Right of Supply — Angola

01 · Correspondence

From the Chair · to Vera Daves de Sousa, Minister of Finance

A first draft, put in front of you to be corrected

Draft 1 · Right of Supply · Angola · from the Office of the Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

Minister Daves de Sousa,

I write to you not as a secretariat, but as a colleague — one of fifty-four ministers who signs the same painful cheque every year. Africa buys USD 709 bn of goods annually, and USD 620 bn of it leaves this continent. Some of that money is yours, some of it is mine, and almost none of it needs to go where it goes.

What is fixed — and what is yours to change

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they carry different weight. The continental spine is fixed: USD 709 bn of total imports; USD 620 bn sourced off-continent; approximately USD 89 bn traded within Africa; USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement inside an estimated USD 207 bn that our governments influence. Those figures are measured, reconciled and not on the table. Everything else — the product bundle proposed for Angola — is Draft 1: a first pass drawn from your country’s productive-capacity audit, printed precisely so that you can correct it.

Why Angola is in this room

Angola's strongest continental endowment is not a manufactured product but a controlled geography: the Lobito Corridor, the 1,344km Benguela Railway running from the deep-water Atlantic port of Lobito to the DRC border at Luau and on towards the Central African Copperbelt, operated by the Lobito Atlantic Railway consortium of Trafigura, Mota-Engil and Vecturis under a 30-year concession granted in 2022. It serves the DRC, estimated at 76% of world cobalt mine production in 2024, and Zambia, Africa's second copper producer, and it reached financial close on a US$753m DFC and DBSA package in December 2025. The honest constraint is that this is transit rather than production: Angola's logistics performance sits in the bottom tier of the World Bank LPI with customs around 1.7 and timeliness around 2.1, only about 18% of roads are paved, corruption is scored at 32 out of 100 on the CPI 2024, and the corridor faces a funded competitor in the US$1.4bn TAZARA upgrade signed in September 2025. Until the corridor moves from pass-through to value-addition, the advantage is geographic, not industrial.

The instrument — two layers, both required

Pre-allocation. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category to designated African producers. That is the fairness layer — the reason every member state, including those still rebuilding, holds a bundle at all.

Match-or-Release. When any of our governments procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, no penalty, no delay. I have called it the Cell Phone Test: nobody in this room is asked to buy a worse phone. This is a right to match, never a right to exclude. Your procurement autonomy is untouched, and there is no pooled purchasing, no central buyer, no buyers’ club.

What I ask of you

One hour, and your pen. Mark what is wrong: the lines that do not belong to Angola, the capability this draft understates, the buyer it misreads. The response instrument at the end of this document takes a minute to complete, and Draft 2 will show, line by line, which member state asked for each change. Your correction is not an objection to the method — it is the method.

Neal RijkenbergMinister of Finance, Kingdom of Eswatini · Chair, AU STC-FMAEPI

02 · Executive summary

The whole case on one page

A fixed continental prize, and a draft bundle for Angola

Right of Supply · in one read

The spine is settled. The bundle is the conversation.

709USD bn total imports

620USD bn sourced off-continent

136.75USD bn measured procurement

17draft bundle lines

The prize. Africa imports USD 709 bn of goods a year. USD 620 bn of that is sourced from outside the continent, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within it — about 12.5 per cent. The off-continent figure is the market available for progressive import substitution, and it is the denominator this instrument works from.

The beachhead. USD 136.75 bn is measured government procurement, parastatals included, sitting inside an estimated USD 207 bn of government-influenced demand once contractor-imported tenders are counted. Government is where a signature can redirect demand, so government is where the instrument begins.

The instrument. Two layers. The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per product category — the fairness layer. Match-or-Release disciplines it: the designated supplier matches the open-market quote on price, quality, warranty and service, or releases the buyer instantly. This is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Purchase by purchase, country by country.

Angola’s draft bundle. 17 candidate product lines are proposed, drawn from the country’s productive-capacity audit, led on present capability by Crude petroleum, Rough diamonds. Per-line figures are gross continental import demand — market context, sourced, never a statement of what this state will supply. The tier mix is 2 continental anchor · 2 strong contender · 5 emerging · 5 aspirational · 3 grey.

What is draft and what is not. The spine — USD 709 bn, USD 620 bn, USD 136.75 bn, USD 89 bn — is fixed. The bundle is Draft 1 and expected to change. The claim value for Angola is deliberately not stated: it arrives only after the screens and the allocation are resolved, at Draft 2.

03 · Draft provenance

What is fixed · what is draft

Two kinds of statement sit in this document, and they are not equal

The most common way an instrument like this fails is that a provisional product list is read as a settled entitlement, or a measured continental figure is read as negotiable. This page separates them before anything else is claimed.

Fixed · not draft · not negotiable

The macro spine

Measured from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3 on a 2023 basis, reconciled across all 54 member states.

USD 709 bn — total continental imports, 2023.
USD 620 bn — sourced from outside the continent. The prize.
USD 89 bn — traded within Africa today, about 12.5 per cent.
USD 136.75 bn — measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn government-influenced.

These figures do not move because a bundle changes.

Draft 1 · for discussion · will change

The product bundle

The 17 candidate lines proposed for Angola below.

Assembled from the state’s Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit.
Allocation between states is unresolved. Several states currently claim some of the same lines; those lines are marked.
The screens that reduce a candidate bundle to a claim have not yet been applied here.
No claim value is stated for Angola. That figure belongs to Draft 2.

The Minister’s correction is not an objection to the method. It is the method.

The rule this document will not break

Per-line values are gross continental import demand — what the whole continent buys in that category from all sources. They are market context. They are never a statement of what Angola will supply, and they are never added together into a headline. Summing overlapping candidate lines is precisely the error that produces a figure many times a country’s GDP, and it is renounced here.

What a line value means

The continent imported this much of this product category in 2023, from everywhere.

What it does not mean

That Angola will supply it, could supply it tomorrow, or is entitled to that revenue.

04 · The size of the prize

709 → 620 → 136.75 / ≈207

USD 620 bn leaves the continent every year

Africa imports USD 709 bn. USD 620 bn comes from outside the continent; about USD 89 bn is sourced within Africa. The Right of Supply begins with the off-continent prize, then narrows to the government demand a signature can redirect.

USD 709 bn

Total continental imports — all buyers, all sources

The market

USD 620 bn

From outside Africa — the import-substitution prize

The prize

USD 136.75 bn

Measured direct sovereign imports · parastatals included

Band A

≈USD 207 bn total

Government-influenced once contractor-imported tenders are counted · estimated

Band B

17 lines

Angola’s Draft 1 candidate bundle · claim value resolved at Draft 2

Draft 1

Funnel widths are indicative. Band A is measured at USD 136.75 bn (2024). Band B is inferred from the one-third ratio applied to USD 620 bn, giving approximately USD 207 bn of total government-influenced demand. The final row is a count of candidate lines, not a value: no monetary claim is made for Angola at Draft 1.

SCREEN 01

Government first

Begin where a state, agency or parastatal controls the tender or directly imports the good.

SCREEN 02

Off-continent

Substitute imports from beyond Africa. Do not displace an existing African producer.

SCREEN 03

Industrial

Allocate a finished good that requires plant, capability and jobs — not a raw base.

SCREEN 04

Balance

Size the right near what the member buys so the continental allocation can net out.

05 · Government beachhead

Two bands · one honest market

USD 136.75 bn measured. About USD 207 bn government-influenced.

The measured floor already includes state-owned buyers. The estimate above it captures goods specified by government but imported through EPC contractors, construction firms and other delivery vehicles that customs cannot label as sovereign.

Band A · measured floor

USD 136.75 bn

Direct sovereign imports across 62 categories and 48 states. Parastatals and controlled agencies are already present.

NNPCGASCOAICNCPBKEMSANMSPCT

Band B · estimated tender layer

≈USD 207 bn

Total government-influenced demand, applying the one-third ratio to USD 620 bn. The extension above the measured floor is an estimate based on that ratio, not a customs measurement.

Parastatals, confirmed

The sovereign database classifies buyers as monopoly, controlled or predominant, together with functions where a single state entity is the only lawful buyer, each tied to named agencies. Energy includes NNPC and national oil companies; strategic food includes GASC, OAIC and NCPB; public health includes KEMSA, NMS and PCT. Central banks, electoral commissions, defence ministries, public works and roads authorities complete the government layer. The question is not whether state-owned enterprises are counted. They are. The question is which contractor-imported tenders sit above the directly measured floor.

The seven sovereign pillars · USD bn, 2024

Energy & utilities71.65

Strategic agriculture & food27.03

Public health & pharmaceuticals14.02

Digital sovereignty & telecoms8.53

Infrastructure & transport6.60

Currency, governance & elections5.54

Defence & national security3.40

The direct sovereign floor

Fuel, grain, medicines, defence and other lines imported by a state or controlled agency.

The
tender

The contractor-imported layer

The hospital’s tiles, the state road’s rebar and the utility’s pipe. Government specifies the finished material even when a contractor clears customs.

06 · Allocation logic

Two layers · three principles

Allocation chooses the finished product — not merely the resource

The instrument only works with both of its layers in place. Drop either and it breaks: pre-allocation without discipline becomes a cartel; discipline without pre-allocation leaves nothing to build against.

Layer one · fairness

Pre-allocated supply rights

The African Union pre-allocates 25-year supply rights per HS6 product category to designated African producers. This is why every member state — including those rebuilding — holds a bundle. It creates the demand certainty a plant can be financed against.

Layer two · competitive discipline

Match-or-Release

The Cell Phone Test. When a government procures, the designated continental supplier is shown the open-market quote and must match it on price, quality, warranty and service in a single window — or release the buyer instantly, with no penalty and no delay.

What this instrument is not

It is not pooled procurement. There is no central buyer, no aggregated tender and no buyers’ club. Every purchase remains purchase-by-purchase and country-by-country, and Angola’s procurement autonomy is untouched. It is a right to match a price, never a right to exclude a competitor. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent, ramping from 10 per cent to 100 per cent over ten years.

Principle one

The finished-product test

Allocate what the tender actually specifies. A government does not buy winding wire to repair motors; it buys motors. A hospital fit-out buys sanitaryware, not raw kaolin.

Pass: electric motors · sanitaryware
Fail: winding wire · raw kaolin

Principle two

Scale-matching

The largest use of a material anchors to the largest endowment-holder. Smaller holders take a niche, higher-value product rather than a continental bulk line.

Scale anchor: bulk copper cable → Zambia
Niche: motors → Botswana

Principle three

Endowment-combination

The strongest claim brings two endowments together in one plant. The allocation rewards the industrial combination, not the mere presence of either resource.

Eswatini: iron + anthracite → one niche smelter

The South Sudan Principle

Fragile and rebuilding states hold aspirational allocations. These are not near-term capacity claims and must never be read as such. They are the demand certainty against which capability is built — the reason an investor can underwrite a first plant in a state that does not yet have one. A member state is not excluded from the continental market because it is currently unable to serve it.

07 · Discipline

What should come off the list

A credible bundle is defined as much by what it refuses

Every exclusion names the screen it fails. This is the visible evidence that the bundle was reasoned rather than padded — and the reasoning is drawn from Angola’s own capability audit.

Crude petroleum as a continental supply claim

Angola is an anchor producer at roughly 1.1m b/d and 2.6bn barrels of proved reserves, but the audit records the crude as exported essentially raw and overwhelmingly to Asia and Europe, with China taking about 51% of exports and intra-African trade negligible. The audit itself classifies crude as genuine anchor scale but not a continental supply play.

Raw base · industrial screen

Rough diamonds as a beneficiated continental offer

Volume is world-class — a record 13.96m carats in 2024 and third in the world — but in 2020 only about 2% of rough was cut domestically, and the audit rates intra-African demand for rough as low. The Saurimo hub and Robust Diam remain nascent, and polished diamonds are tiered aspirational.

Capability inversion

Refined petroleum products as present supply

Angola imports roughly 80% of its refined fuel from a single Luanda refinery of about 65,000 b/d meeting only around 20% of demand. Cabinda Phase 1 (30,000 b/d) opened in September 2025, Lobito (200,000 b/d) is about 12% complete with a US$4.8bn shortfall, and Soyo (100,000 b/d) is stalled. The audit tiers refined products as emerging to aspirational.

Aspirational · not yet delivered

LNG and gas as an intra-African supply line

Angola LNG at Soyo is a genuine 5.2 mtpa asset, but the audit records exports going to Europe (75% in 2023) and Asia, with intra-African demand rated low. The endowment is real; the flow is off-continent.

Off-continent flow

Phosphate fertiliser and iron ore

Phosphate deposits in Cabinda and Cacata are undeveloped despite very high continental fertiliser demand, and the Kassinga iron ore body of more than 1bn tonnes is dormant. Both are tiered aspirational on undeveloped beneficiation stage.

Resource, not production

Rare earths, manganese and gold

The audit places Pensana's Longonjo rare-earth project at pre-production, manganese as small or at exploration, and gold as mostly artisanal, tiering all three as grey with low data confidence on production volumes.

Grey · insufficient evidence

08 · Endowment

What Angola actually holds

The endowment, read honestly

Drawn from the Productive Capacity & Continental Supply Audit for Angola. Capability tiers reflect installed capability, not the mere presence of a resource.

Angola's mineral endowment is anchored by diamonds. The country produced a record 13.96m carats in 2024 (Endiama), generating US$1.49bn in revenue and placing it third in the world by volume behind Russia and Botswana. Catoca has historically accounted for around 80% of output, and the new Luele mine, with a resource of approximately 628m carats, is ramping towards 3.5–4m carats a year; Alrosa exited in 2024 and was replaced by Oman's Taadeen. Beneficiation, however, is thin: in 2020 only about 2% of rough was cut domestically, and the Saurimo Diamond Development Hub, which targets 19 cutting factories by 2027, together with the Robust Diam polishing factory, remains nascent. Other minerals are largely undeveloped or at exploration and pre-production stage — iron ore at Kassinga (more than 1bn tonnes, dormant), manganese, gold that is mostly artisanal, phosphates in Cabinda and Cacata, and rare earths at Pensana's Longonjo. Diamonds and other minerals account for roughly 90% of mining revenue but a small share of GDP.

Energy is the second pillar and it carries a structural contradiction. Angola holds 2.6bn barrels of proved crude reserves (Oil & Gas Journal, start-2025) and produced about 1.13m b/d in 2024 (ANPG), making it sub-Saharan Africa's second producer after Nigeria, though well below the 2008 peak of roughly 2m b/d; the country left OPEC with effect from January 2024. Refining is the critical weakness: a single Luanda refinery of about 65,000 b/d meets only around 20% of demand, and Angola imports roughly 80% of its refined product. Cabinda refinery Phase 1 (30,000 b/d) was inaugurated in September 2025, the first new refinery since independence; the Lobito refinery (200,000 b/d) is about 12% complete with a US$4.8bn funding shortfall; the Soyo refinery (100,000 b/d) is stalled. Angola LNG at Soyo runs a single train of 5.2 mtpa (approximately 250 Bcf/yr) and has shipped more than 400 cargoes to over 30 countries, but those exports go to Europe (75% in 2023) and Asia rather than to Africa. Installed power capacity is about 6.13 GW, with hydro and solar making up more than 67% of capacity; Laúca (2,070 MW), Capanda and Cambambe are operational, and Caculo Cabaça (2,172 MW) is under construction for commissioning around 2026, when it will become Angola's largest single power source.

Agriculture and manufacturing are thin but not absent. Coffee was a historic powerhouse — roughly 240,000 tonnes in 1973, a world top-five and third-largest producer — before collapsing during the civil war; commercial output was only about 7,584–10,500 tonnes in 2024, with exports of some 2,165–3,288 tonnes earning around US$12m, primarily to Portugal, from about 55,000 hectares against roughly 600,000 hectares at peak. Fisheries run at some 400,000–530,000 tonnes a year with fishmeal and fish-oil processing at Namibe, yet roughly half of all food is imported. Manufacturing value added was approximately US$7.78bn in 2022 (World Bank, current US$), about 8.26% of GDP in 2024, with MVA per capita of roughly US$278 (UNIDO, 2018, constant 2015 US$) against a world median near US$548, and a UNIDO CIP rank of 107 out of 152 countries. Named plants include Carrinho (17 integrated food factories in Benguela, with capacity to process more than 2m tonnes of raw materials into flour, oil and pasta), Nova Cimangola (2.4–2.5 mt/yr of cement in Luanda, exporting to Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Brazil), FCKS in Kwanza Sul, Secil and Cimenfort. National cement capacity is about 8.3 mt/yr against roughly 6 mt of domestic demand. On complexity, Angola ranks 126th on the OEC's ECI (2022 data), down from 103rd two decades earlier, while Harvard's Atlas ranks it 106th — both reported rather than averaged. Products with RCA above 1 are dominated by raw and primary goods: densified wood (40.1), granite (26.5), diamonds (17.9), other sea vessels (16.1, a re-export and oilfield artefact) and crude petroleum (11.9). Harvard's Growth Lab judges Angola less complex than expected for its income level, with few opportunities to diversify using existing knowhow.

The endowment in depth

Minerals and metals sit on a diamond foundation. Angola produced a record 13.96m carats in 2024 (Endiama), generating US$1.49bn in revenue and ranking world number three by volume behind Russia and Botswana. Catoca has historically supplied roughly 80% of output, and the new Luele mine — a resource of about 628m carats ramping toward 3.5–4m carats a year — is now the second pillar; Russia's Alrosa exited in 2024 and was replaced by Oman's Taadeen. Beneficiation, however, is negligible: in 2020 only about 2% of rough was cut domestically, and the Saurimo Diamond Development Hub (targeting 19 cutting factories by 2027) and the Robust Diam polishing plant remain nascent. Beyond diamonds, the mineral base is largely dormant or pre-development — iron ore at Kassinga (more than 1bn tonnes, undeveloped), manganese, mostly artisanal gold, phosphates in Cabinda and at Cacata, and rare earths at Pensana's Longonjo project. Diamonds and other minerals account for roughly 90% of mining revenue but only a small share of GDP.

Energy is the defining endowment and simultaneously the sharpest paradox. Crude reserves stand at 2.6bn barrels (Oil & Gas Journal, start-2025) with output of about 1.13m b/d in 2024 (ANPG), making Angola sub-Saharan Africa's number-two producer after Nigeria — though well below the 2008 peak of roughly 2m b/d, and outside OPEC since January 2024. Refining is the critical weakness: a single Luanda refinery of about 65,000 b/d meets only some 20% of demand, so the country imports around 80% of its refined product. The Cabinda refinery Phase 1 (30,000 b/d) was inaugurated in September 2025 — the first new refinery since independence — while the Lobito refinery (200,000 b/d) is only about 12% complete against a US$4.8bn funding shortfall, and the Soyo refinery (100,000 b/d) is stalled. On gas, Angola LNG at Soyo runs a single train of 5.2 mtpa (about 250 Bcf/yr) and has shipped 400-plus cargoes to more than 30 countries, but exports flow to Europe (75% in 2023) and Asia, not Africa. Power capacity is about 6.13 GW with hydro and solar above 67%; Laúca (2,070 MW), Capanda and Cambambe are operational, and Caculo Cabaça (2,172 MW), commissioning around 2026, will become the country's largest single power source.

Agriculture, fisheries and the industrial base show thin but real bright spots. Coffee was a historic powerhouse — about 240,000 tonnes in 1973, a world top-five and third-largest producer — but collapsed during the civil war to commercial output of just 7,584–10,500 tonnes in 2024, with exports of roughly 2,165–3,288 tonnes earning about US$12m, mostly to Portugal; the crop is Robusta-dominant and covers only some 55,000 ha against about 600,000 ha at peak. Fisheries land around 400,000–530,000 tonnes a year, with fishmeal and fish-oil processing at Namibe and deep-water shrimp and white fish exported to the EU, yet roughly half of all food is imported. Manufacturing value added was about US$7.78bn in 2022, some 8.26% of GDP in 2024, with MVA per capita of about US$278 — well under the world median near US$548 — and a UNIDO CIP rank of 107 of 152 (score 0.012 against a world average of 0.067). The named industrial anchors are the Carrinho food park in Benguela (17 integrated factories able to process more than 2m tonnes of raw materials into flour, oil and pasta) and cement — Nova Cimangola (2.4–2.5 mt/yr in Luanda, exporting to Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Brazil), alongside FCKS, Secil and Cimenfort, giving national capacity of about 8.3 mt/yr against roughly 6 mt of demand.

Human capital and logistics frame what can actually be delivered. The labour force is large but low-skilled, with about 80% of jobs informal (World Bank, 2025) and unemployment easing from 30.8% (Q3 2024) to 26.9% (Q3 2025); specialised clusters exist only in oil and gas (the Angola LNG workforce) and diamonds (Endiama employs about 20,000), while the TVET and tertiary technical base is thin. The infrastructure centrepiece is the Lobito Corridor — the 1,344km Benguela Railway from the port of Lobito to the DRC border at Luau — operated by the Lobito Atlantic Railway consortium (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis) under a 30-year concession granted in 2022. The port system runs through Lobito (best-equipped, with a mineral terminal), Luanda, Namibe (fishing) and Soyo, but logistics performance is bottom-tier on the World Bank LPI (customs around 1.7, timeliness around 2.1) and only about 18% of roads are paved; the Atlantic coastal position remains a strong structural advantage.

Economic complexity & comparative advantage

Angola is one of the least complex economies measured. Its ECI rank is 126 (OEC, 2022 data, HS96), a decline from 103rd two decades earlier, while Harvard's Atlas of Economic Complexity ranks it 106th — the roughly 20-place gap reflecting different trade-data cleaning, with both figures reported rather than averaged. Harvard characterises the economy as "less complex than expected for its income level," with "few opportunities to diversify its production using its existing knowhow."

The revealed-comparative-advantage profile confirms a raw and primary orientation. Products with RCA above 1 are dominated by unprocessed goods — Densified Wood (40.1), Granite (26.5), Diamonds (17.9), Other Sea Vessels (16.1, a re-export and oilfield artefact) and Crude Petroleum (11.9), on OEC 2022 data. Atlas adjacencies are thin, so the productive-knowledge base does not naturally extend into complex manufactures. The implication drawn in the audit is direct: Angola's continental supply advantages lie in raw materials, energy and logistics or transit, not in finished or most semi-finished products.

The trump card · the single strongest continental position

Angola's one defensible continental trump card is not a product it manufactures but a service geography it controls: the 1,344km Benguela Railway from the deep-water port of Lobito to the DRC border, extending toward the Central African Copperbelt, the world's most concentrated source of copper and cobalt. This is the rare Angolan asset that scores YES on every analytical test. Its input base is captive, high-value cargo — the DRC accounted for an estimated 76% of world cobalt mine production in 2024 (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025) and holds about 55% of global reserves, while Zambia is Africa's number-two copper producer. Its position is operational rather than aspirational: the Lobito Atlantic Railway consortium (Trafigura, Mota-Engil, Vecturis) has held a 30-year concession since 2022 and scaled shipments from monthly to twice-weekly, with Trafigura and Kamoa-Kakula contracting 120,000–240,000 tonnes a year of copper from 2025. On deliverability it is the shortest and cheapest Atlantic route against eastern corridors via Dar es Salaam, and on competitiveness the US$753m DFC-plus-DBSA financing package reached financial close in December 2025 — projected by the DFC to lift Lobito's capacity "10-fold to 4.6 million metric tons" and cut transport costs "by up to 30 percent" — on top of EU Global Gateway, AfDB and AFC commitments exceeding US$6bn by end-2024. It directly enables the AfCFTA's minerals value-chain ambitions and makes Angola southern-central Africa's Atlantic gateway.

The limits are real and should not be understated. The route is exposed to corruption and customs inefficiency (Transparency International CPI 2024, score 32/100), to DRC instability and entrenched trucking-cartel resistance, and to landmine contamination along the alignment. It faces a competing China-backed TAZARA upgrade: CCECC signed a US$1.4bn deal in September 2025 (US$1bn for track and signalling plus US$400m of rolling stock including 34 locomotives) under a 30-year concession, explicitly framed by Reuters as "countering" Lobito and aiming to raise TAZARA freight "from 100,000 tonnes a year to 2.4 million tonnes." The deeper risk is strategic — a failure to move from pure transit to value-addition, and continued reliance on feeder roads rather than direct rail, would leave Angola capturing thin margins on other countries' minerals rather than building processing along the corridor itself.

Current reality

Angola is a large, oil-dependent Atlantic-coast economy. GDP was US$80.4 billion in 2024 (World Bank), down from US$84.88bn in 2023, with a population of about 37.9 million and GDP per capita of roughly US$2,666. Oil dominates: crude petroleum accounted for approximately 85% of exports (US$31.4bn) in 2024, with 393.4m barrels exported at around US$79.70 a barrel. Destinations are concentrated on China (about 51%), India, the Netherlands, France and the UAE, and intra-African trade is negligible. The headline supply position is that of an anchor supplier of crude oil and rough diamonds, an emerging LNG exporter, and a very weak manufacturer; the one durable continental advantage is as a minerals-and-energy logistics gateway.

The constraints are structural rather than incidental. Angola imports roughly 80% of its refined fuel despite being sub-Saharan Africa's second crude producer, and the refinery build-out is delayed and underfunded. Logistics performance sits in the bottom tier of the World Bank LPI (customs around 1.7, timeliness around 2.1 in the prior survey round) and only about 18% of roads are paved. Electricity access reached only about 51% in 2023, with hydro seasonality and limited grid and transmission. The manufacturing base is small — MVA around 8% of GDP, CIP 107 of 152, ECI 126 — leaving minimal complex-goods capacity. Governance is a live risk (Transparency International CPI 2024, 32 out of 100), PRODESI has been slow to deliver, and macroeconomic pressure persists: CPI inflation reached 28.2% in 2024 (World Bank WDI) before easing to a roughly three-year low of about 10.9% by May 2026 (BNA/Trading Economics), while the fuel-subsidy phase-out triggered deadly protests in July 2025.

09 · The draft bundle

Draft 1 · 17 candidate lines · will change

Angola’s provisional product bundle

This bundle is Draft 1 and is offered for correction. Each card shows a candidate product category, the HS codes inside it, the strength tier assessed from Angola’s capability audit, and the gross continental import demand for that category in 2023. That figure is market context — what the whole continent buys, from all sources. It is never a statement of what Angola will supply, and these figures are never added together.

Portfolio at a glance · strength-tier mix

How Angola’s 17 candidate lines distribute across the strength tiers — the shape of the bundle before any allocation is settled.

Continental Anchor 2Strong Contender 2Emerging 5Aspirational 5Grey 3

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

Established continental-scale capability.

STRONG CONTENDER

Substantial installed capability; competitive on the continent.

EMERGING

Capability present and growing; not yet at continental scale.

ASPIRATIONAL

A build, not present production. Demand certainty against which capability is created.

GREY

Endowment noted; capability not yet verified.

Refined petroleum

Cabinda Ph1 30k b/d 2025, Lobito 200k pending · Maturity: Nascent · Competitiveness: Very High

EMERGING

USD 110.54 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271000Bituminous Petroleum Distillates (Excl. Crude)

271011Light oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals which >= 90% by volume incl....

271012Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271019Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.

271020Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, containing biodiesel, not crude, not waste oils; preparations n.e.c, c

271091Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude; and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or prepara

271099Waste Oils; of petroleum or obtained from bituminous minerals, not crude and preparations n.e.c., weight 70% or preparat

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 19 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Procuring agency (indicative): NNPC (Nigeria), UNOC (Uganda), PBPA (Tanzania) · Fuel Security · control: monopoly · controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Angola imported USD 3.33 bn of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Nigeria USD 19.94 bnSouth Africa USD 15.19 bnDR Congo USD 7.8 bnMorocco USD 7.61 bnEgypt USD 6.53 bnLibya USD 4.61 bnGhana USD 4.45 bnKenya USD 4.36 bn

Source: S&P Global · 2025

Crude petroleum

#2 SSA producer, 2.6bn bbl, 1.1m b/d · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: High

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 11.08 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

270900Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, crude

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 13 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 4.81 bnCote dIvoire USD 2.89 bnEgypt USD 1.74 bnSenegal USD 952.2 mTunisia USD 506 mGhana USD 124.9 mZambia USD 55.6 mZimbabwe USD 2.5 m

Source: EIA/OPEC/OEC · 2024-2025

LNG/petroleum gas

5.2 mtpa Soyo plant · Maturity: Processed · Competitiveness: Low (ex-Africa)

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 10.27 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271111Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, natural gas

271112Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, propane

271113Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, butanes

271114Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene

271119Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied, n.e.c. in heading no. 2711

271121Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, natural gas

271129Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; in gaseous state, other than natural gas

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Procuring agency (indicative): State utilities · Energy Security · control: controlled. Indicative only — this is the government function that typically buys this category, not a tender-line identification.

Angola imported USD 0.8 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 3.38 bnMorocco USD 2.36 bnTunisia USD 1.66 bnSouth Africa USD 779.1 mCote dIvoire USD 413.8 mKenya USD 240.9 mTanzania USD 205.1 mGhana USD 181.6 m

Source: EIA/Angola LNG · 2024-2025

Processed foods

Carrinho 17-factory park · Maturity: Finished/domestic · Competitiveness: High

EMERGING

USD 4.37 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

110100Wheat or meslin flour

150710Vegetable oils; soya-bean oil and its fractions, crude, whether or not degummed, not chemically modified

150790Vegetable oils; soya-bean oil and its fractions, other than crude, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified

190211Food preparations; pasta, containing eggs, uncooked, not stuffed or otherwise prepared

190219Food preparations; pasta, uncooked (excluding that containing eggs), not stuffed or otherwise prepared

190220Food preparations; pasta, stuffed (with meat or other substances), whether or not cooked or otherwise prepared

190230Food preparations; pasta (excluding stuffed), cooked or otherwise prepared

190240Food preparations; couscous

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Angola imported USD 116.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Morocco USD 628.4 mAlgeria USD 542.7 mSudan USD 382 mEgypt USD 353.6 mSomalia USD 330.8 mZimbabwe USD 263.2 mMauritania USD 181.5 mSouth Africa USD 149.6 m

Source: Buhler/IFC/AfDB · 2024

Fish & fishmeal

~400000t/yr, Namibe processing · Maturity: Semi-processed · Competitiveness: Medium

EMERGING

USD 4.15 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

030310Frozen Pacific salmon "Oncorhynchus nerka, Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, Oncorhynchus keta, Oncorhynchus . . .

030311Fish; frozen, Pacific salmon, sockeye salmon (red salmon) (Oncorhynchus nerka), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, an

030312Fish; frozen, Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha/keta/tschawytscha/ kisutch/masou/rhodurus) other than sockeye salmo

030313Fish; frozen, Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) and Danube salmon (Hucho hucho), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and e

030314Fish; frozen, trout (Salmo trutta, Oncorhynchus mykiss, Oncorhynchus clarki, Oncorhynchus aguabonita, Oncorhynchus gilae

030319Fish; frozen, salmonidae, n.e.c. in item no. 0303.1, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subh

030321Frozen trout (Salmo trutta, Oncorhynchus mykiss, Oncorhynchus clarki, Oncorhynchus aguabonita,...

030322Frozen Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) and Danube salmon (Hucho hucho)

030323Fish; frozen, tilapias (Oreochromis spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 03

030324Fish; frozen, catfish (Pangasius spp., Silurus spp., Clarias spp., Ictalurus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304

030325Fish; frozen, carp (as specified by the WCO), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings

030326Fish; frozen, eels (Anguilla spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 t

030329Fish; frozen, Nile perch (Lates niloticus) and snakeheads (Channa spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030331Fish; frozen, halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides, Hippoglossus hippoglossus, Hippoglossus stenolepis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030332Fish; frozen, plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030333Fish; frozen, sole (Solea spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030334Fish; frozen, turbots (Psetta maxima, Scophthalmidae), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030339Fish; frozen, flat fish, n.e.c. in item no. 0303.3, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030341Fish; frozen, albacore or longfinned tunas (Thunnus alalunga), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030342Fish; frozen, yellowfin tunas (Thunnus albacares), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030343Fish; frozen, skipjack tuna (stripe-bellied bonito) (Katsuwonus pelamis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030344Fish; frozen, bigeye tunas (Thunnus obesus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030345Fish; frozen, Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tunas (Thunnus thynnus, Thunnus orientalis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030346Fish; frozen, southern bluefin tunas (Thunnus maccoyii), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030349Fish; frozen, tuna, n.e.c. in item no. 0303.4, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030350Frozen herrings "Clupea harengus, Clupea pallasii"

030351Fish; frozen, herrings (Clupea harengus, Clupea pallasii), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030352Cod (Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac, Gadus macrocephalus)

030353Fish; frozen, sardines (Sardina pilchardus, Sardinops spp.), sardinella (Sardinella spp.), brisling or sprats (Sprattus sprattus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030354Fish; frozen, mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scomber australasicus, Scomber japonicus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030355Fish; frozen, jack and horse mackerel (Trachurus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030356Fish; frozen, cobia (Rachycentron canadum), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030357Fish; frozen, swordfish (Xiphias gladius), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030359Fish; frozen, n.e.c. in item no. 0303.5, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030360Frozen cod "Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac and Gadus macrocephalus"

030361Frozen swordfish (Xiphias gladius)

030363Fish; frozen, cod (Gadus morhua, Gadus ogac, Gadus macrocephalus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030364Fish; frozen, haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030365Fish; frozen, coalfish (Pollachius virens), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030366Fish; frozen, hake (Merluccius spp., Urophycis spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030367Fish; frozen, Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030368Fish; frozen, blue whitings (Micromesistius poutassou, Micromesistius australis), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030369Fish; frozen, of Bregmacerotidae, Euclichthyidae, Gadidae, Macrouridae, Melanonidae, Merlucciidae, Moridae, Muraenolepididae, other than cod, haddock, coalfish, hake, Alaska pollack, blue whitings, not fillets, meat of 0304, and edible offal of 0303.9

030371Frozen sardines Sardina pilchardus, Sardinops spp.", sardinella "Sardinella spp." and brisling...

030372Frozen haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus)

030373Frozen coalfish (Pollachius virens)

030374Frozen mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scomber australasicus, Scomber japonicus)

030375Frozen dogfish and other sharks

030376Frozen eels (Anguilla spp.)

030377Frozen sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax, Dicentrarchus punctatus)

030378Frozen hake (Merluccius spp., Urophycis spp.)

030379Frozen freshwater and saltwater fish (excluding salmonidae, flat fish, tunas, skipjack or stripe-bellied...

030380Frozen fish livers and roes

030381Fish; frozen, dogfish and other sharks, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030382Fish; frozen, rays and skates (Rajidae), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030383Fish; frozen, toothfish (Dissostichus spp.), excluding fillets, livers, roes, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030384Fish; frozen, seabass (Dicentrarchus spp.), excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030389Fish; frozen, n.e.c. in heading 0303, excluding fillets, fish meat of 0304, and edible fish offal of subheadings 0303.91 to 0303.99

030390Frozen fish livers and roes

030391Fish; frozen, livers, roes and milt

030392Fish; frozen, shark fins

030399Fish; frozen, fish fins (other than shark fins), heads, tails, maws and other edible fish offal

230110Flours, meals and pellets; of meat or meat offal, greaves

230120Flours, meals and pellets; of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Angola imported USD 6.2 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Cote dIvoire USD 836.7 mNigeria USD 595.8 mEgypt USD 359.4 mCameroon USD 301.7 mGhana USD 296.4 mMauritius USD 225.4 mSouth Africa USD 178.6 mZambia USD 175.2 m

Source: FAO/trade.gov · 2022-2023

Gold

Mostly artisanal · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Medium

GREY

USD 2.99 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710811Metals; gold, non-monetary, powder

710812Metals; gold, non-monetary, unwrought (but not powder)

710813Metals; gold, semi-manufactured

710820Gold, monetary

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 36 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Uganda USD 1.9 bnSouth Africa USD 668.4 mEgypt USD 139.2 mMorocco USD 59.6 mLibya USD 58.9 mTunisia USD 43.4 mAlgeria USD 43.4 mMauritius USD 36.1 m

Source: Chambers · 2025

Cement & clinker

~8.3 mt/yr capacity, exports W.Africa/Brazil · Maturity: Finished · Competitiveness: High

STRONG CONTENDER

USD 2.9 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

252310Cement clinkers (whether or not coloured)

252321Cement; portland, white, whether or not artificially coloured

252329Cement; portland, other than white, whether or not artificially coloured

252330Cement; aluminous (ciment fondu), whether or not coloured or in the form of clinkers

252390Cement; hydraulic kinds n.e.c. in heading no. 2523

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium–high

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 30 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Ghana USD 318.1 mMali USD 302.7 mCote dIvoire USD 273 mBurkina Faso USD 205.1 mLibya USD 166.4 mCameroon USD 144.9 mUganda USD 140.3 mMadagascar USD 78.9 m

Source: Global Cement/Nova Cimangola · 2024

Iron ore

Kassinga >1bn t dormant · Maturity: Undeveloped · Competitiveness: Medium

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 2.85 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

260111Iron ores and concentrates; non-agglomerated

260112Iron ores and concentrates; agglomerated (excluding roasted iron pyrites)

260120Iron pyrites; roasted

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 1.63 bnAlgeria USD 822.5 mLibya USD 324.4 mKenya USD 50 mMozambique USD 20.9 mBotswana USD 0.2 mMorocco USD 0.2 mSouth Africa USD 0.1 m

Source: USGS/AngolaX · 2024

Electricity (hydro)

6.13 GW, Caculo Cabaca 2172MW 2026 · Maturity: Generated · Competitiveness: High

EMERGING

USD 2.24 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

271600Electrical energy

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 14 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 337.6 mMorocco USD 223.4 mTunisia USD 223.1 mMozambique USD 210 mBurkina Faso USD 196.1 mZimbabwe USD 180.1 mBotswana USD 158.7 mBenin USD 118.9 m

Source: EIA/IHA · 2024-2026

Rough diamonds

World #3, 14m carats 2024 · Maturity: Raw (~2% cut) · Competitiveness: Low

CONTINENTAL ANCHOR

USD 1.75 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710210Diamonds; whether or not worked, but not mounted or set, unsorted

710221Diamonds; industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set

710229Diamonds; industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set

710231Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted, but not mounted or set

710239Diamonds; non-industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set

Screening intensity · indicativeHigh

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Botswana USD 970.9 mSouth Africa USD 578.4 mNamibia USD 111.7 mMauritius USD 76 mMorocco USD 5.8 mTunisia USD 3 mLiberia USD 1.2 mEgypt USD 0.9 m

Source: Endiama/USGS · 2024

Coffee (Robusta)

Historic top-5, revival ~10500t 2024 · Maturity: Raw/green · Competitiveness: Medium

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 1.13 bngross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

090111Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated

090112Coffee; decaffeinated, not roasted

090121Coffee; roasted, not decaffeinated

090122Coffee; roasted, decaffeinated

090190Coffee; husks and skins, coffee substitutes containing coffee in any proportion

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 12 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 3.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Algeria USD 322.4 mEgypt USD 217.4 mSudan USD 151.5 mMorocco USD 148 mSouth Africa USD 99.8 mLibya USD 77.7 mTunisia USD 34.5 mNamibia USD 9.7 m

Source: INCA/USDA FAS · 2024

Polished diamonds

Saurimo hub, Robust Diam · Maturity: Nascent · Competitiveness: Low

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 406.8 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

710239Diamonds; non-industrial, (other than unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), but not mounted or set

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Angola imported USD 0 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Botswana USD 309.6 mSouth Africa USD 81.1 mMorocco USD 5.8 mMauritius USD 4.5 mNamibia USD 3.5 mTunisia USD 1.7 mRwanda USD 0.2 mGhana USD 0.1 m

Source: Endiama · 2024

Phosphate fertilizer

Cabinda/Cacata deposits · Maturity: Undeveloped · Competitiveness: Very High

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 237 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

310310Superphosphates (excluding those in tablets or similar forms, or in packages with a gross weight...

310311Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, superphosphates, containing by weight 35% or more of diphosphorus pentaoxi

310319Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, superphosphates, other than containing by weight 35% or more of diphosphor

310390Fertilizers, mineral or chemical; phosphatic, n.e.c. in heading no. 3103

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 2 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 1.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Benin USD 76.3 mBurundi USD 60.6 mCote dIvoire USD 29.7 mAlgeria USD 21.7 mGhana USD 16.4 mSouth Africa USD 7.3 mNigeria USD 5.7 mMali USD 3.1 m

Source: Chambers · 2025

Canned meat

Carrinho-Inalca 10000t/yr · Maturity: Nascent · Competitiveness: Medium

ASPIRATIONAL

USD 173.4 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

160210Meat preparations; homogenised preparations of meat, meat offal blood or insects

160220Meat preparations; of the prepared or preserved liver of any animal (excluding homogenised preparations)

160231Meat preparations; of turkeys, prepared or preserved meat or meat offal (excluding livers and homogenised preparations)

160232Meat preparations; of the poultry of heading no. 0105, (i.e. of fowls of the species Gallus domesticus)

160239Meat preparations; of poultry (excluding turkeys), prepared or preserved meat or meat offal (excluding livers and homoge

160241Meat preparations; of swine, hams and cuts thereof, prepared or preserved (excluding homogenised preparations)

160242Meat preparations; of swine, shoulders and cuts thereof, prepared or preserved (excluding homogenised preparations)

160249Meat preparations; of swine, meat or meat offal (including mixtures), prepared or preserved, n.e.c. in heading no. 1602

160250Meat preparations; of bovine animals, meat or meat offal, prepared or preserved (excluding livers and homogenised prepar

160290Meat preparations; of meat, meat offal or the blood of any animal, n.e.c. in heading no. 1602

Screening intensity · indicativeBuilding

Angola imported USD 23.9 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Angola your own imports USD 23.9 mMauritius USD 21.9 mMorocco USD 18 mGhana USD 10 mNamibia USD 8.5 mSouth Africa USD 7.1 mBotswana USD 6.5 mCabo Verde USD 6.2 m

Angola is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: VerAngola · 2024

Granite/dimension stone

RCA 26.5 · Maturity: Raw/cut blocks · Competitiveness: Low-Medium

EMERGING

USD 58.9 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

251611Granite; crude or roughly trimmed

251612Granite; merely cut, by sawing or otherwise, into blocks or slabs of a rectangular (including square) shape

251620Sandstone;. whether or not roughly trimmed, cut, by sawing etc, into blocks or slabs of a rectangular (including square)

251621Sandstone, crude or roughly trimmed (excluding already with the characteristics of setts, curbstones...

251622Sandstone, merely cut, by sawing or otherwise, into blocks or slabs of a square or rectangular...

251690Monumental or building stone; n.e.c. in heading no. 2516, whether or not roughly trimmed or merely cut, by sawing or oth

Screening intensity · indicativeMedium

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 3 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Algeria USD 34.3 mTunisia USD 6.5 mEgypt USD 6.2 mSouth Africa USD 4.5 mGambia USD 2.6 mNamibia USD 1.6 mKenya USD 0.5 mBotswana USD 0.3 m

Source: OEC · 2022

Rare earths (NdPr)

Longonjo project · Maturity: Pre-production · Competitiveness: High

GREY

USD 28.6 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

280511Alkali or alkali-earth metals; sodium

280512Alkali or alkali-earth metals; calcium

280519Alkali or alkali-earth metals; other than sodium and calcium

280521Calcium

280522Strontium and barium

280530Earth-metals, rare; scandium and yttrium, whether or not intermixed or interalloyed

280540Mercury

284610Cerium compounds

284690Compounds, inorganic or organic (excluding cerium), of rare-earth metals, of yttrium, scandium or of mixtures of these m

Angola imported USD 0.1 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

South Africa USD 9.1 mEgypt USD 8.6 mTogo USD 4.8 mNigeria USD 1.1 mGhana USD 1.1 mNiger USD 0.8 mMali USD 0.7 mKenya USD 0.5 m

Source: The Energy Year · 2024

Manganese

Small/exploration · Maturity: Raw · Competitiveness: Medium

GREY

USD 12 mgross continental import demand · 2023 · market context, not a supply claim

260200Manganese ores and concentrates, including ferruginous manganese ores and concentrates with a manganese content of 20% o

Shared demand at Draft 1. This line is currently claimed by 8 member states. The figure shown is gross continental demand for the category, not a quantity available to any one of them. Allocation between the claiming states is unresolved and is exactly what Draft 2 must settle.

Angola imported USD 0.4 m of this category in 2023.

Leading importing states · gross 2023

Egypt USD 8.8 mSouth Africa USD 2.4 mAngola your own imports USD 0.4 mCote dIvoire USD 0.2 mKenya USD 0.1 mMorocco USD 0.1 m

Angola is itself among the leading continental importers of this category. That is the balance argument in one line: this is demand the state already pays for off-continent.

Source: The Energy Year · 2024

Per-line values are gross 2023 continental import demand from UN Comtrade via the Africa Trade Intelligence Master Database v3. The screening intensity on each card is a qualitative indicator only — how strongly the government and off-continent screens are likely to apply, read from the strength tier. It is deliberately not a monetary figure: the addressable value is measured only after the bilateral trade re-pull at Draft 2. Lines marked as shared are claimed by more than one member state at Draft 1; allocation between them is unresolved. Lines marked GREY carry an endowment that is noted but not yet verified. No total is presented for this bundle: summing overlapping candidate lines would produce a meaningless figure, and the claim value for Angola is resolved only at Draft 2.

10 · Balance

What Angola buys, beside what it might make

The fairness test runs in both directions

A right to supply is only fair if it is sized near what the member itself buys. This is the honest counterweight: Angola is a buyer in this system before it is a supplier, and its own import bill is the anchor against which any future claim is sized.

USD 15.31 bn

Angola’s total merchandise imports, 2023. Every line below is measured against this, not against the continental figure.

Candidate lines in the Draft 1 bundle. The number of lines is not a measure of value.

Lines whose figure is still pending verification and is rendered GREY rather than estimated.

Candidate product line	Strength tier	Angola imports, 2023	Continental demand, 2023
Refined petroleum	EMERGING	USD 3.33 bn	USD 110.54 bn
Processed foods	EMERGING	USD 116.2 m	USD 4.37 bn
Canned meat	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 23.9 m	USD 173.4 m
Fish & fishmeal	EMERGING	USD 6.2 m	USD 4.15 bn
Cement & clinker	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 4 m	USD 2.9 bn
Coffee (Robusta)	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 3.1 m	USD 1.13 bn
Phosphate fertilizer	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 1.4 m	USD 237 m
LNG/petroleum gas	STRONG CONTENDER	USD 0.8 m	USD 10.27 bn
Manganese	GREY	USD 0.4 m	USD 12 m
Granite/dimension stone	EMERGING	USD 0.1 m	USD 58.9 m
Rare earths (NdPr)	GREY	USD 0.1 m	USD 28.6 m
Crude petroleum	CONTINENTAL ANCHOR	USD 0 m	USD 11.08 bn
Gold	GREY	USD 0 m	USD 2.99 bn
Iron ore	ASPIRATIONAL	USD 0 m	USD 2.85 bn

Left-hand column: what Angola itself imported in this category in 2023. Right-hand column: gross continental import demand for the same category — market context only. The two columns are deliberately not netted: doing so before allocation is resolved would imply a claim that Draft 1 does not make.

11 · Proportion

The number this document refuses to print

What Angola’s claim is worth is not yet known

At this point a document of this kind normally states a headline: what the allocation is worth to the country. Draft 1 does not, and the reason is the most important methodological statement in these pages.

Why there is no headline figure here

The bundle contains 17 candidate lines. Each carries a gross continental demand figure. Adding them would produce a number, and that number would be worthless — in several cases many times Angola’s entire economy. It would be worthless for three reasons, each of them sufficient on its own.

Overlap

Lines are claimed by several member states at Draft 1. The same continental demand would be counted once for each claimant.

Gross, not addressable

These are total continental imports from all sources — before the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens are applied.

Allocation unresolved

No share of any line has been assigned to Angola. Until allocation is settled there is no quantity to value.

Capability, not entitlement

Aspirational and GREY lines describe a build or an unverified endowment, not present production that could be sold next year.

So the figure is stated the only honest way it can be at this stage: GREY — verification pending. It is produced at Draft 2, after the screens and after allocation, and it will be smaller than any sum of the cards above. A minister who is shown a large headline today is being shown an artefact of double-counting, not a prospect.

GREY — verification pending

Angola’s claim value. Resolved at Draft 2, after screens and allocation.

25 years

The allocation horizon that can make a plant financeable — subject to Match-or-Release on every single order.

10% → 100%

Local-content ramp over ten years. Local content means made anywhere on the African continent.

12 · Demand map

Who buys these categories today

The continental buyers behind Angola’s draft bundle

Where the demand for these product categories actually sits, ranked by 2023 gross imports. This is the customer book the instrument would open — the states that currently buy these goods from outside the continent.

Leading importing states across the bundle

Gross USD · 2023

01South AfricaUSD 22.9 bn

02NigeriaUSD 20.54 bn

03EgyptUSD 14.37 bn

04MoroccoUSD 11.06 bn

05DR CongoUSD 7.8 bn

06GhanaUSD 5.4 bn

07LibyaUSD 5.23 bn

08KenyaUSD 4.65 bn

09Cote dIvoireUSD 4.44 bn

10TunisiaUSD 2.48 bn

11UgandaUSD 2.04 bn

12AlgeriaUSD 1.79 bn

13BotswanaUSD 1.45 bn

14SenegalUSD 952.2 m

15SudanUSD 533.5 m

Read this as a market map, not a claim. These values are the sum of gross continental imports across the candidate categories, shown to indicate where demand is concentrated. Because candidate lines overlap between member states and precede the screens, this ranking indicates the shape of the market and not revenue available to Angola. Bar widths are relative to the leading state.

13 · Due diligence

What would have to be true

The conditions Angola would have to meet

A supply right is only as good as the capability behind it. These are the conditions the audit says must hold for Angola to deliver — printed here, not buried, because a room of finance ministers will ask.

Refineries operational

The Lobito (200,000 b/d) and full Cabinda (60,000 b/d) refineries would need to come online, making Angola a regional fuel supplier, since refined products are Africa's largest single import category.

Corridor moves from transit to value-add

Copper and cobalt processing, battery precursors and agro-processing clusters would have to be established along the Lobito Corridor rather than the line remaining pure pass-through.

Power surplus realised and exported

Caculo Cabaça (2026) plus SAPP interconnection would need to turn the hydro-heavy grid into a tradable continental product.

Diamond beneficiation scales

The Saurimo cutting and polishing factories would have to move the domestically cut share from about 2% toward the 20% target.

Cement and food processing formalise AfCFTA channels

Nova Cimangola and Carrinho would need to convert latent capacity into structured regional supply through formal AfCFTA export channels.

Logistics and governance reform

Customs would need to be digitised, the LPI score improved and corruption addressed for delivery to be reliable.

The binding constraints

Refining deficit Angola imports about 80% of its refined fuel despite being sub-Saharan Africa's number-two crude producer; the refinery build-out is delayed and underfunded, with a US$4.8bn shortfall at Lobito and the Soyo project stalled.

Logistics weakness Performance sits in the bottom tier of the World Bank LPI, with customs around 1.7 and timeliness around 2.1, and only about 18% of roads are paved.

Power reliability Electricity access was only about 51% in 2023, and the hydro-heavy grid faces seasonality alongside limited grid and transmission capacity.

Manufacturing base tiny Manufacturing value added is only about 8% of GDP, with a UNIDO CIP rank of 107 of 152 and an ECI rank of 126 — minimal complex-goods capacity.

Governance Corruption remains a constraint (Transparency International CPI 2024, score 32/100), the business environment is difficult, and PRODESI has been slow to deliver.

Currency and macro instability The kwanza has devalued and CPI inflation ran at 28.2% in 2024 (World Bank WDI), since eased to a roughly three-year low near 10.9% by May 2026, while a fuel-subsidy phase-out triggered deadly protests in July 2025.

13 · Devil’s advocate

Surfaced, not buried

Where this could still be wrong

This bundle is Draft 1, and several of its lines are contested. Lines flagged as shared are claimed by more than one member state. Draft 1 deliberately shows the conflict rather than silently resolving it in Angola’s favour.

Gross continental demand is not addressable demand. Every figure on the bundle pages precedes the government, off-continent, industrial and balance screens. The addressable figure will be materially smaller.

A strength tier is a judgement, not a measurement. Tiers are assessed from the capability audit. Reasonable people can disagree, and the Minister’s correction of a tier is precisely the input Draft 2 needs.

The refining deficit is the sharpest contradiction Angola imports roughly 80% of its refined fuel while being sub-Saharan Africa's second crude producer. The build-out that would close the gap is delayed and underfunded: Lobito carries a US$4.8bn shortfall at about 12% completion, and Soyo is stalled. Refined products only become Angola's single largest substitution prize in the African market if the refineries actually come online.

Logistics performance undercuts the logistics trump card Angola scored among the lowest tier on the World Bank LPI, with customs around 1.7 and timeliness around 2.1 in the prior survey round, and only about 18% of roads are paved. The audit's own condition is that customs be digitised, the LPI improve, and corruption be addressed before corridor capacity converts into reliable delivery.

Power is an endowment before it is a product Installed capacity is about 6.13 GW and hydro-heavy, but electricity access was only around 51% in 2023, with hydro seasonality and limited grid and transmission. Caculo Cabaça (2,172 MW) commissions around 2026; the audit requires that surplus plus SAPP interconnection before hydro becomes a tradable continental product, with exports above 500 MW as the benchmark that would lift electricity to strong.

The manufacturing base is genuinely small Manufacturing value added is around 8% of GDP, the UNIDO CIP rank is 107 of 152 with a score of 0.012 against a world average of 0.067, and ECI is 126. Harvard's Atlas finds Angola less complex than expected for its income level with few adjacencies. Complex-goods capacity is minimal and the audit does not project it appearing quickly.

Governance and the business environment Transparency International's CPI 2024 scores Angola 32 out of 100. PRODESI, launched in 2018, created around 71,677 jobs from 2018 to 2022 across more than 661 funded projects, but implementation has been slow and the EU has flagged WTO-compatibility concerns. Corruption and customs inefficiency are named as direct threats to the corridor itself.

Macroeconomic and social volatility The kwanza has devalued, CPI inflation reached 28.2% in 2024 before easing to about 10.9% by May 2026, and the fuel-subsidy phase-out triggered deadly protests in July 2025. Roughly half of all food is imported and coffee output stands at a small fraction of its historic peak.

The corridor faces a funded competitor and must move beyond transit The China-backed TAZARA upgrade saw CCECC sign a US$1.4bn deal in September 2025 (US$1bn for track and signalling, US$400m for rolling stock including 34 locomotives) under a 30-year concession, framed by Reuters as countering Lobito and aiming to raise TAZARA freight from 100,000 tonnes a year to 2.4 million tonnes. Alongside this sit DRC instability, entrenched trucking-cartel resistance, landmine contamination along the route, continued reliance on feeder roads, and the risk of failing to move from pure transit to value-addition.

14 · Synthesis

The honest read

A fixed prize, a draft bundle, and a decision that belongs to the Minister

The prize is USD 620 bn — the goods Africa buys each year from outside the continent, out of USD 709 bn of total imports, against roughly USD 89 bn traded within Africa today. The instrument begins where a signature can move demand: USD 136.75 bn of measured government procurement, inside an estimated USD 207 bn that government influences. That spine is fixed.

Angola's Draft 1 bundle rests on three things the audit treats as real today: a logistics anchor in the Lobito Corridor, operational and externally financed; anchor-scale raw commodity output in crude oil at about 1.13m b/d and rough diamonds at 13.96m carats in 2024; and one genuinely finished continental export in cement, where national capacity of about 8.3 mt/yr sits against roughly 6 mt of domestic demand and Nova Cimangola ships 2.4–2.5 mt/yr to Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, Gabon, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Brazil. What must be proven is the conversion. The audit sets the benchmarks explicitly: Lobito throughput sustained above roughly 2–3m tonnes a year of minerals to harden the logistics anchor; Cabinda and Lobito refineries running near nameplate to lift refined products from emerging to strong; SAPP power exports above 500 MW to lift electricity to strong; and a cut-diamond share above 10% to move polished diamonds out of the aspirational tier. Alongside these sit the softer conditions — processing and agro-processing clusters established along the corridor rather than pure pass-through, Nova Cimangola and Carrinho converting latent capacity into structured AfCFTA export channels, and customs digitisation with measurable LPI improvement. Everything beyond the corridor, the crude, the rough stones and the cement remains a claim about the future rather than about present capability.

What is not fixed is the bundle. Angola is shown 17 candidate product lines, drawn from its own capability audit, with gross continental demand given as market context and no claim value stated. Lines contested by other member states are marked as contested. Lines whose endowment is unverified are marked GREY rather than estimated.

The strength of this document is what it declines to do. It does not add its own cards together. It does not convert an endowment into a promise. It does not ask Angola to surrender procurement autonomy, because Match-or-Release means the buyer can walk away from the designated supplier on any order, on the same day, without penalty. What it asks for is one hour of the Minister’s correction — and that correction is the next step of the method, not an objection to it.

15 · Your response

The correction is the method

Seven marks on the page, and the reply that produces Draft 2

Minister — this document is unfinished on purpose.

Draft 1 exists to be marked up. Two of these take a single tap. The whole response takes a minute, and it tells the Chair exactly where Angola stands and what would move you. A single correction is worth more than agreement.

Where do you stand on this direction for Angola?

How strongly do you back the Right of Supply framework?

7/ 10

Not at allCompletely

How well does this draft bundle reflect Angola’s real strengths?

Tap to rate

In one word — are you happy with what you see?

Which single line matters most to your government?

What are we missing for Angola?

Your one instruction for Draft 2.

Collated live by the Office of the Chair of the AU STC-FMAEPI. Draft 2 will show, for each change, which member state asked for it.