies spp.) or spruce (Picea spp.), sawn or chipped le
440721Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, mahogany (Swietenia spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise
440722Wood, tropical; virola, imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or
440723Wood, tropical; teak, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, planed, square dressed, structural, thicker than 6mm
440724Virola, mahogany "Swietenia spp.", imbuia and balsa, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or...
440725Wood, tropical; dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whe
440726Wood, tropical; white lauan, white meranti, white seraya, yellow meranti and alan, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or
440727Wood, tropical; sapelli, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440728Wood, tropical; iroko, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440729Wood, tropical, n.e.c. in item no. 4407.2, sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness exceeding 6mm
440791Wood; oak (Quercus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440792Wood; beech (Fagus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440793Wood; maple (Acer spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440794Wood; cherry (Prunus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440795Wood; ash (Fraxinus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, thicker than 6mm
440796Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440797Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed
440799Wood; sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, of a thickness exceeding 6mm, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, n.e.c. in heading no. 4407
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 9 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 728.6 mAlgeria USD 312.7 mMorocco USD 287.1 mSouth Africa USD 114.3 mLibya USD 46.2 mSomalia USD 44.5 mKenya USD 41.3 mSenegal USD 36.2 m

Source: Timber Trade Portal; AfDB · 2017; 2021

Gem-quality rough diamonds

~80% gem-quality alluvial diamonds; ~USD227/ct vs DRC USD16; KP embargo lifted 2024 · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate (cutting demand mostly offshore)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 1.75 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710210Diamonds; whether or not worked, but not mounted or set, unsorted
710221Diamonds; industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set
710229Diamonds; industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set
710231Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set
710239Diamonds; non-industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Botswana USD 970.9 mSouth Africa USD 578.4 mNamibia USD 111.7 mMauritius USD 76 mMorocco USD 5.8 mTunisia USD 3 mLiberia USD 1.2 mEgypt USD 0.9 m

Source: USGS Minerals Yearbook; Kimberley Process Statistics · 2020-21; 2019; 2024

Robusta coffee (green)

Robusta tradition; ~2,100 t exported 2021 · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 1.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
090111Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated
090112Coffee; decaffeinated, not roasted
090121Coffee; roasted, not decaffeinated
090122Coffee; roasted, decaffeinated
090190Coffee; husks and skins, coffee substitutes containing coffee in any proportion
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Algeria USD 322.4 mEgypt USD 217.4 mSudan USD 151.5 mMorocco USD 148 mSouth Africa USD 99.8 mLibya USD 77.7 mTunisia USD 34.5 mNamibia USD 9.7 m

Source: ICO · 2021

Cotton lint

Historic 25k-45k t; ginning capacity · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 404.3 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520100Cotton; not carded or combed
520300Cotton; carded or combed
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 282 mMauritius USD 41.4 mAlgeria USD 28.1 mLesotho USD 21.3 mMorocco USD 14.5 mTunisia USD 2.9 mBotswana USD 2.9 mSudan USD 2.8 m

Source: USDA FAS; UNCTAD · 2021

Tropical hardwood logs

Congo Basin forest; ~530k m3 logs 2017 · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: High (Africa imports ~USD4bn timber/yr)
EMERGING
USD 125.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
440310Wood in the rough, treated with paint, stains, creosote or other preservatives (excluding rough-cut...
440311Wood; coniferous species, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared; treated with pai
440312Wood; non-coniferous species, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared; treated with
440320Coniferous wood in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared...
440321Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squ
440322Wood; coniferous species, of pine (Pinus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squ
440323Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or
440324Wood; coniferous species, of fir (Abies spp.) and spruce (Picea spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or
440325Wood; coniferous species n.e.c. in headings 4403.21 or 4403.23, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood
440326Wood; coniferous species n.e.c in headings 4403.22 or 4403.24, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood,
440341Wood, tropical; as specified in Subheading Note 2 to this Chapter, dark red meranti, light red meranti and meranti bakau
440342Wood, tropical; teak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440349Wood, tropical; other than dark red meranti, light red meranti meranti bakau and teak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440391Wood; oak, in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440392Beech "Fagus spp." in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared...
440393Wood; of beech (Fagus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which the smallest cross-sectional dimension is 15 cm or more
440394Wood; of beech (Fagus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which any cross-sectional dimension is less than 15 cm
440395Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which the smallest cross-sectional dimension is 15 cm or more
440396Wood; of birch (Betula spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, of which any cross-sectional dimension is less than 15 cm
440397Wood; of poplar and aspen (Populus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440398Wood; of eucalyptus (Eucalyptus spp.), in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated
440399Wood; in the rough, whether or not stripped of bark or sapwood, or roughly squared, untreated, n.e.c. in heading no. 4403
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 29.6 mBotswana USD 13.5 mRwanda USD 10.9 mAlgeria USD 8.8 mNamibia USD 8.2 mZambia USD 7.1 mTanzania USD 6.2 mSouth Africa USD 6 m

Source: FAO; Timber Trade Portal; AfDB · 2017; 2021

Uranium concentrate

Bakouma 36,500 tU inferred · Maturity: Unmined · Competitiveness: Niche
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 28 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
284410Uranium; natural uranium and its compounds, alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtures conta
284420Uranium; enriched in U235, plutonium, their compounds, alloys dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixt
284430Uranium; depleted in U235, thorium, their compounds, alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtu
284440Radio-actives nes, their mixtures and compounds
284441Radioactive elements; tritium and its compounds; alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtures
284442Radioactive elements; actinium-225, 227, californium-253, curium-240, 241, 242, 243, 244, einsteinium-253, 254, gadolini
284443Radioactive elements, isotopes and compounds; other alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic products and mixtur
284444Radioactive elements, isotopes, compounds n.e.c. in heading no. 2844, alloys, dispersions (including cermets), ceramic p
284450Spent (irradiated) fuel elements (cartridges) of nuclear reactors
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 16.6 mEgypt USD 4.2 mAlgeria USD 2.6 mMorocco USD 0.8 mKenya USD 0.6 mNigeria USD 0.6 mGhana USD 0.4 mUganda USD 0.3 m

Source: NEA/IAEA Red Book · 2024

Cassava / food staples

200k-300k t/yr; domestic surplus · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Regional
GREY
USD 20.1 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
071410Vegetable roots and tubers; manioc (cassava), with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, wheth
071420Vegetable roots and tubers; sweet potatoes, with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether
071430Vegetable roots and tubers; yams (Dioscorea spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, w
071440Vegetable roots and tubers; taro (Colocasia spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, w
071450Vegetable roots and tubers; yautia (Xanthosoma spp.) with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried
071490Vegetable roots and tubers; arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes and similar roots and tubers (not manioc, sweet potat
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Central African Republic imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Rwanda USD 6.8 mUganda USD 2.5 mSouth Africa USD 2.1 mSomalia USD 1.5 mMali USD 1.2 mGhana USD 0.7 mNiger USD 0.7 mCote dIvoire USD 0.6 m

Source: National data · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Central African Republic is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Central African Republic buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Central African Republic is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 0.73 bn

Central African Republic’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

10

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierCentral African Republic imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Wood-based panels / furnitureASPIRATIONALUSD 0.3 mUSD 1.87 bn
Sawn wood / lumberEMERGINGUSD 0.3 mUSD 1.78 bn
Robusta coffee (green)ASPIRATIONALUSD 0.2 mUSD 1.13 bn
Tropical hardwood logsEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 125.8 m
Gold (unwrought/dore)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
Iron oreGREYUSD 0 mUSD 2.85 bn
Gem-quality rough diamondsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 1.75 bn
Cotton lintASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 404.3 m
Uranium concentrateASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 28 m
Cassava / food staplesGREYUSD 0 mUSD 20.1 m

Left-hand column: what Central African Republic itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Central African Republic’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 10 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Central African Republic’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Central African Republic. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Central African Republic’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Central African Republic’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01EgyptUSD 3.77 bn
02UgandaUSD 1.9 bn
03AlgeriaUSD 1.86 bn
04South AfricaUSD 1.61 bn
05BotswanaUSD 987.5 m
06MoroccoUSD 812 m
07LibyaUSD 558.2 m
08SudanUSD 154.3 m
09MauritiusUSD 153.5 m
10KenyaUSD 142.6 m
11NamibiaUSD 129.6 m
12SomaliaUSD 91.1 m
13TunisiaUSD 83.8 m
14SenegalUSD 73.7 m
15LesothoUSD 21.3 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Central African Republic. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Central African Republic would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Central African Republic to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Durable security in mining and forest zones

Active conflict must give way to restored state control over Ndassima and the key mining and forest concessions, much of which currently sit outside state control.

02

KP compliance maintained and EITI reinstated

The legal diamond channel re-opened on 15 November 2024 only holds if Kimberley Process compliance is sustained with credible traceability, alongside reinstatement following the EITI suspension of November 2024.

03

Basic beneficiation investment

A diamond valuation and sorting capability (and eventually cutting), kiln-drying and sawnwood or furniture lines for timber, and gold assay and doré refining would all need to be built from a near-zero base.

04

Power and corridor upgrades

Delivering the Lobaye and Dimoli hydro projects and rehabilitating the Douala–Bangui corridor would be needed to cut delivery cost and time from the current chronic deficits and 20-day transits.

05

Governance under the 2024 Mining Code

Transparent licensing under the new Mining Code (Law 24-008) would have to displace the security-for-resources model with accountable investment.

The binding constraints
·

Security and governance Active conflict leaves much territory outside state control, and key assets such as the Ndassima gold mine and Lobaye timber are controlled by Wagner/Africa Corps under a security-for-resources model; EITI suspended CAR in November 2024 (score 45/100) for transparency failures.

·

Energy deficit With only 131 MW installed in 2023 amid chronic deficits and load-shedding, there is no power base to support heavy processing or beneficiation.

·

Logistics and landlocked penalty The country is landlocked, roughly 1,450 km from Douala with transit exceeding 20 days, under 4% of roads paved, a river navigable only half the year and no railway; transport costs run at double West African comparators.

·

Capital and skills The Human Capital Index of 0.26 (191st of 193) sits alongside negligible manufacturing FDI and no meaningful TVET base, leaving no skills foundation for moving up the value chain.

·

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency Gold and diamond chains are captured by foreign military-commercial actors and exports are heavily skewed to the UAE, concentrating both control and market risk.

·

Data integrity Large informal and smuggled flows — around 30% of diamonds, and the large majority of gold historically unrecorded — mean all production figures are indicative rather than firm.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Central African Republic’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

An aspirational allocation is not a capability claim. Central African Republic holds lines against which capability must still be built. Nothing here should be read as present capacity, and the instrument’s value to Central African Republic lies in the demand certainty, not in near-term supply.

05

Security and territorial control remain unresolved. Conflict is active and much territory sits outside state control, with key assets including Ndassima gold and Lobaye timber controlled by Wagner and Africa Corps under a security-for-resources model. Durable security in mining and forest zones, and restoration of state control over Ndassima and key concessions, would have to be established first.

06

There is no power base for processing. Installed capacity was 131 MW in 2023 with generation of 183 GWh, against chronic deficits and load-shedding. The planned Lobaye, Dimoli, Kotto and Lancrenon hydro schemes are announced, not installed.

07

Delivery to African markets is poor and costly. The country is landlocked, with roughly 1,450 km to Douala, transit often exceeding 20 days, under 4 per cent paved roads and a river route navigable only around six months a year. Fixed transport costs on the Douala-Bangui corridor are more than double West African comparators.

08

Capital and skills bases are effectively absent. The Human Capital Index stands at 0.26, ranking 191st of 193 on the HDI in 2022, with literacy and TVET bases extremely weak and infrastructure looted. Manufacturing and processing FDI is negligible and there is no credible, financed national beneficiation strategy.

09

The mineral chains are captured by external actors. Gold and diamond chains are captured by foreign military-commercial actors and exports are skewed to the UAE, which took 40.9 per cent of merchandise exports in 2022. Displacing the security-for-resources model with transparent licensing under the 2024 Mining Code would have to occur.

10

Legal market access is conditional and reversible. The Kimberley Process embargo was lifted only on 15 November 2024, and EITI suspended the country in November 2024 with a score of 45 out of 100 for transparency failures. Kimberley Process compliance with credible traceability, plus EITI re-instatement, would have to be sustained to keep the legal diamond channel open.

11

All production figures are indicative rather than firm. Large informal and smuggled flows mean roughly 30 per cent of diamonds and the large majority of gold historically go unrecorded. The USD 2.8 billion Ndassima figure is a government deposit valuation, not an audited reserve, and the USD 290 million annual output figure is an analytical estimate.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

The Draft 1 bundle for the Central African Republic rests on geological luck rather than built capability: gem-quality alluvial diamonds with a documented per-carat premium and a re-opened legal channel, gold from one industrial mine at Ndassima and two to five tonnes a year of artisanal output, and Congo Basin hardwood against an African timber import bill of around USD 4 billion a year. None of it is underpinned by processing infrastructure, energy, skills or governance, and the audit is explicit that this signals fragility. What must be proven is sequential: durable security and restored state control over the mining and forest zones; maintained Kimberley Process compliance with credible traceability and EITI re-instatement; the most basic value-addition steps, namely diamond valuation and sorting, kiln-drying and sawnwood lines, and gold assay and dore refining; delivery of the Lobaye and Dimoli hydro schemes together with rehabilitation of the Douala-Bangui corridor; and transparent licensing under the 2024 Mining Code in place of the security-for-resources model.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Central African Republic is shown 10 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Central African Republic to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2