Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
Burkina FasoBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Burkina Faso — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
14
Draft 1 candidate lines for Burkina Faso
The Minister’s brief · for Aboubakar Nacanabo · Burkina Faso
Minister Nacanabo, Burkina Faso's claim on the continent is not the gold that leaves you as doré, but the shea your women hold. A women-led cluster of 646,000 collecting households, across 1,069 registered groups, makes you the world's largest exporter of shea nut — near half of global exports — and already the source of the crude and refined butter that L'Occitane and AAK buy. Today barely a tenth of your exports stay in Africa, and the high-value refining runs offshore; the continent's spend on cosmetic and food-grade shea is yours to reclaim. The Right of Supply gives Burkina Faso a twenty-five-year first right to supply that demand, and never a subsidy nor a captive contract: Match-or-Release means you hold the order only while you meet the market on price and quality, and release it the moment you do not. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. The figures are ours; the judgement is yours. Your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Burkina Faso
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Aboubakar Nacanabo, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Burkina Faso · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Nacanabo,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Burkina Faso — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Burkina Faso is in this room

Burkina Faso's strongest endowment for continental supply is shea, not gold. The country is the world's third-largest shea-nut producer (FAOSTAT 2023, behind Nigeria and Mali) and is most commonly cited as the world's largest exporter, at roughly 50% of global nut exports, resting on the shea parkland belt and on decades of institutional coordination through women's cooperatives, the Global Shea Alliance and fair-trade buyers such as L'Occitane and AAK — a women-led cluster of at least 646,000 collecting households across 1,069 registered groups. These are durable, hard-to-replicate organisational assets. The honest constraint is that the beneficiation stage today reaches only intermediate crude and refined butter; cosmetic-grade and fractionated product is the audit's next step, not a present capability, and it depends on investment in cosmetic-grade refining and fractionation, HACCP and quality systems, certification to buyer specifications at scale, and aggregation and traceability for consistent volume. Behind that sits energy: roughly 366 MW installed with more than half of consumption imported is the binding gate on any processing scale-up, and unreliable, expensive power raising costs above offshore refiners is the named threat to the whole position.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Burkina Faso, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Burkina Faso

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
14draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Burkina Faso’s draft bundle. 14 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Gold (doré/refined), Live cattle/small ruminants, Raw cotton lint. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 4 strong contender · 6 emerging · 3 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Burkina Faso is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 14 candidate lines proposed for Burkina Faso below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Burkina Faso. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Burkina Faso will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Burkina Faso will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
14 lines
Burkina Faso’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Burkina Faso at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Burkina Faso’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Burkina Faso’s own capability audit.

Gold as a Right-of-Supply claim

Burkina Faso is Africa's fourth-largest gold producer and gold is over 80% of exports, but the audit reasons directly that gold is exported as doré to Switzerland and the UAE and is not an input category African governments procure, rating its continental demand as a procurement-substitution prize low. The 150 t/yr national refinery is treated as new and unproven, with its operating status asserted but not independently verified.

Capability inversion

Zinc concentrate

Perkoa produced 143,000 tonnes of payable zinc in 2021 and was exported as concentrate with no domestic smelter, but the mine closed in 2022 after a fatal flood and remains shut. The audit tiers zinc as aspirational with low continental demand and notes in its confidence statement that Perkoa is shut.

Raw base · industrial screen

Manganese from Tambao

The Tambao deposit holds roughly 107 Mt at one of the world's higher grades, but the audit states plainly that it is commercially undeveloped due to logistics and legal disputes and that this is a resource, not production. No base-metal smelters exist, so any output would be exported raw.

Resource, not production

Copper from Gongondy and Diénéméra

The prospects carry around 974,000 tonnes of contained copper as a resource with no mining, and the audit tiers copper as grey or insufficient. Continental demand is large, which makes the inversion sharper rather than weaker.

Grey · insufficient evidence

Cotton yarn and textiles as present supply

Cotton lint at about 292,600 tonnes in 2024/25 is a genuine strong position, but only around 5% is processed into yarn domestically through a single spinning mill, FILSAH, with no spinning or weaving at scale. Lint goes mainly to Asia. The audit tiers yarn and textiles as emerging and notes domestic processing is near-zero today.

Capability inversion

Cashew kernels

Output of about 143,965 tonnes in 2023 makes Burkina Faso the world's eighth-largest producer, but roughly 14 processing units with about 18,000 MT of installed capacity handle only some 10% of national output; the remaining 90% is exported raw to India and Vietnam. The audit tiers cashew kernels as emerging.

Raw base · industrial screen
08 · Endowment
What Burkina Faso actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Burkina Faso. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Burkina Faso's mineral endowment is dominated by world-class Birimian gold geology. Industrial gold production declined for the third consecutive year in 2024, reaching 53.3 tonnes, down from 57.3 tonnes in 2023, on security challenges, though high gold prices offset the loss (trade.gov Country Commercial Guide); the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 estimate total mine production at around 60 tonnes for 2024 against 57 tonnes in 2023. National figures for 2025 reached a record of about 94 tonnes, including roughly 42 tonnes from artisanal and semi-mechanised mining, as reported by Minister Yacouba Zabré Gouba in the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Quarries' 2025 performance review delivered to Prime Minister Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo on 3 February 2026 (APAnews). That places Burkina Faso as Africa's fourth-largest producer, after Ghana, Mali and South Africa, with gold making up over 80% of exports and 2025 output generating more than CFA 776 billion in budget revenue, up from CFA 548 billion in 2024. The processing position is the inversion: gold has historically been exported as doré, a semi-refined alloy, mainly to Switzerland, with no domestic gold processing beyond doré. The foundation of a first national gold refinery of 150 t/yr capacity was laid in November 2023 with partner Marena Gold and is reported operational from 2024 per government statements (Ecofin Agency), though the audit's own confidence statement treats the refinery's operating status as asserted but not independently verified. Beyond gold, the Perkoa zinc mine in Sanguié produced 143,000 tonnes of payable zinc in 2021, exported as concentrate with no domestic smelter, and has been closed since a fatal flood in 2022; the Tambao manganese deposit holds a resource of roughly 107 Mt at one of the world's higher grades but is commercially undeveloped because of logistics and legal disputes; and the Gongondy and Diénéméra copper prospects hold around 974,000 tonnes of contained copper with no mining. No base-metal smelters exist, so any future manganese or copper output would be exported raw.

The agricultural endowment is where the audit locates the defensible positions. Cotton lint production was about 292,600 tonnes in 2024/25 (trade.gov), making Burkina Faso Africa's fourth-largest producer behind Mali, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire, organised through three ginning companies — SOFITEX, SOCOMA and FASO COTON — but only around 5% is processed into yarn domestically, through a single spinning mill, FILSAH. On shea, or karité, the country is the world's third-largest producer (FAOSTAT 2023, behind Nigeria and Mali) and is frequently cited as the world's largest exporter at roughly 50% of global nut exports (Enhanced Integrated Framework); shea sector export value was about CFA 60.9 bn (approximately USD 103.5 m) for nuts and butter combined in 2023 (HPC Mag MEA, October 2025). A raw-nut export ban was imposed in September 2024, followed by a conditional reopening window from 1 December 2025 to 31 May 2026 carrying a 25% local-processing set-aside and a 200 CFA/kg export levy. Sesame output was about 247,157 tonnes in 2023, roughly Africa's fourth and the world's ninth largest, and is the second-largest agricultural export at around USD 76 m in 2024, though largely exported raw. Cashew output was about 143,965 tonnes in 2023 (FAOSTAT), the world's eighth largest, against roughly 14 processing units with about 18,000 MT of installed capacity, of which only some 10% of national output is processed locally, the rest going raw to India and Vietnam. Burkina Faso is a net exporter of live cattle, sheep and goats to coastal West Africa — Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo — largely informally and with minimal value-added meat processing, and produces roughly 5.2–6.1 Mt of cereals (2024), mostly for subsistence and regional markets.

The industrial base and complexity profile are correspondingly thin. Manufacturing value added was about USD 1.67 bn in 2020 (World Bank), with MVA per capita of roughly USD 74 and medium-high-tech exports per capita of about USD 3, placing the country in UNIDO's low-income group. Actual manufacturing consists of cotton ginning, cottonseed oil pressing, some cashew shelling, cement through CIMBURKINA and Diamond Cement using local limestone, beverages, soap and basic agro-processing, with Bobo-Dioulasso as the industrial hub; there is no spinning or weaving at scale, no base-metal smelting and thin assembly. On complexity, the OEC 2023 rank is 124 with an ECI of −1.36, while the Harvard Atlas-CID puts ECI at −0.75 (2021) with a Complexity Outlook Index of −0.93, signalling low diversification potential; the trajectory is persistently low and broadly flat. The RCA-above-1 basket is dominated by primary commodities — gold at roughly 82% of exports, raw cotton as the world's eighth-largest exporter at about 2% global share, cashews and nuts, oil seeds and vegetable fats and oils — with 27 products above the threshold in total. The audit's judgement is that the credible diversification path is incremental beneficiation within existing agro-chains rather than leaps into complex manufacturing: shea nuts into crude, refined and fractionated butter; cotton lint into yarn and fabric; raw cashew into kernels; sesame seed into oil. Human capital supports this reading, with a large, young, low-cost labour force that is around 80% rural and agricultural, a low tertiary and TVET base, and specialised clusters in women-led shea collection and processing — at least 646,000 collecting households and 1,069 registered groups (FAO), against an FAO and Global Shea Alliance estimate of some 2.4 million women collectors across the eight main shea countries — and in cashew processing, which is about 90% women. Energy frames all of it: installed generation capacity is roughly 366 MW (SONABEL, 2020), comprising about 300 MW thermal, 32 MW hydro and 34 MW solar, with more than half of electricity consumed imported from the Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana grids. Zagtouli's 33 MW solar plant, commissioned in 2017, generates at around CFA 45/kWh against roughly CFA 145/kWh for thermal, and irradiance is high at about 3,031 sunshine hours a year in Ouagadougou, with the AfDB-backed Yeleen project adding more than 50 MW of PV across Ouagadougou, Dori, Diapaga and Gaoua.

The endowment in depth

Burkina Faso's mineral endowment is dominated by world-class Birimian gold geology. Industrial gold production reached 53.3 t in 2024, its third consecutive annual decline (down from 57.3 t in 2023) under security pressure, while USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 estimates total mine production at ~60 t; the national figure for 2025 hit a record ~94 t once ~42 t of artisanal and semi-mechanised output is included, per Minister Yacouba Zabré Gouba's 3 February 2026 performance review. This makes Burkina Faso Africa's 4th-largest gold producer, after Ghana, Mali and South Africa. Gold's fiscal weight is decisive: 2025 output generated more than CFA 776 billion in budget revenue (up from CFA 548 billion in 2024) and more than USD 4 billion in export revenue, and gold accounts for over 80% of exports. Yet domestic processing is essentially absent — gold leaves as doré (semi-refined alloy), mainly to Switzerland — with a first national refinery of 150 t/yr capacity, foundation laid November 2023 with partner Marena Gold and reported operational from 2024 but treated as new and unproven. Beyond gold, the base-metal endowment is largely resource rather than production: the Perkoa zinc mine in Sanguié produced 143,000 t of payable zinc in 2021 (reserves cited at 5.6–6.2 Mt) but has been shut since a fatal 2022 flood; Tambao holds a ~107 Mt manganese resource of one of the world's higher grades, commercially undeveloped for logistics and legal reasons; and the Gongondy/Diénéméra copper prospects hold ~974,000 t contained copper with no mining. No base-metal smelters exist, so any future output would be exported raw.

The energy endowment is thin and constraining. There is no oil and gas, and installed generation capacity was only ~366 MW (SONABEL, 2020), split between ~300 MW thermal (diesel/HFO), 32 MW hydro and 34 MW solar, with more than half of electricity consumed imported from the Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana grids. Solar is the clearest opportunity: the 33 MW Zagtouli plant (commissioned 2017) generates at ~CFA 45/kWh against ~CFA 145/kWh for thermal, and Ouagadougou enjoys high irradiance of ~3,031 sunshine hours a year, while the AfDB-backed Yeleen project adds ~50+ MW of PV across Ouagadougou, Dori, Diapaga and Gaoua. Energy is nonetheless the binding constraint on heavy and agro-manufacturing — unreliable, costly, and import-dependent.

Agriculture, forestry and tree crops are the country's broadest and most distinctive endowment. Cotton lint production was ~292,600 t in 2024/25, making Burkina Faso Africa's 4th-largest producer (behind Mali, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire), ginned by three companies — SOFITEX, SOCOMA and FASO COTON — but only ~5% is processed into yarn domestically through a single spinning mill (FILSAH). Shea/karité is the standout: the world's 3rd-largest producer (behind Nigeria and Mali) yet frequently cited as the world's largest exporter at ~50% of global nut exports, with sector export value of ~CFA 60.9 bn (~USD 103.5 m) for nuts and butter combined in 2023; a raw-nut export ban was imposed in September 2024, with a conditional reopening window of 1 December 2025 to 31 May 2026 carrying a 25% local-processing set-aside and a 200 CFA/kg export levy. Sesame is Africa's ~4th and the world's ~9th producer at ~247,157 t (2023) and the 2nd-largest agricultural export (~USD 76 m, 2024), largely raw. Cashew is the world's 8th producer at ~143,965 t (2023), with ~14 processing units and ~18,000 MT of installed capacity but only ~10% of output processed locally, the rest exported raw to India and Vietnam. Livestock adds a Sahelian herd that makes the country a net exporter of live cattle, sheep and goats to Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, though largely informal with minimal value-added meat processing, alongside ~5.2–6.1 Mt of cereals (sorghum, millet, maize) in 2024.

The existing industrial base, human capital and logistics are modest. Manufacturing value added was ~USD 1.67 bn (2020), MVA per capita ~USD 74 (UNIDO "low income" group) and medium-high-tech exports per capita ~USD 3, with actual activity confined to cotton ginning, cottonseed oil pressing, some cashew shelling, cement (CIMBURKINA and Diamond Cement using local limestone), beverages, soap and basic agro-processing, concentrated in the Bobo-Dioulasso industrial hub. Human capital is a large, young, low-cost labour force that is ~80% rural and agricultural, with a low tertiary and TVET base; the standout clusters are women-led — at least 646,000 shea-collecting households across 1,069 registered groups, and cashew processing (ANTA-BF, ~90% women) — against skills gaps in industrial engineering, energy and food-grade processing. On logistics the country is landlocked, with transit via Lomé (~40% of cargo), Abidjan road and rail (~30–35%, the SITARAIL concession over ~1,150–1,260 km), Tema and historically Dakar; rail is limited and ageing, road condition is variable with rainy-season disruption, and Bobo-Dioulasso on the Abidjan corridor is the most plausible industrial-export node.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Burkina Faso is among the world's least complex economies. Its Economic Complexity Index sits at ECI ≈ −1.36 on OEC 2023 (rank 124) and ≈ −0.75 on the Harvard Atlas-CID (2021), with a low Complexity Outlook Index of −0.93 signalling few nearby diversification options; the trajectory is persistently low and broadly flat. The revealed-comparative-advantage basket is dominated by primary commodities: gold (~82% of exports), raw cotton (the world's 8th-largest exporter at ~2% global share), cashews and nuts, oil seeds (sesame), and vegetable fats and oils (shea butter), with OEC reporting 27 products at RCA > 1.

The low COI implies few nearby complex products, so the credible diversification path is incremental beneficiation within existing agro-chains rather than leaps into complex manufacturing: shea nuts into crude, refined and fractionated butter; cotton lint into yarn and fabric; raw cashew into kernels; and sesame seed into oil. These moves exploit the country's existing input dominance and its women-led processing clusters rather than requiring capabilities far from the current product space.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Burkina Faso's single most defensible continental supply position is processed shea butter (HS 1515), not gold. The logic is procurement-substitution: gold is exported as doré to Switzerland and the UAE and is not an input category that African governments procure, so a high raw endowment confers little Right-of-Supply leverage. Shea is different. The country combines a top-tier input base — the world's 3rd-largest shea-nut producer and most-cited largest exporter at ~50% of global nut exports (FAOSTAT 2023; Enhanced Integrated Framework) — with existing intermediate processing capacity in named plants such as Agrifaso in Bobo-Dioulasso and cooperatives producing crude and refined butter, a women-led cluster of at least 646,000 collecting households across 1,069 registered groups, and established quality and fair-trade buyer relationships with L'Occitane and AAK. The 2024 raw-export ban with a 25% local-processing set-aside (2025) is explicitly engineered to push the country up the value chain, and continental demand exists in cosmetics, soap and as a cocoa-butter substitute in food. The defensible claim is to be Africa's designated supplier of cosmetic and food-grade shea butter and derivatives.

The limits are real and must be stated. Unreliable and expensive energy could raise processing costs above offshore refiners; the bulk of high-value refining still occurs in Europe; competing producers such as Ghana, Nigeria and Mali could impose similar export restrictions; and the sector carries informality and quality-consistency gaps. The runners-up are weaker still today: raw cotton lint and nascent cotton yarn (HS52) enjoy large continental textile-input demand and RCA > 1 but domestic processing is near-zero, and cashew kernels (HS0801) rest on a strong endowment but ~90% is still exported raw.

Current reality

Burkina Faso is a landlocked Sahelian low-income economy with GDP of about USD 23.25 billion (2024, World Bank) and a population of roughly 23.8 million (2024). Three endowments define it: world-class Birimian gold geology, with industrial output of 53.3 tonnes in 2024 and a record national total of around 94 tonnes including artisanal production in 2025; a historic cotton or "white gold" base; and globally significant tree-crop endowments in shea, cashew and sesame. The headline supply position is that Burkina Faso is a continental-scale raw producer but a near-absent processor, and its defensible procurement-substitution prizes lie not in gold, which is exported as doré, but in agro-processing, above all shea butter and cotton-derived intermediates.

The constraints are severe and mutually reinforcing. Energy is the binding gate on any processing scale-up, at roughly 366 MW installed in 2020 with more than half of consumption imported, unreliable and costly. The country is landlocked, with transit via Lomé carrying about 40% of cargo, the Abidjan road and rail route about 30–35% under the SITARAIL concession over roughly 1,150–1,260 km, plus Tema and historically Dakar; rail is limited and ageing, road condition is variable with rainy-season disruption, and the insurgency disrupts northern and eastern transport. On security and governance, Human Rights Watch's April 2026 report "'None Can Run Away'" records that the conflict had by 2025 displaced more than 2.3 million people, an estimated 10% of the population, comprising over 2 million internally displaced and over 270,000 who fled to neighbouring countries, and documents at least 1,840 civilian deaths across 57 incidents between January 2023 and August 2025; two coups in 2022 and resource-nationalist policy, including mine nationalisations and export bans, deter foreign direct investment. Domestic capital is thin, credit access weak, and processing skills and quality-control gaps persist. Trade is single-buyer dependent — gold to Switzerland at about 56% and the UAE at about 26%, cotton mainly to Asia, cashew and sesame to India and Vietnam — with an intra-African export share of only around 10.8% in 2024. AES membership and the ECOWAS exit effective January 2025 add trade-access uncertainty, mitigated by continued WAEMU membership, with the IMF and World Bank judging the exit's trade impact "contained".

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 14 candidate lines · will change

Burkina Faso’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Burkina Faso’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Burkina Faso will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Burkina Faso’s 14 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 4Emerging 6Aspirational 3Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Gold (doré/refined)

Africa's 4th producer; continental-scale output · Maturity: Doré only; refinery new/unproven · Competitiveness: Low (not a procurement input)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: USGS MCS; BF Ministry of Mines · 2024/2025

Cement/clinker

Local limestone; CIMBURKINA, Diamond Cement · Maturity: Finished (domestic) · Competitiveness: Large (construction)
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 205.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso your own imports USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Burkina Faso is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: bne IntelliNews · 2024

Cottonseed oil/cake

Cottonseed byproduct; ~150 small oil units · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Moderate (edible oil/feed)
EMERGING
USD 2.04 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
151211Vegetable oils; sunflower seed or safflower oil and their fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151219Vegetable oils; sunflower seed or safflower oil and their fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not c
151221Vegetable oils; cotton-seed oil and its fractions; crude, whether or not gossypol has been removed, not chemically modif
151229Vegetable oils; cotton-seed oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 656.9 mDjibouti USD 360.5 mEthiopia USD 181.7 mSouth Africa USD 167.6 mMorocco USD 120.2 mLibya USD 108.2 mTunisia USD 79.5 mSudan USD 62.9 m

Source: USDA FAS · 2018

Copper

Gongondy ~974,000 t resource; undeveloped · Maturity: Undeveloped · Competitiveness: Large
GREY
USD 1.36 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
740311Copper; refined, unwrought, cathodes and sections of cathodes
740312Copper; refined, unwrought, wire-bars
740313Copper; refined, unwrought, billets
740319Copper; refined, unwrought, n.e.c. in item no. 7403.1
740321Copper; copper-zinc base alloys (brass) unwrought
740322Copper; copper-tin base alloys (bronze) unwrought
740323Copper-nickel base alloys "cupro-nickel" or copper-nickel-zinc base alloys "nickel silver" . . .
740329Copper; copper alloys n.e.c. in heading no. 7403 (other than master alloys of heading no. 7405)
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.1 bnSouth Africa USD 209.7 mAlgeria USD 20.1 mZimbabwe USD 12.7 mTunisia USD 8.8 mMorocco USD 4.5 mUganda USD 3.1 mTanzania USD 1.4 m

Source: minesactu · 2023

Live cattle/small ruminants

Sahelian herd; established net exporter to coast · Maturity: Live animals · Competitiveness: Moderate (regional red meat)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 849.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
010210Pure-bred breeding bovines
010221Cattle; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010229Cattle; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010231Buffalo; live, pure-bred breeding animals
010239Buffalo; live, other than pure-bred breeding animals
010290Bovine animals; live, other than cattle and buffalo
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 4 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 307.9 mMorocco USD 188.2 mAlgeria USD 103.9 mSouth Africa USD 102.6 mLibya USD 46.7 mMauritius USD 19.9 mCote dIvoire USD 12.3 mTunisia USD 12.1 m

Source: OECD West African Papers; FAO · 2020

Cotton yarn/textiles

Cotton base + cheap labour; one spinning mill · Maturity: Raw→intermediate · Competitiveness: Large (textile imports)
EMERGING
USD 493.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520511Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring 714.29 decitex
520512Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 714.29 but not
520513Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 232.56 but not
520514Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 192.31 but not
520515Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring less than 125 d
520521Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring 714.29 decitex or
520522Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 714.29 but not le
520523Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 232.56 but not le
520524Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 192.31 but not le
520526Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 125 but not less
520527Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 106.38 but not le
520528Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), single, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, measuring less than 83.33 d
520531Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.29 decitex or more (not exceeding 14 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520532Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.28 to 232.56 decitex (15 to 43 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520533Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 232.55 to 192.31 decitex (44 to 52 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520534Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 192.30 to 125 decitex (53 to 80 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520535Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of uncombed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 125 decitex (exceeding 80 metric number), per single yarn, not for retail sale
520541Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.29 decitex or more (not exceeding 14 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520542Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 714.28 to 232.56 decitex (15 to 43 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520543Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 232.55 to 192.31 decitex (44 to 52 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520544Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 192.30 to 125 decitex (53 to 80 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520546Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 124 to 106.38 decitex (81 to 94 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520547Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, 106.37 to 83.33 decitex (95 to 120 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
520548Cotton yarn; (not sewing thread), multiple or cabled, of combed fibres, 85% or more by weight of cotton, less than 83.33 decitex (exceeding 120 metric number) per single yarn, not for retail sale
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 234.6 mMorocco USD 110.7 mTunisia USD 37.5 mMauritius USD 35.9 mSouth Africa USD 27.8 mEswatini USD 13.4 mMadagascar USD 11 mTanzania USD 8.2 m

Source: USDA FAS · 2018/2025

Raw cotton lint

Africa's 4th producer; world's 8th-largest exporter; RCA>1 · Maturity: Intermediate (ginned lint) · Competitiveness: Large (African textile mills)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 392 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520100Cotton; not carded or combed
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 281.8 mMauritius USD 41.3 mAlgeria USD 23.8 mLesotho USD 21.2 mMorocco USD 14.4 mTunisia USD 2.6 mMozambique USD 2.4 mSouth Africa USD 2.1 m

Source: USDA FAS; OEC · 2024/2025

Shea butter & fractions

World's largest shea-nut exporter (~50% share), 3rd producer; women-led processing clusters · Maturity: Intermediate (crude/refined butter) · Competitiveness: Moderate (cosmetics, food/CBE)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 357.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
151511Vegetable oils; linseed oil and its fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151519Vegetable oils; linseed oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151521Vegetable oils; maize (corn) oil and its fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151529Vegetable oils; maize (corn) oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modifie
151530Vegetable oils; castor oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151540Tung oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151550Vegetable oils; sesame oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151560Vegetable oils; microbial fats and oils and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151590Fixed vegetable fats and oils and their fractions n.e.c. in heading 1515; other than linseed, maize (corn), castor, sesa
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Libya USD 90.9 mEgypt USD 49.3 mTunisia USD 44 mDjibouti USD 29.5 mGambia USD 24.3 mTanzania USD 20 mSudan USD 19.5 mCameroon USD 9.3 m

Source: FAOSTAT; Enhanced Integrated Framework · 2023

Sesame seed/oil

Africa ~4th, world ~9th producer; 2nd ag export · Maturity: Raw seed; oil nascent · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 337.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120710Oil seeds; palm nuts and kernels, whether or not broken
120720Cotton seeds, whether or not broken
120721Oil seeds; cotton seeds, seed, whether or not broken
120729Oil seeds; cotton seeds, other than seed, whether or not broken
120730Oil seeds; castor oil seeds, whether or not broken
120740Oil seeds; sesamum seeds, whether or not broken
120750Oil seeds; mustard seeds, whether or not broken
120760Oil seeds; safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) seeds, whether or not broken
120770Oil seeds; melon seeds, whether or not broken
120791Oil seeds; poppy seeds, whether or not broken
120799Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; n.e.c. in heading no. 1207, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 7 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 1.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 115.5 mGhana USD 46 mMorocco USD 42.7 mTunisia USD 27 mAlgeria USD 25.5 mKenya USD 19.1 mSouth Africa USD 12.6 mMozambique USD 8 m

Source: FAOSTAT; Milling MEA · 2023/2024

Cashew kernels

World's 8th producer; ~14 processing units · Maturity: Mostly raw (~10% processed) · Competitiveness: Moderate–large
EMERGING
USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Source: FAOSTAT; ComCashew · 2023

Leather/hides

Large livestock base · Maturity: Raw hides · Competitiveness: Moderate
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 112.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
410110Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing <= 8 kg when dried, <= 10 kg when dry-salted and . . .
410120Raw hides and skins; whole, unsplit, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin not exceeding 8kg when simply dri
410121Whole raw bovine hides and skins, weighing > 14 kg, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired . . .
410122Raw butts and bends of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split
410129Raw hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted, whether or not dehaired or split . . .
410150Hides and skins; raw, whole, of bovine or equine animals, of a weight per skin exceeding 16 kg
410190Hides and skins; other than whole, but including butts, bends and bellies, of bovine (including. buffalo) and equine ani
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Nigeria USD 93.1 mEgypt USD 7.4 mGhana USD 5.1 mUganda USD 3.5 mKenya USD 1.4 mTunisia USD 1.2 mBenin USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.2 m

Source: FAO · 2020

Cereals (sorghum/millet/maize)

Large output · Maturity: Raw grain · Competitiveness: Moderate (regional food)
EMERGING
USD 48.2 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
100810Cereals; buckwheat
100820Millet (excluding grain sorghum)
100821Cereals; millet, seed
100829Cereals; millet, other than seed
100830Cereals; canary seeds
100840Cereals; fonio (Digitaria spp.)
100850Cereals; quinoa (Chenopodium quinoa)
100860Cereals; triticale
100890Cereals; n.e.c. in chapter 10
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 9.8 mKenya USD 7.3 mLibya USD 4.5 mSenegal USD 4 mAlgeria USD 4 mSouth Africa USD 3.5 mCote dIvoire USD 2.8 mUganda USD 2 m

Source: FAOSTAT; World Bank · 2024

Manganese ore

Tambao ~107 Mt resource · Maturity: Undeveloped · Competitiveness: Moderate (alloy/battery)
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 12 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260200Manganese ores and concentrates, including ferruginous manganese ores and concentrates with a manganese content of 20% o
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 8.8 mSouth Africa USD 2.4 mAngola USD 0.4 mCote dIvoire USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.1 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Source: SAMAO; minesactu · 2023

Zinc concentrate

Perkoa 5.6–6.2 Mt resource; mine closed 2022 · Maturity: Raw concentrate (shut) · Competitiveness: Low
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 0.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260800Zinc ores and concentrates
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Burkina Faso imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 0.3 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: bne IntelliNews; Mining Technology · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Burkina Faso is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Burkina Faso buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Burkina Faso is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 5.89 bn

Burkina Faso’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

14

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierBurkina Faso imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Cement/clinkerEMERGINGUSD 205.1 mUSD 2.9 bn
Sesame seed/oilEMERGINGUSD 1.3 mUSD 337.6 m
Cereals (sorghum/millet/maize)EMERGINGUSD 1 mUSD 48.2 m
Shea butter & fractionsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0.3 mUSD 357.5 m
Cashew kernelsEMERGINGUSD 0.2 mUSD 155.7 m
Cottonseed oil/cakeEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 2.04 bn
Cotton yarn/textilesEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 493.9 m
Gold (doré/refined)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 2.99 bn
CopperGREYUSD 0 mUSD 1.36 bn
Live cattle/small ruminantsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 849.4 m
Raw cotton lintSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 392 m
Leather/hidesASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 112.6 m
Manganese oreASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 12 m
Zinc concentrateASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 0.5 m

Left-hand column: what Burkina Faso itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Burkina Faso’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 14 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Burkina Faso’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Burkina Faso. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Burkina Faso’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Burkina Faso’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01EgyptUSD 2.94 bn
02UgandaUSD 2.05 bn
03South AfricaUSD 1.22 bn
04MoroccoUSD 584.3 m
05LibyaUSD 481.4 m
06DjiboutiUSD 390 m
07GhanaUSD 371.6 m
08MaliUSD 302.7 m
09Cote dIvoireUSD 288.3 m
10TunisiaUSD 256.1 m
11AlgeriaUSD 255.8 m
12Burkina FasoUSD 205.1 m
13EthiopiaUSD 181.7 m
14CameroonUSD 154.2 m
15MauritiusUSD 133.2 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Burkina Faso. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Burkina Faso would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Burkina Faso to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Reliable, lower-cost power

Solar scale-up plus storage and stable grid imports are needed to make food and cosmetic-grade processing cost-competitive on the four-dimension match of price, quality, warranty and service.

02

Shea refining and quality systems

Investment in cosmetic-grade refining and fractionation, HACCP and quality systems, and certification is required to meet buyer specifications at scale, alongside aggregation and traceability for consistent volume.

03

New cotton spinning and weaving capacity

An anchor investor and competitive power are needed to convert lint into yarn and fabric that African mills will actually buy, against near-zero domestic processing today.

04

Corridor reliability

Rail rehabilitation and border facilitation are needed to deliver across borders on time from a landlocked base.

05

Security and policy stability

A credible, predictable investment regime is required to attract the anchor capital that these beneficiation moves depend on.

The binding constraints
·

Energy is the binding gate Installed capacity was only ~366 MW (2020) with more than half of electricity imported, making unreliable and costly power the binding constraint on any processing scale-up.

·

Landlocked logistics Transit runs through Lomé, Abidjan and Tema over ageing rail with rainy-season road failures and high inland costs, raising the delivered cost of any exported intermediate.

·

Security and governance Per Human Rights Watch's April 2026 report, the conflict had by 2025 displaced more than 2.3 million people — an estimated 10% of the population, with over 2 million internally displaced and over 270,000 fled abroad — and documents at least 1,840 civilian deaths across 57 incidents (January 2023 to August 2025); two 2022 coups and resource-nationalist policy, including mine nationalisations and export bans, deter FDI.

·

Capital and skills Domestic capital is thin with weak access to credit, compounded by processing-skills and quality-control gaps.

·

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency Gold flows to Switzerland and the UAE and cotton, cashew and sesame to Asia, with intra-African orientation at only ~11% of exports.

·

AES membership and ECOWAS exit The ECOWAS exit (effective January 2025) creates trade-access uncertainty, mitigated by continued WAEMU membership and the CFA franc regional market.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Burkina Faso’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Energy is the binding gate Installed generation capacity is roughly 366 MW (SONABEL, 2020), around 300 MW of it thermal, with more than half of electricity consumed imported from the Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana grids. The audit describes energy as unreliable, costly and import-dependent, and as the binding constraint on heavy and agro-manufacturing. What would have to be true is reliable, lower-cost power through solar scale-up, storage and stable grid imports, sufficient to make food and cosmetic-grade processing cost-competitive on price, quality, warranty and service. Unreliable and expensive energy raising processing costs above offshore refiners is named as a direct threat to the shea position.

05

Landlocked logistics Transit runs through Lomé at about 40% of cargo, the Abidjan road and rail corridor at about 30–35% under the SITARAIL concession over roughly 1,150–1,260 km, plus Tema and historically Dakar. Rail is limited and ageing, road condition is variable with rainy-season failures, and inland costs are high. The audit requires corridor reliability — rail rehabilitation and border facilitation — to deliver across borders on time. Bobo-Dioulasso, on the Abidjan corridor, is identified as the most plausible industrial-export node.

06

Security and governance Human Rights Watch's April 2026 report records that by 2025 the conflict had displaced more than 2.3 million people, an estimated 10% of the population, with over 2 million internally displaced and over 270,000 having fled to neighbouring countries, and documents at least 1,840 civilian deaths across 57 incidents between January 2023 and August 2025. Two coups in 2022 and resource-nationalist policy — the 2024 Mining Code with at least 15% state free-carry and higher royalties, the SOPAMIB state mining vehicle, the nationalisation of Boungou and Wahgnion in 2024 at around USD 80 m, and export bans — deter foreign direct investment. A credible, predictable investment regime is a stated precondition for the anchor capital these moves require.

07

Capital and skills Domestic capital is thin and access to credit weak, with processing skills and quality-control gaps. Skills shortfalls are concentrated in industrial engineering, energy and food-grade processing — precisely the disciplines the shea and cotton beneficiation steps depend on. Manufacturing value added stands at about USD 1.67 bn (2020), roughly USD 74 per capita.

08

Single-buyer and feedstock dependency Gold flows to Switzerland at about 56% and the UAE at about 26%; cotton, cashew and sesame flow to Asia. The intra-African export share is only around 10.8% in 2024, and intra-African orientation is weak and concentrated in livestock, cotton to Côte d'Ivoire, and cement. The trade structure currently points away from the continent.

09

AES membership and the ECOWAS exit The ECOWAS exit took effect in January 2025, creating trade-access uncertainty. The mitigation is continued WAEMU membership, keeping the CFA franc and the regional market, and the IMF and World Bank judge the trade impact "contained" on that basis, but the investment climate remains impaired by security and policy uncertainty.

10

The shea claim itself is conditional The audit's requirements for shea are explicit and unmet: investment in cosmetic-grade refining and fractionation, HACCP and quality systems, and certification to meet buyer specifications at scale, plus aggregation and traceability for consistent volume. Alongside these sit the sector's informality and quality-consistency gaps, the fact that the bulk of high-value refining still occurs in Europe, and the risk of competing producers — Ghana, Nigeria and Mali — imposing similar export restrictions. On cotton, the parallel condition is new spinning and weaving capacity behind an anchor investor, with competitive power, to convert lint into yarn and fabric that African mills will buy.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Burkina Faso's Draft 1 bundle rests on a single structural fact the audit returns to repeatedly: the country is a continental-scale raw producer and a near-absent processor. The strong positions it can claim today are the shea input base and existing intermediate crude and refined butter capacity, cotton lint at about 292,600 tonnes in 2024/25 with coordinated ginning through SOFITEX, SOCOMA and FASO COTON, live cattle and small ruminants exported to coastal West Africa, and continental-scale gold that the audit itself discounts as a Right-of-Supply prize because it leaves the country as doré. What must be proven is the step up the chain, and the audit specifies it precisely: cosmetic-grade refining and fractionation for shea with HACCP, certification and traceability; new spinning and weaving capacity behind an anchor investor for cotton; reliable, lower-cost power from solar scale-up, storage and stable grid imports to make food and cosmetic-grade processing cost-competitive; corridor reliability through rail rehabilitation and border facilitation; and a credible, predictable investment regime capable of attracting the anchor capital each of these requires. Policy intent is already visible in the 2024 raw-nut export ban, the 25% local-processing set-aside and the National Shea Strategy; the open question is whether the processing capacity, quality systems and power to honour that intent can be built.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Burkina Faso is shown 14 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Burkina Faso to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2