Draft 1 · for discussion only · this will not be the final allocation  ·  all 54 draft bundles →
BeninBuy African Initiative · Right of Supply
Draft 1 · for discussion
AU STC-FMAEPI
Draft 1 · this will not be the final allocation

The USD 620 bn Africa sends abroad

Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of it is sourced from outside the continent, against about USD 89 bn traded within Africa. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement. This document proposes a first, correctable product bundle for Benin — and states plainly what it does not yet know.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports, 2023
USD 620 bn
Sourced off-continent — the prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured government procurement
≈USD 89 bn
Intra-African trade today (~12.5%)
13
Draft 1 candidate lines for Benin
The Minister’s brief · for Aristide Médenou · Benin
Minister Médenou, no other Francophone West African cotton producer has done what Benin has done. You have taken your own crop — roughly 669,000 tonnes of seed cotton, the largest harvest on the continent — and carried it from raw lint to finished garment inside your own borders, at Glo-Djigbé, where more than 66,000 spindles now turn, 40,000 tonnes of cotton are processed each year, and over two million pieces shipped in 2024 through Cotonou, forty-five kilometres away. Africa spends roughly USD 50 billion a year importing cotton products it could make itself; the cloth on that ship is your claim to bring some of it home. The Right of Supply gives Benin a twenty-five-year first right to supply the continent, disciplined by Match-or-Release, so it is never a subsidy and never a captive contract — only a right you earn on price. This is Draft 1, deliberately provisional. Your correction is the next move.
Right of Supply · Draft 1 · for the Minister of Finance, Benin
01 · Correspondence
From the Chair · to Aristide Médenou, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Benin · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Médenou,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Benin — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Benin is in this room

Benin's strongest endowment is cotton-based textiles and garments. In the 2023/24 campaign it ranked second in Francophone Africa behind Mali at 690,000 tonnes, producing approximately 600,063 tonnes, with output estimated at 669,000 tonnes in 2024/25, and it has done what no other Francophone West African producer has done: moved from lint to operational vertically-integrated spinning, knitting, dyeing, finishing and garmenting at the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone, with, on the zone's own reporting, more than 66,000 spindles installed, 40,000 tonnes of cotton processed annually and more than two million textile pieces exported in 2024. The honest constraint is energy and corridor fragility. Installed national generation capacity was roughly 181.5 MW in 2020, about half of electricity is imported, national access stood at around 31 per cent in 2017, and the zone's captive solar and gas generation is a workaround rather than a national fix; meanwhile the 2023 Niger border closure and the Malanville-Gaya bridge shutdown removed Cotonou's principal northern transit corridor. Benin's textile position is engineered and recent, and its durability rests on continued execution rather than on inherited advantage.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Benin, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI
02 · Executive summary
The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Benin

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports
620USD bn sourced off-continent
136.75USD bn measured procurement
13draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Benin’s draft bundle. 13 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Raw cotton lint, Raw cashew nuts, Home textiles (towels/linen). Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 3 strong contender · 6 emerging · 3 aspirational · 1 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Benin is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance
What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

  • USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
  • USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
  • USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
  • USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 13 candidate lines proposed for Benin below.

  • Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
  • Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
  • The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
  • No claim value is stated for Benin. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Benin will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Benin will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize
709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn
Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources
The market
USD 620 bn
From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize
The prize
USD 136.75 bn
Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included
Band A
≈USD 207 bn total
Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated
Band B
13 lines
Benin’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2
Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Benin at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead
Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor
USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT
Band B · estimated tender layer
≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65
Strategic agriculture & food27.03
Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02
Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53
Infrastructure & transport6.60
Currency, governance & elections5.54
Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic
Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness
Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline
Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Benin’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin
Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana
Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline
What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Benin’s own capability audit.

Refined gold

Benin has no domestic gold production; artisanal output is a few kilograms. Recorded gold exports of 7.27 to 13.17 tonnes a year between 2012 and 2021 are overwhelmingly re-exported transit gold from Burkina Faso and the Sahel, so the USD 386 million gold export line in OEC 2022 is a transit artefact rather than productive capacity.

Transit artefact · GREY

Iron ore

Low-grade iron ore at Loumbou-Loumbou and Madékali in Borgou is estimated at more than 500 million tonnes of ore, but these are resources, not reserves, and the deposit is unexploited. Continental demand is large but there is no capacity.

Raw base · industrial screen

Industrial minerals (limestone, marble, clay)

Limestone of around 123 million tonnes in Ouémé plus marble and clay remain raw or quarried, with no beneficiation at scale. Benin processes essentially nothing in the mineral sector and mining is not material to GDP.

Raw base · industrial screen

Pharmaceuticals, ceramics, e-bikes and electronics

These are announced Glo-Djigbé tenants only and are not operational at scale. Skill depth for higher-complexity manufacturing in pharmaceuticals and electronics is largely absent today.

Announced, not operational

Cashew kernels at claimed capacity

Nationally there are 14 plants with 130,800 tonnes of installed capacity as at 2023, but only around 17,700 tonnes were actually processed, roughly 14 per cent utilisation. Kernel demand is also overwhelmingly extra-African, with thin intra-continental pull.

Capability inversion

Pineapple ranking claims

Claims that Benin is the third largest pineapple producer in the world originate from promotional zone material and are not corroborated by FAO. The audit flags this as GREY and it should not be carried into any supply claim.

Unverified promotional claim
08 · Endowment
What Benin actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Benin. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Benin's productive base rests on three pillars: cotton, a fast-expanding agro-processing special economic zone, and the Port of Cotonou as a regional transit gateway. Agriculture accounts for roughly 30 per cent of GDP and is the genuine productive heart of the economy. Benin produced approximately 600,063 tonnes of seed cotton in the 2023/24 campaign, ranking second in Francophone Africa behind Mali at 690,000 tonnes; it was Africa's leading producer in 2022/23 at around 587,000 tonnes, and its 2024/25 output is estimated at 669,000 tonnes, placing it at the top of African producers ahead of Mali. The USDA ranks Benin eleventh globally and one of only two African countries, with Mali, above one million 480-lb bales in 2024/25. Roughly 300,000 tonnes of lint are produced. Alongside cotton sit raw cashew nuts at some 203,844 to 215,809 tonnes in 2023 across about 376,141 hectares and 250,000 producers, making Benin typically the world's seventh or eighth largest producer; soybean at about 520,900 tonnes in 2023 rising to roughly 650,000 tonnes in 2024, from about 140,000 tonnes in 2015; and significant shea parklands in Atacora and Donga, exported largely raw.

The transformative industrial development is the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone, a public-private partnership between the Republic of Benin, holding 35 per cent through SIPI-Benin, and Arise IIP at 65 per cent, launched in February 2020 across roughly 1,640 hectares. Textile operations are live and, on the zone's own reporting, comprise Btex in home textiles, producing 9,100 tonnes of towels and 13.5 million metres of sheeting a year; BTC and STB in integrated spinning, knitting, dyeing and garmenting, each with 33,000 spindles and around 7,000 tonnes of combed yarn; and two garment training centres of 350 machines each, producing about 1,500 trainees. SIPI-Bénin's managing director, Létondji Beheton, states the zone currently processes 40,000 tonnes of cotton a year, around 12 per cent of national production, and produces around seven to ten million garments a year. The zone reports more than two million textile pieces exported in 2024, with named buyers including The Children's Place, U.S. Polo Assn through INCOM S.p.A., and Kiabi. It also reported around 14,000 direct jobs and 14 operational industrial units across more than 36 signed investors by the end of 2024. Cashew and soybean processing are also operational, with five cashew units in the zone and crushing capacity producing crude and degummed soy oil, meal and lecithin.

Benin's economy remains low-complexity and commodity-concentrated. OEC placed it 86th most complex globally in 2022, and the Harvard Atlas of Economic Complexity places it materially lower. Revealed comparative advantage above one is concentrated in raw or lightly-processed agriculture: raw cotton, cashews and edible nuts, soybeans, oil seeds and soybean oil-cake. The single most important complexity insight is that Benin's only credible move up the product space, its nearest reachable cluster of higher-complexity products, is the cotton-to-yarn-to-fabric-to-garment ladder, which it is already climbing at Glo-Djigbé. Cashew kernels and soy derivatives are secondary processing adjacencies. Beyond agro-processing, the feasible-diversification set is thin.

The endowment in depth

Benin is mineral-poor and processes essentially nothing at scale; production is confined to industrial minerals — cement, limestone, marble, clay, sand and gravel. Cement is the only commodity with consistent production data, roughly 1.8 million tonnes in 2015 after the Nouvelle Cimenterie du Bénin (NOCIBE) plant came on stream, but it is ground from imported clinker across the NOCIBE/CDS and Cimbénin/Heidelberg grinding plants, with no integrated clinker line confirmed operational. Low-grade iron ore at Loumbou-Loumbou and Madékali (Borgou) is estimated at over 500 million tonnes of ore — resources, not reserves — and limestone at roughly 123 million tonnes (Ouémé). Gold is artisanal only, a few kilograms domestically; the recorded "gold exports" of 7.27–13.17 tonnes a year (2012–2021), including the "Gold $386M" OEC 2022 line, are a transit artefact of re-exported Burkina and Sahel gold rather than domestic production. There is no metals beneficiation and mining is not material to GDP.

Energy is the binding constraint on heavy manufacturing. Benin has no active oil or gas production — the offshore Sèmè field produced from 1982, peaked at roughly 8,000 barrels a day in 1986, and was shut in 1998, with no commercial restart since. Installed generation capacity is roughly 181.5 MW (2020), dominated by the Maria-Gléta thermal plant (127 MW dual-fuel), SBEE thermal units, and a 25 MW grid-tied solar plant at Illoulofin first commissioned in 2022. Benin imports roughly half its electricity from Nigeria and Ghana through the West African Power Pool (CEB interconnection); national electricity access was about 31% in 2017 and per-capita consumption roughly 94 kWh in 2020 — among the lowest in ECOWAS. The Sèmè-Kpodji terminal now receives the Niger–Benin (Agadem) crude pipeline, but this is transit, not domestic refining.

Agriculture is about 30% of GDP and the genuine productive heart of the economy. Cotton is the anchor: Benin produced roughly 600,063 tonnes of seed cotton in the 2023/24 campaign (ranking second in Francophone Africa behind Mali's 690,000 t), was Africa's leading producer in 2022/23 at about 587,000 t, and is estimated at roughly 669,000 tonnes in 2024/25, again at the top of African producers; USDA ranks Benin eleventh globally and one of only two African countries (with Mali) above one million 480-lb bales, and roughly 300,000 tonnes of lint are produced. Cashew (raw nuts) ran to about 203,844–215,809 tonnes in 2023 across roughly 376,141 hectares and 250,000 producers, making Benin typically the world's seventh-to-eighth largest producer. Soybean reached roughly 520,900 tonnes in 2023, rising to about 650,000 t in 2024 from just 140,000 t in 2015. Benin is a notable pineapple producer (pain de sucre and smooth cayenne), though the "third largest in the world" claim is promotional and uncorroborated by FAO and is flagged grey, and it holds significant shea parklands in Atacora and Donga exported largely raw; the degree of processing remains low across all of these except where GDIZ has intervened.

Industry is about 20% of GDP (2024, Coface), with UNIDO placing Benin near the bottom decile of the Competitive Industrial Performance index and very low MVA per capita. The transformative development is the Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ), a PPP between the Republic of Benin (35% via SIPI-Benin) and Arise IIP (65%), launched February 2020 across roughly 1,640 hectares. Its textile line is operational: Btex (home textiles — 9,100 t towels, 13.5 million metres of sheeting a year), BTC and STB (integrated spinning-knitting-dyeing-garmenting, 33,000 spindles each, roughly 7,000 t combed yarn each), and two Garment Training Centres of 350 machines and roughly 1,500 trainees each; SIPI-Bénin MD Létondji Beheton states the zone processes 40,000 tonnes of cotton a year (about 12% of national production) and produces around 7 to 10 million garments a year. Five GDIZ cashew units (roughly 100,000–120,000 t/yr capacity) and soybean crushing (Benin Organics plus a conventional unit up to 150,000 t/yr, producing crude/degummed oil, meal and lecithin) are also operational, and GDIZ reported roughly 14,000 direct jobs across 14 operational industrial units and 36-plus signed investors by end-2024. The labour force is large, young and low-cost, roughly 90% informal, with low headline unemployment (~2.4%) but underemployment near 72% and a thin TVET/tertiary base that the garment training centres are designed to backfill. On logistics, the Port of Cotonou handles 90% of the country's international trade and 49% of transit traffic to Niger (37%), Burkina Faso (4%), Mali (3%) and Nigeria (5%), moved 12.5 million tonnes in 2022, and is targeted to reach 23 million tonnes by 2038 under a 2021–2026 Master Plan (AfDB €80m loan in 2023, comprising €55m AfDB and €25m Africa Growing Together Fund); GDIZ sits about 45 km from the port on a connecting highway.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Benin is a low-complexity, commodity-concentrated exporter. OEC ranked it eighty-sixth most complex globally in 2022; the Harvard Atlas of Economic Complexity places it materially lower (around the 118th position in a recent cross-tab dataset, to be confirmed against the live profile), and its complexity has been broadly stagnant-to-weak. Products with revealed comparative advantage above 1 are concentrated in raw or lightly-processed agriculture — raw cotton (very high RCA), cashews and other edible nuts, soybeans, oil seeds and soybean oil-cake.

The single most important complexity insight for the Right-of-Supply allocation is that Benin's only credible "move up" in the product space — its nearest reachable cluster of higher-complexity products — is the cotton-to-yarn-to-fabric-to-garment chain, which it is already climbing at GDIZ. Cashew kernels and soy derivatives are secondary processing adjacencies. Beyond agro-processing, the feasible-diversification set is thin.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Benin's strongest, most defensible continental supply claim is cotton-based textiles and garments (HS 52/60/61/62/63), and the case rests on the rare simultaneous satisfaction of five tests. On input base, Benin is Africa's largest seed-cotton producer (~600,000 t in 2023/24, ~669,000 t in 2024/25, and first in 2022/23 at ~587,000 t), giving it the deepest feedstock pool on the continent and very high revealed comparative advantage in raw cotton. On processing position, uniquely among the C4-plus cotton producers, Benin has moved from lint to operational vertically-integrated spinning, knitting, dyeing, finishing and garmenting at GDIZ (Btex, BTC, STB; 66,000-plus spindles installed; 40,000 t of cotton processed and 7 to 10 million garments a year per SIPI-Bénin) — built, not merely announced. On competitiveness, it combines low-cost labour, captive solar and gas power inside the zone that insulates it from the national grid's weakness, CMiA-certified traceable cotton, duty-free access to the EU (EBA) and US (AGOA where extended), and real offtake — a KIABI order alignment of 2 million pieces for 2024 and 4 million for 2025, plus The Children's Place and U.S. Polo Assn, with more than 2 million pieces exported in 2024. On deliverability, GDIZ is 45 km from the deep-water Port of Cotonou with sub-20-day shipping to Europe; and on continental demand, Afreximbank President George Elombi stated at WTO MC14 in Yaoundé (April 2026) that Africa spends roughly USD 50 billion a year importing cotton products it could manufacture itself, with a programme targeting import substitution and 500,000 jobs by 2030.

The advantage is engineered rather than accidental — deliberately assembled via the SEZ, an anchor developer, captive power and the continent's largest cotton endowment — which makes it the most durable of Benin's positions, but it is recent, so durability depends on continued execution. Its honest limits are real: thin domestic skilled-labour depth; dependence on a single SEZ developer (Arise IIP) and a handful of anchor buyers; national power-supply fragility should zone-captive generation lag expansion; and competition from vertically-integrated Egypt, nearshoring Morocco, and Ethiopian and East-African garment hubs. Value capture also stays shallow until Benin deepens from spinning and garment assembly into large-scale weaving, knitting, dyeing and finishing, so that apparel meets AfCFTA rules-of-origin on yarn-forward and fabric-forward bases.

Current reality

Benin is a small, coastal, CFA-franc West African economy within WAEMU, with GDP of USD 21.48 billion, GDP per capita of USD 1,485 and a population of around 14.5 million, all World Bank figures for 2024. Industry is approximately 20 per cent of GDP. Its UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance ranking is low, sitting near the bottom decile, and manufacturing value added per capita is very low. Benin is mineral-poor and processes essentially nothing at scale; mining is not material to GDP. Energy is the binding constraint on heavy manufacturing: there is no active oil or gas production, installed generation capacity is roughly 181.5 MW as of 2020, about half of electricity is imported from Nigeria and Ghana through the West African Power Pool, national electricity access was around 31 per cent in 2017, and per-capita consumption was about 94 kWh in 2020, among the lowest in ECOWAS. Glo-Djigbé mitigates this with captive solar and gas-fired generation inside the zone, but this is a workaround rather than a national fix.

The Port of Cotonou handles 90 per cent of the country's international trade and 49 per cent of transit traffic to Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Nigeria, moving 12.5 million tonnes in 2022. However, Nigerian and Niger-bound cargo accounted for roughly 80 per cent of transit volumes before 2023, and the July 2023 closure of the Niger border together with the shutting of the Malanville-Gaya bridge collapsed Cotonou's principal northern transit corridor, with flows partly rerouting to Lomé and Abidjan. Export orientation remains overwhelmingly extra-African: only about 15 per cent of exports by value went to other African countries in 2024, much of it informal re-export to Nigeria and transit to the Sahel. At HS4 level in 2024, uncombed cotton was around 45 per cent of exports. Intra-African orientation in formal value-added goods is therefore low today.

09 · The draft bundle
Draft 1 · 13 candidate lines · will change

Benin’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Benin’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Benin will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Benin’s 13 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Strong Contender 3Emerging 6Aspirational 3Grey 1
CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Soybean oil & meal

520-650kt feedstock; GDIZ crushing operational · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Large
EMERGING
USD 4.04 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
150710Vegetable oils; soya-bean oil and its fractions, crude, whether or not degummed, not chemically modified
150790Vegetable oils; soya-bean oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
230400Oil-cake and other solid residues; whether or not ground or in the form of pellets, resulting from the extraction of soy
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 991.2 mEgypt USD 859.9 mAlgeria USD 638.6 mZimbabwe USD 244.5 mMauritania USD 179.3 mCote dIvoire USD 105.4 mSouth Africa USD 104 mTunisia USD 102.6 m

Source: GDIZ;Ecofin · 2024

Refined gold

No domestic production; exports are transit · Maturity: None · Competitiveness: Large
GREY
USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder
710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)
710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured
710820Gold, monetary
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 5.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Ecofin/EITI · 2024

Soybeans raw

Rapid output growth; export ban to force crushing · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 2.93 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
120100Soya beans, whether or not broken
120110Soya beans; seed, whether or not broken
120190Soya beans; other than seed, whether or not broken
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.7 bnAlgeria USD 770 mTunisia USD 319.2 mTogo USD 71.1 mMorocco USD 21.6 mZimbabwe USD 13.8 mTanzania USD 11.5 mRwanda USD 4.5 m

Source: OEC;IMF · 2022;2024

Cement (bagged)

NOCIBE+grinding; ~1.8Mt 2015 · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Large regional
EMERGING
USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)
252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured
252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured
252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers
252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 30.3 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: USGS;GlobalCement · 2015

Iron ore

Loumbou-Loumbou >500Mt low-grade resource · Maturity: Unexploited · Competitiveness: Large but no capacity
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated
260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
260120Iron pyrites; roasted
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS · 2014

Pineapple products

Notable producer; GDIZ fruit processing · Maturity: Raw-early · Competitiveness: Moderate regional
EMERGING
USD 1.07 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080410Fruit, edible; dates, fresh or dried
080420Fruit, edible; figs, fresh or dried
080430Fruit, edible; pineapples, fresh or dried
080440Fruit, edible; avocados, fresh or dried
080450Fruit, edible; guavas, mangoes and mangosteens, fresh or dried
200911Juice; orange, frozen, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweete
200912Juice; orange, not frozen, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not co
200919Juice; orange, not frozen, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not contai
200920Grapefruit juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200921Juice; grapefruit or pomelo, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or no
200929Juice; grapefruit or pomelo, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not cont
200930Juice of citrus fruit, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening...
200931Juice; of single citrus fruit (excluding orange, grapefruit or pomelo), of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200939Juice; of single citrus fruit (excluding orange, grapefruit or pomelo), of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200940Pineapple juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200941Juice; pineapple, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200949Juice; pineapple, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200950Juice; tomato, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200960Grape juice, incl. grape must, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other...
200961Juice; grape, of a Brix value not exceeding 30, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200969Juice; grape, of a Brix value exceeding 30, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200970Apple juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200971Juice; apple, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200979Juice; apple, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200980Juice of fruit or vegetables, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening...
200981Juice; cranberry (Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos); Iingonberry (Vaccinium vitis-idaea), unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200989Juice; of any single fruit, nut or vegetable n.e.c. in heading no. 2009, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200990Juices; mixtures of fruits or vegetables (but not nut juice), unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Benin imported USD 0.6 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Morocco USD 288 mSouth Africa USD 141 mNigeria USD 65.5 mSomalia USD 55.5 mEgypt USD 52.2 mLibya USD 42.7 mBotswana USD 42.6 mGhana USD 39.6 m

Source: GDIZ;FAO · 2023

Cashew apple juice

~112,500L produced 2023 · Maturity: Early · Competitiveness: Marginal
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 596.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
200911Juice; orange, frozen, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweete
200912Juice; orange, not frozen, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not co
200919Juice; orange, not frozen, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not contai
200920Grapefruit juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200921Juice; grapefruit or pomelo, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or no
200929Juice; grapefruit or pomelo, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not cont
200930Juice of citrus fruit, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening...
200931Juice; of single citrus fruit (excluding orange, grapefruit or pomelo), of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, n
200939Juice; of single citrus fruit (excluding orange, grapefruit or pomelo), of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not c
200940Pineapple juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200941Juice; pineapple, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containin
200949Juice; pineapple, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing adde
200950Juice; tomato, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200960Grape juice, incl. grape must, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other...
200961Juice; grape, of a Brix value not exceeding 30, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200969Juice; grape, of a Brix value exceeding 30, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200970Apple juice, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter...
200971Juice; apple, of a Brix value not exceeding 20, unfermented, (not containing added spirit), whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200979Juice; apple, of a Brix value exceeding 20, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200980Juice of fruit or vegetables, unfermented, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening...
200981Juice; cranberry (Vaccinium macrocarpon, Vaccinium oxycoccos); Iingonberry (Vaccinium vitis-idaea), unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200989Juice; of any single fruit, nut or vegetable n.e.c. in heading no. 2009, unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
200990Juices; mixtures of fruits or vegetables (but not nut juice), unfermented, not containing added spirit, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 0.5 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
South Africa USD 129.2 mBotswana USD 39.5 mNigeria USD 37.5 mLibya USD 36 mSomalia USD 25.3 mNamibia USD 24.2 mGhana USD 20.4 mMorocco USD 20.4 m

Source: CICC · 2023

Raw cotton lint

#1-2 African producer; very high RCA · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Large (feedstock)
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 392 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
520100Cotton; not carded or combed
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 281.8 mMauritius USD 41.3 mAlgeria USD 23.8 mLesotho USD 21.2 mMorocco USD 14.4 mTunisia USD 2.6 mMozambique USD 2.4 mSouth Africa USD 2.1 m

Source: PR-PICA;OEC · 2023/24;2022

Shea butter/derivatives

Large shea parklands · Maturity: Raw-early · Competitiveness: Moderate
EMERGING
USD 357.5 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
151511Vegetable oils; linseed oil and its fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151519Vegetable oils; linseed oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151521Vegetable oils; maize (corn) oil and its fractions, crude, not chemically modified
151529Vegetable oils; maize (corn) oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modifie
151530Vegetable oils; castor oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151540Tung oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151550Vegetable oils; sesame oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151560Vegetable oils; microbial fats and oils and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified
151590Fixed vegetable fats and oils and their fractions n.e.c. in heading 1515; other than linseed, maize (corn), castor, sesa
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Libya USD 90.9 mEgypt USD 49.3 mTunisia USD 44 mDjibouti USD 29.5 mGambia USD 24.3 mTanzania USD 20 mSudan USD 19.5 mCameroon USD 9.3 m

Source: GDIZ;FAO · 2023

Industrial minerals

Limestone ~123Mt; marble; clay · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Regional construction
ASPIRATIONAL
USD 163 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
251511Marble and travertine; having a specific gravity of 2.5 or more, crude or roughly trimmed by sawing or otherwise, into b
251512Marble and travertine; merely cut, by sawing or otherwise, into blocks or slabs of a rectangular (including square) shap
251520Ecaussine and other calcareous monumental or building stone; alabaster, having a specific gravity of 2.5 or more
252100Limestone flux; limestone and other calcareous stone, of a kind used for the manufacture of lime or cement
Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Benin imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 79.8 mMadagascar USD 26.5 mAlgeria USD 18.9 mTunisia USD 8.7 mMorocco USD 4.3 mGhana USD 4 mLibya USD 3.5 mCote dIvoire USD 3.1 m

Source: USGS · 2014

Cashew kernels

Top-8 RCN producer; 130,800t capacity but 14% utilisation · Maturity: Intermediate · Competitiveness: Extra-African mainly
EMERGING
USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 1.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Source: CICC;Ecofin · 2023;2024

Raw cashew nuts

~204-216kt production 2023 · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Extra-continental
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 155.7 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
080111Nuts, edible; coconuts, desiccated
080112Nuts, edible; coconuts, in the inner shell (endocarp)
080119Nuts, edible; coconuts, fresh or dried, other than desiccated or in the inner shell (endocarp)
080121Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080122Nuts, edible; brazil nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
080131Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, in shell
080132Nuts, edible; cashew nuts, fresh or dried, shelled
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high
Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 10 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Benin imported USD 1.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Egypt USD 38.1 mAlgeria USD 35.1 mMorocco USD 34.1 mSouth Africa USD 22.6 mLibya USD 5.8 mNigeria USD 4.3 mSomalia USD 3.1 mGhana USD 2.4 m

Source: CICC;FAO · 2023

Home textiles (towels/linen)

Btex operational 9,100t towels/13.5m m sheeting · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: Moderate-large
STRONG CONTENDER
USD 18.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim
580210Fabrics; terry towelling and similar woven terry fabrics, of cotton, whether bleached or unbleached, excluding narrow fa
580211Terry towelling etc of cotton, not narrow fabric, unb
580219Terry towelling etc of cotton nes, width > 30cm
580220Fabrics; terry towelling and similar woven terry fabrics, of textile materials, excluding cotton, excluding narrow fabri
580230Fabrics; tufted textile fabrics, excluding products of heading no. 5703
Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Benin imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023
Algeria USD 9.3 mMorocco USD 3.2 mMauritius USD 1.6 mKenya USD 0.6 mSouth Africa USD 0.5 mTunisia USD 0.5 mNamibia USD 0.5 mGhana USD 0.4 m

Source: GDIZ · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Benin is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance
What Benin buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Benin is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 4.20 bn

Benin’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

13

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

0

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product lineStrength tierBenin imports, 2023Continental demand, 2023
Cement (bagged)EMERGINGUSD 30.3 mUSD 2.9 bn
Refined goldGREYUSD 5.9 mUSD 2.99 bn
Cashew kernelsEMERGINGUSD 1.2 mUSD 155.7 m
Raw cashew nutsSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 1.2 mUSD 155.7 m
Soybeans rawEMERGINGUSD 1 mUSD 2.93 bn
Pineapple productsEMERGINGUSD 0.6 mUSD 1.07 bn
Cashew apple juiceASPIRATIONALUSD 0.5 mUSD 596.6 m
Soybean oil & mealEMERGINGUSD 0.1 mUSD 4.04 bn
Iron oreASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 2.85 bn
Raw cotton lintSTRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 392 m
Shea butter/derivativesEMERGINGUSD 0 mUSD 357.5 m
Industrial mineralsASPIRATIONALUSD 0 mUSD 163 m
Home textiles (towels/linen)STRONG CONTENDERUSD 0 mUSD 18.4 m

Left-hand column: what Benin itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion
The number this document refuses to print

What Benin’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 13 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Benin’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Benin. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Benin’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map
Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Benin’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023
01EgyptUSD 4.86 bn
02AlgeriaUSD 2.4 bn
03UgandaUSD 2.04 bn
04MoroccoUSD 1.47 bn
05South AfricaUSD 1.09 bn
06LibyaUSD 734.4 m
07TunisiaUSD 521 m
08GhanaUSD 387.3 m
09Cote dIvoireUSD 381.5 m
10MaliUSD 302.7 m
11ZimbabweUSD 258.3 m
12Burkina FasoUSD 205.1 m
13MauritaniaUSD 179.3 m
14CameroonUSD 154.2 m
15NigeriaUSD 111.6 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Benin. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence
What would have to be true

The conditions Benin would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Benin to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

01

Power scaled ahead of processing

GDIZ captive generation (solar plus gas) must scale ahead of each new processing tranche, and nationally WAPP imports and domestic gas-to-power such as FLNG and Maria-Gléta expansion must stabilise to support any manufacturing beyond the zone.

02

Fabric depth for rules-of-origin

Benin must move from spinning plus garment assembly to large-scale weaving and knitting plus dyeing and finishing so that garments meet AfCFTA rules-of-origin on yarn-forward or fabric-forward bases; otherwise value capture stays shallow and rules-of-origin benefits are lost.

03

Feedstock control that bites

The cashew and soybean export bans must actually bite by closing smuggling routes and providing processor working capital, so that installed plants run near capacity rather than the roughly 14% utilisation seen today.

04

Restored and secured logistics

The northern corridors must be restored and secured and the Cotonou Master Plan completed (Terminal 5, minus-15-metre draught) to guarantee delivery to both African and offshore markets.

05

Diversified offtake and developer risk

Benin must broaden beyond Arise IIP and a handful of Western brands and cultivate African institutional buyers such as uniforms, home textiles and medical textiles to anchor intra-continental supply.

06

An order-of-magnitude skills pipeline

TVET and garment training must scale an order of magnitude to staff a 200,000-to-250,000-job textile sector.

The binding constraints
·

Power Roughly 181.5 MW installed (2020), about half of electricity imported via the West African Power Pool, roughly 31% national access and about 94 kWh per capita form a structural ceiling on heavy and continuous manufacturing; GDIZ's captive generation is a workaround, not a national fix.

·

Logistics and corridor risk Cotonou's northern transit franchise (~80% Nigerian and Niger-bound cargo before 2023) was gutted by the 2023 Niger border closure and the Malanville–Gaya bridge shutdown, and border-zone insecurity (violence up 86% between 2024 and 2025, tied to the Lakurawa group's expansion into Alibori) raises overland-delivery risk into the Sahel.

·

Feedstock leakage Roughly 70% of the cashew crop is reportedly smuggled to Togo or Nigeria despite the ban, and soybean and cashew processors face working-capital shortages and low utilisation.

·

Capital and single-investor dependence The industrial story is concentrated in one SEZ and one developer (Arise IIP), with buyer concentration in a few Western brands.

·

Skills The TVET and tertiary technical base is shallow, and capability for higher-complexity products such as pharmaceuticals and electronics is largely absent.

·

Data distortion Re-export and transit gold and goods inflate headline trade figures, so single-year reads — especially post-2023 FX and border shocks — are unreliable.

13 · Devil’s advocate
Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

01

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Benin’s favour.

02

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

03

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

04

Power is a structural ceiling, not a solvable detail. Installed capacity of roughly 181.5 MW in 2020, around half of electricity imported through the West African Power Pool, about 31 per cent national access and roughly 94 kWh per capita place a hard limit on heavy or continuous manufacturing. Glo-Djigbé captive generation must scale ahead of each new processing tranche, and it remains a zone-level workaround rather than a national fix.

05

The northern corridor franchise has been gutted. Cotonou's transit business, roughly 80 per cent Nigerian and Niger-bound cargo before 2023, was severely disrupted by the 2023 Niger border closure and the Malanville-Gaya bridge shutdown. Border-zone violence rose 86 per cent between 2024 and 2025, tied to the Lakurawa armed group expanding into Alibori department, raising overland delivery risk into the Sahel.

06

Feedstock leaks faster than policy can close it. Despite the raw cashew and soybean export bans, market expert Jim Fitzpatrick assessed that less than 30 per cent of last year's harvest was processed locally and nearly 70 per cent was diverted to Togo or Nigeria, then re-labelled and sold in India as Beninese-origin. Vietnam and India reported 224,000 tonnes of raw cashew nuts from Togo in 2024, roughly nine times Togo's actual crop.

07

The industrial story rests on one zone and one developer. Capability is concentrated in Glo-Djigbé and its developer Arise IIP, with offtake concentrated in a handful of Western brands. Diversification of both developer risk and buyer base is a precondition of durability, including cultivating African institutional buyers in uniforms, home textiles and medical textiles.

08

Value capture stays shallow without fabric depth. Benin must move from spinning plus garment assembly to large-scale weaving and knitting with dyeing and finishing, so that garments meet AfCFTA rules-of-origin on yarn-forward or fabric-forward bases. Otherwise value capture remains shallow and the rules-of-origin benefits are lost.

09

The skills base is an order of magnitude too small. Around 90 per cent of employment is informal, unemployment is low at about 2.4 per cent but underemployment is around 72 per cent, and the tertiary and TVET base is thin. Training would have to scale by an order of magnitude to staff a textile sector of 200,000 to 250,000 jobs.

10

Headline trade data cannot be read at face value. Re-export and transit flows, notably gold, inflate headline trade figures, and total goods exports of roughly USD 1.05 to 1.11 billion for 2023 to 2024 sit against a WTO figure of about USD 4 billion for 2023. Single-year reads, especially after the 2023 border and currency shocks, are unreliable.

14 · Synthesis
The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Benin's Draft 1 bundle rests on a single deliberately engineered chain: one of the largest cotton feedstock bases on the continent, converted through operational vertically-integrated spinning-to-garment capacity at Glo-Djigbé, shipped from a deep-water port 45 km away into a continental market that imports roughly USD 50 billion a year of cotton products. Home textiles and raw cotton lint sit alongside it as strong positions, with cashew kernels and soybean oil and meal as emerging secondary adjacencies. What must be proven is execution, not concept: captive generation must scale ahead of every new processing tranche; fabric depth must move beyond spinning and assembly so that garments satisfy AfCFTA rules of origin on a yarn-forward or fabric-forward basis; the cashew and soybean export bans must actually bite, so that installed plants run near capacity rather than at around 14 per cent; northern corridors must be restored and secured while the Cotonou Master Plan, including Terminal 5 and a minus-15-metre draught, is completed; offtake and developer risk must be broadened beyond a single zone operator and a handful of brands; and the training pipeline must expand by an order of magnitude. The endowment is real and the processing position is operational rather than announced. The question before ministers is whether Benin can hold and widen a position it has built in five years.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Benin is shown 13 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Benin to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response
The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2